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Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University

(2009) 239 CLR 175 · [2009] HCA 27 · (2009) 258 ALR 14 · (2009) 83 ALJR 951

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 11 November 2026

Overview

Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), given on 5 August 2009 on an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The question was whether the Australian National University (ANU) should have been given leave to make substantial amendments to its claim against its insurance broker, Aon, when it sought that leave during the time set for trial [39], [104]. The High Court allowed the appeal with costs and ordered that ANU's application for leave to amend be dismissed with costs [117]. There were three sets of reasons, French CJ, a joint judgment of Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, and Heydon J, and no judge dissented [37], [117], [157].

Facts

On 18 January 2003 fire destroyed or damaged buildings and their contents at ANU's Mount Stromlo Complex [38], [136]. On 10 December 2004 ANU sued three insurers, Chubb, CGU and ACE, for an indemnity for its losses [38], [41], [136]. The insurers were on a policy for the period 31 December 2002 to 31 December 2003 in the proportions of 50, 20 and 30 per cent, and the property was listed in two schedules, Schedule C and the Property Not Insured Schedule (the PNI Schedule), which Aon had provided to Chubb in October 2002 [41].

ANU joined Aon as fourth defendant on 6 June 2005 [139]. The claim against Aon rested on a contract dated 28 June 1999 and alleged a failure to arrange insurance, or to advise that it had not been arranged [43]–[44]. It was pleaded in the alternative to the claims against the insurers and, read with their defences, was limited to the PNI Schedule property [44].

In defences filed in April 2005, Chubb and CGU alleged that ANU had declared the value of the Schedule C property at much less than its true value, and claimed to reduce their liability under s 28(3) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) [42]. ANU alleged that the balance due to it for the property in the two schedules was in the order of $75 million, and Heydon J described its outstanding claim against Aon as approximately $75 million [42], [141]. On 12 April 2006 the Supreme Court fixed the trial for four weeks commencing on 13 November 2006 [139].

On the first day appointed for trial, ANU, Chubb and CGU began a mediation, and a settlement was reached two days later [45]. A settlement was also reached with ACE, without mediation [45]. On 15 November 2006, the third day of the four weeks, ANU sought an adjournment of its claim against Aon and foreshadowed an application for leave to amend [39], [141].

The joint judgment described the amendments as substantial [47]. ANU now alleged a contract for insurance broking and advisory services from 1 July 1999, under which Aon was to review ANU's policies, prepare submissions to insurers and provide an annual stewardship report [47]. Central to the new claim was the allegation that Aon knew or ought to have known that true replacement values were material to the insurers, and that it breached the agreement and its duty of care by failing to arrange insurance on those values and to obtain accurate valuations [48]. ANU also alleged a failure to advise of the effect of a $1 million deductible, and contraventions of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) [49]–[50].

Senior counsel for ANU gave three matters as requiring the amendment: the settlements, the recent receipt of the insurers' affidavits and of Chubb's discovery about its underwriting, and conversations during mediation [51]. ANU's solicitor filed an affidavit; in cross-examination it was pointed out that the affidavit offered no explanation for the need to amend, and he agreed that a decision had been made not to give a reason [52]–[53]. Letters from Chubb to ANU dated 2 April 2003 and 24 October 2003 explained the significance to the insurer of accurate declared values, and it appeared that Chubb had discovered underwriting manuals with a similar reference in November 2005 [54].

Procedural history

On 15 November 2006 Gray J, the primary judge, gave ANU seven days to file and serve the amended pleading and its evidence, and listed the application for hearing on 27 November 2006 [144]. The trial did not proceed [46]. At the hearing, ANU's counsel said that he could not finish his reply by the normal time for adjournment, and the primary judge gave leave for written submissions by 1 December 2006 and further submissions from Aon by 8 December 2006 [148]. Leave was not granted until 12 October 2007, a delay the joint judgment called "regrettable" [46].

Gray J considered the matter to be governed by Queensland v J L Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146; [1997] HCA 1 (J L Holdings), treated justice as the paramount consideration, placed less importance on the objectives stated in the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) of minimising delay and cost, and regarded it as of fundamental importance that the allegations raised real triable issues [40], [61]-[62]. His Honour did not consider the explanations for the delay entirely satisfactory, but accepted that ANU's lawyers had not appreciated Aon's involvement in the declared values until the insurers' evidence, the discovery and the mediation [62]. He rejected Aon's abuse of process objection, ordered ANU to pay Aon's costs and refused indemnity costs [2], [66].

