Burns v Corbett
(2018) 265 CLR 304 · [2018] HCA 15 · (2018) 353 ALR 386 · (2018) 92 ALJR 423
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Burns v Corbett [2018] HCA 15 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ) given on 18 April 2018. The case concerned whether the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales (NCAT), a State tribunal that is not a court, could decide complaints under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) brought by a resident of New South Wales against residents of other States [147]–[148]. The Court dismissed all five appeals from the New South Wales Court of Appeal, with costs [65]–[66]. Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ, with whom Gageler J agreed, held that Chapter III of the Constitution itself prevents a State from conferring jurisdiction over the matters listed in ss 75 and 76 on a tribunal that is not a court [2], [69]. Nettle and Gordon JJ rejected that implication and reached the same result because s 39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), operating with s 109 of the Constitution, excludes the State conferral [137], [146], [149]; Edelman J also rejected it, holding the State conferral inoperative through ss 38 and 39 of the Judiciary Act [259].
Facts
In 2013 and 2014 Mr Garry Burns complained to the Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales about statements by Ms Therese Corbett and Mr Bernard Gaynor, which he claimed were public acts that vilified homosexuals, contrary to s 49ZT of the Anti-Discrimination Act [6]. Section 49ZT(1) makes it unlawful for a person, by a public act, to incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of a person or group on the ground of homosexuality [152]. At all material times Mr Burns lived in New South Wales, Ms Corbett in Victoria and Mr Gaynor in Queensland [7]. The complaint against Ms Corbett went to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, which found that she had breached the Act and ordered her to make a public and a private apology [12]. NCAT replaced the Administrative Decisions Tribunal on 1 January 2014, and Ms Corbett's appeal to the Appeal Panel of NCAT failed [9], [12]. The orders were entered in the Supreme Court under s 114 of the Act, and Mr Burns then charged Ms Corbett with contempt for failing to make either apology [12]. In her defence she contended that neither tribunal had jurisdiction because she is a resident of Victoria [12]. The complaint against Mr Gaynor went to NCAT, which dismissed it on the basis that there had been no "public act" in New South Wales as s 49ZT requires [13]. While Mr Burns's appeal to the Appeal Panel was pending, a costs order was made against Mr Gaynor, who obtained leave to appeal against it to the Court of Appeal and sought a declaration that NCAT had no jurisdiction over residents of other States [13]. It was common ground that the disputes were matters between residents of different States within s 75(iv) of the Constitution and that NCAT is not a "court of a State" [38]–[39]. It was also accepted in the Court of Appeal that NCAT, in hearing the complaints, was exercising the judicial power of the State [27].
Procedural history
Ms Corbett's jurisdictional defence was removed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which heard it together with Mr Gaynor's matters [12], [14]. The Court of Appeal (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Leeming JA) is cited in the judgment as Burns v Corbett (2017) 343 ALR 690 [14]. In that court the Commonwealth argued primarily that Ch III implies a limit on State legislative power, and alternatively that a State law conferring such jurisdiction on a non-court tribunal is inconsistent with s 39 of the Judiciary Act and inoperative under s 109 of the Constitution [28]. Leeming JA, with whom Bathurst CJ and Beazley P agreed, held that no constitutional implication prevents a State from conferring jurisdiction over s 75(iv) matters on State tribunals, but that such a State law is inconsistent with s 39 of the Judiciary Act and invalid to that extent under s 109 [30]. The Court of Appeal accordingly held that NCAT had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaints against Ms Corbett and Mr Gaynor [156]. Mr Burns, the State of New South Wales and the Attorney General for New South Wales appealed by special leave, and the Attorneys-General of Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania and Victoria intervened in support of New South Wales [33]. The Commonwealth put its primary argument by notice of contention, and Ms Corbett and Mr Gaynor resisted the appeals on the same grounds as the Commonwealth [36]–[37]. The High Court refused Ms Corbett and Mr Gaynor special leave to cross-appeal against the Court of Appeal's order that there be no order for costs in their favour [37].
Issues
The joint reasons framed the first issue, which they called the Implication Issue, as whether the Constitution prevents a State Parliament from conferring jurisdiction over a matter between residents of different States within s 75(iv) on a tribunal that is not one of the courts of the States referred to in s 77 [1]. If that issue were resolved in the negative, the further issue, which they called the Inconsistency Issue, was whether such a State law is inoperative under s 109 of the Constitution because it is inconsistent with s 39 of the Judiciary Act [1].
