Apple Computer v Wily
(2003) 46 ACSR 729 · [2003] NSWSC 719
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Apple Computer v Wily [2003] NSWSC 719 is a decision of Barrett J in the Equity Division (Corporations List) of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, given on 12 August 2003. Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd, by far the largest creditor of Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd, sought the removal of Buzzle's liquidator, Mr Wily, or an inquiry into his conduct, alleging that he had taken a partisan position for certain directors who were in litigation with Apple [2]–[4], [33]. Barrett J held that Apple had not made out a case for removal or inquiry [38], [42]. He dismissed Apple's claims for Mr Wily's removal, for an inquiry under s 536 and for reversal of the decision to issue examination summonses and an order for production, and stood over the rest of the originating process, including the claim to set aside the summonses and the order, to 8 September 2003 [2], [46].
Facts
Apple imports and distributes computer equipment through resellers, and in the first half of 2000 seven of its resellers decided, with Apple's knowledge and co-operation, to combine their businesses in a new company [6]. Apple required security for the new company's debts in the form of a general charge over its assets and directors' guarantees [6]. Buzzle began operations on 13 September 2000, gave Apple a general charge, and its directors guaranteed its debts to Apple [8]. Buzzle soon had difficulties, including complaints about its Navision computer system, and by March 2001 it owed Apple $22 million and was in default [9]. On 30 March 2001 Apple appointed receivers and managers under its charge [9].
In April 2001 Apple sued thirteen guarantors in the Commercial List, and the defendants who had not settled, including Mr Hartono and Mr Liu, cross-claimed on grounds including unconscionability and misleading and deceptive conduct [11]. They alleged that Apple had engaged in what they called "channel stuffing" (insisting that Buzzle take stock it did not want as a price for stock it did need), had supplied defective and obsolete goods, had misled the promoters, and had inflated the debt [13]. Aircent Pty Ltd and Choice Connections Pty Ltd, creditors associated with Mr Hartono and Mr Liu, applied for a provisional liquidator, and Mr Wily was appointed provisional liquidator on 19 December 2001 [10]. Part of their reason was the view that Buzzle might join the Commercial List proceedings and pursue claims based on the matters in the cross-claims [12]. Mr Wily was appointed liquidator on 15 February 2002 [1].
Before the provisional appointment, Apple's solicitors, Clayton Utz, opposed Mr Wily's nomination, citing in their fax the "close referral relationship" between his firm and the solicitors who had acted for all the Buzzle directors [15]. On the day of his provisional appointment Mr Wily and his senior manager, Mr Sampson, met Mr Hartono and Mr Liu and received documents about channel stuffing [16]. At a meeting on 25 January 2002, Apple's solicitors pressed for the Commercial List hearing date not to be lost and offered help if Mr Wily decided to have Buzzle joined, while Mr Wily said he would have to decide whether to get involved and that joinder then seemed a fairly remote chance [17]–[18]. Apple's solicitor also raised the possibility that Apple might fund actions the receivers had identified [17]. Clayton Utz then wrote Mr Wily at least four letters encouraging him to become involved, and he did not reply [19].
Mr Brott, a solicitor for the Commercial List defendants, wrote of a need to "derail" those proceedings (his word), and spoke of that desire to Mr Sampson on 19 March 2002 in a conversation about examining Apple's executives [20]. In mid-February 2002 Mr Sampson had recommended that Apple personnel be examined [23]. On 19 March 2002 Surry Partners, the solicitors for the winding-up applicants, sent Mr Sampson a draft affidavit and nine draft examination summonses, and Barrett J inferred that Mr Wily's solicitors, MBP Legal, used those drafts in some way, though just how could not be said [25]–[26]. On 26 March 2002 Mr Wily obtained examination summonses directed to nine persons, six of them Apple employees, and an order for production directed to Apple [1]. The matters he wished to examine included when Buzzle became insolvent, the effectiveness of Apple's charge, whether Apple was a de facto or shadow director of Buzzle, and possible causes of action against Apple [24]. No examination had yet taken place, and the liquidator had no funds [5].
