Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Limited v Hills Industries Limited
(2014) 253 CLR 560 · [2014] HCA 14 · (2014) 88 ALJR 552
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Limited v Hills Industries Limited [2014] HCA 14 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ), given on 7 May 2014 on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. A financier, AFSL, was induced by its customer's fraud to pay money to two of the customer's trade creditors, Hills and Bosch, and the question was whether its claim to recover the money should have been refused because the recipients had changed their position. [33]–[34] The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs, which left AFSL unable to recover from either recipient, as the Court of Appeal had held. [3], [32], [103], [167] All seven judges held that the recipients could keep the whole of the payments because of what they had done on the faith of them, in three sets of reasons with no dissent: French CJ; Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ jointly; and Gageler J. [31], [96], [160], [166]
Facts
AFSL was a business financier, and Hills and Bosch were manufacturers and suppliers of commercial equipment. [39] In August and September 2009, Mr Skarzynski, a director and shareholder of companies in the Total Concept Projects group (TCP), created false invoices suggesting that TCP was buying equipment from Hills and Bosch, and presented them to AFSL, which agreed to buy the equipment and lease it back to TCP. [40] AFSL paid each invoice amount directly to Hills or Bosch by electronic transfer, believing that it was paying for equipment which in truth did not exist. [41]–[42] AFSL's documents did not show an intention to discharge TCP's debts, but at Mr Skarzynski's request Hills and Bosch each credited TCP's accounts with the payments. [41]
Hills applied the money it received on 25 August 2009 to TCP's existing debt of $308,000. [48] Its case was that without the payment it would have pressed Mrs Skarzynski for a mortgage of her land and started recovery proceedings against TCP and the guarantors of its debt, whereas having been paid it did neither and instead reopened TCP's account and continued to supply equipment on credit. [48]
By mid-May 2009 TCP owed Bosch about $193,000, and Bosch obtained default judgments against TCP and its directors and shareholders in July and August 2009 and, by 28 August 2009, had placed garnishee orders on TCP's bank accounts. [50] Bosch received $198,000 from AFSL on 3 September 2009 and, on 15 September 2009, consented to the default judgments being set aside and discontinued its proceedings against TCP. [50]
More than six months passed between the payments and AFSL's demand, during which each recipient treated the debts as repaid, stopped pursuing them and continued to trade with TCP, and AFSL also continued to trade with TCP. [35] Before discovering its mistake, AFSL entered into further lease agreements with TCP and took secured guarantees from Mr Skarzynski and his associates, and in February 2010 Mrs Skarzynski executed a mortgage over the Skarzynskis' home in support of TCP's obligations. [43]
The fraud went undetected until late March or early April 2010, and AFSL made demand on Hills and Bosch on or about 6 April 2010. [42], [45] Receivers and managers were appointed to TCP on 12 April 2010 and a liquidator on 5 July 2010, and the liquidator's report of 27 July 2010 stated that TCP's total realisable assets were zero and its total liabilities were $11,143,322. [44]
Procedural history
Hills and Bosch rejected the demand, and AFSL sued them in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, claiming that the payments had been mistakenly made and that they had been unjustly enriched, and each relied on change of position. [3], [45]–[46]
The primary judge (Einstein J), in a decision cited in the joint reasons as (2011) 5 BFRA 555; [2011] NSWSC 267, held that AFSL was prima facie entitled to restitution from each recipient, less some deductions. [37], [47] He rejected Hills' defence, reasoning that TCP's precarious financial position made it unlikely that Hills could have recovered significant sums, so that Hills had shown no real detriment. [49] He upheld Bosch's defence, on the basis that Bosch had shown real detriment by the actual extinguishment of a legal claim to TCP's property. [50]
AFSL and Hills each appealed, and the Court of Appeal (Bathurst CJ, Allsop P and Meagher JA), in a decision cited as (2012) 295 ALR 147, dismissed AFSL's appeal and allowed Hills' appeal. [37], [51]-[52] Allsop P, with whom Bathurst CJ and Meagher JA agreed on this point, upheld the defence on the view that each recipient had lost a valuable opportunity to pursue its claims against TCP and was unable to demonstrate the extent of the resulting detriment. [53] Allsop P also held that each recipient could resist the claim, whatever the commercial worth of the TCP debt, either because of a bona fide discharge or because that discharge, with the payment away, could be seen as a change of position. [58] Meagher JA did not accept a separate defence of bona fide discharge of debt, but held that the discharge gave rise to change of position because it was equivalent to each recipient paying the money to TCP and receiving it back in discharge of the debt. [59] AFSL appealed to the High Court by special leave. [3]
Issues