Held
Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ
Their Honours resolved the Implication Issue in the affirmative, holding that a State law that purports to confer jurisdiction over any of the matters in ss 75 and 76 on a tribunal that is not a court of a State is inconsistent with Ch III and invalid [2]. They held that Ch III exhaustively identifies the possibilities for the authoritative adjudication of those matters, by federal courts and by State courts as part of the federal Judicature, so that adjudication by other organs of State government is excluded [3]. Because the Implication Issue was decided in the affirmative, they found it unnecessary to resolve the Inconsistency Issue [5]. Whatever choices the Commonwealth Parliament makes under s 77, adjudicative authority over ss 75 and 76 matters "may be exercised only as Ch III contemplates and not otherwise" [43]. Accordingly, even if the Commonwealth Parliament had made no law under s 77(ii) or (iii), a State law authorising a non-court agency of a State to decide a dispute between residents of different States would be invalid [43]. Applying the approach to Ch III taken in the Boilermakers' Case, they concluded that "Ch III recognises no other governmental institution as having the potential to exercise adjudicative authority over the matters listed in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution" [44]–[45]. They reasoned that adjudication of these matters only by courts, with an appeal to the High Court guaranteed by s 73, ensures that they are decided consistently and coherently throughout the federation [49]. Just as Ch III leaves no room for the Commonwealth Parliament to co-opt an executive agency of a State into the federal Judicature, it leaves no room for a State law to force on the parties to a ss 75 or 76 matter a determination by such an agency [50]. They noted that the question had not been squarely determined by the High Court, but found support in earlier authority, including The Commonwealth v Queensland and K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court [51]–[55]. A State law could not deny an appeal to the High Court from a State court in such a matter, and it would be surprising if a State could achieve that result indirectly by giving adjudicative authority to a body other than its courts [53]. It was not to the point that such a body's decisions might be subject to judicial review in the State Supreme Court, because the s 73 guarantee of an appeal does not depend on State law [53]. They said there is not the faintest suggestion in any historical material that the founders contemplated that disputes between residents of different States might be decided by State institutions other than courts [56]. They rejected New South Wales's argument based on the jurisdiction that "belongs to" State courts under s 77(ii), holding that those words refer to courts and necessarily exclude executive agencies of the States [57], [59]. They held that the existence of State administrative bodies exercising judicial power at Federation could not decide the question, because, although s 107 preserved State legislative power generally, the question was whether Ch III withdrew that power for ss 75 and 76 matters [63]. They concluded that ss 28(2)(a) and (c), 29(1) and 32 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) are invalid to the extent that they purport to confer jurisdiction on NCAT in the matters between Mr Burns and Ms Corbett and Mr Gaynor, and may be read down under s 31 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) so as not to confer jurisdiction where the parties are residents of different States [64].
Gageler J
Gageler J agreed with the conclusion, and substantially with the reasoning, of Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ on the Implication Issue, but set out his own reasoning, which first addressed the Inconsistency Issue [69]. His Honour held that s 77(ii) and s 77(iii) cannot be read, or extended by implication, so as to allow the Commonwealth Parliament to exclude the adjudicative authority of State tribunals that are not courts [76]–[77], [79]. He respectfully disagreed with the Court of Appeal, holding that even if a State could confer such jurisdiction on a non-court tribunal, s 109 would not operate on a Commonwealth law made under s 77(iii) to invalidate the State law [84]. In his view the Court of Appeal's approach necessarily treated s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act as a complete statement of the law that also stipulated negatively against any investing of jurisdiction other than in State courts [87], [91]. The fundamental problem with that approach was the lack of a source of Commonwealth legislative power, since neither s 77(iii) nor any other provision, including s 51(xxxix), allows the Commonwealth Parliament to make its conferral of federal jurisdiction exhaustive of the judicial power of a tribunal that is not a State court [92]–[93]. Applying the threshold drawn from earlier authority, he asked whether the implied limitation was logically or practically necessary for the preservation of the integrity of the constitutional structure [94]. He held that it was, because otherwise a State could circumvent a Commonwealth law excluding the State jurisdiction of State courts by conferring equivalent jurisdiction on a State tribunal that need not be independent or impartial and whose decisions need not be appealable to any court [99]. He illustrated the point with a hypothetical State commission modelled on the original Inter-State Commission, which the High Court had held the Commonwealth Parliament could not create [100]. He stated the implication as confining judicial power over the subject matters in ss 75 and 76 to judicial power exercised in respect of matters and conferred on courts, with neither the Commonwealth Parliament nor the State Parliaments having power to confer judicial power of any other kind [106]. He saw the implication as foreshadowed in the unanimous 1975 decision holding invalid a Queensland law that purported to confer jurisdiction on the Privy Council, and the reasoning of Jacobs J in that case as wholly consistent with it [101], [105]. On the historical argument about Local Land Boards, he held that practices adopted in the early years after federation without apparent regard to the Constitution "carry no interpretative weight at all" [108], [111]. He said that "on federation, everything adjusted", so that colonial legislation that could not be worked conformably with the Constitution ceased to operate [112]. A structural implication need not be shown to accord with pre-federation expectations, because the Constitution was framed as an enduring instrument of government [116]. He added that confirmation of the implication could not now come as a surprise to anyone who had studied the High Court's treatment of Ch III over the past half-century [118]. He held that the provisions of the NCAT Act are invalid to the extent that they purport to confer State judicial power over ss 75 and 76 subject matters and should be read down under s 31 of the Interpretation Act [119]–[120]. He agreed with the orders proposed by Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ [121].
