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Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Lewski

(2018) 266 CLR 173 · [2018] HCA 63

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Lewski [2018] HCA 63 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ), given on 13 December 2018, on five appeals by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, about directors of the responsible entity of a managed investment scheme who resolved to lodge with ASIC, and later acted on, amendments to the scheme's constitution that, if valid, would have introduced very substantial new fees payable to the responsible entity [1]-[2]. In one set of joint reasons the Court held that an amendment made outside s 601GC of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) has no interim validity and that an honest belief that the constitution had been amended did not answer the duties ASIC relied on, but that ASIC had not proved that the directors were involved in a contravention of s 208 [58], [63], [69], [73], [75], [78], [87]. The appeals were allowed in part: the primary judge's declarations of contravention were restored except those concerning one director, Mr Clarke, and those concerning s 209(2), and the matters concerning the other four directors were remitted to the Full Court for penalty, disqualification, costs and ASIC's cross-appeal [90], [92].

Facts

Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (APCHL) created the Prime Retirement and Aged Care Property Trust (the Trust), a unit trust whose business was retirement villages and aged care facilities, by deed dated 27 December 2000 [6]. ASIC registered the Trust as a managed investment scheme on 23 July 2001, the consolidated trust deed became its constitution (the Constitution), and APCHL was the responsible entity [6], [8]. Mr Lewski was a director of APCHL and its driving force, and he, his family and an associated company owned all its shares [8]. Dr Wooldridge, Mr Butler and Mr Jaques were directors at all relevant times, and Mr Clarke became a director on 21 August 2006, so that by the meeting of APCHL's board (the Board) on 22 August 2006 all five were directors (the Directors) [8].

On 20 June 2006 Mr Lewski sought legal advice from APCHL's solicitors about amending the Constitution without consulting the members, and he wanted to do so because he was concerned that they would not approve additional fees [11]–[12]. The additional fees he proposed (the Amendments) were a new Listing Fee of 2.5 per cent of the Trust's gross asset value immediately before listing on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), a new Removal Fee of 2.5 per cent of gross asset value if APCHL were removed as responsible entity (other than by reason of proven fraud or misconduct, or by ASIC), and a Takeover Fee based on gross asset value rather than net equity [13].

Clause 25.1(a)(i) of the Constitution provided that an amendment "shall not be in favour of or result in any benefit to the Responsible Entity", and cl 25.1(b) provided that any amendment must comply with the Corporations Act [16]. The solicitors identified s 601GC(1)(b) as an obstacle and advised that cl 25.1 could be read in two ways: either both paragraphs had to be satisfied, or cl 25.1(b) qualified cl 25.1(a), so that an amendment complying with the Corporations Act could be made despite noncompliance with cl 25.1(a) [15], [17]. The advice did not say which reading to prefer, and said in effect that the Amendments could be made without member approval if the Directors, none of whom was legally qualified, took the second reading and reasonably considered that members' rights were not adversely affected [17].

On 19 July 2006 the Board unanimously resolved to pass the Amendments (the Amendment Resolution), with all the Directors other than Mr Clarke voting in favour [19]. There was either scant or no discussion of the conflict between the interests of APCHL and its members, the gratuitous nature of the fees, the uncertainty in the solicitors' advice about the power to make the Amendments, or whether the Amendments were appropriate [19]. On 22 August 2006 the Directors passed a resolution (the Lodgement Resolution) to lodge with ASIC a consolidated Constitution incorporating the Amendments so that they would become effective, without further consideration of those matters [22]–[23]. The Deed of Variation, signed on 19 July 2006 but left undated on legal advice, was dated 22 August 2006, and lodgement occurred on 23 August 2006 [20], [23].