The issue was whether AFSL's claim should have been refused because of the recipients' change of position and, as French CJ put it, the circumstances in which that defence may be invoked as a complete defence. [1], [33] AFSL's principal contention was that the question could not be answered by reference only to abandoning the opportunity to recover the debts and entering further transactions, and that what had been lost had to be valued to determine whether a recipient was worse off in economic terms. [36] It submitted that the enquiry was into each recipient's net enrichment, so that the defence operates only pro tanto, to the extent of the proven value of the debt or of the lost opportunity to recover it. [61] It also submitted that TCP's debts were worthless because TCP could not pay, so that the opportunities to recover were of minimal value and Hills and Bosch had given away nothing of value. [62]
Held
French CJ
French CJ held that the appeal should be dismissed, because the respondents suffered an irreversible detriment when they decided, on the faith of the payments, not to pursue their legal remedies against their fraudulent client and TCP. [4] His Honour said that change of position may apply as a pro tanto defence where the detriment can readily be quantified, that this was not such a case, and that the defence applied here as a complete defence. [4]
He traced the seeds of a general defence to Lord Mansfield in Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005 [97 ER 676], and noted that a general defence was denied by later judges while restitutionary remedies were linked to the fiction of an implied contract. [5], [13] He recorded that Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 164 CLR 662 (the ANZ Case) placed the basis of the action in restitution or unjust enrichment rather than implied contract, and that a general defence was recognised by Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 and in Australia in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353. [8], [15], [17]-[18] Unjust enrichment, he said, came to be seen as a taxonomical concept rather than as a principle of direct application in a particular case. [20]
In his view the defence should be applied in a way faithful to its origins in Moses v Macferlan, reflected in the general test of inequitable recovery adopted in Lipkin Gorman. [23] He rejected AFSL's description of disenrichment as the central core of the defence, saying that disenrichment, as propounded by Professor Birks, is "at best a circumstance which may define a class of case in which recovery could be held to be inequitable" and "not a unifying rule for the change of position defence". [17], [23] He said it may be that disenrichment, applied at the time of demand, defines a sufficient condition for the defence, but that the criterion of irreversible detriment proposed by Professor Bant is "a more useful and flexible guiding criterion" and "certainly more appropriate to the circumstances of this case". [23]–[24]
That criterion looks to detriment at the point of demand, which he justified by reference to the analogous requirement in estoppel explained by Dixon J in Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641. [23] He noted it could be argued that the time should instead be when the recipient became aware of the mistake, but said that in this case, and probably in most cases, the distinction does not matter. [23] He did not explore the limits of detriment or the links between detriment and receipt needed for a change to be on the faith of the receipt, but agreed with the joint reasons that detriment is not a narrow or technical concept. [25]
AFSL's central proposition, that where the change of position is a form of economic loss, including loss of an opportunity, the defence operates only to the extent of its value as determined by the court, was in his view "too general and should not be accepted". [26] Whether the defence is available depends on whether it would be inequitable for the recipient to refuse to repay, which he described as a judgment the recipient, properly advised, must be able to make within a reasonable time and at a reasonable cost. [27] He contrasted a recipient of $100,000 who gives $2,000 to a charity and may readily conclude that it should repay $98,000 with a recipient who decides, on the strength of the payment, not to pursue its legal rights against a third party, in which case whether the defence should operate pro tanto may depend on how far the detriment is quantifiable when demand is made. [28]
At the time of demand, he held, the respondents had suffered economic detriment well within the relevant class, because whatever prospect they had had of recovering from TCP before the payments no longer existed, whether or not the debts could be said to have been discharged or released. [29] He attributed the detriment in part to the passage of time, while saying that fault is not relevant to the outcome of the appeal. [29] Valuing the detriment would involve more than one counterfactual, and he said the extent of the defence is not to be determined by an elaborate and potentially expensive assessment that can only be undertaken long after demand, agreeing with the joint reasons in rejecting the valuation approach used to assess damages for loss of opportunities. [30] He held that the change of position was a complete defence, so that it was unnecessary to consider the other matters raised in the Court of Appeal's judgment and on the notice of contention. [31]
Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ
Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ held that AFSL's appeal should be dismissed, and framed the question as whether it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require Hills and Bosch to make restitution. [38], [69] Their Honours said there "can be no denying the equitable roots" of the principle governing the action, which they traced to Lord Mansfield in Moses v Macferlan. [65], [68] Reference to equitable notions, they said, does not invite a balancing of competing equities based on considerations such as fault, and the answer "is not at large, but neither is it simply a measure of the monetary extent to which the recipient remains enriched by the receipt at the time of demand for repayment". [69] Nor, they said, is a subjective evaluation of the justice of the case necessary or appropriate. [76]
