Castle Constructions Pty Limited v Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd
(2013) 247 CLR 149 · [2013] HCA 11 · (2013) 296 ALR 394 · (2013) 87 ALJR 528
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Castle Constructions Pty Limited v Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 11 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Gageler JJ), given on 10 April 2013 on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. It concerned an easement over land in Northbridge, Sydney, which the Registrar-General removed from the Register after giving notice to the then owners of the dominant tenement, who did not object [1]–[2]. The High Court allowed the appeal, refused Sahab special leave to cross-appeal, and set aside the Court of Appeal's orders, which had required the Registrar-General to restore the easement [10], [41]. All five judges agreed in the orders, but on different grounds: Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ held that the deliberate removal was not an "omission" within s 42(1)(a1) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) (the RPA), and Gageler J held that s 12A(3) of the RPA answered the whole of Sahab's case [25], [42], [44].
Facts
In 1921, the pieces of land known as 69 Strathallen Avenue (the Strathallen land) and 134 Sailors Bay Road (the Sailors Bay land) each formed part of a larger piece of land owned by Mr and Mrs Middleton [1], [4]. The Middletons sold the Strathallen land to Mr Davis, and the instrument of transfer (the 1921 transfer) created an easement of way over the western boundary of the land they kept, giving access from Sailors Bay Road to the rear of the land sold, and included covenants about fencing, the use of the easement and the use of the land sold [4]. After a subdivision in 1958, the covenants and the easement burdened the Sailors Bay land [4].
Castle bought the Sailors Bay land in June 2001 and in September 2001 asked the Registrar-General to remove the easement from the Register [5]. A statutory declaration filed in support asserted that, according to its terms, the easement lasted only for so long as Mr Davis (or his successors other than on sale) owned the Strathallen land [5]. The Registrar-General notified the then owners of the Strathallen land, Mr and Mrs Howard, that he intended to remove the easement, and when they did not object he removed it in November 2001 from the folios of both pieces of land [6]. Sahab became registered proprietor of the Strathallen land in April 2007, and in September 2008 it asked the Registrar-General to restore the easement, which he refused to do [7].
Procedural history
Sahab sued the Registrar-General in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for a declaration that the easement had been wrongly extinguished and an order requiring its restoration, and Castle was joined on its own application [7]. After the primary judge, Slattery J, ordered the Registrar-General in October 2009 to give Sahab reasons for the 2001 decision to remove the easement, the Registrar-General provided minute papers recording that no objection was received and the applications were granted, with a letter saying the notice was sent because he agreed with the applicant that the easement and covenant had expired by their own terms [7]–[8]. On 8 March 2010 Slattery J published reasons holding that Sahab was not entitled to the orders it sought, and on 5 May 2010 made final orders dismissing its claim [9].
The Court of Appeal (McColl and Campbell JJA and Tobias AJA) decided that Sahab's appeal should be allowed, dismissed Castle's application to withdraw or reconsider its reasons, and then ordered the Registrar-General to restore the easement [10]. In joint reasons of Campbell JA and Tobias AJA, with which McColl JA agreed, the Court of Appeal concluded that the right of way was subsisting at the time of the 2001 decision, a conclusion that depended at least in part on its construction of the 1921 transfer [16]. It held that the easement had been omitted within s 42(1)(a1) because "omission" in that provision and in s 12(1)(d) meant no more than that the easement was not there, treating that as established by its earlier decision in Dobbie v Davidson (1991) 23 NSWLR 625 [13], [18]. The Court of Appeal's joint reasons said that "if one looks at the register and the easement is not there but should be, it follows that it has been omitted" and that the reason for its absence was irrelevant, and the Court of Appeal held that the Registrar-General was therefore empowered to correct the omission in 2008 [18].
By special leave Castle appealed to the High Court against the Court of Appeal's final orders, and Sahab sought special leave to cross-appeal to allege that, contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion, the easement was no longer subject to the covenants in the 1921 transfer [11].
Issues
Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ stated the determinative issue as whether Castle's title to the Sailors Bay land was subject to the easement the Registrar-General had intentionally removed from the Register, which turned on s 42(1)(a1) of the RPA [12]. Section 42(1) provided that, except in the case of fraud, a registered proprietor held the recorded estate or interest subject to other recorded interests but free from all others, except in five listed circumstances, one of which, in s 42(1)(a1), was the omission of an easement validly created, at or after the land was brought under the RPA, under the RPA, another Act or a Commonwealth Act [12].
Sahab submitted that "omission", the word in s 42(1)(a1), means no more than is "not there", so that this was such a case because the easement it claimed was not recorded on the Register [13]. It also submitted that some or all of ss 12, 122, 136 and 138 of the RPA permitted it to challenge the removal and obtain restoration of the easement [15]. It did not dispute that, on its reading, a registered proprietor could be confident of an indefeasible title only once any statutory means of reviewing the Registrar-General's decision had been exhausted in the Registrar-General's favour [15].
