Adam v The Queen
(2001) 207 CLR 96 · [2001] HCA 57
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Adam v The Queen [2001] HCA 57 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ), given on 11 October 2001, on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The question was whether the trial judge at the appellant's murder trial erred in admitting a prosecution witness's statements to police as evidence of the truth of what was stated in them [4]. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed [40]. Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ, in joint reasons, held that leave to cross-examine the witness was given without error and that his statements were admissible as evidence of their truth [39]. Gaudron J dissented and would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial [81].
Facts
The appellant, Gilbert Adam, and his brother Richard were charged with the murder of a police constable, David Carty, at Fairfield, New South Wales, on 18 April 1997 [1]. Constable Carty was attacked in the car park of an hotel where he and other police officers had been drinking after coming off duty [2]. An altercation that initially involved one other person escalated, more young men became involved, and he suffered a fatal knife wound to the chest [3]. At about the time of the altercation, a young man named Thaier Sako suffered a knife wound to the neck [3].
Sako had been present for some or all of the events, and according to some of the evidence at trial he was the man who first had an altercation with Constable Carty [7]. He was charged with the murder on 22 April 1997 and gave police a recorded interview on 2 July 1997 while in custody [5]. He gave a second recorded interview on 1 September 1997 while on bail, and the charge against him was withdrawn on 29 September 1997 [6]. The version of events in those interviews supported the prosecution's case against the appellant [8].
On the 36th day of the trial (24 November 1998) he was given a conditional indemnity against prosecution for common assault or any associated offence, except murder [9]. Because the indemnity excluded murder, the trial judge indicated that he would give Sako a certificate under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (the Act), the effect of which would be that his evidence could not be used against him in a New South Wales court except in a criminal proceeding about its falsity [10]. On a voir dire, the general tenor of his evidence was that he had seen nothing of any great moment and that what he told police was what others had told him after the events [12]. Before the jury, the general tenor was again that he had made statements to police but had merely been repeating what others had told him [14].
Procedural history
At a trial in the Supreme Court of New South Wales before Wood CJ at CL and a jury, the appellant was found guilty of murder, and his brother was acquitted of murder but found guilty of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm on Constable Carty [1]. The trial judge decided to review Sako's position on a voir dire in the absence of the jury, which the judge called a Basha type of inquiry [10]. On 3 December 1998, the 41st day of the trial, the judge published reasons for concluding that leave should be granted under s 38(1) and (3), and that the use of the statements should not be confined under s 136 to credibility but should also go to proof of the facts asserted [13]. He was satisfied that Sako's evidence would be unfavourable to the prosecution and that Sako was not making a genuine attempt to give evidence of the events in the car park, but was attempting to assist the defence and conceal what he must have seen [13].
When Sako was called before the jury, the judge granted leave under both s 38(1) and s 38(3) to cross-examine him [14]. The evidence of his statements was tendered to the jury as evidence of the truth of what was said in them, and only against the appellant [4]. The judge told the jury they must approach Sako's evidence with the greatest of care, and that if they concluded he was lying in court it did not automatically follow that what he said earlier was true [16]. The Court of Criminal Appeal (Spigelman CJ, James and Bell JJ) dismissed the appellant's appeal against his conviction, in R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 [4].
Issues
The joint reasons identified the question as whether the Court of Criminal Appeal should have held that the trial judge erred in admitting Sako's statements to police as evidence of the truth of what was stated in them [4]. They broke it into three questions: whether the judge erred in granting leave to cross-examine, whether the credibility rule then precluded evidence of the statements, and whether the statements were properly admitted as evidence of the truth of the representations they contained [25]. They first dealt with a largely separate argument based on Blewitt v The Queen, about the propriety of receiving a prior inconsistent statement [17]–[18].
Gaudron J put the question as whether leave should have been granted under s 38 [41]. Her Honour said the outcome turned on two narrow issues: whether leave was wrongly granted because it resulted in the reception of relevant but inadmissible evidence, and, if the statements were admissible, whether the judge erred in exercising the power to grant leave [46].
Held
Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ
The appellant relied on a passage in Blewitt v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 503 at 505, quoted in the joint reasons, that calling a witness known to be hostile for the sole purpose of getting before the jury a prior inconsistent statement inadmissible to prove facts against the accused is improper and might well give rise to a miscarriage of justice [18]. Their Honours readily accepted that the prosecutor's purpose in calling Sako was to get the content of his statements before the jury [18]. But under the Act, a witness's prior inconsistent statements will be admitted as evidence of the truth of what was said in them if the evidence is relevant for another purpose, and then no statement inadmissible to prove facts against the accused is tendered and nothing improper is done [19]. At common law, by contrast, a prior inconsistent statement is not evidence of the truth of its contents, and Blewitt was concerned with that position and will still apply in the absence of statutory provisions of this kind [19]. So the question became whether the statements should have been received as evidence of their truth: if so, Blewitt had no application, and if not, "it is clear that the trial has miscarried" [20].
