Bell Group N.V. (in liquidation) v Western Australia
(2016) 260 CLR 500 · [2016] HCA 21
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Bell Group N.V. (in liquidation) v Western Australia [2016] HCA 21 was decided by the High Court of Australia on 16 May 2016, by French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ. The plaintiffs in three proceedings challenged the validity of the Bell Group Companies (Finalisation of Matters and Distribution of Proceeds) Act 2015 (WA) (the Bell Act) by special cases stated for the Full Court [2]–[3]. The Court held that the Bell Act is invalid in its entirety by the operation of s 109 of the Constitution, because of inconsistency between its provisions and the Commonwealth tax laws [9], [73], [78]. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ gave joint reasons, and Gageler J agreed with their conclusion and the substance of their answers but reached invalidity on a narrower basis [78]–[79]. In each proceeding the Court answered the questions on standing, justiciable controversy and invalidity in the plaintiffs' favour, found the remaining questions unnecessary to answer, and ordered Western Australia to pay the costs of the special case [76].
Facts
In November 2015 the Parliament of Western Australia enacted the Bell Act to deal with a list of companies, each defined in the Act as a "WA Bell Company", all of which were then in liquidation or deregistered [1]. None of the windings up had concluded before 27 November 2015, the "transfer day" under the Act [1]. The Bell Act was amended by an Amending Act that received the Royal Assent on the evening of 5 April 2016, the first day of the hearings in the High Court [1].
The Bell Group Limited (in liq) (TBGL) was the holding company of the Bell Group, and its wholly owned subsidiaries included Bell Group NV (in liq) (BGNV), Bell Group Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) (BGF) and Maranoa Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) [12]. Mr Woodings was the liquidator (or provisional liquidator) of a number of Bell Group companies, and under the Act as amended Maranoa Transport was included as a WA Bell Company even though it was taken to be registered in Queensland [13]. BGNV, a company formed or incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles, had been ordered by the Supreme Court of Western Australia to be wound up in insolvency, with Mr Trevor as its ancillary liquidator in Australia [10]–[11].
BGNV was an unsecured creditor of TBGL and BGF with admitted proofs of debt of $69,334,059 and $394,809,067.88, and W.A. Glendinning & Associates Pty Ltd was an unsecured creditor of BGF with an admitted proof of debt of $183,297,347.04 [14]-[15]. The Commonwealth was also a creditor, having lodged proofs of debt for unpaid tax totalling $167,648,203.86 in the windings up of 10 WA Bell Companies, largely on assessments for income years before the windings up began [16]. In August 2015, before the Bell Act was enacted, the Commissioner of Taxation issued further assessments totalling $298,190,348.70 for tax liabilities incurred after liquidation [18]. Other known creditors of TBGL had claimed more than $1.02 billion, and the amount owed to other known creditors of BGF was estimated to exceed $1.6 billion [19].
The Bell Act received the Royal Assent on 26 November 2015, and apart from Pt 1, s 47 and the offence provisions in ss 54 to 56, it came into operation on 27 November 2015 [20]. Its stated objects included providing a mechanism, avoiding litigation, for distributing the funds received by the liquidator of TBGL and certain subsidiaries as a consequence of the Bell litigation and its settlement in 2013 [21]. The Act established the WA Bell Companies Administrator Authority as a body corporate, and s 22 transferred to and vested in the Authority, at the beginning of the transfer day, all property of the WA Bell Companies, freed from any encumbrance, trust, equity or interest [23], [30]. Liabilities could be proved only under Pt 4 Div 2 of the Act, and no other action or claim relating to them could be brought against the Authority, the companies, their liquidators or the State [36], [38]. The joint reasons described the heading of Pt 4, "Completion of winding up of WA Bell Companies", as misleading, because the Part terminates the winding up under the Corporations Act and purports to annihilate the Commonwealth's rights as a creditor to a pro-rata distribution of any surplus [37].
The Authority had an absolute discretion to determine each company's property and liabilities and to recommend what, if anything, each creditor should be paid, and the rules of natural justice did not apply to it [40]–[41]. The Governor could then determine payments but was not required to pay anything to any person, the liabilities owed to anyone to whom nothing was to be paid were discharged and extinguished, and any surplus went to the State [44]–[46]. Decisions under the Act were made final and conclusive and protected from challenge or review, except for relief for jurisdictional error in the Supreme Court of Western Australia [49].
Procedural history
The three proceedings were BGNV's (S248 of 2015), W.A. Glendinning's (P63 of 2015) and Maranoa Transport's (P4 of 2016), and Western Australia was a defendant in each [2]. In each, the parties stated a special case and questions of law for the opinion of the Full Court under r 27.08.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) [3]. The Commissioner was granted leave to intervene on the question of inconsistency with the Tax Acts, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth intervened under s 78A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and the Attorneys-General of the other States also intervened [4], [6]. Western Australia initially contested the plaintiffs' standing to raise inconsistency with the Tax Acts, but that issue fell away when the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth intervened and adopted the Commissioner's submissions, generally in support of the plaintiffs [7].