Gageler J considered the determinative issue to be different and treated s 12A(3) of the RPA as the answer, which raised two issues of construction: whether a successor in title to a person given notice is a person claiming "through or under" that person (the words of s 12A(3)), and the nature and scope of the declaration in s 12A(3) that "no action … shall lie" against the Registrar-General [42], [44], [48]–[50].
Held
Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
These four judges said the inquiry must begin by examining s 42(1)(a1) and deciding what is an omission of an easement, against the background of some basic principles [19]. The question the Court of Appeal began with, whether the easement continued in operation, was directed, they said, to what interest the 1921 transfer would give under general real property principles, and not to "the separate, and only relevant, inquiry: what interests in land did the RPA give to Castle and Sahab?" [19]. They treated it as of fundamental importance that the Torrens system, of which the RPA is a form, "is not a system of registration of title but a system of title by registration", quoting Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376 at 385 per Barwick CJ [20].
They accepted that the primary definitions of "omission" and "omit" in the Oxford English Dictionary direct attention only to the action of leaving out, and not to how or why it occurred [22]. Relying on the reasons of Priestley JA in Dobbie, they also accepted that the history of Torrens title legislation and the treatment of cases of omission of unregistered easements point to reading omission in this setting as meaning no more than left out or not there [23]. They said the Court of Appeal in Dobbie rightly held that an easement existing before the land was brought under the RPA, but not recorded when the land was first brought under it, was a case of omission regardless of what brought about its absence [23]. On that understanding, s 42(1)(a1) both presupposes the continued existence of what was omitted and provides for its continued effect even though it does not appear on the folio, which they said can be applied readily to an easement created under a Commonwealth Act or under a State Act other than the RPA, and also, at least, to an easement created by registration under the RPA but not recorded on the folio of the servient tenement [24].
They said other considerations arise where an easement created by registration under the RPA has later been removed by the Registrar-General: it could be said to be "not there", but it is more accurate to say it is "no longer there because it has been removed" [25]. Because the RPA provided for title by registration, they held, the deliberate removal from the Register of an easement created by registration cannot be a case of omission under s 42(1)(a1), since that provision's presupposition that the easement continues to exist is not valid [25]. Section 32(6) empowered the Registrar-General to cancel the recording of the easement on both folios if satisfied that it no longer subsisted [26]. They did not decide whether the statutory declaration's assertion about the easement's duration was correct, or examine the Court of Appeal's construction of the 1921 transfer, saying neither was necessary [5], [16].
Where the Registrar-General removes an easement after notice under s 12A(1) and the owner of the dominant tenement obtains no restraining order, they said, s 12A(3) would bar that owner from any relief against the Registrar-General in respect of the removal, including relief compelling restoration [27]. They did not decide whether s 12A(3) also bars a later purchaser, which would turn on whether the purchaser was "claiming through or under" the former owner (the words of s 12A(3)), because there was a more fundamental reason why the purchaser cannot compel restoration [28]. That reason was that the former owner transferred only its interest as registered proprietor of land without any registered easement, and, because this is a system of title by registration, the purchaser acquired that interest "shorn as it then was of any recorded easement" [28]. If no notice had been given, they said, the owner at the time of removal could seek review under s 122(1) as a "person who is dissatisfied" (the words of s 122(1)), but a later purchaser could not, because the decision did not relate to land in which the purchaser then had any interest [29].
Although the notice itself was not in evidence at trial or in the Court of Appeal, they refused to find that no notice was given, saying Sahab offered "no satisfactory basis" for overturning the finding that it was, and that the inference that notice was given to the Howards was "irresistible" [30]. They added that it may also be inferred that the notice accorded with s 12A [30]. The Howards, having made no objection and obtained no restraining order, would have been barred by s 12A(3) from an action against the Registrar-General to compel restoration [31]. They could have pursued any personal claim they could establish against Castle, but unless and until such an action compelled Castle to procure restoration, their title did not include any easement over the Sailors Bay land [31]. The Howards therefore did not and could not transfer any easement to Sahab, and since Sahab made no personal claim against Castle, it did not have the easement it claimed [31]. The easement was not omitted from the folio of either piece of land, and the fact of its removal was apparent from the Register before Sahab bought the Strathallen land [32].
The four judges then made four further points. First, Sahab's case meant that a deliberate alteration of the Register changed nothing in the interests to which Castle's title was subject, even though the Howards would have been barred from asserting the interest, a result they described as "odd or surprising" and which pointed firmly against Sahab's construction of the RPA [34]. Second, Sahab's case gave continued effect to an easement after its removal from the Register, even though under s 41 it took effect only on registration of the 1921 transfer, a result again described as "odd or surprising" [35]. Third, Sahab's reliance on ss 12, 122, 136 and 138 assumed that it was a "person who is dissatisfied", the words of s 122(1), with a decision of the Registrar-General [36]. As to the 2008 refusal, there was no omission, and Sahab could not be dissatisfied because it had obtained title by registration to land without a recorded easement: "Sahab got what appeared on the Register" [37]. As to the 2001 removal, the decision did not relate to land in which Sahab then had any interest, so Sahab did not become a person dissatisfied with it, and "Section 122 is not reached" [38]. Fourth, and most importantly, Sahab's case on both s 12(1)(d) and s 42(1)(a1) ultimately depended on reading "omission" in each as including an easement deliberately removed after registration [39]. To observe that the easement is "not there", they said, "provides only a snapshot of the state of the Register"; it is more accurate to say it is "no longer there because it was deliberately removed", and that "is not a case of the omission of an easement" [39]. Because Castle's land was no longer subject to the easement, the related covenants no longer applied, and the questions raised by the proposed cross-appeal were not reached [40].