Contrary to the appellant's contention, s 55(1) requires relevance to be determined on the assumption that the tribunal of fact accepts the evidence, so the trial judge was neither required nor permitted to assess whether the jury would or might accept it [22]. The statements related to whether Sako was to be believed on oath, but they also described who was standing where and what they were doing in the events leading up to the stabbing, which, if accepted, affected the assessment of the probability of some of the central facts in issue [23].
As evidence of prior representations they were inadmissible to prove the facts asserted unless a hearsay exception applied, and, the prosecution having called Sako, they could be put to him only with leave to cross-examine under s 38 [24], [26]. Their Honours held there was no doubt that pars (b) and (c) of s 38(1) were satisfied, given the judge's finding about whether Sako was making a genuine attempt to give evidence and the fact that he had made prior inconsistent statements [27]. It was not necessary to consider par (a), although there "appears much to be said" for the view that giving evidence which at best is unhelpful to the party calling it, without a genuine attempt to give evidence, is giving unfavourable evidence [27]. Their Honours said it may be doubted that it was necessary for the judge to form a view about where the truth probably lay, though his finding that the interview version more probably than not reflected Sako's observations clearly bore on s 38(1)(b) [27].
There was no basis for concluding that the discretion to grant leave miscarried, as the judge had examined carefully all the matters the parties said bore on it [29]. The appellant complained of unfairness because the defence could not challenge the detail of what Sako told police and was left to rely on the jury accepting that he simply reported what others had told him [29]. Their Honours noted counsel's acceptance that it was no part of the defence case to put an alternative version of the appellant's participation in the events [30]. The defence could have cross-examined Sako about a motive to give an account exculpating himself and his brother Thamir, and by suggesting he was too affected by drink or his wounds to give a proper account, so there was no unfairness and the judge was right that the defence could test the evidence [30].
The appellant's principal argument was that the credibility rule in s 102 excluded the statements and that the s 103 exception did not apply, which depended on distinguishing the use of the statements to discredit Sako from their use as evidence of the truth of what they asserted [31]. Their Honours rejected this because it focused on the use to be made of the evidence, whereas the Act directs attention in s 102 to how the evidence is relevant and in s 103 to whether it has substantial probative value [33]. They also rejected the submission that s 102 should not be read literally but should apply to evidence not admissible on any basis other than credibility [34]–[35]. The criterion of operation of s 102 is the relevance of the evidence, not its admissibility, and the appellant's reading amounted to a proposition "that evidence which is not admissible, is not admissible", which confused or conflated relevance and admissibility [35].
The appellant argued that this produced a bizarre result, since a prior inconsistent statement relevant to facts in issue as well as credibility would escape s 102 and, through s 60, be admitted as evidence of the truth of its contents [36]. Their Honours said the appellant had stated the Act's operation correctly, and that the difference from the common law was "one of the significant alterations in the rules of evidence that the Act was intended to effect" [37]. Far from being bizarre or unintended, they said, "it is the intended operation of the Act" [37]. That example was in effect Sako's situation, so once it was decided the prosecution could cross-examine him about his prior statements, they were admissible as evidence of the truth of their contents [38].
Because the evidence was not relevant only to credibility, s 102 was not engaged, and it was unnecessary to consider the s 103 exception or what the statutory phrase "substantial probative value" means [39]. Because the evidence was relevant to the attack on Sako's credibility and directly to the facts in issue, it fell within the hearsay exception in s 60 and was admissible as evidence of the truth of the statements' contents [39]. It was unnecessary to consider other hearsay exceptions such as s 66 [39]. The appellant's attacks on the trial judge's evidentiary rulings therefore failed, as the Court of Criminal Appeal had correctly held, and the appeal should be dismissed [40].
Gaudron J (dissenting)
Gaudron J agreed with the joint reasons that the statements satisfied the relevance test in s 55 and that the cross-examination was about the matters in pars (b) and (c) of s 38(1), and in her Honour's view it was also about a matter in par (a) [44]. Cross-examination on the content of the prior statements, however, could be permitted only under s 38(1)(b) [45].
