Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Wily & Hurst
(2019) 137 ACSR 1 · [2019] NSWSC 521
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Wily & Hurst [2019] NSWSC 521 is a decision of Brereton J, sitting alone in the Corporations List of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, given on 9 May 2019. ASIC asked the Court to inquire, under s 536 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), into the conduct of two liquidators, Mr Wily and Mr Hurst, in the 2009 liquidations of twelve companies that had provided services to Crystal Carwash Pty Ltd [2]–[3]. Brereton J was not satisfied that there was a well-based suspicion that the liquidators had fallen short of the standard expected of reasonably competent liquidators, and held that, even if there were, the discretionary considerations did not warrant an inquiry [134]–[138]. The Court ordered that the originating process be dismissed with costs [139].
Facts
Mr Wily was registered as a liquidator in 1991 and as an official liquidator in 1995, and from about 2004 practised as an equity partner in the insolvency firm Armstrong Wily [1]. His registration had been suspended for four months from 25 November 2003 by order of the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board (CALDB) [1]. Mr Hurst became a registered liquidator in 1997 and an official liquidator in 2005, and became a salaried partner in Armstrong Wily in 2005 [1].
Crystal Carwash Pty Ltd operated car wash sites in metropolitan Sydney, and its recorded director was Mr Anthony Sahade [5]. In October 2007 Mr Wily was appointed liquidator, in creditors' voluntary windings-up, of seven companies that had provided services to Crystal Carwash (the 2007 Companies); Mr Hurst was not an appointee, though he had some limited involvement in them as Mr Wily's employee [2]. All but one of the 2007 Companies had their registered office at an address in Coogee which, according to the ASIC database, was the home address of Anthony Sahade's father, Victor Sahade [6].
Between 11 March and 31 August 2009, Mr Wily and Mr Hurst were jointly appointed liquidators, in creditors' voluntary windings-up, of twelve companies (the 2009 Companies), all of which provided services to Crystal Carwash, apparently largely in substitution for the services the 2007 Companies had provided [2]. Eleven of the 2009 Companies provided labour hire to Crystal Carwash at its car wash sites, while Stone Cliff provided administrative services [8]. Five of the 2009 Companies had the same named directors as five of the 2007 Companies had had when they went into liquidation [9]. The main unsecured creditors of the 2009 Companies were the Australian Taxation Office, owed about $1.15 million across all the companies, and Employers Mutual, owed $163,000 in unpaid workers compensation premiums [10]. All the 2009 Companies had been deregistered, the last in May 2011 [11].
ASIC learned from media reports in about September 2010 that the Fair Work Ombudsman was investigating Crystal Carwash and its principals, and made preliminary enquiries up to 27 June 2012 [13]. ASIC had separately been investigating Mr Wily on matters entirely unrelated to the 2009 Companies, a Paddington Bowling Club investigation with which a Vanuatu investigation had been amalgamated [12]. That investigation was finalised in February 2013 with no action taken against Mr Wily, and on 6 December 2013 ASIC Enforcement opened an investigation into the liquidations of the 2009 Companies [14]. ASIC issued some 52 notices for the production of documents and conducted 26 interviews or examinations, including examinations of Mr Wily over three days in July 2015 and of Mr Hurst on 20 August 2014 and 30 July 2015 [15].
In April 2017 Mr Wily resigned all his appointments and retired from practice, and he did not apply to renew his registration [17]. Because he had resigned all his appointments and was no longer an external administrator of any company, ASIC is taken by s 1560(4) to have cancelled his registration as a liquidator [17]. On 3 July 2017 Mr Wily made an open offer to undertake, without admissions, to retire permanently from the insolvency profession and not to apply for registration as a liquidator in the future, on condition that the proceedings be dismissed with no order as to costs; the offer was rejected, and he renewed it at the hearing [18]. Mr Hurst left Armstrong Wily in 2012 to found his own firm, now HoskingHurst Pty Ltd, where he continues to practise, apparently without attracting any further adverse notice [4].
