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Bofinger v Kingsway Group Limited

(2009) 239 CLR 269 · [2009] HCA 44

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 11 November 2026

Overview

Bofinger v Kingsway Group Limited [2009] HCA 44 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ, in one joint judgment) on the law of sureties, their right to indemnity by the principal debtor and the equitable doctrine of subrogation [1]. The Court gave judgment on 13 October 2009. The Court allowed the appeal by Mr and Mrs Bofinger, who had guaranteed three mortgage loans to a company [2], [99]. It answered a separate question by holding that, absent their prior consent or release, on 8 February 2006 the first mortgagee, Kingsway Group Limited, was obliged to account to them as a constructive trustee for any dealing with the identified moneys and securities in favour of any other party, and to pay equitable compensation for the resulting denial or limitation of their recoupment [99].

Facts

B & B Holdings Pty Ltd, of which Mr Bofinger was a director, was a real estate developer that built 17 town houses and one house on land in an inner suburb of Sydney (the Enmore land) [2], [18]. To finance the purchase and the construction it borrowed $7,062,000 from Kingsway (the first mortgagee) in 2003, then, as the project proceeded, $1,400,000 from Rekley Pty Limited (the second mortgagee) and finally $350,000 from Mr John Edward Skehan (the third mortgagee) [19]. Each debt was secured by registered mortgages against the title to the Enmore land and a property at Nullaburra Road, Caringbah [19]. By instruments dated 31 January 2003, 14 March 2003 and 28 April 2005, relevantly in the same form, the Bofingers guaranteed B & B Holdings' debts to the first, second and third mortgagees respectively [22]. The guarantees were secured by mortgages over their own two properties at Caringbah, the Willarong Road property and the Bulwarra Street property [22].

The fifth, sixth and seventh respondents (the Solicitors), practising as Willis and Bowring Solicitors, acted for the first and second mortgagees and, at least in February 2006, for the third mortgagee, the fifth respondent was a director of Kingsway, and the eighth respondent was an officer of Kingsway [20].

B & B Holdings defaulted on the first mortgage on 1 October 2005 and on the third on 28 October 2005, and it is not clear when it defaulted on the second [25]. In July 2005 the Bofingers sold the Willarong Road property and paid $894,044.14 from the proceeds to Kingsway, and after selling the Bulwarra Street property they paid it $625,190.26 on 5 October 2005, making $1,519,234.40 in all [27]. Kingsway had made no call on the guarantees, but the payments were made in the circumstances of B & B Holdings' default, and Kingsway knew of the sales and of the use of the proceeds [29]. After the sales the mortgages over the two properties in favour of all three mortgagees were discharged, so the guarantees remained in force but were unsecured [28].

Kingsway went into possession of the Enmore land in November 2005 and completed a sale of Lot 13 on or about 2 February 2006 [30]. By 8 February 2006 B & B Holdings' debt to Kingsway had been satisfied, while it still owed $1,935,671.23 to the second mortgagee and $464,267.12 to the third [30].

On 7 February 2006 the Solicitors, acting for Rekley, asked Kingsway for possession of the two unsold lots, Lots 1 and 14, and for payment of the balance proceeds of Lot 13 and the total proceeds of Lot 5 to their trust account [31]. On 8 February 2006 Kingsway consented and enclosed the keys and the deeds and discharges of mortgage for Lots 1 and 14, and the discharges were registered on or about that date [31]. On 20 February 2006 Kingsway told a liquidator of B & B Holdings that $268,307.30 had been provided to Rekley at settlement, and attached a summary that made an allowance for the earlier receipt from the Bofingers of the proceeds of their properties [32]. On 21 February 2006 the whole of the proceeds of Lot 5, $432,712.53, was paid to the Solicitors on Rekley's behalf [32]. Kingsway did not account to the Bofingers so that they might recoup what they had paid [3].

The case proceeded on agreed facts, which the joint reasons say may be an incomplete account of events, but on which the parties chose to present the question [16].

Procedural history

The Bofingers sued in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, claiming an entitlement to recoupment in the nature of a trust binding Kingsway, breaches of trust by Kingsway, receipt of their trust property by Rekley, and accountability of the Solicitors under the principles associated with Barnes v Addy [38]. The separate question asked whether, in the circumstances, the sums of $268,307.33 and $432,712.53 and the securities over Lots 1 and 14 were held by the second defendant in trust for the plaintiffs as at 8 February 2006 [39]. The joint reasons read its sense as asking whether, the first mortgagee having been paid in full by 8 February 2006, it was trustee for the Bofingers of the surplus moneys from Lots 5 and 13 and the first mortgages over Lots 1 and 14, up to so much as would give effect to their subrogation rights [40].