Press articles on 28 March 2002 reported Mr Wily's view that Buzzle had been "insolvent from day one", but there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that anyone on his behalf had contact with the media consultant retained by the Commercial List defendants [30]–[31]. Bergin J later adjourned the Commercial List hearing to three weeks from 24 June 2002, which clashed with Mr Wily's examination dates of 9, 10 and 11 July 2002 [32]. After an attempt to agree on a deferral failed, Barrett J granted Apple's application to defer the examinations on 20 May 2002 [32]. Bergin J's judgment disposing of the Commercial List proceedings, which runs to 412 paragraphs, was given after the summonses and the order for production were issued [43].
Procedural history
Apple filed its originating process on 14 May 2002 [32]. It sought an order removing Mr Wily as liquidator, an order for an inquiry under s 536 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) into his conduct, an order reversing or modifying his decision to obtain the summonses for the six Apple employees and the order for production, and an order setting aside those summonses and that order [2]. Before the hearing, on 20 May 2002, Barrett J deferred the examinations so that Apple and its officers would not be distracted from the Commercial List proceedings [32]. The cover records the hearing dates as 14, 15 and 16 July 2003, and no lower court.
Issues
The first issue was whether Apple had shown cause under s 473(1) of the Corporations Act for Mr Wily's removal as liquidator [3], [36]. Short of removal, the issue was whether his conduct warranted an inquiry under s 536 [2]-[3]. As a fall-back, the issue was whether the examination summonses and order for production should be set aside or at least curtailed [3].
Held
Barrett J
Under s 473(1), a liquidator appointed by the court may be removed by the court "on cause shown" [36]. Barrett J said the recent decision perhaps most often cited is Re Biposo Pty Ltd (1995) 17 ACSR 730 [36]. He relied on the analysis of the authorities by Austin J in Domino Hire Pty Ltd v Pioneer Park Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 496, which he quoted at length [36]. In that passage Austin J said that "cause shown" is not a narrow concept and can include bias, partiality or lack of independence, and referred to Bowen LJ's statement in Re Adam Eyton Ltd; Ex parte Charlesworth (1887) 36 ChD 299 that due cause is measured by the real, substantial, honest interests of the liquidation [36]. Austin J also said that cause may be shown where a perception of partiality has been created, even if independence has in fact been maintained, citing Santow J in Advance Housing Pty Ltd v Newcastle Classic Developments Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 230 and Young J in Re Biposo [36]. Austin J noted too that courts take a realistic attitude to funding, quoting Street J in Re Allebart Pty Ltd [1971] 1 NSWLR 24 that a creditor is to be encouraged, rather than criticised, in making funds available to a liquidator [36].
From these authorities Barrett J concluded that "cause shown" is a broad concept, concerned less with particular instances of wrong conduct than with a general enquiry into what benefits the administration and those interested in it, and with maintaining confidence in its integrity, objectivity and impartiality [37]. In a situation such as this, removal is warranted if the liquidator's conduct, taken as a whole, would ground in the mind of a reasonable observer a perception of lack of impartiality among the interests he serves and lack of objectivity in serving them [37].
Apple alleged that Mr Wily had been a "puppet" (Apple's word) of the Hartono and Liu parties, that his contact with Apple, on matters relevant to recoveries, had been confined to a single meeting with its solicitors, and that the only recoveries he had shown interest in were against Apple [33]. Mr Wily did not deny receiving useful information and assistance from the Hartono and Liu parties, and he had no funds to pursue investigations [34]. He argued that a liquidator's duty is owed to the body of creditors as a whole, so that action may be taken against one creditor for the general benefit, and that Apple's application aimed to remove or reduce the threat to Apple of his possible claims [35].
Barrett J held that Apple had not made out its case, and did not accept that Mr Wily had become the puppet of the Hartono and Liu interests or that his decisions on the summonses were motivated, or would be perceived to be motivated, by a desire to help them in their litigation with Apple [38]. It suited Mr Hartono and Mr Liu to give him information and he took advantage of it, but Barrett J was "not at all satisfied" that their motives coincided with Mr Wily's [38]. Mr Wily had no funds, and he saw potential claims against Apple as significant to the administration, though not to the exclusion of others [38]. The potential claims against Apple merited a degree of priority because of the potential challenge to Apple's charge, under which receivers were working on recoveries for Apple alone: if the liquidator could find a firm basis for having it set aside and succeeded, there would be significant favourable consequences for the general body of unsecured creditors [38]. Whether Apple might be a de facto or shadow director was also ripe for investigation and could add an important dimension to insolvent trading claims [38].