On 26 June 2007 the Directors resolved to list the Trust and that the Listing Fee be paid to APCHL, ten per cent in units at quotation and the remainder deferred over a three-year period subject to performance hurdles [24]. That resolution and further resolutions and acts of the Directors, collectively called the Payment Resolutions in submissions, enabled payment of the fee, which APCHL's auditors calculated at $32,939,947 [25]. On 7 April 2008, when as the Directors knew an agreement for Mr Lewski to sell his interests in APCHL was finalised or close to it, they resolved that the unpaid balance would become immediately payable in cash if interests associated with him ceased to control APCHL before the end of the deferral period [25]. On 27 June 2008 Mr Lewski, Mr Jaques and Mr Clarke, the only Directors at that Board meeting, resolved to execute a deed for payment of the remainder in units worth $5 million and $24,645,953 in cash, and the units went to a company controlled by Mr Lewski and the cash to APCHL and then to a company controlled by Mr Lewski [25]. The Court said the description of these payments as fees is "a euphemism", because none was a payment for any additional obligation on APCHL or the Directors or for any additional benefit to members [26]. The Listing Fee of about $33 million amounted to between one-third and two-thirds of the entire capital expected to be raised on the listing [26].

Procedural history

More than six years had elapsed since 19 July 2006, so s 1317K of the Corporations Act barred ASIC from alleging a contravention on that date, and it relied on the Lodgement Resolution and the Payment Resolutions [27]. ASIC alleged that the Lodgement Resolution breached what the reasons call the Negligence Duties (ss 601FC(1)(b) and 601FD(1)(b)), the Loyalty Duties (ss 601FC(1)(c) and 601FD(1)(c)), the Improper Use Duties (s 601FD(1)(e)) and the Compliance Duties (ss 601FC(1)(m) and 601FD(1)(f)) [28]. It alleged that the Payment Resolutions breached the Loyalty Duties and the Compliance Duties, that APCHL contravened s 208 by actually paying the Listing Fee (the Listing Fee Payments), and that each Director contravened s 209(2) by involvement in that contravention [29]–[30].

The primary judge, Murphy J, held the Amendment Resolution invalid, because s 601GC(1) required a responsible entity amending without a special resolution of members reasonably to consider that the change would not adversely affect members' rights, the Amendments affected those rights, and APCHL did not consider whether they would adversely affect them [31]. His Honour held that the Directors did not read and understand the effects of the Amendments before passing the Amendment Resolution or the Lodgement Resolution, and that the effects were not considered by the Directors acting as a Board [32]. He found all the alleged contraventions established, although the position of Mr Clarke, who was not a director at the time of the Amendment Resolution, was different in some respects [35]. His Honour made 47 declarations of contravention under s 1317E, disqualified each Director except Mr Clarke from managing corporations under s 206C (Mr Lewski for 15 years), and ordered pecuniary penalties against each Director under s 1317G (Mr Lewski $230,000 and each other Director $20,000) [36]–[37].

The Directors, but not APCHL, appealed to the Full Court (Greenwood, Middleton and Foster JJ), and ASIC cross-appealed on the adequacy of the penalties and disqualifications [38]. The Full Court held that, although the Amendment Resolution was, in its words, "invalid" and "no decision at all", the Amendments had "interim validity" and once lodged with ASIC would be "valid until set aside" [38]. It also said that "[t]he Directors were entitled to act in accordance with the Constitution which they honestly believed existed, and make decisions accordingly", and concluded that APCHL and the Directors were not liable for breaches of duty under ss 601FC and 601FD because they honestly believed that the Constitution had been amended [39]. The Full Court overturned the finding that Mr Clarke had voted for the Lodgement Resolution, which was the sole basis for the finding of contravention against him for the events of 22 August 2006, and in the High Court ASIC did not seek to disturb its orders in relation to him [39], [41]. Before orders were made APCHL was joined on the Directors' application and, as ASIC had submitted it should, the Full Court reconsidered its reasons but did not depart from them, and it set aside all the primary judge's declarations and orders and dismissed ASIC's cross-appeals without needing to consider them [40].

The reasons cite the primary judgment as Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) (In liq) (Controllers appointed) [No 3] (2013) 31 ACLC ¶13-073 and the Full Court's reasons as Lewski v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2016) 246 FCR 200 and Lewski v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [No 2] (2017) 352 ALR 64 [11], [38], [40].