Issues
The main question was whether the Bell Act, or some of its provisions, were invalid under s 109 of the Constitution because of inconsistency with the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (together, the Tax Acts), the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act [3]. The plaintiffs in the BGNV and W.A. Glendinning proceedings also contended that provisions of the Bell Act infringed Ch III of the Constitution [3]. The special cases also asked whether the plaintiffs had standing, whether a justiciable controversy arose on the grounds relying on s 215 of the 1936 Act, and whether any invalid provisions were severable [76].
Held
French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ
Their Honours observed that the plaintiffs had standing in their own right because, like the Commissioner, they had an interest in the due administration of the liquidation of debtor companies [8]. Once that interest was identified, Western Australia's central argument, that the plaintiffs might not receive less under the Bell Act than in a winding up, "misses the point" [8].
Quoting Jemena Asset Management (3) Pty Ltd v Coinvest Ltd, they said that s 109 requires a comparison between two laws which create rights, privileges or powers, and duties or obligations, and resolves any conflict in favour of the Commonwealth [50]. A State law that would alter, impair or detract from the operation of a Commonwealth law is invalid to that extent, which is sometimes described as direct inconsistency [51]. Quoting earlier authority, they said that the alteration, impairment or detraction must be "significant and not trivial", and that whether it is significant is "always one of fact and degree" [52].
Under the Tax Acts, a notice of assessment is conclusive evidence of the due making of the assessment and, except in proceedings under Pt IVC of the Taxation Administration Act, that its amount and particulars are correct, and the assessed tax is a debt due to the Commonwealth which the Commissioner may recover [54]. Those rights of the Commonwealth and the Commissioner, including the Commonwealth's right to a pro-rata distribution of any surplus in a winding up under the Corporations Act, had accrued before the Bell Act commenced, and the Bell Act purported to override them [55]. Under the Bell Act, the State collected, pooled and vested the companies' property in a State authority, decided in its absolute discretion who would be paid, and took any surplus [56]. The Governor could extinguish the Commonwealth's tax debts simply by making no determination in respect of them [57]. The Act also provided that nothing in a recommendation or determination created any right for the Commonwealth as a creditor, and it prohibited the Commissioner from bringing proceedings against the companies for the tax [59].
Their Honours concluded that the Bell Act purported to create a scheme under which Commonwealth tax debts were stripped of the characteristics the Tax Acts give them as to their existence, quantification, enforceability and recovery [60]. The Commonwealth (and the Commissioner) was reduced to "the position of a mere supplicant for the exercise of a favourable discretion on the part of the Executive of the State of Western Australia" [60]. In particular, ss 9, 16, 22, 25, 35, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 73 and 74 of the Bell Act altered, impaired or detracted from s 177 and ss 208 and 209 of the 1936 Act (now provisions of Sched 1 to the Taxation Administration Act) [60]. That effect on rights accrued under Commonwealth law was significant, so as to engage s 109 [61].
Separately, s 215 of the 1936 Act (now s 260-45 of Sched 1 to the Taxation Administration Act) imposed obligations on the liquidators for the pre-liquidation tax debts, including not to part with assets without the Commissioner's leave until notified, to set aside assets to meet the tax, and a liability to pay it [62]. For the post-liquidation tax debts, s 254 of the 1936 Act required the liquidator to retain enough money to pay the tax, an obligation that crystallised once the post-liquidation assessments issued, and made him liable to pay the tax to the extent of what he retained or should have retained [63]. Each of those obligations had arisen and was owed to the Commissioner before the Bell Act commenced [64]. By transferring all the companies' property to the Authority, s 22 left the liquidator no funds to meet the tax, and so purported to prevent him from complying with his obligations under the Tax Acts [65]. Section 22 substituted for those obligations "a mere expectancy or possibility of the payment of an uncertain amount resting in the discretion of the Authority and ultimately the Governor", and that alteration, impairment or detraction was significant so as to engage s 109 [66].
Their Honours did not need to resolve whether lodging proofs of debt based on the pre-liquidation assessments amounted to notice under s 215(2) of the 1936 Act [67]. Even if no notice had been given, so that the liquidator's obligation to set aside under s 215(3) had not arisen, the Bell Act was inconsistent with ss 215 and 254, and so a justiciable controversy did arise [68].