Barrett J found that Mr Wily took advantage of the assistance "for legitimate purposes and in a legitimate way and not as an exercise in partisanship" [39]. Mr Wily did not cause Buzzle to support the cross-claims in the Commercial List proceedings, as Aircent and Choice had hoped, and in declining to make Buzzle a party he also failed to fall in with Apple's solicitors' plans, which caused friction [39]. Barrett J described Apple's original objection to the appointment, so far as it was articulated, as insubstantial, being based, it seemed, on an association two places removed that had not been shown to be a potential source of adverse impact on the administration [39]. He found that Mr Wily, for his part, was uncooperative in not replying to several of Clayton Utz's letters [39]. He also said that Mr Wily's conclusion that Apple was being obstructive, drawn from a telephone call with Apple's solicitor on 15 March 2002, seemed to him inappropriate [21].
Apple's solicitors' letter of 16 May 2002 seeking agreement to defer the examinations gave two reasons: the clash with the Commercial List hearing and the pending application for Mr Wily's removal [39]. Barrett J said he would not see it as in any way incumbent on a liquidator to cooperate in the face of a threat to seek his removal, and that yielding to such pressure "might well entail a compromising of independence" [40]. He applied the reasoning of Palmer J in Macpherson v Sherman (in his capacity as Deed Administrator of Agriculture.com Pty Ltd) [2001] NSWSC 628, that a pending application to terminate a deed of company arrangement should not without more ground the postponement of an examination, to a deferral sought because of a pending application to remove a liquidator [40]. Including the second reason could have cast considerable doubt on Mr Wily's motivation had he agreed to the deferral, and made his preference for having the court deal with it much more understandable [40].
That Mr Wily had not yet sought to examine others, such as Arthur Andersen Corporate Services or Deloitte, did not count against him, because a liquidator "must start somewhere and must always be free to prioritise his work" [41]. Where funding is an issue, the availability of assistance for a line of inquiry will bear on priorities, and the vulnerability of Apple's charge was logically a question for early attention [41]. Barrett J held that Apple had not established an entitlement to an order for removal or an inquiry, nor shown grounds for reversing the decision to issue the summonses and order [42]. The proposed examinations and, subject to what he went on to say about the claim to set aside the summonses and the order, the documents sought were relevant to matters properly engaging Mr Wily's attention as liquidator [42].
The claim to set aside the summonses and the order for production raised separate and additional issues, particularly because Bergin J's comprehensive judgment, with a wealth of factual findings on Buzzle's dealings with Apple, came after they were issued [43]. Given Mr Wily's own statement of the value of that judgment, Barrett J held it was incumbent on him to re-examine closely the document requirements of the summonses and the order to see whether their scope could be curtailed, and it was his "clear impression" that curtailment was achievable [44]. Evidence from Ms Law, Apple's internal legal counsel, that assembling the documents would be a significant burden was an added reason for Mr Wily to address curtailment [45].
Orders. Barrett J dismissed the claims in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the originating process: the claim for orders reversing the decision to issue the order for production and the examination summonses, the claim for an inquiry under s 536, and the claim for Mr Wily's removal as liquidator [46]. He stood over the balance of the originating process to 10 am on Monday 8 September 2003 in the Corporations List [46]. On that day he expected to hear whether Mr Wily had been able to reduce the scope of the document requirements and of the examinations of the six Apple employees, whether the parties had found common ground on a regime for producing documents, and any application on costs [47].
Why it matters
The case states when removal of a court-appointed liquidator "on cause shown" is warranted where partiality is alleged: when the liquidator's conduct, taken as a whole, would give a reasonable observer a perception of lack of impartiality and objectivity [37]. It shows that a liquidator without funds may accept information and assistance from interested creditors, and give priority to claims against the largest creditor, without being partisan, where he does so for legitimate purposes [38]–[39], [41]. It also records Barrett J's view that a liquidator is not bound to cooperate in the face of a threat to seek his removal [40].
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