Gageler J (separate reasons, agreeing in the orders on a different ground)
Gageler J agreed with the orders proposed by the other four judges and adopted their statement of facts and abbreviations, but considered the determinative issue to be different [42]. Gageler J saw the proceedings as in substance for judicial review of two decisions: the November 2001 decision to remove the easement under s 32(6), and the October 2008 decision not to restore it under s 12(1)(d) [43]. Sahab's case, Gageler J said, was that the 2001 decision was a nullity because the Registrar-General erred in law, and that in 2008 the Registrar-General failed to perform a statutory duty to correct that error, invoking ss 122 and 138 of the RPA and s 65 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) [43]. Once it was found that the Registrar-General had notified Sahab's predecessors in title in accordance with s 12A(1), a finding Gageler J said should not be disturbed, s 12A(3) "provided the short and complete answer to the whole of Sahab's case" [44].
Section 12A(3) provides that where a person given notice does not, within the time limited, serve or give written notice of a Supreme Court order restraining the Registrar-General, no action by that person or by anyone claiming through or under that person lies against the Registrar-General in respect of the action specified in the notice [45]. Gageler J noted that when inserted in 1970 the section covered only the registration of a dealing, and that it was then explained as designed to put a contest between the interested parties and to absolve the Registrar-General and the assurance fund from liability where a person deprived of an interest had been given, and ignored, an opportunity to safeguard it [46]. A 1996 amendment extended it to any action that alters the Register [47].
On the first issue of construction, Gageler J agreed with the Court of Appeal that a successor in title to a person given notice is a person claiming "through" that person within s 12A(3), and so is subject to the bar [49], [51]. On the second, Gageler J disagreed with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that an "action" in s 12A(3) does not extend to proceedings against the Registrar-General permitted by other sections of the RPA, such as ss 122 and 138 [50], [52]. In Gageler J's view, s 12A "manifests a legislative choice that a notified alteration of the Register by the Registrar-General should not be legally impugned after the alteration is made", so that no person notified, and no successor in title to such a person, has any right to challenge the alteration once made if the person failed to object to the notice [53]. Gageler J said that confining the process to the period before the Register is altered enhances indefeasibility of title, citing Frazer v Walker and Breskvar v Wall [53].
The expression "no action … shall lie" in s 12A(3) is, Gageler J said, best read "not as a procedural prohibition but as a substantive alteration of legal rights" [54]. The word "action" there covers any proceeding to vindicate a legal right or compel the performance of a legal duty, and, among other circumstances, an action is in respect of the notified action so far as it directly or indirectly challenges the validity of the notified alteration [54]. So read, Gageler J said, s 12A leaves the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under ss 122 and 138 unaffected, because there is no infringement of a legal right or breach of a legal duty on which relief might be obtained, and s 12A(3) "operates as a plea in bar to any action that might be brought" [55].
Gageler J therefore held that s 12A(3) operated as a plea in bar to both of Sahab's claims for judicial review: the claim about the 2001 decision was a direct challenge to the notified alteration, and the claim about the 2008 decision an indirect one, in the words of Slattery J "merely an attempt to reopen the 2001 decision" [56]. Gageler J found it neither necessary nor appropriate to address the meaning of "omission" in s 42(1)(a1), the scope of the power under s 12(1)(d), whether the proceedings fell within s 138, or whether Sahab was "dissatisfied" with the 2001 decision under s 122, an issue the Court of Appeal found Castle estopped from raising [57].
Orders. The Court ordered that the appeal be allowed and that the application for special leave to cross-appeal be refused [41]. The first respondent, Sahab, was ordered to pay the appellant and the second respondent the costs of the appeal and of the application for special leave to cross-appeal [41]. The orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 5 April 2012 were set aside, and in their place it was ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs [41].
Why it matters
The case matters because four of the five judges decided that the deliberate removal from the Register of an easement created by registration is not a case of omission under s 42(1)(a1) of the RPA, while accepting that Dobbie was rightly decided for an easement not recorded when the land was first brought under the RPA [23], [25], [39]. Those judges reasoned from title by registration that a later purchaser of the dominant tenement acquires only the registered interest as it then stands, without any easement already removed [28], [37]. They noted that a personal claim against the servient owner could have been pursued if established, though Sahab made none [31]. The four judges left open whether s 12A(3) reaches a later purchaser, only Gageler J decided that it does, and Gageler J did not address the meaning of omission [28], [51], [57].
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