Baker v The Queen
(2012) 245 CLR 632 · [2012] HCA 27
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Baker v The Queen [2012] HCA 27 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), given on 15 August 2012 on appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appellant was convicted of murder at a joint trial at which his co-accused, LM, was acquitted, and the question was whether LM's out-of-court confessional statements should have been available in the appellant's favour through a change to the common law of hearsay [11], [45]–[46]. The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ gave joint reasons [1], [61], and Heydon J gave separate reasons reaching the same result [62], [122]. No judge dissented.
Facts
On 27 November 2005, at around 3am, an altercation took place on the stairwell landing just outside a party on the first floor of a converted warehouse in Brunswick [1]. In the course of it the deceased, a young man named Albert Snowball, crashed through a window, fell 5.4 metres to the ground and died two days later from his injuries [1]. At around 3am two persons, who it was open to find were the appellant and Faulkner, had begun an apparently random and unprovoked assault on party-goers, and on the Crown case LM joined in [16].
The appellant and LM were jointly charged with the murder and were arraigned in the Supreme Court of Victoria (Whelan J) on 26 March 2008 [1]. The Crown case was that the appellant and LM were attacking the deceased at the time of his fall, although the precise circumstances of the fall were not known [2]. It was not alleged that either of them intended the deceased to go through the window; each was said to be liable because they acted in concert with the intention of inflicting really serious injury, or because one aided and abetted the other knowing the other was assaulting the deceased with that intention [2].
Witnesses gave two inconsistent versions of events on the landing [3]. On the first, given by Doig, Arcaro, Stuart and Brady, it was open to find that the appellant was the principal assailant [21]. On the second, given by Asfer, Masonga and, to some extent, Morgan, it was open to find that LM was the sole assailant, the appellant being restrained by a bystander [3], [21].
The appellant made no admissions, and neither he nor LM gave or called evidence [4]. In a police interview on the evening of the incident, after speaking with a solicitor and with his father present, LM made admissions that included having pushed the deceased [5], [34]. His account was that he was trying to break up a dispute involving a friend, that a man hit him, that he pushed the man away and went down the stairs, and that he then saw the man outside on the pavement [36]. He estimated that the man was about a metre and a half in front of the window when he pushed him, and he had not thought the man would go through the window [39]. He said he was only assuming that the man was badly injured from his push [38]. LM's references to his friend were not references to the appellant, and on LM's account he did not see the appellant on the landing or in the stairwell [40].
LM also made statements to witnesses in the immediate aftermath that were capable of being viewed as an admission of responsibility for the fall [5]. Asfer said that in the car afterwards LM challenged Faulkner, saying "look what you made me do" [29]. Morgan remembered LM saying "see what you've done" and "see what you put us through" [33].
Procedural history
At the conclusion of the evidence, Whelan J raised with counsel the directions to be given about LM's statements and observed that the circumstances of the joint trial were "very closely analogous" to those considered in Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1 [7]. Whelan J ruled that LM's out-of-court statements were not admissible in the appellant's trial, because there was at present no exception to the hearsay rule that would make them so [8]. He directed the jury that the evidence of LM's admissions was evidence only in LM's case and was to be ignored when they considered the appellant's case [10]. The jury acquitted LM and convicted the appellant of murder [11].
The appellant applied to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Bongiorno JJA) for leave to appeal against his conviction (Baker v The Queen [2010] VSCA 226) [12]. His grounds included that LM's statements had been wrongly excluded, but that ground was not pressed at the hearing, which was argued only on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence [12]. The Court of Appeal considered there was no substance in that ground and refused leave [12].
Special leave to appeal to the High Court was granted on the ground not pressed below, but the joint reasons said the proper course was for the appellant to have maintained it in the Court of Appeal, so that this Court would have had the benefit of that Court's analysis [13].
Issues
The first ground of appeal alleged error in the trial judge's failure to direct the jury that LM's admissions could be used in exculpation of the appellant, and the second, which depended on the first, alleged error in the Court of Appeal's holding that the evidence could support the verdict without taking those admissions into account [45]. The appellant acknowledged that Whelan J's ruling was correct under the present state of the law, so success depended on modifying the law of evidence governing hearsay [45]. The joint reasons said that determining the first ground made it unnecessary to say more about the second [45].
His principal contention sought a limited exception confined to joint trials: where the prosecution relies on admissions by accused A to prove A's guilt, and those admissions also tend to exculpate co-accused B, the trial judge should be required, or have the discretion, to direct that they are evidence in B's trial to be considered in exculpation of B [46]–[47]. His broad contention was that an exception for third party confessions should be allowed, to bring the common law into line with the uniform Evidence Act provisions on first hand hearsay when a witness is unavailable [46].
Held
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ
At the date of the trial the common law governed the admissibility of LM's statements in the appellant's case, the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) having commenced only on 1 January 2010 [6]. Subject to recognised exceptions, the rule against hearsay precludes the admission of out-of-court statements as evidence of the fact asserted, and their Honours noted the acknowledgment in Bannon that the common law of Australia has not to date recognised an exception for the out-of-court confessional statements of a co-accused or third party [6]. They said that LM's statements, assessed in the context of the Crown case, did not present issues materially different from those considered in Bannon, and that their exclusion did not occasion a miscarriage of justice [13].