On 25 August 2008 the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory unanimously held that the costs should be on an indemnity basis, and by majority (Higgins CJ and Penfold J, Lander J dissenting) dismissed the challenge to the grant of leave [3]. Penfold J held that the application fell squarely within principles drawn from J L Holdings, because the claim was arguable, no case management consideration required refusal, and costs could compensate Aon [63]. Higgins CJ likewise considered it sufficient that the amendment would not cause substantial injustice and that any injustice could be remedied by costs [63]. Lander J listed matters given insufficient weight, said that it could be inferred that ANU had deliberately adopted its course, and said that ANU should have been required to conduct its case "in accordance with the decision it made some years before" [64]. Penfold J agreed that the inference could be drawn but considered that refusing the application would amount to punishment [65]. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was granted on 13 February 2009 [3].

Issues

The central question was whether ANU's application for leave to amend, made during the time set for trial, should have been granted under the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) [58], [104]. That raised whether r 501(a) or r 501(c) obliged the amendment, or whether it depended on the discretion in r 502(1) read with the objectives of r 21 [67], [86], [88]. It also raised whether the statements in J L Holdings about case management should still be followed, and whether an order for costs is enough to overcome the prejudice caused by a late amendment [55], [96], [99]. Heydon J also addressed whether any inference could be drawn from the absence of an explanation, so far as an explanation may have rested on legal advice [132].

Held

French CJ

French CJ wrote separate reasons, would allow the appeal and agreed with the orders proposed in the joint judgment [6], [37]. His Honour said that, save for Lander J's dissent, the history of the proceedings revealed "an unduly permissive approach" to an application made late, inadequately explained, requiring the trial dates to be vacated or adjourned, and raising new claims apparently not previously agitated because of a deliberate tactical decision [4]. In such circumstances, he said, the party applying "bears a heavy burden" to show why leave should be granted [4].

His Honour traced rr 501 and 502 to 19th century reforms of civil procedure in the United Kingdom, and r 21 to the Civil Proceedings Rules introduced there in 1998 following the Woolf Report [9]. He distinguished the discretion to allow a party to amend its pleading on that party's motion from the requirement to make all amendments necessary to determine the real questions in controversy, a requirement that engages the court's authority to amend of its own motion [14]. The flexibility conferred by such rules, he said, was not intended to provide a tactical instrument, and should not be so used where that wastes the time and resources of the court and other parties [17].

His Honour said that the courts are concerned not only with justice between the parties, "which remains their priority", but also with the public interest in the proper and efficient use of public resources [23]. Undue delay can undermine confidence in the rule of law, and the waste of public resources and inefficiency caused by vacating trial dates or adjourning trials relate to the parties' interests but transcend them [24]. Even under Judicature Act rules unaffected by the 1998 United Kingdom reforms, he said, these are "both relevant and mandatory considerations" in a discretion under rules such as r 502 [24].

French CJ said that J L Holdings arose in an entirely different factual setting [6], [28]. He said that, accepting that case management principles should not supplant the objective of doing justice between the parties according to law, J L Holdings cannot be taken as authority that waste of public resources and undue delay should not be taken into account in discretions of the kind conferred by r 502 [30]. To the extent that statements in it suggest that case management and the proper use of court resources are to be discounted or given little weight, he said, it "should not be regarded as authoritative" [6]. Also to be considered, in his view, is the potential loss of public confidence where a court is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification [30].

Applying the rules, French CJ held that the amendment could only be supported under r 502, and that on no view was it required by r 501(a), which imposes no unqualified duty to permit the late addition of any new claim [31]. The real issues were to be determined in this case by the limited way in which ANU had deliberately framed its original claim and persisted in it up to the trial date [31]. Rule 501(c), he said, operates within the framework of an ordered progression to a fixed trial date and does not oblige a court to accept new claims at the last moment, and there was no basis for inferring that further proceedings would follow [32]. In any event, in his view, fresh proceedings would face the potential barrier of an abuse of process objection and possibly the kind of estoppel discussed in Henderson v Henderson and Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [33]. A court faced with a late amendment and a prediction of multiple proceedings is entitled to have regard to such barriers [34].

