Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Frenmast Pty Ltd
(2013) 282 FLR 351 · [2013] NSWCA 459
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Frenmast Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 459 is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Macfarlan, Meagher and Barrett JJA), given on 19 December 2013. The appeal concerned whether a bank could rely on the assumption in s 129(5) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that a company's guarantee had been duly executed when one director's signature on it had been forged [2]. The primary judge, Adams J, held that the bank, ANZ, could not rely on the assumption because it had no relevant dealings with the company, Frenmast [3]. The Court of Appeal allowed ANZ's appeal, set aside orders 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the primary judge and varied order 3, gave judgment for ANZ against Frenmast for $1,724,498.50 and ordered Frenmast to pay ANZ's costs of the appeal [49]. Meagher JA wrote the leading reasons, and Macfarlan JA and Barrett JA agreed with him [1], [50].
Facts
By 1998 three brothers, Robert, Vlado and Steve Tiricovski, were in a liquorice manufacturing business that involved three companies: Frenmast, RV & Sons Pty Ltd (RV) and Australian Fresh Confectionery Pty Ltd (AFC) [10]. Documents lodged with ASIC showed that the three brothers were the shareholders and directors of Frenmast, and that Robert was its company secretary [10]. Frenmast owned a factory and land at Carlton, which RV occupied to make the liquorice products, under an unwritten arrangement that included RV paying Frenmast's outgoings and mortgage repayments [11]. The primary judge found that Robert managed the administration of the business, including arranging finance, while Vlado concentrated on manufacturing and Steve spent most of his time overseas [12]. The primary judge also found that in 2006 Steve and Vlado had a major disagreement with Robert and no longer communicated with him, and recorded their evidence that they did not authorise Robert or the company to enter into any arrangements with the bank [12].
ANZ had been the banker to the three companies, and to Robert and his wife Slavica, since before 2000 [10], [13]. On 13 September 2001 ANZ offered Frenmast a loan of $923,000, which was accepted, to be secured by, among other things, a cross-guarantee and indemnity between ANZ, AFC, RV, Frenmast and Robert and Slavica [15]. Under new security arrangements made in 2006, Frenmast ceased to be liable as a guarantor [16]. On 3 September 2008 ANZ wrote separately to Robert and Slavica and to AFC offering variations to their facilities, including the taking of a guarantee from Frenmast, unlimited in amount, of the obligations of AFC and of Robert and Slavica, and the release of the mortgage over Robert and Slavica's Taren Point property [18]. Each letter required acknowledgements from the existing guarantors and from Frenmast as the proposed guarantor, and these were signed and returned to ANZ on 3 September 2008 [19]. Frenmast's acknowledgements were purportedly signed by Robert and Vlado as directors, but Vlado's signature was forged [19]. The guarantee itself was undated, was signed by Robert above the words "Signature of Director" and bore Vlado's forged signature above the words "Signature of Secretary" [20]. It was not in issue that the guarantee was signed and returned to ANZ on or about 3 September 2008 [20].
Procedural history
ANZ brought proceedings to enforce the guarantee and relied on the assumption in s 129(5) that the document had been duly executed [2]. Adams J held that ANZ could not rely on that assumption because it had not had any relevant dealings with Frenmast in procuring the guarantee: ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Tiricovski [2012] NSWSC 1304 [3]. His Honour gave two reasons: there was no evidence of any negotiation, communication or other step that might have been a dealing between ANZ and Frenmast before the guarantee was executed; and any dealing between ANZ and Robert was not a relevant dealing with Frenmast because Robert had no actual or ostensible authority to give the guarantee on its behalf [3]. Adams J rejected Frenmast's further argument that s 128(4) prevented ANZ from making the assumption because it knew or suspected that the assumption was incorrect, and Frenmast did not press a notice of contention on that point in the appeal [8]. The primary judge's orders were made on 22 April 2013 [47]. ANZ's amended notice of appeal relied on 18 grounds, and ground 1 was not pressed in oral argument [4], [6].
Issues
Meagher JA said that, although there were 18 grounds of appeal, there were in substance only two issues [4]. The first was whether ANZ had dealings with Frenmast concerning the giving of the 2008 guarantee: whether there were communications or negotiations between ANZ and Robert about the guarantee in which he at least purported to act for the company and, if so, whether he had actual or ostensible authority to engage in them [4]. The second was whether "dealings with a company" in s 128(1) covers dealings with anyone acting for the company with actual or apparent authority, or only dealings with someone who has actual or ostensible authority to enter into the transaction to which the dealings relate [5]. Ground 12, that ANZ was entitled under s 129(4) to assume the company's officers were properly performing their duties, was relevant to the second issue because Frenmast argued that Robert's ostensible authority to negotiate and communicate with ANZ for it did not extend to dealing with ANZ about transactions for his own benefit [6]. Ground 14, that Robert had actual authority to enter into the guarantee, was relied on only in case the primary judge's construction of s 128(1) was upheld [7].