In Bannon, the co-accused's statements would not have been admissible on either basis argued there, because the assertion relied on, that she acted alone, was not an asserted fact against her penal interest, and the implication that she acted alone was an inference lacking the necessary reliability [42]. Deane J, in general agreement with the joint reasons for dismissing that appeal, considered it strongly arguable that fairness required a trial judge to have a discretion to direct that material tendered by the Crown against one accused at a joint trial, and supportive of the other accused's innocence, be evidence at the instance of that other accused [43]. The appellant's principal argument was constructed on that passage [44].
On the principal contention, the joint reasons said the appellant's submissions were apt to treat the assertions in LM's interview as "an undifferentiated whole", possessed of reliability because they were made against LM's penal interest [49]. LM's statement that he pushed the deceased was an admission against penal interest, but it was consistent with both versions of events, and other assertions conveying that the appellant was not involved were not evidently against LM's penal interest [49]. As explained in Bannon, the question was whether LM apprehended that it was to his prejudice to implicate himself alone as opposed to having acted in concert with or been assisted by the appellant, and there was no reason to suppose that he did [49]. LM did not assert that his push caused the fall; the appellant's intended reliance was on an inference that it did, because LM was the only person in hostile physical contact with the deceased at the time of the fall [48]. The joint reasons said the submission that LM's acquittal showed rejection of the case of concert "wrongly reasoned backwards from the verdicts", and that LM's admission to pushing the deceased was consistent with the Crown case and, if received in the appellant's trial, amounted to proof of an element in the case against him [50].
One very important reason for the hearsay rule, they said, is the unfairness of depriving the party against whom hearsay is tendered of the opportunity of cross-examining its maker [51]. Deane J's examples each concerned an unambiguous confession of sole guilt, and whether such a case could be dealt with satisfactorily by an order for separate trials was a question that need not be addressed in this appeal [51]. The suggested discretion is posited on the reliability of the confession of sole guilt, yet tendering a confession against its maker does not vouch for the reliability of all the assertions in it, and the maker may have reasons for choosing not to implicate a confederate [52]. Where the Crown has credible evidence tending to establish A's complicity, there will ordinarily be no unfairness in a joint trial of A and B or in tendering B's confession against B alone [52]. The Crown did not rely on the contents of LM's interview as reliable, except to show that he played a part in the deceased going through the window; the assertions in the interview gave no unambiguous support to the appellant's case, and there was no unfairness in excluding them from his trial [53].
On the broad contention, the appellant relied on three developments: Tasmanian and Victorian legislation modelled on the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Queensland decision in R v Zullo, and English legislation following R v Myers [54]. Their Honours recalled McHugh J's proposal in Bannon that this Court take a cautious approach to developing new hearsay exceptions, given that other States might adopt some or all of the Commonwealth Act [55]. They did not need to address whether LM's representations met s 65(2)(b), (c) or (d) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), and noted that s 65(8) provides a broad exception for first hand hearsay adduced by a defendant in criminal proceedings [55]. Upholding the broad contention would have no consequence for any new trial, at which the admission of LM's statements (if he were unavailable to give evidence) would be governed by that Act [55]. It would instead significantly alter the common law of evidence in States that had chosen not to adopt the uniform Evidence Act or to modify the hearsay rule along the lines of the English legislation or otherwise, and, as applying the hearsay rule in the appellant's trial did not occasion a miscarriage of justice, the invitation to make that change should be rejected [56].
On Queensland, Zullo was decided before Bannon, and in it the Court of Appeal of Queensland, while commenting that there was authority against admissibility, said the jury were to consider the confession for what they thought it was worth [57]. In R v Martin, McPherson JA said, for reasons that were not explained, that he was not persuaded that statements in Bannon were necessarily inconsistent with the Queensland line of authority [59]. The joint reasons said that the common law of evidence governs the admission of hearsay confessions in Queensland, and that, to the extent the appellant identified Queensland as a jurisdiction in which hearsay confessions are admissible, the submission was "misconceived" [60]. For these reasons they concluded that the appeal should be dismissed [61].
Heydon J
Heydon J wrote separately and also concluded that the appeal should be dismissed [62], [122]. Heydon J said the appellant's submission would admit a statement incriminating its maker even when the maker is "alive, available, and sitting in the courtroom" but has chosen not to testify, and that, apart from the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australian courts had held that this is not the law [62].
First, he held that LM's statements did not exculpate the appellant [70], [76]. In the police interview LM did not admit pushing the deceased out of the window: he said only that he assumed that was the case, and he denied two leading questions suggesting it [71]. Heydon J said the statements in the car, which he called "rather vague statements", may inculpate LM and Faulkner but did not exculpate the appellant [72]. He said that LM's statements that he pushed the deceased, taken in isolation, were not the same as LM saying "I, and I alone, pushed the deceased", and that their contexts did not suggest otherwise [73]. LM was extremely keen to minimise the involvement of his friends, and of the appellant in particular, yet never explicitly said the appellant had no involvement, which Heydon J regarded as significant [74]. Heydon J said the "factual substratum" necessary for debate about a new hearsay exception did not exist, and that this conclusion alone was sufficient ground for dismissing the appeal [76].