Procedural history
On 15 December 2016 ASIC filed an originating process seeking an inquiry under s 536 into the conduct of the liquidations of each of the 2009 Companies [3]. As final relief it sought orders that each liquidator lodge a request under s 1290(1) for the cancellation of his registration, be prohibited from holding office as a liquidator or in similar roles for such period as the Court thought fit, and be restrained from applying for registration as a liquidator [3]. ASIC chose not to use the procedure in s 536(2) of reporting to the Court what it considered to be a misfeasance, neglect or omission, and instead made a complaint to the Court to found an inquiry by the Court [24].
After directions hearings in 2017, the application for an inquiry was heard on 5 and 6 September 2017 [19]-[20]. Section 536 was repealed by the Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016 (Cth) with effect from not later than 1 September 2017, but because these proceedings were commenced before the commencement day, the transitional provision in s 1617 kept s 536 applicable to them [25]–[26]. Brereton J said that the time that had passed since the hearing was too long and was his responsibility, explaining that other matters had been given higher priority given the absence of any present risk to the public interest [21].
Issues
The application concerned the first of three stages in proceedings under s 536, namely whether to conduct an inquiry at all, as distinct from conducting it and then deciding what action to take [34]–[35]. That stage raised two questions: whether there was a complaint to the Court about the conduct of a liquidator in connection with the performance of his or her duties, and whether, as a matter of discretion, an inquiry should be conducted [35]. A further question was whether s 536 could be invoked against a person who was no longer a liquidator, where the administrations had concluded and the companies had been deregistered [31].
Brereton J framed the main issues as whether there was a well-based suspicion that, in the 2009 liquidations, the liquidators had not acted to the standard expected of reasonably competent liquidators as to (a) conflicts and disclosure, (b) reporting under s 533 the possibilities of shadow directors and unlawful phoenixing, and (c) their other duties, and if so, whether there should be an inquiry as a matter of discretion [41].
Held
Brereton J
Adopting the Court of Appeal's description in Hall v Poolman, Brereton J described s 536 as conferring "a broadly expressed supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of persons in control of the affairs of a corporation" [27]. He held that the jurisdiction is of a supervisory and disciplinary character, and that its place in Part 5.6, together with s 513, makes it apply to voluntary as well as compulsory windings-up [28]. The power is exercised in respect of a particular liquidation or liquidations, rather than over the liquidators' profession generally, and although the Court could remove a liquidator from the liquidation under inquiry, he said "it may be doubted" that it could order his deregistration [29]. He observed that this was apparently why ASIC's final relief sought, "somewhat curiously", orders that the liquidators apply for their own deregistration [29]. The express reference to compensatory orders suggests the provision's original main purpose was compensation, but cases such as Hall v Poolman show that it confers a broader regulatory and disciplinary function [30].
On the further question, Brereton J held that "liquidator" in s 536 refers to a person who was a liquidator at the time of the conduct complained of, whether or not he or she remains one [32]. He read observations of Barrett J in BL & GY International Co Ltd v Hypec Electronics Pty Ltd, made about a deceased liquidator, as directed to whether the jurisdiction should be exercised as a matter of discretion, not as denying that it remained [32]–[33]. The deregistration of a company is not a bar to an inquiry, though it may bear on its utility [31].
To attract the jurisdiction, an applicant need not show a prima facie case in the strict sense, but an inquiry is not a roving commission, and there must be at least a well-based suspicion indicating a need for further investigation, meaning a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust as distinct from mere wondering [36]. Whether to order an inquiry is discretionary, the applicant must persuade the Court, and the discretion is exercised having regard to the purpose of regulating, supervising, disciplining and correcting liquidators in the public interest; the section is not concerned, at least directly, with the vindication of private rights [37]. Relevant factors include the gravity of the alleged misconduct, the strength of the evidence, the liquidator's explanation, other remedies, the progress of the liquidation, the money involved, the funds available for an inquiry, its likely benefit, the applicant's legitimate interest and delay, and the list is not closed [37].
