Clark v Macourt
(2013) 253 CLR 1 · [2013] HCA 56 · (2013) 304 ALR 220
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Clark v Macourt [2013] HCA 56 is a decision of the High Court of Australia delivered on 18 December 2013. It concerns the measure of damages recoverable by the buyer of the assets of a business when the vendor promised to deliver stock complying with a warranty but did not do so [25]. The New South Wales Court of Appeal had held that the buyer, Dr Clark, should have no damages for the breach of warranty [5]. By a majority (Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ, with Gageler J dissenting), the High Court allowed her appeal [23], [24], [74], [146]. Its orders, on the cover, allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the Court of Appeal's orders and ordered that the appeal to that court be dismissed with costs.
Facts
Dr Anne Clark, the appellant, and Dr David Macourt, the respondent, were registered medical practitioners who each specialised in providing assisted reproductive technology services [1]. Dr Macourt controlled St George Fertility Centre Pty Ltd ("St George"), which provided such services to patients and which Hayne J calls the vendor and Gageler J calls the company [1], [41], [77]. By a deed made in January 2002 ("the Deed"), St George agreed to sell Dr Clark assets used in or attached to its practice, and Dr Macourt guaranteed St George's obligations [78]. Under cl 2a of the Deed, the price was 15% of the amount by which Dr Clark's gross fee income in each of 2002, 2003 and 2004 exceeded 105%, 110% and 115% respectively of her fee income for 2001 [80]. As at 8 April 2005 the total payable was $386,950.91, of which she had paid only $167,000 [81].
By cl 5.1(a), St George warranted that the consents, screening tests and identification of sperm donors had been conducted in compliance with the guidelines of the Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee ("RTAC") [79], [83]. Keane J says St George delivered 3,513 straws of donor sperm on completion [85], and Gageler J says some 3,500 [45]. Dr Clark used only 504, and the balance was discarded because of St George's breaches [85]. The primary judge found that she could reasonably have expected to use at least 2,500 straws, since a limit in the RTAC Code of Practice on the number of children generated by any one donor meant that not all could have been used even with compliance [89]. Deducting the 504 used gave 1,996 straws, a figure on which no issue was taken in the High Court [2], [50], [89].
By September 2005 she had exhausted the usable St George straws, and the only donor sperm available to meet the shortfall that complied with all regulatory and legislative requirements came from Xytex Corporation ("Xytex"), a company in the United States [86]. She bought straws from Xytex to use in treating patients [5]. She accepted that ethically she could not charge, and had not charged, any patient more for using donated sperm than she had outlaid to acquire it [3]. On her recovery from patients, Hayne J says the fee charged to each patient covered the costs of buying the straws used for that patient [5]. Crennan and Bell JJ record a concession that the costs passed on to patients equalled her acquisition and other costs [37]. Gageler J says her charges covered "most (but not all)" of the cost and expense of acquisition [46].
Procedural history
St George sued Dr Clark in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for the unpaid balance of $219,950.91, and she cross-claimed against St George and Dr Macourt for breach of warranty [48], [81], [82]. Macready AsJ entered judgment for her for damages to be assessed, against St George for breach of warranty and against Dr Macourt as guarantor, and those orders were not appealed [5]. Crennan and Bell JJ record that she obtained summary judgment by consent on the basis of admissions, and that she abandoned claims for loss of profits in respect of embryos and, earlier, donor sperm [31].
On the assessment, in St George Fertility Centre Pty Ltd v Clark [2011] NSWSC 1276, Gzell J assessed the damages as what it would have cost at the date of breach to buy 1,996 straws from Xytex [5], [90]. Gageler J describes this as the difference, at delivery in 2002, between what a hypothetical sale of the unusable straws would have brought (implicitly nothing) and what a hypothetical purchase of replacements would have cost [51], [52]. Gzell J used the cost of Xytex straws after September 2005 to find the notional cost in early 2002, and allowed for the likely lower price at that time by allowing no interest for the intervening three and a half years [92]. Crennan and Bell JJ and Keane J state the award as $1,246,025.01 [24], [88]. Gageler J states the damages as $1,020,252.70 exclusive of interest [53]. Hayne J says the replacement straws would have cost about $1 million at the time of breach [3]. Gzell J rejected an argument that damages should be assessed at the date of trial because her costs had by then been recovered from patients, and applied the general rule that damages are assessed at the time of breach or when the cause of action arises [91].
In Macourt v Clark [2012] NSWCA 367, the Court of Appeal (Tobias AJA, with whom Beazley and Barrett JJA agreed) allowed Dr Macourt's appeal and reduced the damages on the cross-claim to nothing [5], [55], [58], [93]. Keane J identifies two strands in that reasoning, the first being that the Deed was for the sale of a business and not goods and that, given the cl 2a price formula, it could not be demonstrated she had paid anything for the sperm [94]. The second strand was that she suffered no loss because she recovered her expenditure on the Xytex stock from patients [95]. Tobias AJA treated the cost of replacement sperm as her prima facie loss, subject to mitigation, and said she had mitigated to what was in practical terms the maximum extent her legal and ethical constraints allowed [56]. He also found she could not ethically have charged patients for usable sperm acquired under the contract, as the price terms gave no way of determining its cost [55]. On his approach, her loss consisted of the unrecouped part of the cost of replacements already bought, plus the capitalised value of the part of the cost of the remaining replacements that could be expected not to be recouped, which she could have claimed but did not [57].
By special leave, Dr Clark appealed to the High Court seeking orders reinstating the primary judge's award [6]. Dr Macourt is the only respondent because St George is now in liquidation [78]. He sought leave to file out of time a notice of contention that the cost of Xytex sperm was not an accurate proxy for the value of the contract sperm [138].
Issues
The main issue was the measure of damages, as between an approach focused on the loss of the value of the stock at the date of completion and one focused on the expense of acquiring substitute stock in the ongoing conduct of the business [75]. A related issue was whether Dr Clark's recovery from patients of her outlays on Xytex sperm mitigated her loss [125]. Dr Macourt also argued that compliant sperm would have been valueless, that she was better off using Xytex sperm, and that any consequence of breach was built into the contract through the price formula [113], [139], [144].
Held
Keane J (majority)
Keane J held that the approach focused on the value of the stock at the date of completion is correct [75]. Dr Clark was entitled to frame her claim in the manner most advantageous to her, and her reply sought the equivalent of the value of the worthless sperm, with the amount paid to Xytex being no more than evidence of an appropriate measure [103]. That was the measure the primary judge applied [104]. It was "perhaps unfortunate" that he also spoke of her being out of pocket for the amount paid under the Deed, a "flourish" that "seems to have served as a distraction to the Court of Appeal" [97].
Keane J stated the ruling principle, quoting Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 236 CLR 272 and, through it, Parke B in Robinson v Harman: a party who sustains a loss by a breach of contract is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed [106]. He said Bellgrove v Eldridge (1954) 90 CLR 613 confirms that the principle is not displaced because a case does not involve the transfer of marketable commodities, and that Tabcorp is to the same effect [107]. The principle applies where goods are supplied as an aspect of performance under a contract for the sale of assets of a business, and s 54(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW) is a statutory expression of the principle that does not exhaust its operation [108]. Value is assessed at the date of breach, "not as a matter of discretion, but as an integral aspect of the principle" [109]. That serves finality and certainty in commercial dealings, because what later befalls the purchaser in dealing with persons who were not parties to the contract, and market movements, have no bearing on the entitlement [110].
On the first strand of the Court of Appeal's reasoning, Keane J said it was irrelevant that the contract did not permit a calculation of the price paid for the St George sperm, because the loss is measured by the value of what St George promised to deliver and did not, not by what she outlaid [111], [112]. Answering the argument that compliant sperm would have been valueless, he noted that Dr Clark denied a concession Tobias AJA attributed to her about s 32(1) of the Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW), and said s 32(2) ensured that neither St George's sale, Xytex's sale nor her use of sperm in treating patients was prohibited by s 32(1) [113], [114], [115]. The National Health and Medical Research Council guidelines imported into the RTAC Code were concerned to prevent commercial trading in human sperm and contemplated that practitioners could recover reasonable expenses, and Keane J said Dr Clark, in providing services for a fee, "cannot sensibly be said to be engaging in commercial trading in sperm for a profit" [121]. Section 16 of the Human Cloning for Reproduction and Other Prohibited Practices Act 2003 (NSW) was not in force when the Deed was made or completed, and so did not affect the lawfulness of the Deed or the parties' expectations [122], [123]. Tobias AJA's observations that Dr Clark did not obtain title and that a donor could withdraw consent were irrelevant, as nothing in the evidence suggested they diminished the value of her contractual entitlements [124].