Second, he rejected each of the four reasons the appellant gave for saying that LM's statements were reliable [77], [82]. The prosecution relied on the statements as inculpatory of LM only, and its reliance on evidence does not mean it vouches for that evidence, given the prosecution's duty to call all available evidence [78]. That LM did not object did not of itself make his admissions reliable [79]. That the admissions were made under police caution supported the conclusion that they were made, but did not make reliable LM's perception, recollection or expression of events [80]. The suggested corroboration by Asfer and Masonga took no account of the contradicting evidence of Doig, Arcaro and, to some extent, Stuart, and in any event reliability had to be assessed independently of what other witnesses said [81].
Third, he dealt with the three arguments from Bannon on which the appellant relied [83]. On a flexible application of the hearsay rule based on reliability, he found Brennan CJ's grounds for rejecting it in Bannon convincing, and added that the principal guarantee and test of a witness's honesty and accuracy lies in the capacity to be cross-examined, a test missing for the absent maker of a hearsay statement [83]–[85]. An exception for statements against penal interest would depend at least on the declarant's death, and LM was not dead at the time of the trial [88]. LM also did not meet any of the conditions of unavailability in the Canadian exception, and at least for the statements in the car its condition of apprehended vulnerability to penal consequences was not met either [88]–[89]. Even if an exception for statements that are reliable and reasonably necessary existed, which he said it was unnecessary to decide, LM's statements did not exculpate the appellant, were not reliable and were not necessary, since the appellant could have testified that LM alone pushed the deceased [91], [93].
Heydon J added that LM's statements to police were likely to be understood as inculpatory of the appellant as an aider and abettor, given the alternative way the prosecution case was put [96]. He asked why, if out-of-court confessions of crime are admissible in favour of an accused, they are not admissible against an accused [97].
As to Deane J's reasons in Bannon, he said they were put as suggestions only and not as concluded statements of the law [100], and that they depended on the maker unambiguously admitting to having committed the crime alone and without assistance, which was not true of LM's statements [102]. It does not follow from the putative reliability of self-inculpation that the exculpation of others is reliable [103]. Heydon J said fairness applies to all parties and "must involve parity and reciprocity", and cannot be limited to the defence [104]. A retrospective change would also operate unfairly to the prosecution, in a way he described as perhaps only transitory, because the police had probed LM about what he did and not about what others did [106]. He said there may be cases where unfairness arises because the prosecution tenders one co-accused's statement pointing to the innocence of another, but that the solution may not lie in the rules of evidence, and it might be more appropriate to grant a separate trial or turn to doctrines of abuse of process [107].
He regarded the risk of manufactured evidence as a real danger in cases such as this one, and said any rule benefiting the appellant would have to operate more widely [108]. On Queensland, he said the Court of Appeal's assumption in R v Zullo that the confession was admissible was obiter only and inconsistent with the Australian common law as received from England [110]. He accepted that no majority in Bannon decided unequivocally against any future departure from the traditional law, but said their Honours made it plain that the law as it then stood contained no exception in favour of accused persons for confessions made by a co-accused or third party [112]. Heydon J said Bannon is inconsistent with the Queensland cases and that those cases "should be overruled" [112].
On legislative developments, he said it can be difficult to detect a consistent legislative trend in a federation with nine Parliaments, and that Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia had not adopted the Evidence Act [114]. The Evidence Act is based on a carefully thought out scheme whose parts are interdependent to some degree [116]. Heydon J said its judgments and techniques could not be incorporated into the common law "without a violent act of legislation, this time judicial" [119]. The difficulties of adapting the common law to a foreign legislative change were even greater [120], and the appellant did not demonstrate the suitability of R v Myers as a precedent to be followed in Australia [121].
He concluded that the common law on hearsay exceptions should not be changed in the respects the appellant advocated, that LM's evidence was not admissible in the appellant's favour, and that the trial judge's direction was correct [122].
Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, which is the only order stated on the cover of the judgment [61], [122].
Why it matters
No judge accepted the appellant's contentions for a new exception, so the position acknowledged in Bannon, that the common law of Australia has not recognised an exception for the out-of-court confessional statements of a co-accused or third party, was left unchanged [6], [53], [56], [122]. The joint reasons decided the principal contention on the footing that LM's statements gave no unambiguous support to the appellant's case, and did not address whether a case of an unambiguous confession of sole guilt could be dealt with satisfactorily by separate trials [51], [53]. They also explained that the broad contention would have had no consequence for a new trial in Victoria under the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), but would have significantly altered the common law in States that had not adopted the uniform Evidence Act or otherwise modified the hearsay rule [55]–[56]. On Queensland, the joint reasons said the common law of evidence governs hearsay confessions there [60], and Heydon J said the Queensland cases should be overruled [112].
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