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Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited

(2012) 247 CLR 205 · [2012] HCA 30 · (2012) 290 ALR 595 · (2012) 86 ALJR 1002

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2012] HCA 30 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), delivered on 6 September 2012, about when the doctrine of relief against penalties is engaged. In one joint judgment the Court held that the restrictions on the penalty doctrine stated by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Interstar should not be accepted: the doctrine is not limited to stipulations that operate on a breach of contract [46], [78]. The Court also rejected Interstar's proposition that the penalty doctrine is a rule of law and not of equity [51], [63]. It granted the bank customers leave to appeal on grounds 1-4, allowed the appeal with costs, and substituted the answer that the fact that the honour, dishonour, non-payment and over limit fees were not charged on breach of contract, and that customers had no obligation to avoid the events on which they were charged, does not make those fees incapable of being penalties [84]. Whether the fees are in fact penalties was left for further trial [83].

Facts

The applicants brought a representative action under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) against the ANZ, with approximately 38,000 group members [3]. Six proceedings against other banks raising the same or similar issues were also pending in the Federal Court [3]. Their pleading also relied on statutory grounds, including unconscionable conduct, unfair terms under the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) and unjust transactions under the consumer credit codes, but those aspects were not before the High Court [4]–[5]. What was immediately material was the claim for declarations under s 21 of the Federal Court Act that contractual provisions were void or unenforceable as penalties, and that the fees charged under them were repayable as moneys had and received [6].

The fees were honour, dishonour and non-payment fees charged on retail and business deposit accounts, and over limit and late payment fees charged on consumer and commercial credit card accounts, which the primary judge called "exception fees" [19]. Under clause 2.12 of the ANZ's product disclosure statement of March 2005, the ANZ did not agree to provide credit without prior written agreement, but might in its discretion allow a withdrawal or payment that would overdraw the account, on terms that included interest and an honour fee for agreeing to honour the transaction [24]. Clause 2.7 provided for a dishonour fee and a non-payment fee where a direct debit or a periodical payment authorised by the customer was not made because there were insufficient cleared funds [24]. In December 2009 these provisions were modified, so that an honour fee was charged for considering a deemed and successful request for an informal overdraft, and an outward dishonour fee for considering a deemed and rejected request [25].

The applicants pleaded that the fees were out of all proportion to the loss or damage the ANZ might sustain when the stipulated events occurred [27]. They also submitted that the fees were charged for a service with no content, and that the honour fee, despite its form, was in substance a disguised penalty [28]. The ANZ conceded that it did not set the fees by reference to a genuine pre-estimate of the damage it might suffer from an account being overdrawn, but the primary judge's principal findings made that concession irrelevant [26].

Procedural history

The proceeding was brought in the Victorian District Registry of the Federal Court, which s 5 of the Federal Court Act creates as a court of law and equity [16]. Separate questions asked, in substance, whether the exception fees were payable on breach of contract by the applicants, or alternatively whether the applicants were responsible for seeing that the circumstances in which the fees were imposed did not arise, and if so whether the fees were capable of being characterised as penalties for that reason [20]. The primary judge (Gordon J) answered the separate questions on 13 December 2011 [17].

Her Honour found that the late payment fee was payable on breach of contract and so was capable of characterisation as a penalty, and the ANZ did not seek to appeal against that finding [21]. She held that the honour, dishonour, non-payment and over limit fees were not charged on breach of contract, and that the customer had no obligation or responsibility to avoid the event on which they were charged (overdrawing the account or credit limit or attempting to do so), so it was unnecessary to decide whether those fees could be penalties [22]. She also found that, under the pre-existing terms, these fees were charged as a consequence of the ANZ's decision to afford or to decline further accommodation to the customer [23]. In reaching her conclusion on the scope of the doctrine she followed, in the High Court's words "quite properly", the New South Wales Court of Appeal's decision in Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd v Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd (2008) 257 ALR 292 [29]. She also ordered the applicants to pay 50 per cent of the ANZ's costs of the separate questions [87].

The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, and by an order made on 11 May 2012 the part of that application raising grounds 1-4 was removed into the High Court [17]. Ground 6, which asserts that the primary judge erred in not characterising the fees as payable on breach, was not before the High Court [23].

Issues

Grounds 1-4 concerned the nature and scope of the jurisdiction to relieve against penalties, and whether relief is available only where the penalty is imposed upon a breach of contract [18]. The applicants relied on the penalty doctrine, while the ANZ relied on legal history to show that the doctrine did not apply [7]. The applicants challenged the statements in Interstar that the rule against penalties is a rule of law, not equity, and that the doctrine's limits arise from the consequences of breach of contract [31]–[32]. The Court said the dispute required attention at a stage anterior to the distinction between a penalty and a pre-estimate of liquidated damages, namely the criteria by which the penalty doctrine is engaged [15].

Held

French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

All five justices joined in one set of reasons [1]. They observed at the outset that the pattern of remedial legislation "suggests the need for caution in dealing with the unwritten law as if laissez faire notions of an untrammelled 'freedom of contract' provide a universal legal value" [5].

