casewise

Bankstown City Council v Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd

(2005) 223 CLR 660 · [2005] HCA 46

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Bankstown City Council v Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 46 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), given on 7 September 2005, about the immunity for flood-related conduct that s 733 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) gives councils. A landowner, Alamdo, had obtained a mandatory injunction requiring the Council to carry out works to abate a nuisance caused by the flooding of its land [5], [7]. All five judges held that s 733(1) protected the Council against the injunctive relief, not only against damages, and that the Council had acted in good faith [45], [57], [62], [67]. The High Court allowed the Council's appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal's orders, dismissed the proceedings against the Council, and dismissed with costs Alamdo's application for special leave to seek damages in addition to the injunction [58]–[59].

Facts

The Council is a council constituted under the Act for an area that includes the Sydney suburb of Chester Hill [1]. Alamdo owns land at Chester Hill on which two industrial buildings stand, and the land is at a low point of the local catchment [1]. The Council owns the stormwater drainage works it has installed and is empowered by s 59A of the Act to operate, repair, extend and improve them [2]. Alamdo bought the land in 1988, after its managing director, Mr Maurici, had been told of a recent brief flooding of both buildings [3]. Parts of the land were briefly flooded in January 1998 and April 2000, including one of the buildings on the first occasion [3]. Beside the land, stormwater runs for about 450 metres in an unlined channel, which receives water from the Council's drainage system to the south through a gross pollutant trap fed by two 2,400 mm pipes [4]. The trial judge found that in 1960 flooding had been likely as something between a one in five year and a one in 10 year event, but that by 1998 floodwaters would be likely to enter one of the buildings at flow rates somewhat above a one in two year event [5]. The cost to the Council of abating the nuisance was estimated to be at least $1.5 million [6]. The Council's valuer put the diminution in the value of the reversion caused by the land being flood prone at $1,417,340, and Alamdo's valuer put it higher [10].

Procedural history

In the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Gzell J held that the increased frequency of likely flooding was an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land of the kind against which the action for private nuisance is directed [5]. His Honour rejected the Council's submissions that relief should be withheld because Alamdo bought the land knowing it was flood prone, or because the cost of abatement was disproportionate to Alamdo's prospective damage [6]. He granted an injunction restraining the Council from causing or permitting stormwater to inundate the land so as to cause a nuisance, and ordered the Council to carry out works to abate the nuisance at no expense to Alamdo and to give Alamdo a detailed report of the steps it proposed to take [7]. He made no provision for damages for the diminution in the value of the reversion, because he considered that this injury would be rectified by the mandatory relief [9]. Gzell J declined Alamdo's invitation to order that the Council pay damages if remedial works were not completed within two years [11]–[12]. On s 733, Gzell J accepted both of Alamdo's answers: that the section did not protect the Council from injunctive relief, and that the Council had not acted in good faith [19]. The Court of Appeal (Spigelman CJ, Giles and Ipp JJA) dismissed the Council's appeal and Alamdo's cross-appeal [14]. It accepted that s 733 did not extend to injunctive relief, following Attrill v Richmond River Shire Council, but held that the finding of an absence of good faith could not be sustained [19], [41], [46]. The mandatory injunction was suspended pending the appeal to the High Court [14]. Special leave was granted on the Council's undertaking to pay Alamdo's costs of the appeal in any event and not to seek to disturb the costs orders in Alamdo's favour in the courts below [60].

Issues

The Council relied on one ground only: its contention that s 733 of the Act gave it an exemption from liability that was a complete answer to all the relief granted against it [18]. The first issue was whether the protection in s 733 extends to exposure to injunctive relief [19]. The second was whether the Council had acted in good faith within the meaning of the section [19]. Section 733(1) provides that a council "does not incur any liability in respect of" advice furnished in good faith, or anything done or omitted to be done in good faith, so far as it relates to the likelihood of land being flooded or the nature or extent of any such flooding [24].