One category of case in which it would be inequitable to require repayment, they said, is where the recipient has so far altered its position in relation to the receipt that it would be a detriment to it if now required to repay. [77] AFSL's approach, which focused on how far Hills and Bosch had been disenriched, did not govern the case, they held, because "the concept of unjust enrichment is not the basis of restitutionary relief in Australian law", and the principle of disenrichment, "like that of unjust enrichment, is inconsistent with the law of restitution as it has developed in Australia". [78] Disenrichment operates as a mathematical rule, they said, whereas the Australian enquiry "is directed to who should properly bear the loss and why", by reference to equitable principles. [78]
From David Securities they took the central element of the defence to be that the defendant has acted to his or her detriment on the faith of the receipt, and said that whether later English cases have taken a wider view, requiring only a causal link, cannot alter what was said there. [81] They said it is tolerably clear that David Securities did not suggest the defence was available only to a recipient able to demonstrate monetary disenrichment. [82] They answered AFSL's reliance on The Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 and Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 by saying that those cases concerned damages by way of compensation for a breach, whereas Hills and Bosch had done AFSL no wrong giving rise to an obligation to compensate. [83] More importantly, they said, under Australian law "a mathematical assessment of enduring economic benefit does not determine the availability of restitutionary remedies". [84]
The injustice, in their view, lies in the disadvantage which would result to the recipient if the payer were permitted to recover payments which the recipient has applied. [84] They said this accords with detrimental reliance in estoppel as explained by Dixon J in Grundt, while saying it may be accepted that estoppel affords a different level of protection to expectations than the defence, and that both are grounded in equitable doctrine preventing the unconscientious assertion of legal rights. [85]–[86] Detriment has not been considered a narrow or technical concept in connection with estoppel and, so long as it is substantial, need not consist of expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, as Robert Walker LJ observed in Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210. [88] In the context of mistaken payments, they said, the question is whether it would be unconscionable for a recipient who has changed its position on the faith of the receipt to be required to repay. [88]
They said it was not without importance that the transactions took place in a commercial context, in which all the parties were involved in trade and the primary judge considered that neither recipient's conduct was commercially unacceptable. [55] Hills and Bosch, they said, not only continued to trade on the basis of the payments but also discharged TCP's debts and no longer sought to recover them. [93] It was not accurate, in their view, to characterise the payments as bare receipts or mere book entries, and even if the discharges were legally reversible for some reason, such as TCP's fraud against AFSL, the consequence would be that Hills and Bosch became unpaid creditors of TCP in its liquidation. [95] The consequences of the receipts were "irreversible as a practical matter of business", and neither recipient could reverse the consequences of its decision to continue trading with TCP and the commercial risks that decision entailed. [95] They concluded that the disadvantages to Hills and Bosch if required to repay were such that it would be inequitable to require them to do so. [96]
They said these conclusions were not reached by first stating comprehensively what change of position encompasses, and that attempts to describe the defence comprehensively "are apt to mislead". [97]–[98] Lest their decision be thought tacitly to accept the Court of Appeal's other grounds, they said Meagher JA was correct that AFSL's payments were not made to discharge TCP's debts, so that the payments were not made or received in the circumstances envisaged by Goff J in his formulation of the good consideration defence, and they added that it is doubtful whether the fraud was irrelevant to whether there had been any discharge. [99]–[101] They described as somewhat artificial Meagher JA's alternative basis of treating Hills and Bosch as if they had advanced the amount of their debts to TCP and then been paid back, saying that it involved the kind of fiction deprecated by Gummow J in Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd and left the difficulty of regarding as irreversible a discharge founded in TCP's fraud. [102]
Gageler J
Gageler J adopted the joint reasons' statement of facts and also held that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. [159], [167] His Honour explained David Securities as meaning that a causative mistake gives rise to a prima facie obligation to make restitution, which the recipient must displace by establishing some other circumstance the law recognises would make an order for restitution unjust, the defence of change of position comprehending one of those circumstances. [105]–[106] Within that explanation, he said, unjust enrichment is rejected as a definitive legal principle but embraced as a unifying legal concept. [105]