Her Honour criticised the indication the trial judge gave, before Sako was called in the trial, that he would grant leave if defence counsel were given access to notes of a conference and the prosecution called Bashar Hurmiz [51]–[54]. Save, perhaps, where decisions depend on difficult questions of admissibility, whether to call a prosecution witness is entirely for the prosecution, and it is not appropriate for the trial judge "to be conscripted into the decision-making process" [53]. Such an indication carried "a grave risk that the trial judge will be perceived as other than impartial", so the prosecution should not have sought the advance ruling and the judge should not have given the indication [54]. But because leave was technically sought and given after Sako had been called, that course had no bearing on admissibility or on the matters governing the grant of leave [54].
One purpose of s 60, her Honour said, is to overcome the common law position, which the Law Reform Commission regarded as anomalous, that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible only as to credit [57]. For s 60 to apply the statements had to be relevant for a purpose other than proof of the facts asserted, and the only such purpose here was to attack Sako's credit [58]. Reading into the dictionary definition of probative value the assumption that the evidence will be accepted, and for the reasons in the joint judgment, her Honour held that the statements had substantial probative value, so the combined effect of ss 103(1) and 60 made them "technically admissible in proof of the matters therein asserted" [60]. Her Honour thus relied on s 103(1), whereas the joint reasons found it unnecessary to consider s 103 [39], [60].
Technical admissibility, however, did not in her view bear on whether leave should have been granted, because the question of leave is answered on the hypothesis that the evidence is admissible [61]. Nor did satisfying pars (a), (b) or (c) of s 38(1) bear on the grant of leave, as those paragraphs limit the matters on which cross-examination may be permitted, and ss 38(6) and 192(2) state the matters governing leave only to a limited extent [62]. It seemed to her Honour that the primary consideration should be "the legal character of the evidence which it is sought to elicit" [65]. Sako's evidence was, first, evidence the Act recognises in s 165(1)(d) as potentially unreliable, coming from a witness who might reasonably be supposed to have been criminally concerned in the events, and he was himself charged with the murder when he made the statements [66]. Secondly, the statements were hearsay, which subject to the exceptions in Pt 3.2 is not admissible in proof of the facts asserted, primarily because it is not on oath and its reliability cannot be tested in the same way as evidence on oath in court [67].
The trial judge gave four reasons for granting leave: that it would not be unfair to the accused, that the prosecution's points were persuasive, that the statements more probably than not reflected Sako's observations on the night, and, more importantly in his view, that the jury would be able to hear from the two persons perhaps best placed to state what occurred [70]–[72]. Her Honour said it was clear that the third of these was the main reason leave was granted [75]. In her view, a trial judge's conclusion that a prior inconsistent statement is probably true is not relevant to whether leave should be granted so as to put an otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement before the jury, because in very many cases the judge could not reach it without hearing all the evidence, and in some cases it may put the appearance of impartiality at risk [76]. The primary consideration in such a case, in her view, is whether the evidence is inherently reliable or, if not, whether a jury can safely find that it is necessarily reliable, and the second matter is whether its truth and accuracy can properly be tested [77].
Sako's statements were not inherently reliable, were of a kind the Act treats as potentially unreliable, and could not be found necessarily reliable if his evidence in chief or part of it were rejected [78]. Nor could the defence properly test them, because once he asserted that he saw nothing of relevance it was impossible to question him effectively on the detail of the statements, although the defence could question him about motives for lying and his opportunity to witness events [79]. On this point her Honour differed from the joint reasons, which held that the defence could test the evidence [30], [79]. Because the trial judge did not consider that the statements were potentially unreliable, he erred in exercising the power to grant leave, and because leave necessarily resulted in the admission of potentially unreliable evidence that could not effectively be tested, it should not have been granted [80]. Her Honour would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial [81].
Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed [40]. Gaudron J, dissenting, would have set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissing the appeal against conviction, allowed the appeal to that court and ordered a new trial [81].
Why it matters
On the joint reasons, a prior inconsistent statement that is relevant to more than a witness's credibility is not caught by the credibility rule in s 102, and if it is relevant for purposes including an attack on credibility it falls within s 60 and is admissible as evidence of the truth of its contents [39]. Their Honours described the change from the common law as one of the significant alterations in the rules of evidence the Act was intended to effect, so that tribunals of fact were no longer to treat such statements as showing no more than that the witness may not be reliable [37]. They left open what "substantial probative value" in s 103 means and did not decide whether s 38(1)(a) was met [27], [39]. Gaudron J's dissent proposes a different approach to leave under s 38, in which the reliability of the hearsay evidence is the primary consideration, whether it can properly be tested is the second, and the judge's view of its probable truth is not relevant [76]–[77].
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