The joint reasons began with Mason and Deane JJ's observation in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 that a penalty is in the nature of a punishment for non-observance of a contractual stipulation and consists, upon breach, of the imposition of an additional or different liability [9]. In general terms, a stipulation prima facie imposes a penalty if, as a matter of substance, it is collateral (or accessory) to a primary stipulation in favour of a second party and, on the failure of the primary stipulation, imposes on the first party an additional detriment for the benefit of the second party [10]. In that sense the collateral stipulation is described as being in the nature of a security for and in terrorem of the satisfaction of the primary stipulation [10]. If compensation can be made for the prejudice caused by the failure of the primary stipulation, the collateral stipulation is enforced only to the extent of that compensation [10]. The doctrine is not engaged if the prejudice cannot be evaluated in money terms, because "[i]t is the availability of compensation which generates the 'equity' upon which the court intervenes" [11]. The primary stipulation need not be the payment of money, and the penalty need not be a requirement to pay money [12]. In Jobson v Johnson, Dillon LJ and Nicholls LJ explained that there is no distinction in principle between a stipulation on default for the transfer of property and one for the payment of money [13]. Lord Dunedin's formulation in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd of the distinction between a penalty and a pre-estimate of liquidated damages was recently applied by the High Court in Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 224 CLR 656 [15].

The Court of Appeal in Interstar held that Brereton J had erred in denying that the doctrine had ceased to be one of equity and was now wholly legal, and in concluding that it was not limited to the failure of stipulations which were breaches of contract [29]. Its holdings that the agreements conferred no accrued rights and that the provisions defined entitlement to the commissions would have been enough to dispose of that case [30]–[31]. The Court of Appeal went on, with reference to Mason and Wilson JJ in AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin, to state that "[t]he modern rule against penalties is a rule of law, not equity", and, with reference to Lord Roskill in Exports Credits Guarantee Dept v Universal Oil Products Co (ECGD), to say that the doctrine's limits arise from the consequences of breach of contract [31]. The joint reasons held that the applicants' challenge to these statements should succeed [32].

Turning to bonds, the joint reasons noted that equity first intervened there, and that the term "condition" has several distinct meanings which must be kept apart to avoid confusion of legal principle [33]. A bond is an instrument under seal, usually a deed poll, by which the obligor is bound to the obligee, ordinarily accompanied by a condition in the nature of a defeasance whose performance or occurrence discharges the bond [34]. In a bond, "condition" is not used in the sense of a vital contractual promise whose breach will repudiate a contract [35]. The condition of a bond may be an occurrence or event that need not be an act or omission of the obligor [39]. Equity looked to what was involved in satisfaction of the condition for which the bond was security, but unless the failure of the condition was compensable there was no "handle" for equity to intervene [40]. Contrary to the ANZ's submission, cases in which equity treated a bond's condition as evidence of an agreement to convey land or of a non-competition covenant did not establish any general proposition that the condition in a bond is contractual [42]. The courts of equity later extended their jurisdiction to penal provisions in simple contracts, but that extension did not change the nature of the jurisdiction [44]. It followed that the first field for the equitable doctrine was the enforcement of bonds, that "obligation" and "condition" in bonds are not used in the sense they bear in dealing with breach of contractual promises, and that it does not follow, as the ANZ argued, that in a simple contract the only stipulations which engage the doctrine are contractual promises broken by the promisor [45].

The joint reasons did not accept the limitation to breaches of contract which the Court of Appeal in Interstar identified with ECGD [46]. Lord Roskill's remarks in ECGD were made in the particular situation of an indemnity given to a government guarantor, where the indemnifier's liability would mirror the guarantor's loss [47]. In AMEV-UDC, Gibbs CJ had emphasised that the High Court was not required to consider the proposition, said to be derived from ECGD, that no clause providing for payment on an event other than a breach of contractual duty could ever be a penalty [48]. Brereton J at first instance in Interstar had rejected the breach limitation, pointing to equity's regard for substance rather than form and to relief given against penal bonds for non-performance of a condition that was not the subject of any contractual promise, and the joint reasons described these as "significant considerations" [49]. "In Interstar the Court of Appeal misunderstood the scope of the penalty doctrine." [50] Whether, in a given case, a stipulation which is not a contractual promise may attract the doctrine is not foreclosed by the Court of Appeal's rejection of Brereton J's view [50].

The joint reasons rejected the further proposition in Interstar, which appeared to treat the penalty doctrine as having disappeared from equity by absorption into the common law action of assumpsit [51]. Before the Judicature system, the common law courts responded to Chancery's practice of relieving against penalties by revising their own procedures, as Lord Nottingham recorded and Priestley JA repeated in Austin, and the position was regulated by statutes of 1696 and 1705 [53]-[54]. But the common law courts were constrained by the limits of their remedies and procedures, lacking procedures to take complex accounts and the remedy of injunction [59]. Where the collateral stipulation was for the transfer or use of property, an assumpsit action left no scope for what Nicholls LJ called "the scaling down exercise" by which equity tailored specific relief to ensure adequate compensation but no more [60]. These developments in the common law courts "did not somehow supplant the equity jurisdiction" [61]. The joint reasons accepted the applicants' submission that the ANZ could point to no reason in principle to restrict the equitable doctrine to cases where an assumpsit action would hypothetically have lain in the 19th century, noting that the principles of equity continue to develop by principled advances of traditional doctrine [62]. Where law and equity spoke with the same voice there was no conflict or variance on which the Judicature legislation required equity to prevail, and in any event under that legislation (the Judicature Act 1873 (UK), s 24(11); see Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 29) "it is equity not the law that is to prevail" [63]. The Court of Appeal in Interstar "thus had no basis for the proposition that the penalty doctrine is a rule of law not of equity" [63].

