Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd
(2013) 252 CLR 38 · [2013] HCA 7 · (2013) 295 ALR 638 · (2013) 87 ALJR 458 · (2013) 228 A Crim R 237
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Gageler JJ), given on 14 March 2013. The case came to the Court as a Special Case asking whether provisions of the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Q) (the Act), under which the Supreme Court of Queensland may declare an organisation to be a criminal organisation and may receive material kept from the respondent, infringe Ch III of the Constitution [96]–[97]. The Court answered "no" to each of the seven questions on validity, so none of the challenged provisions was held invalid, and it ordered that the respondents pay the costs of the Special Case. French CJ wrote separately, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ wrote jointly, and Gageler J wrote separately, all reaching that result, and no judge dissented [95], [173], [213].
Facts
On 1 June 2012 the applicant, the Assistant Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service, filed an application in the Supreme Court of Queensland under s 8 of the Act seeking a declaration under s 10 that the Finks Motorcycle Club, Gold Coast Chapter and Pompano Pty Ltd, said to be part of that Chapter, constitute a criminal organisation [8]. The application listed the Chapter's current, former and nominee members and the office-bearers and shareholders of Pompano Pty Ltd, and it was supported by 135 affidavits [8]. Its grounds were that the organisation consists of a group of more than three people based inside Queensland, that the members associate for the purposes of engaging in or conspiring to engage in serious criminal activity, and that the organisation is an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare and order of the community [9]. The supporting information included members' criminal convictions, and the application also stated that supporting information was contained in information declared to be criminal intelligence [10]–[11].
Before filing, the applicant had applied ex parte under s 63 for a declaration under s 72 that particular information was criminal intelligence [12]. As ss 66 and 70 required, the Supreme Court considered that application without notice to the respondents in a special closed hearing [12]. A person appointed under s 83 as the criminal organisation public interest monitor (the COPIM) attended and made submissions, and the Court made the declaration [12]. All or part of that information is relied on in support of the substantive application, which is pending [12]–[13].
Under s 10(1) the Supreme Court may declare a respondent a criminal organisation if satisfied that it is an organisation, that members associate for the purpose of engaging in, or conspiring to engage in, serious criminal activity, and that it is an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the community [17]. The Court need not be satisfied that all members so associate, and a declaration remains in force for five years unless sooner revoked [18]. A declaration has no coercive operation itself, but it enlivens or informs the Court's powers to make coercive orders, in particular control orders, public safety orders and fortification removal orders [25]–[26]. Control orders may prohibit a person from, among other things, associating with members of any declared criminal organisation and applying for or undertaking stated employment [101].
Section 59 defines criminal intelligence as information relating to actual or suspected criminal activity, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice a criminal investigation, enable the discovery of the existence or identity of a confidential source of information relevant to law enforcement, or endanger a person's life or physical safety [11]. A criminal intelligence application must be decided before any substantive application in which the information is to be relied on, and the Court must consider it without notice to any person other than the COPIM [110]. Section 78 requires any part of the hearing of a substantive application in which declared criminal intelligence is to be considered to be a closed hearing, which would exclude the respondents and their legal representatives but not the applicant or the COPIM [13]. Under s 76 an informant who has given criminal intelligence to a relevant agency cannot be called or otherwise required to give evidence, although an officer of the agency must file an affidavit with specified information about the informant, a statement that the officer believes the intelligence is reliable, and the reasons for that belief [13].
Procedural history
The respondents raised contentions about the validity of provisions of the Act, and on 5 October 2012 so much of the application as concerned validity was removed into the High Court under s 40(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) by order of French CJ and Crennan J [14]. On 26 October 2012 Kiefel J referred an agreed Special Case setting out questions for determination to a Full Court for hearing [15]. The Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland, the Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia intervened.
Issues
The Special Case asked who should pay its costs and whether each of the following is invalid as infringing Ch III of the Constitution [16].
- Question 1: s 66, by requiring the Court to hear a criminal intelligence application without notice to the person or organisation to which the information relates [16].
- Question 2: s 70, by requiring the Court to exclude all persons other than those listed in s 70(2) from the hearing of such an application [16].
- Question 3: s 78, by requiring a closed hearing of any part of the hearing of the substantive application in which the Court is to consider declared criminal intelligence [16].
- Question 4: s 76, by providing that an informant may not be called or otherwise required to give evidence, that the application and supporting material need not include identifying information about an informant, and that identifying information cannot otherwise be required to be given to the court [16].