Held

Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ

Their Honours first observed that the claim for an injunction was in the auxiliary jurisdiction and would ordinarily be granted only if damages were not ascertainable or otherwise not an adequate remedy [11]. The mandatory injunction "very much masked the true position" that any liability of the Council was readily calculable in money and was for damage already done to the reversion [13]. They also noted that a line of authority in Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd, indicating that a body such as the Council is not liable without negligence for a nuisance attributable to the exercise of its statutory powers, had not been drawn to attention at trial or in the Court of Appeal [16].

On the statute, they noted that s 733 derives from s 582A of the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW), introduced in 1985, and that the responsible Minister's Second Reading Speech described a principal purpose of the Bill as indemnifying councils and other public authorities from liability for decisions about flood liable land [21]. The Minister had added that without that protection councils might take an unnecessarily conservative approach to development applications and conditions [21]. Their Honours held that the Council's conduct as identified in the Court of Appeal, in constructing and operating the drainage system and in its role in urbanisation, related to the likelihood of the land being flooded or the nature and extent of such flooding [26]. Drawing on what Dixon J said of "incurred" in New Zealand Flax Investments Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, they said it would be unsafe to attempt an exhaustive definition of "incur any liability", and that much depends on the subject, scope and purpose of s 733 [27]. They distinguished cases such as Coco v The Queen and Puntoriero v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation, in which powers or immunities were read narrowly [28]. The objective of s 733 was not solely to protect councils' funds, and general statements calling for a narrow reading of "in respect of" in immunity provisions were no substitute for considering the subject, scope and purpose of the whole text [29]. They rejected Alamdo's reliance on the Minister's reference to "claims for damages", holding it highly unlikely that the words were used in a technical sense limited to accrued causes of action for damages [30]. A council's need for protection is no less when it faces an injunction requiring substantial expenditure than when damages in a similar sum are awarded instead under s 68 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), and s 733 is concerned "with matters of substance and not merely with matters of legal or procedural form" [31].

Because of its past conduct, the Council was liable to the exercise of the Supreme Court's equity jurisdiction and its statutory jurisdiction under s 68, and Alamdo had an equity in the sense described by Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [32]. In their Honours' words, "the susceptibility of the Council to the adjudication of that equity was a liability which it had encountered, run into, or fallen upon", and so one which, but for s 733(1), it had incurred [33]. Adopting words of Kitto J in Scala v Mammolitti, they held that the phrase confers protection from liability in the general sense of amenability to claims [34]. They rejected Alamdo's contrast between a mandatory injunction and a money remedy, saying it would be "a curious result" if s 733(1) could be avoided simply by granting a mandatory injunction instead of a readily quantifiable award of damages [35].

Their Honours warned that decisions on statutes with a different subject, scope and purpose must be approached with caution [36]. In Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General of Queensland, Griffith CJ had held that a notice before action provision referred to the past, so that a suit for an injunction to restrain a nuisance, being a claim for future protection, could be brought without notice, but that reasoning operated in a different context from s 733 [37]-[38]. In Attrill, Hodgson J held that the liability dealt with by s 582A was a liability in respect of past events, so that the protection covered damages for past events but not injunctions based solely on the probability of future events [42]. Their Honours accepted that injunctions are generally directed to future events and that past conduct is evidence of what is apprehended, but held that susceptibility to relief quia timet may be said to be in respect of what the defendant has already done, because "That which presents the threat has already occurred" [43]. Equity responds to threats of future injury, and an equity of that kind is not the same as an accrued cause of action at law [44]. Once the phrase "not incur any liability" is understood as protection from amenability to the range of claims to which the general law exposes a council, the limitation suggested in Attrill "is shown to lack foundation in the statute" [45].