The primary judge, Young CJ in Eq, answered the question wholly in the negative and then entered judgment for the defendants [14], [42]. The Court of Appeal (Giles JA, Handley AJA and Sackville AJA) dismissed an appeal and made a special costs order in favour of the Solicitors [14], [42]. In the High Court the Bofingers sought to have those orders set aside and to have an affirmative answer to the question [42]. The third mortgagee and the joint liquidators of B & B Holdings entered submitting appearances, and the other respondents presented essentially a united front [18], [20], [21].

Issues

The central question was whether the Bofingers, relying on their subrogation rights, could bring themselves within Kingsway's obligation to account for the surplus, in priority to any entitlement of the puisne mortgagees [36]. The respondents contended that the established principles did not speak to this case, because the first mortgage debt had been paid in full and the first mortgage displaced on the register, the surplus had left Kingsway's control, and the sureties had also guaranteed the puisne mortgages [13].

A further question was the scope of equitable relief that would adequately protect the position of the Bofingers as it stood on 8 February 2006 [45]. By their Notices of Contention the respondents also argued that the right was excluded by the terms of the guarantee to the second mortgagee and that it was inequitable to rely on Drew v Lockett [52]. The Court then had to decide whether the grounds of decision of the Court of Appeal should be sustained [69]. The reasons also deal with whether the doctrinal basis of equitable subrogation in Australian law is unsettled, given recent English authorities [98].

Held

Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ

All five judges joined in one set of reasons, so there was no separate concurrence and no dissent [1]. They said that resolving the appeal calls for applying, in words from Warman International Ltd v Dwyer, "the cardinal principle of equity that the remedy must be fashioned to fit the nature of the case and the particular facts" [1]. Their conclusion favoured allowing the appeal, without going to the length of accepting all of the Bofingers' submissions [15].

They said it is unhelpful to speak of subrogation as if it were a cause of action in the sense recognised at common law [6]. The ultimate liability of the principal debtor provides a foundation for subrogation in aid of a surety [8].

The authorities hold that a second mortgagee cannot complain where the surety uses by subrogation the security held by the first mortgagee [9]. In Drew v Lockett this was put on the basis that the second mortgagee took its interest with notice and by grant from the equity of redemption as it remained after giving full effect to the first mortgage [9]. The Bofingers relied in particular on the statement of Sir John Romilly MR in that case that a surety who pays off the debt is entitled to all the equities the creditor could have enforced, against the principal debtor and all persons claiming under him [10]. That statement is to be read with Gedye v Matson, where the same judge ruled that a surety who had paid off part of a mortgage was entitled to stand in the place of the mortgagee and, as against the principal debtor, to a charge on the estate [11]. The respondents did not challenge these statements of principle [13].

Sir Andrew Morritt V-C had described the surety's right as operating either by conferring the creditor's rights against the debtor or by imposing on the creditor an obligation to account to the surety for any recovery in excess of the debt [4]. That description was important here because the debt to Kingsway had been paid in full and its securities discharged, so the remedies had to found upon Kingsway's obligation to account [4].

Section 58(3) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) directs that purchase money from a mortgagee's sale be applied to the expenses of sale, then the first mortgagee, then subsequent mortgagees in order of priority, with any surplus to the mortgagor, but equity may place requirements on the first mortgagee as to the disposition of the surplus [34]. Adams v Bank of New South Wales is authority that s 58 is to be read consistently with the first mortgagee's equitable duty to account to puisne mortgagees as a trustee for any surplus, and the reasons set out the description by Kay J in Charles v Jones of a selling mortgagee as a trustee of any balance in his hands [35]. The second mortgagee correctly submitted that if, as it contended, the Bofingers lacked an equity supporting subrogation, s 3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) would not supply that deficiency [37].

On the remedy, the joint reasons held it unnecessary to resolve all the competing arguments about a trust or a charge, because the essential task was to identify the relief that now adequately protected the Bofingers' position on 8 February 2006 [45]. It was not apparent from the agreed facts that the proceeds of Lots 5 and 13 remained capable of separate identification, and the first mortgages over Lots 1 and 14 could not provide subject matter for any trust after the discharges were registered [46]. Assistance came from a point emphasised by four members of the Court in the joint reasons in Giumelli v Giumelli: the term constructive trust may be used not for the creation or recognition of a proprietary interest but to identify the imposition of a personal liability to account on a defaulting fiduciary [47].

On 8 February 2006 Kingsway "was obliged in good conscience both to account to the appellants for surplus moneys and securities it held and not to undertake or perform any competing engagement in that respect without prior release by the appellants", and these obligations were fiduciary in character [49]. As the correspondence of 7, 8 and 20 February 2006 indicated, Kingsway entered into and performed a conflicting engagement with the second mortgagee, which caused the Bofingers loss by denying them their entitlement to recoupment from the surplus moneys from Lots 5 and 13 and the first mortgages over Lots 1 and 14 [49]. Kingsway was therefore "to be treated as a constructive trustee to the extent that it must account to the appellants as a defaulting fiduciary" [50]. It was unnecessary to determine on the agreed facts whether Kingsway was a trustee in a fuller sense that gave the Bofingers a beneficial interest in the assets [50]. The breach would suffice to engage the principles associated with the second limb in Barnes v Addy, if at any further hearing the necessary further facts are established against other respondents [51].

The respondents started from the statement of Lowe J in The Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v New Zealand Loan & Mercantile Agency Co Ltd that the surety's right rests on equitable principles and applies unless excluded by agreement or unless the surety's conduct makes it inequitable to enforce it, a statement the joint reasons called plainly correct [52]. Following Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd, a doubt as to the construction of a provision in a contract of guarantee or indemnity should be resolved in favour of the surety or indemnifier, and the doubt may arise from apparent width of possible application as well as from uncertain meaning [53].

Clause 3 of the guarantee to Rekley, taken by itself, contained no covenant by the guarantor to ensure that B & B Holdings met its obligations to Rekley in priority to those owed to Kingsway, and such a priority structure would have required clear terms in a multi-party priority agreement [56]. The waiver in cl 6.4 reached only such of the guarantor's rights as surety under the guarantee to Rekley as may be inconsistent with that guarantee, and was not a waiver of rights under the guarantee to Kingsway [59]. The restraints in cl 7.1 were operative at 8 February 2006, because Rekley had not been paid in full and B & B Holdings' obligations under the second mortgage had not been discharged or released [61]. The Solicitors contended that par (2) of cl 7.1 showed an intention that Rekley would "go first" and be protected from prior claims by the Bofingers relying on subrogation [63]. The joint reasons rejected that submission, reading par (2) as dealing with matters relating to the guarantee of the second mortgage, such as claims for indemnity under that guarantee or for contribution by co-sureties, and any doubt about that construction was to be resolved in favour of the guarantor [64]–[65]. It followed that the Bofingers were not in breach of any restriction in that guarantee, and that there was nothing inequitable as between them and Kingsway and the Solicitors in seeking equity's support [66]. Nor were they bound to do equity by offering to "protect" the second mortgagee, as the Solicitors submitted, because, citing Rich and Dixon JJ in Langman v Handover, those who ask for equity's assistance must accept terms which flow from the legal or equitable rights of the defendant [67]. The grounds in the Notices of Contention based on the terms of the guarantee of the second mortgage therefore failed [68].

Turning to the Court of Appeal, Giles JA thought it important that the Bofingers had also guaranteed the second and third mortgages, which distinguished Drew v Lockett, and that they had undertaken obligations to Rekley inconsistent with asserting a prior entitlement to subrogation [70]. The joint reasons rejected this, saying the guarantee to Rekley showed no such intention, there was no displacement of priority between the mortgagees, the consecutive guarantees produced no inconsistency, and nothing made it inequitable for the Bofingers to enjoy their rights of subrogation [71].

Handley AJA relied on an application or extension of the rule in Otter v Lord Vaux and on an estoppel by convention, reasoning that the guarantors had agreed in substance that once the first mortgagee was paid in full the second would be paid next before they got anything [72]. The joint reasons found several obscurities in this and said there was no such agreement, in substance or otherwise [73]. As to estoppel by convention, they said "the agreed facts fall far short of what would be necessary" to establish the asserted priority of the second mortgagee as the conventional basis of its transaction with the guarantors [75]. The rule in Otter v Lord Vaux supplied no analogy, because it is concerned with the merger of charges in estates, and the mortgages by B & B Holdings were of land under the Real Property Act, to which the general law principles of destruction by merger did not apply [76]. Under that rule a mortgagor who has paid off an encumbrance cannot set it up in priority to a puisne mortgage it has granted, but here there was no question of any merger by operation of law [77].

Sackville AJA's preferred basis was that Kingsway's accounting to Rekley for the surplus was not unconscionable [78]. The joint reasons answered that equity required Kingsway to account for the net surplus to the Bofingers, an obligation imposed upon Rekley's enjoyment of its entitlement under s 58(3) [79]. Sackville AJA also said the arrangements were not intended to let the Bofingers turn Rekley into an unsecured creditor, but the joint reasons pointed out that the Bofingers could raise the money only because the three mortgagees consented to clearing the titles, and that the second and third mortgagees had not, for example, obtained an agreement expressly denying the subrogation rights [80]. Sackville AJA appeared not to have proceeded in accordance with the passage he cited from Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi, which looks first to well developed principles rather than to unconscientious conduct in some loose sense [81]–[82]. His reasoning did not allow for the fact that the surplus was computed only after allowance for the Bofingers' payments, which had enlivened the doctrine of subrogation [82]. The ultimate liability of B & B Holdings founded subrogation in the Bofingers' favour, and Kearney J in Cochrane v Cochrane, which the joint reasons said is often and correctly cited, contrasted that right with the right of contribution [83]–[84].

On unjust enrichment, the joint reasons said the concept is not a principle supplying a sufficient premise for direct application in a particular case, whether in contribution, as in Friend v Brooker, or in equitable subrogation [85]. In David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ rejected the submissions that in Australian law unjust enrichment was more than "just a concept" and that it was "a definitive legal principle according to its own terms", a position the Court has reaffirmed and by which all other Australian courts are bound [86]. The concept may provide a means for comparing and contrasting categories of liability, and may assist in recognising obligations in a new or developing category of case, but this appeal was not in that category [88]–[89]. In the words of the joint reasons, "The principles of equity which govern the outcome are well developed and have the vitality to permit further development in an orthodox fashion" [89]. All-embracing theories of unjust enrichment may conflict in a fundamental way with well-settled equitable doctrines and remedies, including the fashioning of a remedy such as the remedial constructive trust to meet the nature of the case [91]. The relevant principles of equity "do not operate at large and in an idiosyncratic fashion", and Millett LJ in Boscawen v Bajwa denied that subrogation is a remedy the court has a general discretion to impose whenever it thinks fit [94].

The joint reasons noted that in England matters appear now to stand differently [95]. In Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd, Lord Hoffmann spoke of a restitutionary remedy and asked whether the defendant would be enriched at the plaintiff's expense, whether that enrichment would be unjust, and whether there were reasons of policy for denying a remedy [96]. It may well be, the joint reasons said, that the result in that case could have been reached by development of orthodox equitable principles of subrogation [96]. There is difficulty in identifying the unjust enrichment in subrogation cases, which necessarily involve multilateral relationships, and Bryson J in Challenger Managed Investments Ltd v Direct Money Corporation Pty Ltd explained that restitution does not account for treating the mortgagor as obliged to hold the payer secured [97]. Giles JA had described the understanding in Australia of the doctrinal basis of subrogation as "open to debate" because of the recent English authorities, but the joint reasons held, contrary to the earlier suggestion in Highland v Exception Holdings Pty Ltd (In liq), that "the doctrinal basis of equitable subrogation in Australian law is not unsettled" [98].

Orders. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside order 1 of the orders of the Court of Appeal entered 29 December 2008 and the orders entered 8 July 2009 [99]. In their place it ordered that the appeal to the Court of Appeal be allowed, that orders 1 and 2 of the primary judge's orders entered 18 February 2008 be set aside, and that the separate question stated on 16 November 2006 be answered [99]. The answer was: "In the absence of prior consent or release by Mr and Mrs Bofinger, on 8 February 2006 Kingsway Group Limited was obliged to account to Mr and Mrs Bofinger as a constructive trustee for any dealing by it with the moneys and securities identified in the question for decision in favour of any other party, and to pay equitable compensation to Mr and Mrs Bofinger in respect of the denial or limitation by such dealing of recoupment from those moneys and securities of moneys paid by Mr and Mrs Bofinger to Kingsway Group Limited, in total $1,519,234.40, from the proceeds of sale of their properties at 407 Willarong Road, Caringbah and 2/41 Bulwarra Street, Caringbah." [99]. The first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents were to pay the Bofingers' costs in the High Court, in the Court of Appeal and of the proceedings to date in the Equity Division [99]. It is for the Bofingers to take such steps as may be appropriate to restore the proceedings in the Equity Division for the remaining issues, which will include the rate and nature of an interest component of the equitable compensation [100].

Why it matters

The case matters for sureties because, on the terms of these guarantees, the joint reasons held that giving consecutive guarantees to the first and later mortgagees produced no inconsistency and did not displace priority, so nothing made it inequitable for the sureties to enjoy their rights of subrogation [71]. It shows equity's response where the first mortgage debt has been paid in full and the securities discharged: the first mortgagee's obligation to account for the surplus, enforced by treating it as a constructive trustee who must account as a defaulting fiduciary [4], [50]. It left undecided whether a trust in a fuller sense arose, and whether other respondents are accountable on the principles associated with Barnes v Addy, which depends on further facts being established at any further hearing [50]–[51]. On doctrine, the joint reasons state that unjust enrichment does not supply a sufficient premise for direct application in equitable subrogation, and that the doctrinal basis of equitable subrogation in Australian law is not unsettled [85], [98]. The reasons also say that in a separate question proceeding agreed facts are to be stated with precision, because the parties will be bound by the determination [17].

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