- Question 5: s 10, insofar as it requires the Court to have regard to declared criminal intelligence which a respondent or its legal representative has not heard or received because of the Act's provisions [16].
- Question 6: s 10(1)(c), because of the nature of the judgment it requires the Court to make [16].
- Question 7: s 9, when read with s 8(5) and s 106 [16].
French CJ grouped questions (i) to (v) as going to the effect of the criminal intelligence provisions on the Court's defining characteristics, question (vi) as going to the nature of the function conferred, and question (vii) as going to the limited time to reply [66]. The joint reasons treated as the chief issue whether s 10 is invalid because the prescribed procedures impair the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, and treated the suitability of the unacceptable risk question for judicial determination and the short time to respond as subsidiary [97], [99].
Held
French CJ
French CJ wrote separate reasons and answered each of questions (i) to (vii) "no", with the respondents to pay the costs [95]. He said State and Territory legislatures cannot confer or impose on State or Territory courts functions which substantially impair their defining or essential characteristics as courts, and he framed the question going to validity as whether the challenged provisions substantially impair those characteristics of the Supreme Court [4]. He said the answer is "not black and white", because the open court tradition is adapted to protect the public interest in cases such as those involving national security, commercially sensitive documents and police informants, and the constitutional limits do not prevent parliaments from legislating to protect the public interest in such areas [5].
On question (vi), he rejected the respondents' submission that s 10(1)(c) required a policy assessment devoid of adequate legal standards and identified the Supreme Court with the Executive Government [21]. He said no implication from Ch III subjects State courts to the full doctrine of separation of powers, and that the s 10(1) power, when exercised by a court, can properly be characterised as judicial [22]. He added that this did not assume that State judicial power is defined in the same terms as Commonwealth judicial power, a question that was not debated [22]. He described the s 10(1)(c) criterion as "evaluative and purposive", saying the Court would assess, as an important if not dominant component of risk, the likelihood that the organisation and its members will be involved in serious criminal activity in the future [23]. In his view the statutory word "unacceptable" imports a requirement that the likelihood of continuing involvement in serious criminal activity is not trivial or transient [23]. The criterion is imprecise, but he said that does not deprive it of the character of judicial power, citing the plurality in Baker v The Queen and the same point made in Thomas v Mowbray [24].
He said a s 10 declaration provides a foundation for orders which significantly affect the common law freedoms of individuals and the interests of the organisation, so that in the ordinary course procedural fairness would require that the organisation have the opportunity to know and answer the case against it, yet the Act diminishes those protections for evidence declared to be criminal intelligence [30].
He read the Act as not, as a general proposition, displacing the rules of evidence in an application for a criminal organisation declaration, nor, in the absence of clear words, the Supreme Court's inherent powers [38]. An affidavit on information and belief admitted under s 61 in a criminal intelligence application could be relied on in the substantive application only with leave under r 395 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Q) (the UCPR), and even if admitted the Court would still decide what, if any, weight to give it [36]–[37]. The Court could revoke its ex parte declaration if it emerged that the applicant had not made full disclosure, which was not in dispute [43]. Where a statute requires an ex parte inquisitorial process, he said the Court, unless and to the extent precluded by the statute, retains inherent power to control that process to avoid abuse and injustice, extending to calling witnesses [44]. Rule 391 of the UCPR in any event allows the Court to call a witness on its own initiative, and nothing in the Act excludes that rule in the closed hearings [45]. He noted that the extent, if any, to which the inherent powers of State Supreme Courts are protected from statutory derogation by Ch III was not in issue [42].
He accepted that special closed hearings in which evidence is received in the absence of a party and its representatives travel beyond the procedures developed at common law for public interest immunity claims [47]. He referred to Al Rawi v Security Service, where a majority of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that a trial court had no inherent power to direct a closed material procedure [47]. He said Al Rawi did not answer the constitutional questions here: it was unnecessary to decide whether State and Territory Supreme Courts have such an inherent power, and the absence of an inherent power analogue does not determine the questions about a statutory procedure [49].
He said the COPIM does not act as an advocate for any respondent and resembles specially appointed advocates only "to a very limited extent" [54]. He reviewed, with caution because of their different constitutional and statutory settings, decisions on closed hearings and special advocates from Canada, the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights [55], [59]–[63]. He observed that the greater the degree of procedural unfairness and curial secrecy mandated by a statute, the greater the risk that it will impair the defining characteristics of the court [64]. Compared with those special advocate provisions, he said the COPIM provisions "adopt a fairly minimalist approach" to protecting a respondent's interests, though they remain relevant to the Court's ability to provide procedural fairness [65].