On good faith, their Honours noted that the presumption of good faith in s 733(4) can apply only to the furnishing of advice, so that otherwise a council pleading the immunity bears the burden of making out its case, which, as the Council accepted, includes good faith [47]–[48]. In Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council, a council that had no adequate system for answering flooding inquiries when issuing s 149 certificates, and whose responsible officer consciously ignored the records that would have supplied the information, was held not to have acted in good faith although it was not dishonest [49]. Because what good faith requires may vary from case to case, they considered it "unwise, if not impossible, to place a definitive gloss upon the words of the statute" [50]. The present case was different: the nuisance was clarified only in the Court of Appeal, and the vagueness of the complaints lightened the Council's evidentiary burden [51]. Further, although the point was not taken as an answer to liability, the Council was not liable in nuisance without negligence, so that here "something more than negligence is necessary", since otherwise there would be no liability against which the Council needed s 733(1) [51]. The evidence of Mr Morrison, the Council's Manager of Roads and Infrastructure, and the Council's voluminous records would, unless challenged, suggest good faith over a long period [52]. Gzell J had found against the Council because it abandoned further investigation pending the litigation, which began in May 1999 [53]. The Court of Appeal, through Spigelman CJ, held that the evidence was an inadequate basis for that finding, noting that no link between the litigation and the ordering of the Council's priorities had been considered [54]. Their Honours held that any apparent infelicities in Spigelman CJ's treatment of the burden of proof reflected the shape the issues had taken at trial [55]. The pending litigation advanced the Council's case for good faith rather than Alamdo's: where the Council might have no legal responsibility to spend money, depending on litigation it was defending, "prudence would support deferral", and s 733(1) protects that approach as an exercise of the Council's powers in good faith [56]. The trial judge's contrary holding could not be supported, and s 733(1) applied [57]. That conclusion made Alamdo's special leave application for damages in addition to the injunction otiose, and it was dismissed with costs [58].

McHugh J

McHugh J agreed that the appeal should be allowed and adopted the joint judgment's statement of the facts and issues [61]–[62]. In his Honour's opinion, s 733(1) gives a council immunity from injunctive relief sought in equity's auxiliary jurisdiction as enhanced by statutes such as s 68 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) [62]. He relied on the joint judgment's reasoning that the Council's past conduct made it liable to the exercise of the Supreme Court's equity and statutory jurisdiction [64]. He rejected Alamdo's argument that, unlike a right to damages, no right to a discretionary remedy arises from a defendant's act or omission, holding that the two senses of liability in the joint judgment accord with the first and third senses of "liability" described by Windeyer J in Ogden Industries Pty Ltd v Lucas [65]. Applying the Hohfeldian analysis on which Alamdo relied, he reasoned that the court's power to grant the injunction meant the Council had a liability to have its legal position changed, and that Alamdo's equitable right meant the Council had a corresponding duty [65]. The injunctive relief was therefore a "liability" within s 733(1)(b) [66]. For the reasons in the joint judgment, the Council had acted in good faith and was entitled to the immunity [67]. His Honour agreed that Alamdo's special leave application must be rejected and agreed with the orders proposed in the joint judgment [68]–[69].

Orders. The appeal was allowed, and orders 1 and 2 of the Court of Appeal entered on 12 October 2004 were set aside. In their place, the appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed, orders 1 to 5 of Gzell J made on 16 December 2003 were set aside, and the proceedings were dismissed. Because of the Council's undertaking when special leave was granted, the Council was ordered to pay Alamdo's costs of the appeal to the High Court [60]. Alamdo's application for special leave to appeal was dismissed with costs [58].

Why it matters

All the judges held that s 733(1) protects a council against injunctive relief, not only against damages [45], [62], [66]. The joint judgment reached that result by reading "does not incur any liability" as protection from amenability to the range of claims to which the general law exposes a council, and held that the contrary limitation suggested in Attrill lacked foundation in the statute [45]. The joint judgment's treatment of good faith, which McHugh J adopted, indicates that good faith under s 733(1) has no fixed definition, that in a case like this something more than negligence is needed, and that deferring expenditure while litigation is pending can be an exercise of a council's powers in good faith [50]–[51], [56], [67].

Cited in 68 later casesRelies on 14 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries