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Bruton Holdings Pty Limited (in liquidation) v Commissioner of Taxation

(2009) 239 CLR 346 · [2009] HCA 32

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 11 November 2026

Overview

Bruton Holdings Pty Limited (in liquidation) v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] HCA 32 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, given on 26 August 2009 by French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Bell JJ in one joint judgment. The question was whether the Commissioner of Taxation could use a notice under s 260-5 in Sched 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ("the Administration Act") to require a firm of solicitors to pay over money a company had deposited with it, after the company's creditors had resolved to wind it up [2]. The Court held that the Commissioner's general power to issue a s 260-5 notice is not available if a liquidator has been appointed to a company, and that only the more particular provisions of s 260-45 are then engaged [10]. It also held that "any attachment" in s 500(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) extends to non-curial attachments, meaning those not made through a court, including those made by s 260-5 notices [38]. The appeal was allowed with costs, the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court made on 25 February 2009 were set aside, and in their place the Commissioner's appeal to the Full Court was dismissed with costs [3], [52].

Facts

The appellant was incorporated on 27 May 1997 with the sole purpose of acting as trustee of the Bruton Educational Trust, whose income and capital were to be applied for charitable purposes [41]. On 28 April 2006 the Commissioner disallowed its objection to the refusal of its application for endorsement as a tax exempt entity, and it challenged that outcome in the Federal Court, with the second respondent, the solicitors Piper Alderman, acting for it [2], [41]. Between 26 October 2005 and 28 February 2007 the appellant paid Piper Alderman some $470,000 to be held in its trust account on account of costs and disbursements of that litigation [42].

On 28 February 2007 administrators were appointed under s 436A of the Corporations Act, and under the Trust Deed the entry into administration ended the appellant's trusteeship, with no replacement trustee appointed [42]. Under cl 13 of the Trust Deed the appellant had a lien on the trust assets for liabilities, costs and expenses properly incurred in administering the Trust, and even without that clause it had rights of recoupment or exoneration, supported by a lien over the whole of the trust assets amounting to a proprietary interest, which survived its loss of office as trustee [43].

On 26 March 2007 the Commissioner issued to the trustee for the Trust an assessment for the year ending 30 June 2004 of $7,715,873.73, due for payment on 30 April 2007 [44]. On 30 April 2007 the appellant was placed into liquidation following a creditors' resolution under s 439C of the Corporations Act, the two administrators were appointed joint liquidators, and the date of commencement of the winding up was 28 February 2007, the day the administration began [45]. On 8 May the Commissioner lodged a proof of debt for the amount of the assessment [45]. On 9 May 2007 Piper Alderman received the s 260-5 Notice, dated 8 May, which recited that it owed money to the appellant and that the appellant owed the Commonwealth $7,715,873.73, and required it to pay the Commissioner $447,420.20 [46]. Section 255 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) required Piper Alderman to pay the moneys to the appellant or in accordance with its direction [47].

Procedural history

The primary judge, Allsop J, granted a declaration that the s 260-5 Notice was void [3]. The Full Court of the Federal Court (Ryan, Mansfield and Dowsett JJ) allowed an appeal by the Commissioner [1], [3]. The Full Court held that s 500(1) was limited to curial attachments, applying Commissioner of Taxation v Donnelly and saying that "the need for certainty in the law can best be recognised by applying the decision in Donnelly to s 500" [29], [30], [32]. The company then appealed to the High Court, seeking restoration of the primary judge's orders by the setting aside of the Full Court's orders [3]. Piper Alderman, the second respondent, entered a submitting appearance in the High Court.

Issues

The ultimate question was whether Piper Alderman was obliged to pay the Commissioner the amount demanded by the s 260-5 Notice from the sum standing to the company's credit in the firm's trust bank account [2]. The critical issue was whether, after the resolution for winding up, the company's property, which subject to preferential payments must be applied as ss 501 and 555 of the Corporations Act prescribe, could be diminished by the later engagement of s 260-5, a question requiring consideration of the relationship between the two Commonwealth statutes and of the relationship between provisions of the Administration Act [9]. A further question was whether, given the subject, scope and purpose of Ch 5 of the Corporations Act, "any attachment" in s 500(1) has a more restricted meaning than it otherwise bears [27]. The Commissioner also made submissions based on the appellant's lien that would deny s 500(1) any operation in this case, but the judges found it unnecessary to rule on them [49], [51].

Held

French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Bell JJ

All five judges wrote one set of joint reasons; there was no separate concurrence or dissent [1].

Section 501 of the Corporations Act requires a company's property on winding up to be applied in satisfaction of its liabilities equally, subject to the provisions on preferential payments, and s 555 adds that proved debts and claims rank equally and are paid proportionately if the property is insufficient [5], [6]. Section 500(1) makes void any attachment, sequestration, distress or execution put in force against the company's property after the passing of the resolution for voluntary winding up, and s 468(4) is relevantly in the same terms for a winding up by the court [7]. Section 5A(2), subject to exceptions not presently material, makes the Ch 5 provisions regulating winding up, including ss 500, 501 and 555, bind the Crown in right of the Commonwealth [8].

A s 260-5 notice gives the Commissioner the right to recover from a third party an amount the third party owes or may later owe to a taxpayer indebted to the Commonwealth for tax [12]. The third party must pay what is demanded, failure to comply is a criminal offence, and s 260-5(3) read with s 260-15 in effect gives the Commissioner the right to give a valid receipt and discharge [13]. The judges said a notice in these respects operates in the manner in which Kitto J, in Hall v Richards, described a garnishee order as operating to attach a debt [14]. They said the provisions have an ancestry beginning with s 50A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) and including s 218 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ("the 1936 Act"), which the Court in Bluebottle UK Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation described as containing "statutory garnishee provisions" [15].

Section 260-45, by contrast, deals specifically with collecting and recovering companies' tax liabilities from liquidators, and the Commissioner must notify the liquidator of the amount the Commissioner considers enough to discharge any outstanding tax-related liabilities [16]. The liquidator must set aside, from assets available to pay tax-related liabilities and other non-priority unsecured debts, the proportion that would be applied under s 555 to the notified amount, and is personally obliged to discharge the tax liabilities to the extent of the value of those assets, with failure a criminal offence [16]. The judges treated these provisions as an example of a specific regime which, where it applies, excludes more general provisions that might otherwise be engaged [17].

They said Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Moorebank Pty Ltd, referred to by the Commissioner's counsel, may provide some support for preferring, in the event of a conflict, specific schemes in the Administration Act to protect the revenue over the more general scheme of the Corporations Act, but that the relevant specific scheme in the Administration Act must first be identified [18]. They said the conclusion that would otherwise follow from the special provisions for liquidators in s 260-45 is that the Commissioner's general powers under s 260-5 are not available if a resolution has been passed for the winding up of a company, or an order has been made for winding up by the court or in insolvency [19]. That conclusion, in their words, "is at least reinforced, even required" by the application of ss 501 and 555 to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth through s 5A(2) [19].

They found further support in the points that the s 260-5 process falls within "attachment" in s 500(1), and that the emphatic language of s 500(1) is consistent with reading s 260-5 as not extending the general power to the circumstances for which s 260-45 makes special provision [20]. They also pointed out that before the Taxation Debts (Abolition of Crown Priority) Act 1980 (Cth), while the Crown retained priority for tax debts, it was necessary to provide specially, by s 221(1)(b) of the 1936 Act, that a liquidator was bound to apply the company's assets in payment of tax in priority to all other unsecured debts [20]. Finally, the proportionate system in s 260-45 "would be subject to adventitious disruption" if a third party's debt to the company gave the Crown full garnishee rights under s 260-5, since recovery of a tax debt owed by an insolvent company would depend on how far its assets comprised debts owed by third parties and how quickly the liquidator gathered them in [20].

They said the relevant provisions of the two Acts are not at odds and in need of reconciliation: "Rather, the former assists in the construction of the latter", the former being the Corporations Act [21]. With only s 260-45 engaged once a liquidator has been appointed, they said, there is no disruption of Ch 5 and, in particular, no attachment to be rendered void by s 500(1) [10].

On the meaning of "attachment", the judges explained that at common law it included seizing chattels under a writ of fieri facias, but that there was no remedy enabling a creditor after judgment to appropriate debts and moneys of the debtor held by third parties [23]. A new remedy came with the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (UK), soon copied in the Australian colonies, and by the time of s 163 of the Companies Act 1862 (UK), the ancestor of s 500(1), the term "attachment" was in use to describe that statutory garnishee remedy [7], [25], [26]. The judges accepted as correct the appellant's submission that the effects of serving a s 260-5 notice are, as a matter of general understanding, indicia of an attachment: it obliges the recipient to pay the Commissioner, makes it unlawful to pay the creditor, invalidates any attempted assignment by the creditor after receipt, and gives the Commissioner the sole right to discharge the debtor and to sue on non-payment [28]. They treated as in point von Doussa J's observation in Commissioner of Taxation v Donnelly that the meaning of attachment may extend to means other than a process of the court by which a debt is frozen or seized [29]. The essential point, they said, adapting what Willes J pointed out in The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London v Cox, is that the third party debtor "is safe" in paying, whether by the protection of a court order or by the operation of a statute such as s 260-15 [29].