He traced the action from indebitatus assumpsit and Moses v Macferlan through the confining of Lord Mansfield's equitable considerations, and noted that the course of decisions had rejected any defence based simply on change of position, although an alteration of position induced by the payer could found an estoppel. [109]–[110], [113], [123] He located the coherent principle in the two-stage analysis formulated in the ANZ Case, which he called Westpac, and confirmed in David Securities, an analysis explained (as distinct from defined) by reference to the juristic concept of unjust enrichment. [129], [138] He saw no inherent reason why the notion of enrichment must reappear at the second stage, and said it "might well be" that no defence is available to a recipient no longer enriched because of an intervening theft. [142]
Professor Birks' later disenrichment argument, he said, "cannot stand with the formulation of principle in David Securities", and its adoption is not necessary once the analogy with estoppel in pais is more fully worked through in an Australian context. [147]–[148] He said that, at least since The Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, that doctrine is not necessarily confined to assumptions induced by representations, need not produce an all-or-nothing consequence where that would undermine the rationale for its operation, and allows relief to be tailored so as not to be disproportionate to a measurable detriment. [152]-[154] He said there is "much to be said" for treating the defence as a particular application of estoppel, but that whether it is ultimately to be so assimilated is "a larger question than that which need now be determined". [155]–[156]
In his view, the defence is established where the defendant proves two conditions, the first being that the defendant has, in good faith, acted or refrained from acting on the assumption of being entitled to deal with the payment, whether or not on knowledge derived from the payer, and he said that whether the defendant must also have acted reasonably did not arise for determination. [157] The second is that, by reason of so acting or refraining, the defendant would be placed in a worse position if ordered to make restitution than if the defendant had not received the payment at all. [157] That detriment need not in every case be financial or pecuniary or, if it is, be established with precision, and it can be an opportunity forgone, but it "must, in every case, be shown by the defendant to be substantial". [157] Once the defence is established, the defendant is prima facie entitled to retain the whole payment, qualified to the extent that retention can be shown to be disproportionate to the detriment, and reduced pro tanto where the detriment is financial or pecuniary, can be quantified and is less than the amount received. [158]
There being no dispute about good faith, and the differences between Hills and Bosch not being material in his view, he examined Hills' position. [159]–[160] He held that Hills' argument that it had discharged $308,000 of TCP's debt was in truth an argument for an agreement to release TCP, which failed for want of consideration moving from TCP, so that the debt remained, enforceable at law and provable in TCP's liquidation. [163] He rejected the analogy of Hills paying $308,000 to TCP and receiving it back, saying that the course of action analogised "makes no commercial sense, absent perhaps the fraud of Mr Skarzynski". [164] Reopening TCP's account and continuing to trade was an undoubted source of detriment, but it could be precisely quantified as the $21,739.03 TCP owed Hills when the fraud was discovered and, standing alone, would not entitle Hills to retain more than that amount. [165] By ceasing the steps it had proposed of engaging lawyers and seeking security and repayment, however, Hills gave up a commercial opportunity, the substantial value of which it had lost by reason of the intervening liquidation of TCP. [166] Hills would therefore be placed in a worse position if ordered to repay than if it had not received the payment, which was enough to entitle it to retain the whole unless the value of the opportunity forgone was able to be quantified as a lesser amount. [166]
Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs, the conclusion stated in each of the three sets of reasons. [32], [103], [167]
Why it matters
The case shows that a recipient of a mistaken payment who, on the faith of it, stops pursuing a debtor may keep the whole payment even though the value of what was given up has not been proved. [4], [30], [84], [93], [96], [166] The judges gave different accounts of the defence: French CJ used irreversible detriment as a guiding criterion, the joint reasons declined to describe the defence comprehensively, and Gageler J stated two conditions that he drew from a commonality of principle with estoppel. [24], [97]–[98], [156]–[157] They also described unjust enrichment differently: a taxonomical concept for French CJ, not the basis of restitutionary relief in Australian law for the joint reasons, and a unifying legal concept for Gageler J. [20], [78], [105] Matters the reasons left open include the limits of the concept of detriment (French CJ), and whether a defendant must also have acted reasonably and whether the defence is ultimately to be assimilated to estoppel (Gageler J). [25], [156]–[157]
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