On conflicts and disclosure, Brereton J accepted for present purposes that the liquidators knew or should have known of the features common to the 2009 Companies and shared with the 2007 Companies, but noted that ASIC did not allege any actual conflict or explain what the potential for conflicts was [42]–[43]. Common features among companies going into liquidation at about the same time were unremarkable and did not point to any conflict between the liquidators' duty and their personal interest or a duty to anyone else, and he described the allegation as "an amorphous reference to the potential for conflicts, with no specificity of how there might have been one" [43]. A common referrer of the 2009 Companies did not alter this, and he found it "extraordinary" that, after an extensive investigation including examinations of both liquidators, ASIC was unable to allege who the common referrer was [44]. Counsel for ASIC said that the finding ASIC would ultimately ask the Court to make was that the common referrer was more than likely Victor or Anthony Sahade, but accepted that he could not make that case solely on the evidence before the Court, adding that ASIC's suspicions remained [45]. Brereton J held that ASIC's inability to make that allegation "is telling", and that at its highest the Court was left merely wondering [46].
Even a potential conflict would not have prevented the liquidators from accepting appointment and acting, because the circumstances in which a liquidator must not accept an appointment are specified in s 532, and there did not appear to be any relevant basis on which either liquidator was disqualified under it [47]–[48]. Brereton J accepted ASIC's submission that liquidators must be and appear to be independent and impartial, but ASIC had not alleged that they were otherwise, and a mere potential for conflicts did not require them to decline to act [49]. Neither liquidator was disqualified from acting as liquidator of the 2009 Companies [50].
ASIC's principal contention became that the liquidators' Declarations of Independence, Relevant Relationships, Indemnities and Remuneration Methods (DIRRIs), required in a creditors' voluntary winding up by s 506A, disclosed no prior association or potential conflict, though its contentions did not in terms allege any contravention of that section [42], [51]–[52]. The keystone of its argument was that being liquidator of a 2007 Company gave Mr Wily a relationship, within s 60(2), with that company's named director, which should have been disclosed on appointment to a 2009 Company with the same director [54]. Brereton J did not accept that a liquidator has a relevant relationship with a person merely because that person is a director of the company in liquidation; in this context a "relationship" is one which creditors might think could potentially affect the liquidator's impartiality [56]. The liquidators were therefore not required to disclose in their DIRRIs that Mr Wily had previously been liquidator of a company of which the same person had been a director, and ASIC did not at that stage allege any relationship with either Sahade that would engage s 60(2) [57]. He was not satisfied that there was the required suspicion on conflicts and disclosure, and added that if the relationship were a relevant one, its nature, the arguability of the point and its being at the margin of the 24-month period would bear on the discretion [58].
On reporting under s 533, the liquidators had lodged reports for each of the 2009 Companies, in substantially similar terms and signed by Mr Hurst, which reported possible misconduct in failing to keep adequate financial records and insolvent trading, and answered "No" to a question whether there were shadow directors [61]–[62]. ASIC replied on 16 December 2010 that it had decided not to commence an investigation at that time [62]. Brereton J noted that ASIC's power of disqualification under s 206F is triggered simply by the making of a report under s 533, regardless of its content [64]. He held that s 533 does not require a liquidator to report that a company is operating as a group or is managed by a common guiding mind or will, let alone the mere possibility of that [68]. Nor does s 533 require a report that there may have been shadow directors; the form's question was not one s 533 obliged the liquidators to answer, and it asked whether, in their opinion, there were shadow directors, not whether there might be [69]. An allegation that a person is a shadow director is not easily established and is not to be inferred merely from a relationship between companies or co-ordinated activity between them [71]. If it had been alleged that the liquidators had formed the opinion that there were shadow directors and answered the question falsely, "there might well be something for inquiry", but there was no such assertion, and he was not satisfied of the required suspicion [72].