The Commissioner relied on the Full Court's conclusion that s 500(1) is limited to curial attachments [30]. The judges answered that s 163 of the 1862 Act contains no words of limitation to that effect, and that there appears to be no decision, before the one under appeal, holding s 500(1) or any preceding provision to the same effect so limited [31]. Donnelly, on which the Full Court relied, concluded that "attachment" in s 118 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) is confined to attachments by curial order and does not extend to non-curial charges created by notices under s 218 of the 1936 Act [32]. The judges noted that the Full Court in Macquarie Health Corp Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation later noted the "considerable force" of the contention that Donnelly does not apply to what is now s 468(4), and said that contention applies with equal force to s 500(1) [32].

Three features of s 118 relied on in Donnelly are not present in s 500(1): a legislative history indicating that it is confined to curial attachments, since when introduced it referred to a creditor who had "instituted proceedings to attach a debt"; its link between attachments and executions against property and proceedings to enforce a charge, all court procedures to enforce judgments; and the reduction of the amount paid to the trustee by the taxed costs of the execution or attachment [34]. The judges added that s 500(1) includes the non-curial remedy of distress [34]. They said the legislative history of s 500(1) is distinct from that of s 118 and contains no indication of a limit to curial attachments: s 118 derives from s 92 of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth), whose predecessors, as Dixon CJ noted in McQuarrie v Jaques, were introduced to remedy conflicting priorities created by the doctrine of relation back, whereas s 500(1) only applies after the passing of a resolution for voluntary winding up and has no relation back period [35]. Donnelly was therefore distinguished [36].

The Full Court had also attached importance to "attachment" in s 569 of the Corporations Act, which expressly refers to the taxation of costs and shares a legislative history with s 118, but the judges said the particular confinement of the word in s 569 is not indicative of the meaning of "any attachment" in s 500(1) [37]. They concluded that an examination of s 500(1) and Ch 5 does not reveal any reason to restrict "any attachment", and that its meaning "extends to curial and non-curial attachments, including those effectuated by notices issued pursuant to s 260-5 in Sched 1 to the Administration Act" [38]. Contrary to the Full Court's holding, then, the term has no restricted meaning excluding the operation of a valid s 260-5 notice, and that conclusion supports the proposition that, as a matter of construction, the s 260-5 power does not extend to a company in liquidation [39]. They added: "The tension which would otherwise exist if a provision of one statute avoided a notice issued under another does not arise" [39].

The judges said the appellant's proprietary interest under the lien, in respect of Piper Alderman's obligation to account under s 255, "would appear to be" property of the appellant protected by s 500(1), and that both the primary judge and the Full Court so held [47]. They said particular questions may arise in the winding up of a trustee company with non-trust activities whose third party creditors seek access by subrogation to the trustee's lien, but that those questions did not arise here [48]. The Commissioner, relying on the lien and on the circumstance, contested by the appellant but assumed for present purposes, that the Commissioner was likely to be the only creditor admitted to proof, submitted that as the tax debt had not been paid the appellant's right was at best to exoneration, that the Commissioner was subrogated to that right with no prospect of any excess for the appellant, and so that the property represented by the right was not the appellant's and s 500(1) was not enlivened [49], [50]. The judges found it unnecessary to rule on those submissions, first because, on the construction of the Administration Act, the remedy available on these facts was the regime for liquidations in s 260-45, not the garnishee regime in s 260-5 [51]. Secondly, the Commissioner took inconsistent positions, because the garnishee regime only applies if the third party owes money to the taxpayer, yet the Commissioner denied that the appellant had any "property" within the broad meaning of that word for s 500(1) [51].

Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed with costs [52]. It set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 25 February 2009 and in their place ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs, which gave the company the restoration of the primary judge's orders that it sought [3], [52].

Why it matters

On the joint reasons, the remedy available to the Commissioner against a company in liquidation is the regime for liquidations in s 260-45, not the general garnishee power in s 260-5 [39], [51]. The case also holds that "any attachment" in s 500(1) reaches non-curial as well as curial attachments, contrary to the Full Court's holding, while Donnelly, on s 118 of the Bankruptcy Act, was distinguished and not applied [36], [38], [39]. It treats the Corporations Act as assisting in the construction of the Administration Act, not as a statute at odds with it and in need of reconciliation [21]. The judges did not rule on the Commissioner's submissions about the lien, subrogation and the meaning of "property" in s 500(1), and the questions that may arise for a trustee company with non-trust creditors did not arise [48], [51].

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