His Honour said that the applications were not to be considered solely by reference to whether prejudice to Aon could be compensated by costs, since, whatever costs are ordered, there is "an irreparable element of unfair prejudice in unnecessarily delaying proceedings" [5]. The time of the court is a publicly funded resource, and inefficiencies in its use from vacating or adjourning trials are to be taken into account [5]. He accepted that a punitive response to a late application is not appropriate, but said that a party is not to be rewarded by weighing in its favour the disruptive consequences of its own application [35]. Granting the amendment would still mean further delay, with Aon having to prepare a new defence, and that delay would undermine confidence in the administration of civil justice, a factor neither court below took into account [35]. He concluded that the primary judge's discretion miscarried, that the Court of Appeal erred in not allowing the appeal, and that the application should have been refused [35]. French CJ reached that conclusion without having regard to r 21, but said that r 21 strengthens it and informs both the requirements and the discretions in rr 501 and 502 [36].

Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

These five judges wrote the joint judgment, and said that the starting point for any application to amend must be the rules governing such applications in the relevant jurisdiction [55], [58]. They did not accept ANU's contention that the "real issues in the proceeding" in r 501(a) extend to any arguable issue a party seeks in good faith to advance [67].

To be a real issue, and for amendment therefore to be necessary, they said, the dispute or controversy must exist at the time of the application [71]. Amendments raising entirely new issues fall under the general discretion in r 502(1), read with the objectives of r 21 [71]. They raised, but left open, how far the objectives of r 21 apply to a matter within r 501(a), saying that it was not necessary to consider those questions further [72]. They said that the statements of Bowen LJ in Cropper v Smith are best understood by reference to the circumstances of that case, where the issue of invalidity had already been raised by a co-defendant and litigated [75], [77]. Drawing on Cropper v Smith, Tildesley v Harper, O'Keefe v Williams and Dwyer v O'Mullen, they said that what needs to be shown is that the controversy existed before the application was made, while those cases do not suggest an unduly narrow approach to the real issues [82]–[83].

Here, they said, before the application there was no issue about Aon's involvement with the declared values or about the insurance of the Schedule C property; the dispute was only whether Aon had been obliged to effect cover over the PNI Schedule property and had not done so [84]. The insurers' defences should have alerted ANU to the need to reconsider its claim against Aon if its contractual relationship was other than it had alleged [84]. Rule 501(a) did not require the amendment to be allowed [85].

As to r 501(c), they said that further proceedings depended on ANU being able to abandon its case without precluding a later claim, and raised the question of a stay based on Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [86]. ANU did not seek to show the Court how it might have dealt with an Anshun point, so it was not demonstrated that the amendment was necessary to avoid multiple proceedings [87]. Rule 501(c) did not apply, and the application fell to be determined solely under r 502(1), read with r 21 [88].

Their Honours said that, given r 21, the latitude in deciding whether to grant or refuse leave was not at large, and that the objectives in r 21(2) are to be sought in exercising the power [89]. The purposes in r 21 reflect principles of case management, now an accepted aspect of civil justice in Australian courts [92]. Rule 21(2)(b) indicates that the rules are no longer directed only to resolving the dispute between the parties, since a just but timely and cost-effective resolution affects the court and other litigants [93]. They said that the statement of Waller LJ in Worldwide Corporation Ltd v GPT Ltd, that where a party has had sufficient opportunity to plead the court may have to make a decision producing a sense of injustice in that party for the sake of justice to the opponent and other litigants, identifies a fundamental premise of case management [94]–[95].

What may be just when amendment is sought, they said, requires account to be taken of other litigants, and the statements in J L Holdings do not reflect a proper understanding of case management and are not consistent with what was said in Sali v SPC Ltd [95]. To say, in the J L Holdings plurality's phrase, that case management principles should be applied only "in extreme circumstances" to refuse an amendment implies that delay and costs can never be as important as raising an arguable case, and denies the wider effects of delay on others [95]. The plurality's approach suggested that a party has something approaching a right to amend to raise an arguable issue, subject to costs, and their Honours said "That is not the case" [96]. Parties have the right to invoke the court's jurisdiction and powers to resolve their dispute, but further amendment, subject to any rights to amend without leave, depends on the exercise of the court's discretionary power [96]. They added that later rules such as r 21 are likely to have been written with J L Holdings in mind [97].

Their Honours said that a just resolution remains the paramount purpose of r 21, but that it is to be understood in light of the stated purposes and objectives, and that speed and efficiency are seen as essential to it [98]. This should not detract from a proper opportunity to plead, but limits may be placed on re-pleading [98]. It cannot be said that a just resolution requires that a party be permitted to raise any arguable case at any point in the proceedings on payment of costs [98]. The modern view is that even indemnity costs may not always undo the prejudice from a late amendment, and they found it difficult to see that such an order could be sufficient here, as Aon would have to defend litigation effectively commenced afresh [99]. They said that the views of Lord Griffiths in Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd, that justice cannot always be measured in money and that a judge may weigh the strain litigation imposes on litigants, are now generally accepted [100]. Corporations too are subject to the pressures of litigation, through contingent liabilities, diverted resources and the strain on employees and officers [101].