Although s 109 invalidates a State law only so far as it is inconsistent, the Bell Act presented as a package of interrelated provisions intended to operate fully and completely according to its terms [69]. Severing the inconsistent provisions would leave "a radically different and essentially ineffective residue" of provisions which, in the words of Dixon J in Wenn v Attorney-General (Vict), the State Parliament never intended to enact [52], [70]. Nor could s 22 be read down, because s 109 does not permit reading down that produces provisions the State Parliament could never have intended to enact, or reading into s 22 words that are not there, such as an exception for property set aside under s 215 [71]. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) did not assist because, quoting Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales, it does not speak to the extent of inconsistency, under s 109, of a State law made in the exercise of concurrent power [71]. The only way to make s 22 consistent would be to sever it completely, and because the scheme depended on vesting the companies' property in the Authority, what remained could not have been intended by the Parliament of Western Australia [72]. The Bell Act was therefore invalid in its entirety [73]. It was unnecessary to consider the other challenges to validity, in keeping with the Court's settled practice of not deciding constitutional questions unless necessary for the decision [75].
Gageler J (concurring)
Gageler J agreed with the conclusion that the Bell Act is invalid in its entirety by reason of inconsistency with the Tax Acts, and agreed with the substance of all the proposed answers [78]. He also agreed that, although the plaintiffs had standing quite independently of any intervention to raise other possible grounds of invalidity, the conclusion on the Tax Acts made it unnecessary to answer most of the other questions [78]. His Honour reached invalidity on a narrower basis: ss 22 and 29 of the Bell Act were essential to its scheme and, if valid, would alter, impair or detract from the operation of ss 215 and 254 of the 1936 Act [79]. He did not think it necessary to address the effect of ss 177, 208 and 209 of the 1936 Act or the related issues argued about the Crown Debts (Priority) Act 1981 (Cth) [79].
Section 22 would vest all the property of each WA Bell Company in the Authority, and s 29 would prevent the liquidator from performing any function or exercising any power except with the Authority's consent [80]. Unless each of those sections had full operation, the scheme of the Bell Act "simply cannot work" [81]. Western Australia argued that s 215 was no more than a machinery provision ensuring that funds would be available for whatever distribution the law governing the winding up required, and that the Bell Act was such a law [85]. Gageler J said that this characterisation "glosses the legal operation of the section and understates its purpose", because it fails to account for the method of quantifying the liquidator's set-aside obligation in s 215(3)(b) [86]. Section 215 operates as a separate and distinct law of the Commonwealth, of its own force, to impose the liquidator's payment obligation and, in default, a personal tax liability [89]. It is a machinery provision for the protection of the revenue, but the scope of its protection is "considerably more extensive and prescriptive" than Western Australia's characterisation allowed [89].
Even assuming that a liquidator could not breach s 215 by parting with property involuntarily and that the Commissioner had not yet given notice, that would not mean that ss 22 and 29 did not alter, impair or detract from the operation of s 215 [90]-[91]. Section 22 would remove from the liquidator's control the whole of the property subject to the s 215 obligations, making any notification by the Commissioner futile, and s 29 would prohibit compliance unless the Authority chose to consent [92]. Together, ss 22 and 29 would "denude s 215 of its relevant practical operation and in so doing flout its protective purpose" [93]. Their practical effect, in words Gageler J quoted from Australian Mutual Provident Society v Goulden, would be to "qualify, impair and, in a significant respect, negate the essential legislative scheme" [93]. Western Australia's arguments about s 254 "must suffer the same fate", because ss 22 and 29 would remove the factual substratum of its obligations and prevent their observance [96]. Because the Commissioner had made the post-liquidation assessments before 27 November 2015, the Commonwealth already had a right to payment, and, quoting Stock Motor Ploughs Ltd v Forsyth, a provision which prevents or suspends the enforcement of an accrued right cannot do otherwise than impair its enjoyment [97]. His Honour ended by noting the Commissioner's closing submission that the drafter of the Bell Act had either forgotten the Tax Acts or decided to proceed in disregard of them, adding: "That, indeed, is the basic problem" [98].
Orders. In the BGNV proceeding (S248 of 2015), the Court answered that the plaintiffs had standing, that a justiciable controversy arose, and that the Bell Act is invalid in its entirety; the questions about particular provisions and severance were unnecessary to answer, and the defendant was to pay the costs of the special case [76]. In the W.A. Glendinning proceeding (P63 of 2015), the Court answered that the plaintiff had standing, that a justiciable controversy arose, and that, by reason of inconsistency with the Tax Acts, the Bell Act is invalid in its entirety; the questions on the Corporations Act, s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act and Ch III were unnecessary to answer, and the defendant was to pay the costs [76]. In the Maranoa Transport proceeding (P4 of 2016), the Court answered that the plaintiffs had standing, that a justiciable controversy arose, and that, by reason of inconsistency with the Tax Acts, the Bell Act is invalid in its entirety; the Corporations Act question was unnecessary to answer, and the first defendant, Western Australia, was to pay the costs [76].
Why it matters
The joint reasons apply the test of whether a State law alters, impairs or detracts from a Commonwealth law to rights and obligations that had arisen and accrued under Commonwealth law before the State law commenced [9], [74]. They also hold that where the inconsistent provisions are fundamental to a State scheme, s 109 does not permit severance or reading down that would leave provisions the State Parliament never intended, so the whole Act is invalid [70]–[72].
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