He said the defining characteristics of courts include the reality and appearance of decisional independence and impartiality, the application of procedural fairness, adherence as a general rule to the open court principle and the provision of reasons, and that those characteristics are not exhaustive [67]. He said those characteristics "are not attributes plucked from a platonic universe of ideal forms" and, being historically evolved and requiring application in the real world, "are not and cannot be absolutes" [68]. Both the open court principle and the hearing rule may be qualified by public interest considerations such as protecting sensitive information and the identities of vulnerable witnesses, including informants [68]. He cautioned that judgments as to validity cannot be "vehicles for imposing institutional uniformity on State judicial systems" [72].
On questions (i) and (ii), he treated the enquiry on a criminal intelligence application as analogous to the courts' traditional enquiry into whether material should not be produced in the public interest [73]. He said the s 59 criteria are important and substantive and are not to be satisfied by pro forma affidavits containing conclusionary statements [75]. He accepted that the effect of Pt 6 of the Act on the normal protections of procedural fairness is significant [78]. But he held that the Pt 6 provisions on a criminal intelligence application do not impair the Court's essential and defining characteristics, because the Court performs a recognisably judicial function, cannot be directed as to the outcome and retains significant inherent and UCPR powers [78]. He contrasted International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission, where orders had an immediate legal effect on an absent respondent's property rights, whereas a criminal intelligence declaration has no immediate legal operation, although it has legal consequences for later use of the information [79]. He said nothing in K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court required a different conclusion [80]. He answered questions (i) and (ii) in the negative [81].
On questions (iii) and (v), he said it is in the use of criminal intelligence in substantive proceedings that the Act most directly affects procedural fairness and the open court principle [82]. He described the general closing of proceedings by s 108 and the transcript restrictions in s 109 as "remarkable constraints" for which no plausible explanation was offered, though their validity was not in issue [83]. The respondents argued that denying the Court any discretion to balance secrecy against their interest in testing adverse evidence was repugnant to the judicial process, and that the COPIM offered no substantive protection [84]. He said a law that disadvantages one party in order to restrict, mitigate or avoid damage to legitimate competing interests does not for that reason impermissibly impair the defining characteristics of the court administering it [86]. Looking at the scheme as a whole, he listed factors supporting validity, including that the declaration involves judicial power, that the Court may refuse it even if satisfied of the criteria, that grounds based on criminal intelligence must be disclosed though not the content of the information, that the Court can order particulars and can have regard to degrees of unfairness in deciding whether to accept criminal intelligence, that it may call witnesses whom the COPIM may examine or cross-examine, and that the rules of evidence apply subject to ss 107(2) and 61 [87].
He said the provisions undoubtedly represent incursions on the open court principle and procedural fairness, but the Court retains its decisional independence and the responsibility to determine what weight, if any, to give criminal intelligence [88]. He said its power to control its own proceedings also suggests that it would have a discretion to refuse to act on criminal intelligence where doing so would cause a degree of unfairness that could not have been contemplated when the declaration was made [88]. He held the provisions valid, and answered questions (iii) and (v) "no", because they do not so impair the Court's essential or defining characteristics as to be beyond the Queensland Parliament's legislative power [89].
On question (iv), he accepted that the informant provisions place a respondent at a forensic disadvantage [92]. But he said the Court may accept, reject or give little weight to informant information, taking account of unfairness from the informant's anonymity, unavailability for cross-examination and the hearsay character of the evidence, so the provisions do not impair its defining or essential characteristics [92]. On question (vii), his short answer was that the provisions do not exclude the Supreme Court's power to extend the times fixed for filing a response [94].
Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ
Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ wrote joint reasons and concluded that the impugned provisions are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, and that the respondents should pay the costs [173].
They construed ss 8 and 10 as requiring the Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service (the Commissioner) to tell the respondent the whole of the case, and they determined the challenge on the basis that the application and accompanying affidavits must give detailed particulars of what is alleged and how the case for a declaration is put [103], [105]. They read the reference to criminal activity in the definition of criminal intelligence as requiring the identification of specific criminal offences, and the reference to prejudicing a criminal investigation as referring only to a continuing investigation [108]–[109].
They said it was unnecessary to answer three questions debated in argument: what role the COPIM has, whether a respondent can apply to discharge or vary a criminal intelligence declaration, and whether the Court can give a respondent's representative access to declared criminal intelligence [111], [115]. They recorded that no party or intervener submitted that the COPIM could or would stand in the shoes of a respondent organisation [112]. They said validity had to be determined on the footing that the provisions may, and at least commonly will, be applied according to their terms, the basic principle being that declared criminal intelligence is not to be revealed to the respondent or any representative [114].
They identified one central proposition behind the case for invalidity: that Ch III puts beyond State legislative power any enactment permitting a State Supreme Court to decide a disputable issue by reference to evidence or information of which one party does not know and to which that party can have no access, personally or by a representative [116]. They said that proposition is absolute, entrenches a particular form of adversarial procedure as a constitutionally required and defining characteristic of State Supreme Courts, and is founded not in any particular constitutional text but in what is said to be the logical consequence of earlier decisions [119]. They held that it cannot be adopted [120].
They said the principles first stated in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) have their roots in Ch III [122]–[123]. Drawing on Gummow J in Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld), they said the essential notion is repugnancy to or incompatibility with the institutional integrity of the State courts, which cannot be further defined in terms that necessarily dictate future outcomes, and that the doctrine does not imply into State Constitutions the separation of judicial power mandated for the Commonwealth by Ch III [123]–[124]. They said independence and impartiality are defining characteristics of all Australian courts, and that courts cannot be required to act at the dictation of the Executive [125]. But the notions of repugnancy and incompatibility are not to be treated as simply reflecting what Ch III requires for the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth [125].
They reviewed the four cases in which the Court had found State provisions repugnant to or incompatible with the institutional integrity of State courts [127]. They said the conclusion in Kable proceeded from the whole of the Act there and, in particular, its conscripting of the Supreme Court to procure the imprisonment of a named person [129]. In International Finance, s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) was held to require ex parte orders for the sequestration of property on suspicion of wrongdoing, for an indeterminate period, with no effective curial enforcement of the duty of full disclosure [130]–[131]. In South Australia v Totani, s 14(1) of the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) was held to authorise the Executive to enlist the Magistrates Court to implement the Executive's decisions [132]–[133]. In Wainohu v New South Wales, the critical feature was that the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) exempted eligible judges from any duty to give reasons [134]–[135].
Those alleging invalidity relied heavily on those cases, arguing among other things that the ex parte criminal intelligence process was not relevantly different from that in International Finance [136]. The joint reasons answered that the validity of one law cannot be decided simply by joining together statements from earlier cases about other laws, and that the critical questions are whether and why what was said can be applied [137]. They said Judge Henry Friendly was surely right to warn against what he called "the domino method of constitutional adjudication" [137]. They accepted that the procedures are novel, but said "Novelty does not, without more, supply the answer to that question" [138].
They recorded that those alleging invalidity did not submit that the Act conscripts the Supreme Court to do the Executive's bidding or trenches on its independence, or that it is beyond legislative power to require the Court to consider the criminal intelligence matters in private [140]–[141].
They rejected the submission that asking whether an organisation is an unacceptable risk is unsuitable for judicial determination, because accepting it would be contrary to Fardon and Thomas v Mowbray, and courts are often called on to make predictions about dangers to the public [143]. They also rejected the submission that the provisions expand the nature of the evidence beyond what would ordinarily be admissible [144]. In their view the provisions do not provide for the reception of evidence that would otherwise be irrelevant or inadmissible, but for the admission of evidence that would otherwise not be adduced because of the adverse consequences of tendering it [148].
On procedural fairness they began with Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police and K-Generation, in each of which at least a majority had upheld the legislation [149]. In Gypsy Jokers, s 76(2) of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA) allowed only the Court to have access to information properly claimed as confidential [150], [152]. They said the plurality's conclusion there proceeded from an acceptance that, as Crennan J rightly pointed out, Parliament can validly legislate to exclude or modify the rules of procedural fairness [152]. They said the decision "points firmly against accepting the central proposition", but explored the issue further lest it be said that a majority had not dealt with the point expressly [153]. In K-Generation the Court unanimously upheld s 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA) because the courts could determine for themselves whether information met the definition of criminal intelligence and what steps to take to maintain its confidentiality [154]. They rejected the respondents' distinction that the Act here prohibits giving a respondent or its representative access: even assuming that to be so, and without deciding whether such access could be ordered, the provisions are not invalid by reason only of that difference [155].
They said the rules of procedural fairness do not have immutably fixed content, adopting Gleeson CJ's observation that the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice [156]. They said an adversarial system assumes as a general rule that each party will know the case the other seeks to make, but the rule is not absolute, and where legislation provides novel procedures that depart from it the question is whether, taken as a whole, the court's procedures accord both parties procedural fairness and avoid practical injustice [157].
They made three points about the claimed denial of any opportunity to test criminal intelligence [159]. First, if the unfairness is that the respondent cannot test the material, telling the respondent's lawyer would not cure it, because the lawyer could not seek instructions about it or ask a member of the respondent to comment without disclosing it [160]–[161]. Second, s 72(2) expressly permits the Court, in deciding whether to declare information to be criminal intelligence, to consider whether the consequences of disclosure outweigh any unfairness to a respondent, and in many cases the Court would be bound to have regard to that fairness [162]. Third, the provisions deny a respondent knowledge of how the Commissioner seeks to prove an allegation, not knowledge of what the allegation is [163].
They said the Court would know that evidence constituting criminal intelligence had not been and could not be challenged directly, and the weight to give it would be for the Court to judge [166]. They said this does not rely on the Court to remedy a constitutional defect but shows that under the provisions the Court retains its capacity to act fairly and impartially, which they called "critical to its continued institutional integrity" [167]. Unlike the Act in Wainohu, they said, this Act does not alter the Court's duty to assess the cogency and veracity of the evidence [168]. They said that observing that the Court can and will be expected to act fairly and impartially "points firmly against invalidity" [169]. They said Al Rawi did not assist, because its proposition about inherent power, whose validity they did not need to examine, does not bear at all on the "radically different question" of the ambit of legislative power [170].
On ss 9 and 106, they noted that an application must state a return date within 35 days of filing, that the respondent must file its response at least five business days before that date, and that the Act makes no express provision for a respondent to seek an extension [171]. Those challenging the provisions did not in the end contest the submission that they should not be construed as excluding the power to extend time [172]. Applying the established principle that the Act takes the Supreme Court as it finds it, the joint reasons held that neither section shows a clear intention to prevent the Court from acting on a late response or affidavit, and they rejected the challenge [172].
Gageler J
Gageler J wrote separate reasons. He agreed with French CJ, for his reasons, that s 9 is not invalid because it limits the time to respond and that s 10(1)(c) is not invalid because of the nature of the judgment it requires [175]. On the other questions he agreed with French CJ's answers but stated his own view of what compatibility with the constitutionally mandated characteristics of the Supreme Court requires [176].
His view was that Ch III mandates the observance of procedural fairness as an immutable characteristic of a Supreme Court and of every other court in Australia, and that procedural fairness has a variable content but admits of no exceptions [177]. He said a procedure is unfair if it has the capacity to result in an order that finally alters or determines a right or legally protected interest of a person without affording that person a fair opportunity to respond to evidence on which the order might be made [177]. He said the criminal intelligence provisions have the potential, in some but not all cases, to result in a declaration or order being made without the affected organisation or individual being afforded a fair opportunity to respond to evidence on which it might be made [178].
He located the foundation in Ch III's allowing federal judicial power to be vested in State and Territory courts, which requires those courts to be able to act judicially and so to have institutional integrity [181]–[183]. He noted that two members of the majority in Kable held that a function cannot be conferred compatibly with Ch III if it is repugnant to the judicial process, explained in Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd as requiring that parties have an opportunity to present their evidence and to challenge the evidence led against them, a holding later applied by all of the majority in International Finance [185]. He said unfairness in a court's procedure saps confidence in the judicial process and undermines the integrity of the court [186].
He said no authority compels the conclusion that the proposition that a court cannot be required by statute to adopt an unfair procedure admits of exceptions [189]. He read Crennan J's statement in Gypsy Jokers, that Parliament can validly legislate to exclude or modify the rules of procedural fairness, in a context where she went on to find modification and not exclusion, noting that the joint majority judgment there did not go that far and that the cases she referred to raised no constitutional issue [190]. He said the statute in K-Generation relevantly required no more than that a court take steps to maintain confidentiality, and that the plurality stressed the range of procedures still available to provide procedural fairness [191]. Of Wainohu he said the Court did not "strain at the constitutional gnat of a statutory permission for a court not to give reasons only to swallow the constitutional camel of a statutory requirement for a court not to give procedural fairness" [191]. He said ex parte orders, and adjustments made to protect intellectual property, client legal privilege, public interest immunity, commercial confidentiality or the safety of a witness or informant, are modifications within an overall process that, viewed in its entirety, entails procedural fairness [192]. From United Kingdom and Canadian decisions he drew a common approach that the processes of a court, viewed as a whole, "can never be unfair", leaving questions of that nature, if they arise in Australia, for concrete cases [193].