Nettle J
Nettle J agreed with the conclusions of Gordon J but gave his own reasons [123]. His Honour held that the power in s 77 carries with it an implied incidental power to prohibit State courts from continuing to adjudicate ss 75 and 76 matters in State jurisdiction [128]. Ch III as enacted left that State jurisdiction in place, so that until the Parliament used its s 77 power, State courts and non-court State tribunals remained free to adjudicate such matters in State jurisdiction [129]. He rejected the thesis of Jacobs J in The Commonwealth v Queensland, on one view of it, that Ch III withdrew State jurisdiction over these matters at Federation, because s 77(ii) expressly left it to the Parliament to decide whether federal jurisdiction should be exclusive [133], [136]–[137]. A fortiori, the Constitution did not of itself exclude the State jurisdiction of non-court State tribunals over ss 75 and 76 matters [137]. The decisive questions were whether the Constitution gave the Parliament power to exclude that jurisdiction and, if so, whether s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act had done so [138]. He held that because States cannot undermine the Commonwealth's exclusive legislative power to invest and regulate federal jurisdiction, the Parliament has an implied incidental power to exclude the State jurisdiction of non-court State tribunals [140]–[141]. He accepted that there was "some force" in the submission of the Solicitor-General for New South Wales that the Court of Appeal's reasoning assumed the answer, and that it was necessary to find in s 39(2) an intention to exclude non-court tribunals [143]–[144]. He held that the Court of Appeal was nonetheless correct, because s 39(2) evinces an intention to cover the field of adjudication of ss 75 and 76 matters and so conveys an implied negative stipulation that non-court State tribunals should not enter it [145]. By the operation of s 109, adjudication of such matters by a non-court State tribunal in State jurisdiction is prohibited, and he would dismiss the appeals [146].
Gordon J
Gordon J held that a State Parliament cannot vest jurisdiction in a s 75(iv) matter in an administrative tribunal that is not a court of a State [148]. Her Honour held that this does not depend on any implied constitutional limitation on State legislative power, but on s 39 of the Judiciary Act operating with s 109 of the Constitution [149]. With the enactment of the Judiciary Act in 1903, State courts' jurisdiction in matters between residents of different States was withdrawn by s 39(1) and conditionally reinvested by s 39(2), so that the source of their authority became federal and could only be federal [150]. She held that such matters were within the State jurisdiction of State courts before 1903, and rejected as untenable Ms Corbett and Mr Gaynor's argument that no such jurisdiction survived Federation [168]–[170]. She rejected the Commonwealth's primary submission, holding that it had not been established, and was not correct, that the Constitution requires ss 75 and 76 matters to be dealt with only in the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth [176]. To say that Ch III made a "deliberate selection" of courts, as the Commonwealth put it, was in her view "a statement of conclusion, not of reasoning" [175], [177]. Section 77(ii) is facultative, so that federal control over these matters is not pre-ordained by the Constitution but depends on the Parliament exercising its s 77 powers [179]. She read the Queen of Queensland Case as resting on the Parliament having enacted s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act, not on any constitutional implication [182]. The Boilermakers' Case did not establish a separation of powers for the States and did not deny that ss 75 and 76 matters could be adjudicated by a State tribunal [183]. Any concern that States might circumvent a national scheme could arise only once the s 77 powers were actually exercised [184]. She concluded that the implication was not logically or practically necessary for the preservation of the integrity of the constitutional structure envisaged by Ch III [188]. On inconsistency, she held that if a State could confer jurisdiction over the matters on which s 39 operates on its tribunals, free of the conditions in s 39(2), that would plainly detract from the intended operation of s 39 [193]. She answered the argument of Queensland and Victoria that the Commonwealth lacked power over non-court bodies by holding that s 77(ii) and (iii) support a law that such matters be dealt with only in federal jurisdiction, and that the incidental power in s 51(xxxix) also supports the exclusion [194]–[197]. The New South Wales conferral was therefore invalid by reason of inconsistency with s 39, and NCAT had no jurisdiction to determine the complaints against Ms Corbett and Mr Gaynor [199]–[200]. She would dismiss each appeal and make the orders proposed in the joint judgment [202].