Issues

As a logically anterior matter, a notice of contention by the Directors other than Mr Clarke (the active respondents) raised whether a member's "right to have a managed investment scheme administered according to its terms", in the notice's words, is a member's right under s 601GC(1)(b) [43], [45]. ASIC's first ground was that the Full Court erred by concluding that Pt 5C.3 of the Corporations Act, which includes s 601GC(1)(b), contains a concept of interim validity [42]. Its second ground was that the Full Court erred in finding APCHL and the Directors not liable for breaches of duty under ss 601FC and 601FD because they honestly believed that the Constitution had been amended [42]. Its third ground was that the Full Court erred in concluding that ASIC bore the onus of proving that the Listing Fee Payments were not authorised by the Constitution consistently with s 208(3) [42].

Held

Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Edelman JJ (joint reasons)

All five judges joined in one set of reasons; no judge wrote separately and there was no dissent. The active respondents objected that ASIC's first two grounds had not been pleaded at trial, but the Court found no substance in this, because ASIC had pleaded that lodgement was not effective to amend the Constitution and that passing the Lodgement Resolution breached the four groups of duties, on facts that existed on both 19 July and 22 August 2006 [43]-[44].

Section 601GC(1) confers a power to amend that can be exercised "if, but only if", either para (a) (special resolution of the members) or para (b) (the responsible entity reasonably considers the change will not adversely affect members' rights) is met [46]–[47]. The Court said the simple answer to the notice of contention lay in the concession by senior counsel for Dr Wooldridge, Mr Butler and Mr Jaques that, if "right" in s 601GC means "interest", the Amendments adversely affected members' rights, and that "right" is used in that sense in s 601GC(1), "interest" having a broad meaning that includes the members' concern with the due administration of the Trust [50]. The Court drew support from the definitions in s 9, under which an interest in a managed investment scheme is a right to benefits produced by the scheme whether or not enforceable, and from the protective purpose of s 601GC(1), which requires a broad construction of members' rights [51]–[52]. On the active respondents' reading, member approval would be needed to change reports to members from semi-annual to annual, but not for an amendment requiring a payment out of scheme property that would remove most of the members' equity [53].

The Court said its interpretation accords with the prevailing authority, 360 Capital RE Ltd v Watts (2012) 36 VR 507, where the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria unanimously rejected a contrary submission relying on decisions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and, following Gordon J, held that members' rights included the right "to have a managed fund managed and administered in accordance with the constitution of the fund" [54]-[55]. That does not deny efficacy to s 601GC(1)(b): it may be that very few, if any, amendments would not affect members' rights in this broad sense, but amendments can still be made where they reasonably are not considered to affect those rights adversely, such as abbreviating a period for redemption of units from 90 days to 60 days [55]. The meaning of "members' rights" is to be determined by the statutory context and purpose, not derived from philosophical conceptions of a right [56]. As the primary judge correctly held, each of the Lodgement Resolution and the Payment Resolutions adversely affected the members' interests, and therefore their rights, so the notice of contention failed [57].

On the first ground, the Court described the Full Court's concept as more accurately one of qualified voidability or qualified interim validity, since the Full Court said noncompliant amendments would only "ordinarily" be valid until set aside, left open that an amendment would have no effect if the directors knew or had reason to believe there was no authority to make it, and treated the notion as taking effect only once the amendments were lodged [58]. That notion is not supported by the text of s 601GC, which confers a power and defines its scope, or by its protective purpose [58]. The Full Court's analogy with Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 was "inapt", because the authority to amend derives from s 601GC(1) itself, the sub-section contains a rule and is not expressed in indeterminate language, and public inconvenience cannot ignore the injustice to members of an amendment permitting $33 million of their equity to be paid away without authority [59].

A notion of interim validity would also be in considerable tension with the structure of the Corporations Act, first because ss 1318 and 1322(4)(c) give the Court wide latitude to grant relief closely tailored to the case, which is inconsistent with turning the lodgement requirement in s 601GC(2) into a blunt guarantee of interim validity qualified only by dishonesty [60]. Secondly, s 1322(2) establishes a presumption of validity only for a procedural irregularity, and only unless the Court is of the opinion that the irregularity has caused or may cause substantial injustice that cannot be remedied by any order of the Court [61]. Thirdly, interim validity has never been suggested to apply to unauthorised amendments to the constitutions of corporations, and it is inconsistent with general law principles on unauthorised amendments to a trust deed without consent of the beneficiaries, which are relevant because s 601FC(2) creates a statutory trust of scheme property [62]. The first ground was upheld [63].