Rule 21, they said, does not require every amendment to be refused because it wastes some costs and causes some delay, and the nature and importance of the amendment to the applicant cannot be overlooked [102]. The extent of the delay and the costs, with the prejudice reasonably assumed and shown, are to be weighed against permission to alter a party's case, and much may depend on the point the litigation has reached relative to a trial [102]. There may be cases where a party has had sufficient opportunity to plead and it is too late to amend, having regard to the other party and other litigants awaiting trial dates [102]. In most cases of delay a party should explain it, showing good faith and bringing the circumstances giving rise to the amendment to the court's attention [103].

Applying this, they adopted as salient features, as Lander J had pointed out in his dissent, that the amendments introduced new and substantial claims, would require Aon in effect to defend again from the beginning, came during the time set for trial and would result in abandoning the trial, and raised a question whether even indemnity costs would overcome the prejudice to Aon [104]. The primary judge erred in failing to recognise the extent of the new claims, their effect on Aon, and the extent to which r 21's objectives would not be met [105]. That the new claims were arguable was not itself sufficient and could not prevail over those objectives [105].

ANU, they said, had to explain why it was seeking leave at the trial when the insurers' defences had identified the central issue more than 12 months earlier, and it gave no explanation, so the primary judge erred in accepting that it had given a satisfactory one [106]. Counsel's statements foreshadowing the application were not evidence, and the solicitor's later affidavit did not support them [106]. The evidence was no basis for a finding of oversight, and the absence of explanation suggested the possibility that none favouring ANU could be offered [108]. There was no mistake of judgment, such as Bowen LJ referred to, to weigh against the effects of the delay [109]. The primary judge incorrectly elevated the fact that the claim was arguable to a level of importance it did not have and failed to recognise the importance of r 21's objective of timely disposal, so the exercise of the power in r 502(1) miscarried and the application should have been refused [110].

In conclusion, they said that an application for leave to amend should not be approached on the basis that a party is entitled to raise an arguable claim, subject to payment of costs: "There is no such entitlement" [111]. All relevant matters should be weighed, and substantial delay, wasted costs and the concerns of case management will assume importance [111]. Statements in J L Holdings suggesting only a limited application for case management do not rest on a principle carefully worked out in a significant succession of cases, are not consonant with the Court's earlier recognition of the effects of delay on the parties, the court and other litigants, and "should not be applied in the future" [111]. Limits will be placed on parties' ability to change their pleadings, particularly if litigation is advanced [112]. The resolution of disputes, they said, serves the public as a whole, not merely the parties [113].

In this case, they said, ANU's delay meant that a trial was lost and litigation substantially recommenced, which would affect other litigants, and a just resolution had to have regard to Aon's position in defending the claim [114]. Critically, ANU had to give some explanation for its delay if the discretion was to be exercised in its favour, and none was given [114]. In view of their conclusion on the amendments, it was not necessary to consider Aon's abuse of process contentions further [115]. Having read French CJ's reasons in draft, they said that there may be some point of distinction as to what J L Holdings holds, but that they did not understand there to be any difference as to the principles now to be applied [116].

Heydon J

Heydon J wrote separate reasons, and said that the orders set out in the joint judgment should be made [157]. He accepted, as the only satisfactory way of reconciling rr 21, 501 and 502, the joint judgment's conclusions that r 501 creates a duty operating on the real issues as they exist when the court considers whether an amendment is necessary, and that r 502 creates a discretion for amendments raising new issues, with the factors in r 21 relevant to it [119]. He supported that result as a matter of construction of those particular rules, not by reference to authorities on other rules of court [119]. He also accepted that r 501(a) did not apply and that ANU had not shown that r 501(c) assisted it, and said that r 501(b) obviously could not apply [120].

Heydon J added that, so far as the materials before the Court indicated, the application before the primary judge was based only on r 501, so that, r 501 being inapplicable, the primary judge erred in not dismissing it [121], [125]. The Court of Appeal approached the question only by reference to rr 21 and 501 and did not mention r 502, so that, assuming the parties' argument was equally silent, it erred in failing simply to allow the appeal [126]. He said that ANU's reliance on r 502 in the High Court would require a notice of contention, which it did not file, though if that were the only obstacle it would be a very slight one [129]–[130].