Edelman J
Edelman J held that there was no necessity for the proposed implication, because s 77(ii) gives the Commonwealth Parliament an express power to make matters, including diversity matters, exclusive to federal courts [205]. His Honour said that no authority compels the implication to be drawn 117 years after Federation, and that the Boilermakers' Case concerned the separation of federal judicial power and federal executive power, not State powers [207]. He held that the implication was inconsistent with the United States model on which s 77(ii) was based, not required by its text, inconsistent with its historical context, without principled basis and not required by authority [215]. He relied on the Vice-Admiralty Courts in New South Wales and Victoria, which at Federation were courts but not courts of the States, and on colonial tribunals and administrative bodies that exercised judicial power over diversity, admiralty or maritime matters, including Marine Boards, Land Boards and Commissioners of Customs [225]–[237]. The only principled and coherent justification for the implication would be a strict separation of powers at State level, which, apart from limited and specific exceptions, the Constitution does not require [243]. He said that the premise of the observations of Jacobs J in the Queen of Queensland Case relied on by the Commonwealth was "simply wrong" [247], [250]. Adopting Leeming JA's observation, he described the Commonwealth's reliance on K-Generation as involving a basic logical fallacy [251]. He accepted the Commonwealth's alternative submission that ss 38 and 39 of the Judiciary Act invalidated a State's conferral of diversity jurisdiction on a body other than a State court [252]. The power in s 77(ii) is a power to make federal jurisdiction exclusive of any and all State jurisdiction over ss 75 and 76 matters, whether vested in State courts or in State tribunals subject to judicial review by State courts [253]. In his view it was not necessary to treat the State law as invalid under s 109, since it could more simply be seen as rendered inoperative directly by the exercise in ss 38 and 39 of the power to exclude in s 77(ii) [208], [254]. He construed ss 38 and 39, which borrowed the language of s 77, as a full exercise of that power, whose object included ensuring an appeal to the High Court [256]–[257]. He explained that if the power had been withdrawn by constitutional implication, only a referendum under s 128 could return it to the States, whereas on his construction it remains for the Commonwealth Parliament to exclude, or not to exclude, the States' concurrent power [260]. He agreed that the orders proposed in the joint judgment should be made [261].
Orders. In each of the five matters, S183, S185, S186, S187 and S188 of 2017, the appeal was dismissed [65]. In S183 and S185 the appellant, Mr Burns, was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs, and in S186, S187 and S188 the appellant, the Attorney General for New South Wales or the State of New South Wales, was ordered to pay the second respondent's costs [66].
Why it matters
The joint reasons noted that whether a State may sidestep its own courts by giving an executive agency adjudicative authority over ss 75 and 76 matters had not been squarely determined by the High Court [51]. Four judges, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Gageler JJ, held that Ch III itself denies the States power to confer jurisdiction over ss 75 and 76 matters on bodies that are not courts, while Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ reached the same result through the Judiciary Act [2], [69], [146], [149], [259]. Edelman J explained that a result resting on a constitutional implication could be changed only by referendum, whereas on his view the matter remains for the Commonwealth Parliament [260]. The joint reasons noted that Pt 3A of the NCAT Act, which commenced on 1 December 2017, provides for such matters to be heard by an authorised court instead of NCAT where NCAT lacks jurisdiction because federal diversity jurisdiction is involved, but did not consider it further [11].
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