On the second ground, the Court identified the premise of the Full Court's conclusions as being that, in the absence of any new facts or knowledge, any breach of duty was spent after the Amendment Resolution [64]. The Court rejected the submission that the Lodgement Resolution merely performed a duty under s 601GC(2), because that sub-section is concerned with amendments validly made, does not oblige a responsible entity to lodge an amendment invalidly made, and does not confer validity on one [65]. Lodgement was "no mere administrative task", since the resolution and the dating of the Deed were acts intended to give legal effect to the Amendment Resolution, which even if valid would have remained inchoate until dated and lodged [66]. The Payment Resolutions, by which the Listing Fee was resolved to be paid in an accelerated manner, also attracted, at least, the Loyalty Duties and the Compliance Duties [67].

The Negligence Duties involve an objective test of the care a reasonable person would exercise, tailored to the circumstances, and, as the primary judge concluded, on 22 August 2006 each Director other than Mr Clarke ought reasonably to have known that his consideration of the Amendments on 19 July 2006 was inadequate [68]. The Court said that the Full Court's conclusion that "a reasonable director, honestly believing the previous decisions to be adequate, would not normally re-visit such decisions" "missed the point" that the vote for the Lodgement Resolution was the step taken to facilitate giving legal effect to the Amendments [69].

The Loyalty Duties comprise two separate duties, to act in the best interests of the members and to give priority to the members' interests if they conflict with those of the responsible entity [70]. The first is not purely subjective: as Bowen LJ said of the equitable progenitor of the duty, in Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654, otherwise a wholly irrational but honest director could conduct the company's affairs by "paying away its money with both hands in a manner perfectly bonâ fide yet perfectly irrational" [71]. It is a duty to act in the members' best interests rather than to secure the best outcome for them, and the relevant purpose and terms are the existing legal purposes and terms of the Constitution, not those honestly believed to exist [71]. The second duty is narrower in one respect than the equitable rule on conflict of interest and duty, because it proscribes only acts in the course of a conflict that do not give priority to the members' interests, but it is not satisfied by an honest or reasonable belief [72]. It was therefore not sufficient that the Directors acted honestly in the belief that the Constitution had been amended, and the primary judge correctly concluded that none of them could reasonably have believed it to be in the members' best interests to bring the Amendments into effect by the Lodgement Resolution or to make the accelerated Listing Fee Payments by the Payment Resolutions [73]. His Honour also correctly concluded that the Directors should have voted against the Lodgement Resolution in order to prioritise the members' interests in APCHL complying with the Constitution [73].

The Full Court gave no specific reasons on the Improper Use Duties, must be taken to have relied again on the Directors' honest belief, and erred in treating those duties as fulfilled by it [74]–[75]. The Court quoted what it said had been repeatedly said in the High Court, citing R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501 and Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (In liq) v Carabelas (2005) 226 CLR 507, that "[i]mpropriety does not depend on an alleged offender's consciousness of impropriety" and consists in a breach of the standards of conduct that reasonable persons with knowledge of the duties, powers and authority of the position and the circumstances would expect [75]. The same principles generally apply to s 601FD(1)(e), and the primary judge correctly found that the Lodgement Resolution had the same improper purpose as the Amendment Resolution, which was to provide an advantage to APCHL [76]. No reasonable person in each of the Directors' positions could have considered it proper to pass the Lodgement Resolution [76].

On the Compliance Duties the Full Court again gave no specific reasons, and the premise that the Directors had acted honestly did not address the objective duty in s 601FD(1)(f) to take all steps that a reasonable person in the Director's position would take [78]. The primary judge's declarations recorded that a reasonable person in each Director's position would have obtained clear legal advice, a judicial direction or member approval for the Listing Fee Payments, and the Court held that correct given the highly unusual and equivocal nature of the solicitors' advice and the acceleration of the payments [78]. The appeals therefore succeeded on the first and second grounds [90].