Section 128(1) entitles a person to make the assumptions in s 129 in relation to dealings with a company, and bars the company from asserting in proceedings about the dealings that the assumptions are incorrect [21]. Under s 128(3) the assumptions may be made even if an officer or agent of the company acts fraudulently or forges a document in connection with the dealings [22]. Section 129(4) allows a person to assume that the company's officers and agents properly perform their duties, and s 129(5) allows a person to assume that a document has been duly executed if it appears to have been signed in accordance with s 127(1) [23]. Section 127(1) allows a company to execute a document without a common seal if it is signed by two directors, or by a director and a company secretary [24].
Held
Meagher JA (Macfarlan JA and Barrett JA agreeing)
Meagher JA held that, although Vlado's purported signature appeared as company secretary, the guarantee still appeared to be signed by two directors and so satisfied the condition in s 127(1)(a) [25]. He noted that in Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd v Occidental Life Nominees Pty Ltd the equivalent condition in the Companies (Vic) Code had been held satisfied where one director signed as secretary, and he held the primary judge was correct to treat this matter as of no significance [25].
On the first issue, Meagher JA held that the primary judge's findings that there were no dealings "involved error", because they did not take into account the letters of 3 September 2008, the signed acknowledgements and guarantee, and their return to ANZ [27]. The acknowledgements were the subject of a request to Frenmast that they be signed and returned, and each was signed at least by Robert as a director, dated and returned on that day [28]. In his Honour's words, "On any view there were written communications by ANZ to Frenmast which were responded to by the signing and return of the acknowledgements" [28]. The subject matter of those communications was the guarantee proposed in the letters of offer [29]. The guarantee was also sent to Frenmast for execution and was returned, or arranged to be returned, by Robert purporting to act for Frenmast [30]. Meagher JA concluded that these communications were a dealing or dealings between ANZ and Robert, as a director of Frenmast purporting to act on its behalf, relating to the taking of the guarantee, and that the primary judge's contrary conclusion was wrong [31].
Meagher JA then asked whether Robert had actual or ostensible authority to engage in those communications for Frenmast, which he described as a different question from whether Robert had authority to bind Frenmast to the guarantee [32]. Since at least 2001 ANZ had communicated in writing with Robert about the banking facilities of the companies and of Robert and Slavica, and before 2006 the communications about Frenmast took place with the knowledge and agreement of Vlado and Steve [33]. After 2006, Vlado and Steve must be taken to have known that Robert was continuing to act for Frenmast in day to day communications with ANZ about its banking facilities [33]. Meagher JA held that by their conduct Vlado and Steve created an apparent authority in Robert "to be at least the point of communication between ANZ and Frenmast", permitting him to manage Frenmast's banking relationship with ANZ, including receiving and responding to its communications [34]. He identified the relevant principles as those stated by Diplock LJ in Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Magnal) Ltd and applied by the High Court in Crabtree-Vickers Pty Ltd v Australian Direct Mail Advertising & Addressing Company Pty Ltd [35]. Those principles are not limited to an agent's ostensible authority to bind the principal to a contract and apply equally to other acts, such as representations made in communications with a third party [35].
Frenmast argued that Robert's actual authority did not extend to communications about a guarantee of the facilities of AFC and of Robert and Slavica, because that transaction was solely for his or their benefit and not for Frenmast's, relying on the principle, applied by Griffith CJ in Lysaght Bros & Co Ltd v Falk, that a third party with notice of an agent's lack of actual authority cannot rely on ostensible authority [36]. Meagher JA held that this principle did not apply, because ANZ was not shown to have had notice, if it was the fact, that Robert was acting against Frenmast's interests and solely in his own [37]. ANZ was entitled by ss 128(1) and 129(4) to assume that Robert, as a director, was properly performing his duties, and Frenmast was debarred from asserting otherwise, citing Pico Holdings Inc v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd [37]. His Honour added that "It was also not obvious, or necessarily the case, that the proposed guarantee was not in Frenmast's interests", pointing to the directors' commercial judgment, the connection between Frenmast's business and AFC's, and the guarantees of Frenmast's own debt to ANZ given by Robert and AFC [37]. He concluded that there were purported dealings concerning the guarantee between ANZ and Frenmast, undertaken by Robert within his actual or ostensible authority [38].