He said "No court in Australia can be required by statute to adopt an unfair procedure" [194]. He said Ch III allows legislative choice as to "how, not whether," procedural fairness is provided [195]. He left the limits of that choice unexplored, including whether avoiding practical injustice in a particular context might necessitate confrontation and cross-examination [196].
He described a three-stage process: the declaration of criminal intelligence, the declaration of a criminal organisation, and the making of a control order, public safety order or fortification removal order [199]. He said the ex parte hearing at stage one does not of itself give rise to a want of procedural fairness, because that declaration has no effect on rights absent an application at a later stage [200]. He accepted as correct the Solicitor-General of Queensland's position that the unfairness consideration in s 72(2) is mandatory, and his concession that the s 72(1) discretion could never be exercised to make a declaration in the face of an assessment at that time that admitting the information in a substantive application would cause unfairness to a respondent [203]. He said the difficulty is that this assessment is a prediction made in advance, which may turn out to be wrong [205].
He rejected the suggestion that r 667(2)(a) of the UCPR allows a declaration to be set aside, because that runs counter to ss 73(2) and 74(1) [206]. He accepted that the inherent jurisdiction includes power to dissolve a declaration for fraud or material non-disclosure, but said the Act is inconsistent with any general ability of the Court to set one aside on a respondent's application or of its own motion [206]. He said the COPIM adds to the integrity of the process but "cannot cure a want of procedural fairness" [208]. He said the Court's ability to determine weight does not cure procedural unfairness either, since the relevant inquiry is what procedures should have been followed, and the appearance of a fair hearing in a court and confidence in the curial process are constitutionally mandated [209]. He said the width of the discretion fails for the same reason, because "A discretion as to the result is no cure for a flaw in the process" [210]. He said relying on a court to compensate in its reasoning for a want of procedural fairness is "in the long run, self-defeating" [211].
He said "The procedural difficulty demands a procedural solution", which lies in the capacity of the Supreme Court to stay a substantive application in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any case in which practical unfairness to a respondent becomes manifest [212]. He held the criminal intelligence provisions saved from incompatibility with Ch III only by the preservation of that capacity [212]. He answered each substantive question "no", adding that the answers do not determine questions not reserved and not argued, including whether s 108 is valid in requiring a closed hearing [213]–[214].
Orders. The Court answered the questions in the Special Case as follows.
- Question 1 (s 66): No.
- Question 2 (s 70): No.
- Question 3 (s 78): No.
- Question 4 (s 76): No.
- Question 5 (s 10, as to declared criminal intelligence): No.
- Question 6 (s 10(1)(c)): No.
- Question 7 (s 9, read with s 8(5) and s 106): No.
- Question 8 (who should pay the costs of the Special Case): The respondents.
None of the provisions was held invalid, and the respondents must pay the costs of the Special Case. The High Court did not decide whether the respondents are a criminal organisation, as that substantive application was pending in the Supreme Court [13].
Why it matters
The case matters because the High Court upheld, against a Ch III challenge, a State scheme that permits a Supreme Court to receive and act on material which must not be disclosed to a respondent or its representatives [89], [97], [173], [213]. Every judge gave the same answers, but the reasons differ on procedural fairness. French CJ looked to the features of the scheme as a whole, including the powers the Court retains to mitigate unfairness [87]–[89]. The joint reasons asked whether, taken as a whole, the procedures accord both parties procedural fairness and avoid practical injustice, and relied on the Court's retained capacity to act fairly and impartially [157], [167]. Gageler J treated procedural fairness as an immutable characteristic of a court and held the provisions saved only by the capacity to stay a substantive application where practical unfairness becomes manifest [194], [212].
The joint reasons rejected the proposition that Ch III entrenches a particular form of adversarial procedure in State Supreme Courts, and said their conclusions cannot be directly translated and applied to the exercise of federal judicial power by a Ch III court [119]–[120], [126]. The answers have limits: French CJ noted that the validity of ss 108 and 109 was not in issue, and Gageler J said the answers do not determine whether s 108 is valid in requiring a closed hearing [83], [214].
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