On the third ground, involvement under s 79(c) required ASIC to prove that each Director was intentionally involved in the contravention with knowledge of all its essential elements, for which the Court cited Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 [80]. It was common ground that ASIC could not prove that the Directors knew the Constitution did not authorise the Listing Fee, so the issue was whether a lack of authorisation in the Constitution was an essential element of the contravention of s 208 [80]. The elements in s 208(1)(a) to (d), which include member approval, must be pleaded and proved by the person alleging the contravention, while an exception under s 208(1)(e) must be pleaded and proved by the person relying on it [81], [83]. The Court rejected ASIC's submission that s 208(3), which provides that sub-s (1) "does not prevent the responsible entity from paying itself fees" as provided for in the constitution under s 601GA(2), was another such exception, and held that it defines the scope of s 208(1)(d) [82]–[83]. Section 208(3) sets out when a responsible entity's right in the constitution to be paid fees out of scheme property is taken to be approved by the members, namely where the right is specified in the constitution and available only in relation to the proper performance of its duties [86]. Since s 208(3) is directed to member approval under s 208(1)(d), which ASIC must prove was not obtained, the Full Court was correct that ASIC needed to prove that the Directors knew the Constitution did not authorise the Listing Fee, and ASIC did not do so [87]. The third ground failed [88].

Orders. In Matters M79, M80, M81 and M82 of 2018 (the appeals concerning Mr Lewski, Dr Wooldridge, Mr Butler and Mr Jaques), the Court allowed each appeal in part and set aside orders 2 to 6 of the Full Court's orders of 1 November 2017 [92]. In their place it ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed in part, that declarations 13, 21, 29, 37 and 40 to 47 and orders 1.1 to 1.4 and 2.1 to 2.5 of the primary judge's orders of 2 December 2014 be set aside, that order 3 of those orders be set aside and the second to fifth defendants pay ASIC's costs of and incidental to the proceeding, and that ASIC pay the appellant's costs of and in connection with the dispute as to the form of orders [92]. It remitted each of those matters to the Full Court for determination of penalty and disqualification orders, costs and the cross-appeal, and ordered the first respondent in each (the director) to pay ASIC's costs of the appeal to the High Court [92].

In Matter M83 of 2018, concerning Mr Clarke, where the orders were not in dispute, the Court allowed the appeal in part, set aside the Full Court's orders of 1 November 2017 and ordered instead that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed in part, that declarations 40 to 47 and order 2.5 be set aside, that ASIC's claim in paragraphs 6 to 19 of its originating process dated 21 August 2012 be dismissed so far as it was made against Mr Clarke, and that ASIC pay Mr Clarke's costs at trial and in the Full Court, including reserved costs [41], [93]. There was no order as to the costs of the appeal to the High Court in that matter [93].

The effect was to reinstate all the primary judge's declarations other than those concerning Mr Clarke and those concerning the contraventions of s 209(2), and to leave the Full Court to determine what, if any, effect the third ground has on the penalties and disqualifications for the Directors other than Mr Clarke and on the orders as to costs [90]–[91].

Why it matters

The case matters because it holds that "right" in s 601GC(1) is used to mean "interest", which requires a broad construction of members' rights and confines a responsible entity's power to amend a scheme's constitution without a special resolution of members [52], [56]. It rejects any notion of interim validity for an amendment made outside s 601GC(1), and holds that s 601GC(2) does not confer validity on an amendment invalidly made [58], [63], [65]. It holds that an honest belief that a constitution has been amended is not by itself an answer to the Negligence, Loyalty, Improper Use and Compliance Duties, and it identifies ss 1318 and 1322(4)(c) as mechanisms under which the Court may grant relief [60], [69], [73], [75], [78]. It also holds that involvement in a contravention of s 208 requires knowledge of all the essential elements, so that ASIC needed to prove that the Directors knew the Constitution did not authorise the Listing Fee [80], [87].

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