As to phoenixing, ASIC did not suggest that the liquidators were aware of, or involved in, the later companies said to have carried on the businesses of the 2009 Companies [75]. The allegation was a failure to report possible negligence, default or breach of duty under s 533(1)(b)(ii), not a possible offence under s 533(1)(a) [76]. The mere fact that, when a company goes into liquidation, another with the same ownership and directors begins to provide the same services to the same customers does not amount to illegal phoenixing [77]. These labour hire companies had no marketable goodwill or fixed assets, so they inherently had no assets capable of transfer to a new company by phoenixing [77]. Rejecting the submission that the breach of duty was placing the companies into liquidation to avoid paying creditors, Brereton J said that "liquidation is not a means of avoiding the payment of creditors; rather, it is a means of paying creditors, to the extent that the assets permit" [79]. If there was a breach of directors' duty, it lay in allowing the companies to incur liabilities, including taxation liabilities, that they could not pay, or potentially in denuding them of assets, and the liquidators had reported the possibility of insolvent trading [79]. He was not satisfied that there was the required suspicion on this allegation either [80].
On the other matters (books and records, investigations, potential claims, reporting to creditors and creditors' meetings), Brereton J treated as relevant s 545, under which a liquidator is not liable to incur any expense unless there is sufficient available property [81]–[82]. While there may be room for debate whether s 545 extends to a liquidator's own time, authority, including the judgments of Cohen J in Clasquin SA v AAR International Pty Ltd and Finkelstein J in Jenkins v Jonkay Pty Ltd, favours the view that what a liquidator is expected to do must be affected where there are no available assets [83], [85]. There were no available assets in any of the 2009 administrations, and the files showed that work was done to obtain financial information, including letters to each company's registered office and to each named director [88]. The erroneous preliminary admission of two proofs for voting at a creditors' meeting "could hardly warrant an inquiry", and he was not satisfied of the required suspicion on these matters [89]. ASIC itself acknowledged that these other allegations would not of themselves warrant an inquiry [90].
Turning to the discretion, Brereton J noted that ASIC proposed to call at least 13 witnesses, requiring not less than a week of court time [92]. ASIC had not advanced any case that the liquidators were party to a scheme to evade taxation liabilities; its allegations were essentially of omissions in asset-less administrations, and the more serious ones were framed in terms of potential conflicts and the possibility of shadow directors and phoenixing [95]. Any suggestion that there might be more to the liquidations than met the eye rose no higher than mere wondering or speculation, and given ASIC's ample investigatory powers and extensive investigation, the limited nature of the allegations was "striking" [95]. He concluded that the allegations were not of a strength or nature that would justify an inquiry [96].
On delay, ASIC was alerted to concerns in 2010 but did not begin inquiries until mid-2012, opened an investigation only in December 2013, and did not institute proceedings until mid-December 2016 [97]-[98]. Brereton J did not regard the evidence of lost records and faded memories as of much significance, but noted that this was not a defendant's application to stay proceedings for delay and that ASIC bore the onus of persuading the Court to order an inquiry notwithstanding its delay [101]. He did not agree that it was reasonable for ASIC to defer the investigation until its other investigations of Mr Wily had ended without adverse action, finding "a significant element of vexation in deferring one investigation ... until the others had come to nothing" [103]. Because Mr Wily practised until 2017 and Mr Hurst still practised, apparently without further complaint, the prospects of establishing present unfitness by conduct in 2009 were much diminished, a point he supported by quoting McHugh JA in Herron v McGregor [104]. That consideration, with the element of vexation, weighed against ordering an inquiry [105].
As to utility, ASIC, as regulator of the profession and representative of the public interest, had a legitimate interest in upholding the standards of the profession [107]. An inquiry could secure no benefit for the administrations or for creditors, and the relief sought did not include compensatory orders [109]. But the regulatory and disciplinary function of s 536 is not rendered inutile by that, or by the liquidator having submitted to deregistration, because formal findings uphold the reputation of the profession and inform any later application for reinstatement, as Spigelman CJ explained in New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins [110]–[111]. In particular, "liquidators should not be able to escape censure by resigning", though their current status and circumstances remain relevant [112].