The joint reasons found no ground to cavil with four of the five propositions which Mason and Wilson JJ distilled from the history of the doctrine in AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170 [65]. They said that a reference such as that in proposition (5), to implying into a bond an express contractual promise to perform the condition, tends to obscure the path taken by the common law courts in developing assumpsit [66]. Brereton J had properly understood Mason and Wilson JJ's judgment as not deciding that relief against a penalty is available only when it is conditioned on a breach of contract [67]. Mason and Wilson JJ's further statement in AMEV-UDC that the equitable jurisdiction "withered on the vine" under the Judicature system overlooked that the only relevant effect of that system was on procedures in the unified court system, not on substantive doctrine [68].

In Dunlop, the respondent, a sub-purchaser, agreed to pay £5 for each tyre, cover or tube sold or offered in breach of a price maintenance agreement, as liquidated damages and not as a penalty [72]. The Court of Appeal in that case (Kennedy LJ dissenting) held that the £5 stipulation was a penalty and that Dunlop was entitled only to nominal damages of £2 [74]. In the House of Lords the critical issue, decided in Dunlop's favour, was whether the sum agreed was commensurate with the interest protected by the bargain, and the decision restored the outcome at first instance and the Master's award of damages [75]–[76]. Because legal and equitable remedies were sought in one proceeding there and the defendant raised the penalty doctrine in its defence, Dunlop illustrates the place of the doctrine in a court with a unified administration of law and equity in which equitable doctrines retain their identity [77].

The restrictions on the penalty doctrine urged by the Court of Appeal in Interstar should not be accepted [78]. The primary judge erred in concluding, in effect, that without a contractual breach or an obligation or responsibility on the customer to avoid the event on which a fee was charged, no question arose whether the fees were capable of characterisation as penalties [78]. Her findings appeared to present a further issue: whether the fees were security for the customer's performance of its other obligations, or were charged under pre-existing arrangements for further accommodation which the ANZ provided, or refused, on customer instructions it was otherwise not obliged to act on [79]. The operative distinction would be the one on which the majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Jacobs JA and Holmes JA) decided Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pty Ltd v Greenham [1966] 2 NSWR 717, between a stipulation attracting the penalty doctrine and one giving rise consensually to an additional obligation [80]. That distinction had been identified long before by Lord St Leonards in French v Macale, with the example of a lease allowing a tenant to till meadow land on paying an additional rent [80]. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, a film hiring contract that conferred the right to one screening only and required four times the original fee for each additional screening was construed so that the penalty doctrine had no application [82]. The joint reasons emphasised that the determination of live issues of this nature for the exception fees, along with the applicants' grounds for saying the doctrine does apply, "is entirely a matter upon further trial" [83].

Orders. The Court granted leave to appeal on grounds 1-4 of the amended draft notice of appeal and allowed the appeal with costs [84]. The amended draft notice of appeal was treated as filed and the appeal as instituted and heard instanter. Save for certain sub-paragraphs of order 1, the Court set aside orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Court's orders of 13 December 2011 and in their place declared that the circumstances that the honour, dishonour, non-payment and over limit fees were not charged by the ANZ upon breach of contract by its customers, and that the customers had no responsibility or obligation to avoid the occurrence of the events upon which the fees were charged, do not render the fees incapable of characterisation as penalties [84]. It set aside the Federal Court's costs orders of 7 February 2012 on the separate questions and ordered that the question of costs be reserved for consideration by a judge of that Court. The reasons explain that the order requiring the applicants to pay 50 per cent of the ANZ's costs of the separate questions should be set aside, and that a substituted costs order should be for the primary judge on the further conduct of the trial [87]. The grant of leave on ground 6, which challenges the finding that there was no breach, was left to the Full Court, together with ground 5, which may add nothing, and it is for the applicants to decide whether to press those grounds [85]. After that, it will be for the applicants to seek a trial of the live issues about penalties and of the statutory claims [86].

Why it matters

The case rejects the view, stated in Interstar, that the penalty doctrine is confined to stipulations that operate on a breach of contract [46], [50], [78]. It treats the penalty doctrine as an equitable doctrine whose substance was not changed by the Judicature system, rejecting the proposition that it had become only a rule of law [63], [68], [77]. It directs attention to the stage before the Dunlop distinction between penalties and liquidated damages, namely the criteria by which the doctrine is engaged [15]. It also identifies, for trial, the question whether a fee is a penalty securing the customer's obligations or a charge consensually agreed for further accommodation, drawing on the distinction applied in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pty Ltd v Greenham [79]–[80], [83].

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