In his view the High Court had to exercise the r 502 discretion for itself, for the first time in the proceedings; it was not a question of setting aside an erroneous exercise of that discretion by the courts below, which had not embarked on it [130]. He would exercise it against ANU because of considerations pointed out in the joint judgment [131]. He added that nothing in the recently served affidavits or discovery was identified as pointing for the first time to any possible amendment, and nothing indicated that what was relevant had not been available earlier with diligence [131].

He attached one qualification concerning the solicitor's statement that senior counsel had advised that leave to amend be sought [132]. To the extent that the affidavit, by not disclosing the detail of that advice, was claiming privilege, it would not have been open at common law to draw any inference from the claim, and the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which applies in the Australian Capital Territory, does not make clear whether that position continues [132]. As there was no argument on the point, he said that "it is undesirable to draw any inference from the failure to reveal the legal advice" [132].

As to J L Holdings, Heydon J said that it was sufficient to hold that, at least in jurisdictions having rules similar to rr 21 and 502, the case "has ceased to be of authority", and that the Rules must be applied without preconceptions derived from it [133]. He referred to a common, though far from universal, opinion in the judiciary and the legal profession that J L Holdings, whether correctly understood or not, has had a damaging influence on the conduct of litigation [133]. He quoted Bryson J, who said that forbearance and liberality towards late amendments leave litigants with less incentive to do their thinking in due time, and that the burden tends to fall on parties who have not been delinquent [133].

Noting that the grounds of appeal did not complain of it, and lest silence be taken as approval, Heydon J then reviewed how ANU had conducted the litigation and how the Supreme Court had resolved it [134]. He said that commercial litigation has significant claims to expedition, because a failure to resolve commercial disputes speedily is injurious to commerce and hence to the public interest [137]. He said that the primary judge's reaction to ANU's application on 15 November 2006 was surprising, as such applications are usually decided with extreme speed [143]. The course the primary judge took gave ANU half of the adjournment it wanted before any opportunity to investigate the merits of that course [146]. After the directions of 27 November 2006, in his words, "the whole of the four weeks set aside for the trial vanished" [148].

Unless there was some good explanation not revealed to the Court, Heydon J called the delay of more than ten months after 8 December 2006 "deplorable", and, for a fairly routine procedural application, "alien to every axiom of modern litigation" [151]–[152]. He accepted Aon's suggestion that the delay led to some deficiencies in the judgment, including its failure to refer to the affidavit evidence or the cross-examination of ANU's solicitor [153]. He said that the directions of 15 and 27 November 2006 were contrary to the precepts of r 21, and that it could not be said that ANU complied with its obligation under r 21(3) to help the court achieve the objectives [154]. He also noted that the Court of Appeal heard the appeal on 27 and 28 February 2008 and gave judgment on 25 August 2008, a delay of nearly six months with no explanation [155].

Heydon J concluded that the case does merit a place in the precedent books, for "the numerous examples it affords of how litigation should not be conducted or dealt with" [156]. He described a party failing in its duty to assist the court and a court not achieving the objectives it had a duty to achieve, adding: "The torpid languor of one hand washes the drowsy procrastination of the other" [156].

Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed with costs [117]. It set aside orders 2 and 3 of the orders of the Court of Appeal dated 25 August 2008 and in their place ordered that the appeal to that court be allowed, that the orders of Gray J made on 12 October 2007 be set aside, and that ANU's application for leave to amend the further amended statement of claim be dismissed with costs [117]. The joint judgment noted that the parties would need to list the matter in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory for further directions towards final determination [117].

Why it matters

The joint judgment states that an application for leave to amend should not be approached on the basis that a party is entitled to raise an arguable claim subject to costs, and that statements in J L Holdings suggesting only a limited application for case management should not be applied in the future [111]. French CJ said that, to the extent stated in his reasons, J L Holdings should not be regarded as authoritative, and Heydon J said that, at least in jurisdictions with similar rules, it has ceased to be of authority [6], [133]. The joint judgment noted a possible point of distinction with French CJ as to what J L Holdings holds, but no difference as to the principles now to be applied [116].

The joint judgment said that the importance of r 21 to an application for leave to amend is to be determined by reference to its own terms, and Heydon J supported his reading of rr 501 and 502 as a matter of construction of those particular rules [91], [119]. French CJ reached his conclusion without having regard to r 21, and said that delay and waste of public resources are relevant and mandatory considerations even under rules unaffected by the 1998 United Kingdom reforms [24], [36].

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