As to alternative remedies, ASIC could have applied to CALDB under former s 1292(3) to cancel the liquidators' registration, which is the ordinary course for disciplinary proceedings by the regulator against a liquidator, though the Court retained a supervisory jurisdiction under s 536 [114]. More significantly, ASIC could itself have conducted an inquiry under s 536 and reported its findings to the Court [115]. Brereton J was unconvinced that the liquidators' rights were better served by asking the Court to conduct the inquiry; the real practical consequence of ASIC's choice was that they had one opportunity to be heard instead of two [117]. He held it relevant, though "far from decisive", that ASIC had not itself conducted an inquiry or formed the opinion, which it could have reported to the Court, that there had been a misfeasance, neglect or omission [118].
As to Mr Wily, the public interest in exposing and censuring impropriety survived the deemed cancellation of his registration, but was mitigated by the nature and strength of the allegations and by the delay, especially its vexatious aspect [119]. Any application by him for re-registration would go to a committee under Div 20 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), which assesses an applicant's conduct and fitness, so ASIC would be in a position to ensure that its concerns were considered [120]–[121].
As to Mr Hurst, he had not been an appointee of the 2007 Companies, had not introduced the 2009 Companies to the firm, did not then know the source of the referral, and relied principally on Mr Wily, through the firm's standard conflict check review form, to identify any conflict issues [123]. He was the junior appointee, an employee subject to Mr Wily's direction, appointed chiefly so that someone could act if Mr Wily were absent [124]. Mr Hurst accepted that, with hindsight, he should have been more actively involved in the 2009 liquidations [125]. Brereton J said there "can be no doubt" that a liquidator appointed jointly and severally must have an adequate and proper involvement in the liquidation, even where another liquidator has the day-to-day running of it, but held that the context and Mr Hurst's acceptance of deficiencies were relevant to whether an inquiry would be of utility [126]. Mr Hurst gave unchallenged evidence of procedures at HoskingHurst that minimise the risk of recurrence, including that joint appointments are exceptional, and no lapse in his professional conduct since 2012 had been suggested [128]–[129]. Brereton J held that the matters ASIC relied on as going to Mr Hurst's judgment, including his signing of ten almost identical s 533 reports, did not raise a serious concern about his discretion and judgment, and that it was "doubtful in the extreme" that present unfitness could be established from them [129]–[131]. He agreed with ASIC that Mr Hurst's lack of means to defend himself was no basis for declining an inquiry, reading the factor of available funds in Leslie v Hennessy and Hall v Poolman as directed to funds in the liquidation or of the applicant, not the respondent liquidator's circumstances [132]–[133].
In conclusion, Brereton J was not satisfied of a well-based suspicion on any of the three heads, noting on s 533 that the liquidators did report the possibility of insolvent trading, "which was the real vice" [134]. Even if those conclusions were wrong, the allegations were not of a strength or nature to justify an inquiry, and the passage of time for which ASIC was essentially responsible, the diminished prospects of proving present unfitness, the element of vexation and ASIC's choice not to conduct the inquiry itself weighed against one [135]–[136]. For Mr Wily, there was no need for action to protect the public, as he could not resume practice without ASIC having ample opportunity to have its concerns considered [137]. For Mr Hurst, whose role was subordinate and against whom there was no suggestion of a systemic or continuing pattern of misconduct, the prospects of establishing present unfitness were "remote in the extreme" [138].
Orders. The Court ordered that ASIC's originating process, which sought an inquiry under s 536 into the conduct of the liquidations of the 2009 Companies, be dismissed with costs [3], [139]. No inquiry was ordered [139].
Why it matters
It illustrates that at the first stage of proceedings under s 536 an applicant for an inquiry must show at least a well-based suspicion, not mere wondering, and that the regulator's inability, after an extensive investigation using its compulsory powers, to allege more than potential conflicts and possibilities counted against it [36], [46], [95]. It holds that a liquidator does not have a relevant relationship requiring disclosure under s 60(2) merely because he was previously liquidator of another company with the same director [56]–[57]. It also holds that s 533 did not require liquidators to report the mere possibility that companies were operating as a group or had shadow directors [68]–[69]. It shows that a regulator's delay in deferring an investigation until others had come to nothing can weigh against an inquiry, while liquidators cannot escape censure simply by resigning [103], [105], [112]. Section 536 has since been repealed and replaced by provisions of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), including the Court's supervisory powers in Div 90 [25].
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