On the second issue, Meagher JA held that the primary judge's view, that the dealings had to be with someone with actual or ostensible authority to enter into the guarantee, rested on a wrong understanding of a statement by Hodgson CJ in Eq in Soyfer v Earlmaze [38]–[39]. In Story v Advance Bank Australia Ltd, Gleeson CJ (with whom Mahoney and Cripps JJA relevantly agreed) had held that a bank which negotiated with a husband to take a mortgage from a company, where the husband forged his wife's signature as a director, was having dealings with the company under s 68A of the Companies (NSW) Code, because the wife permitted the husband to have de facto control of the conduct of the company's business and part of the loan moneys were applied for the company's purposes [40]. Meagher JA set out Gleeson CJ's further observation that the concept of having dealings with a company must embrace purported dealings, since the provisions would be largely unnecessary if they extended only to cases where the person representing the company had actual authority [40]. Meagher JA said the same observation applied with equal force to Part 2B.2 of the Corporations Act, while noting that Story did not require consideration of a case where there had been no relationship between the party claiming to have dealt with the company and anyone with actual or ostensible authority to do anything for it, a question Mahoney JA expressly reserved [41]. Hodgson CJ in Eq in Soyfer had said that the person representing the company need not have authority to commit the company to the transaction or execute the documents, but must have authority to undertake some negotiation or other steps [42]. The primary judge, expanding on that statement, had said that the representative must have ostensible authority to bind the company to the particular transaction, and that Robert, as only one director among others, had no actual or ostensible authority to bind Frenmast to a guarantee [43].
Meagher JA held that the statements of Gleeson CJ and Hodgson CJ in Eq "in fact are to the opposite effect" of the primary judge's observation [44]. Because Robert had actual or ostensible authority to undertake communications and negotiations with ANZ on Frenmast's behalf, those communications and other steps were dealings with the company, and the primary judge erred in concluding otherwise [45]. It followed that ANZ was entitled to rely on the assumptions in s 129(4) and (5), Frenmast could not assert that the guarantee had not been duly executed under s 127(1)(a), the guarantee was enforceable against Frenmast and ANZ was entitled to judgment for the amount claimed [46]. Evidence led in the Court of Appeal, not disputed by Frenmast, showed that $1,697,994.60 was due under the guarantee at 4 September 2013, with interest accruing at $247.70 a day [47]. Noting that the primary judge had decided other issues, some in favour of Vlado and Frenmast, that the orders of 22 April 2013 included no costs orders, and that no submissions had been made about the costs below, Meagher JA held it was not appropriate for the Court of Appeal to make any order about those costs, which the parties could take further before the primary judge [48].
Macfarlan JA (agreeing)
Macfarlan JA agreed with Meagher JA's reasons and proposed orders [1]. He added, consistently with what Meagher JA said in paragraph 37 and citing Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General and Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Pty Ltd, that the nature of the transaction was not such as to excite a reasonable apprehension on the bank's part that it was entered into for purposes apparently unrelated to the company's business [1]. As a result, in his Honour's view, the evidence did not indicate that ANZ was on notice of Robert's lack of authority [1].
Barrett JA (agreeing)
Barrett JA agreed with Meagher JA [50].
Orders. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside orders 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 made by Adams J on 22 April 2013 [49]. It varied order 3 of those orders by replacing the reference to "paragraphs 5 & 7" with "paragraph 5" [49]. It entered judgment for ANZ against Frenmast for $1,724,498.50, being $1,697,994.60 together with interest from 5 September to 20 December 2013 at a daily rate of $247.70 [49]. It ordered Frenmast to pay ANZ's costs of the appeal [49]. The Court made no order about the costs of the proceedings before the primary judge [48].
Why it matters
On Meagher JA's reasoning, the assumptions in s 129 were available because the company's representative had actual or ostensible authority to undertake communications and negotiations with the bank on the company's behalf, even though the primary judge had found he lacked authority to bind the company to the guarantee itself [43]–[45]. Meagher JA treated authority to communicate on the company's behalf as a different question from authority to bind the company to the transaction [32]. The decision also applies s 129(4) to answer an argument that a director was acting solely in his own interests, where the bank was not shown to have had notice of that [37]. It also holds that a document signed by two directors still appears to satisfy s 127(1)(a) even where one of them signed as secretary [25].
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