On the second strand, Keane J said that to rely on her recovery of the Xytex costs from patients "is to fail to address the claim which the appellant actually made" [128]. The loss occurred at completion, when the assets she acquired were less valuable than they would have been had St George met its warranties, and her business would have been worth substantially less if she had been minded to on-sell it then [128]. She may also have been able to charge fees within the market range at a greater profit had she not had the extra cost of replacement sperm, and she could claim the measure without going into such matters [129]. It would be "an unprecedented application of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale" to confine her damages by the likely effects of her decisions on how to exploit the assets commercially [129]. Keane J said the passage Dr Macourt relied on from Lord Atkinson in Wertheim v Chicoutimi Pulp Co [1911] AC 301 gave general support to Dr Clark's position [130], [131]. He applied Warrington LJ's statement in Slater v Hoyle & Smith Ltd [1920] 2 KB 11 that a buyer of inferior goods has lost the difference in values, and that it is immaterial that by good fortune he recouped what he paid [133], [134]. The value of the St George sperm lay not in a market for sperm as a commodity but, as the Deed contemplated, as stock of a business, and as stock it was "distinctly inferior" [134].
Dr Macourt said it was counter-intuitive that a total price of $386,950.91 could lead to damages of $1,246,025.01 for failure to deliver some only of the assets, and Keane J rejected that appeal to intuition as unsupported by evidence [135]. First, it is the complaint of any vendor in breach where the purchaser made the better bargain, the fundamental value being that "bargains are to be kept" [135]. Secondly, Xytex was the only source of replacement sperm, with storage and transport costs and an exchange rate to the disadvantage of the Australian dollar [136]. Thirdly, the argument ignored the possibility that the straws would have been deployed on a higher turnover in her expanded business [137]. Fourthly, St George and Dr Macourt did not advance at trial an evidentiary basis for the true value of compliant sperm [138].
He rejected the notice of contention, as Dr Macourt adduced no evidence of a more reliable proxy and the primary judge's view was not unreasonable [138]. He also rejected the betterment argument, as the primary judge had held betterment and its quantum not proved, no extra profitability from Xytex sperm was suggested to have been established, and British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673 was not analogous [140], [142]. British Westinghouse was irrelevant for the further reason that the buyer there claimed the cost of substitute goods, not the difference in value at delivery [143]. Finally, he rejected the argument that the cl 2a price formula already dealt with any consequence of breach of warranty about the donor sperm, since the Deed contained no hint of that common intention and the argument was contrary to the evident intention of cl 2a [144], [145].
Hayne J (majority)
Hayne J agreed generally with Keane J's reasons and gave his own [23]. He said any difficulty in applying the principles stems from failing to identify what "loss" is being compensated, and he identified three forms: how much worse off the promisee is, what the defaulting promisor gained, and the value of what the promisee would have received if the promise had been performed [8], [9]. Subject to limitations not engaged in this case, damages must be measured by the third [10]. Drawing on Fuller and Perdue, he said the loss compensated "reflects a normative order in which contracts must be performed" [11]. The relevant question was the value of what Dr Clark did not receive, and the answer was what it would have cost at the date of breach to acquire 1,996 straws from Xytex [12]. That answer does not depend on whether the contract is for goods or a business or on how much she paid for the promise, and how far she could have turned performance to profit would matter only on a claim for loss of profit, which she did not make [13].
The Court of Appeal's calculations would show how much worse off she was and so the amount needed to put her in the position she would have been in if the contract had not been made, but not the value of what she would have received on performance [15]. Hayne J said the reference to mitigation was "apt to mislead" [16]. For present purposes, he said, mitigation embraces two ideas: a plaintiff cannot recover for a loss he or she ought to have avoided, nor for a loss he or she did avoid [17]. The Court of Appeal relied on the second, which is recognised in British Westinghouse, but her replacement purchases left her neither better nor worse off and gave her no relevant benefit [18], [19]. The price paid for replacement sperm revealed the value of what was lost, and those transactions neither mitigated nor aggravated the loss, since she was not shown to have gained any advantage and did not claim to be worse off [20], [21]. Had the contract been performed she could have stored the sperm, given it away, or used it in her practice and charged patients nothing, so whatever she charged patients was irrelevant to the value of what should have been supplied [22].
Crennan and Bell JJ (majority)
Crennan and Bell JJ agreed that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by Keane J, and added comments on the award of $1,246,025.01 being made when the total price for the assets was $386,950.91 [24]. They agreed the assessment required the value of what should have been delivered under the vendor's promise [25]. They referred to the corollary stated by Mason CJ and Dawson J in The Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 that a plaintiff is not entitled to be placed in a superior position, and added that the loss must be genuine, the expenses reasonable and the onus on the plaintiff [27]. Subject to being displaced, the prima facie measure for a sale of goods is the market price at the contractual time for delivery less any unpaid contract price, even if the buyer is a non-profit organisation or is constrained in the price at which it could resell [28]. There is no reason in principle why a seller cannot rely on the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale, for example where the actual loss is less than the prima facie measure [29].
However, the appeal did not turn on that or on any distinction between a sale of goods and a sale of a business, as it was sufficient that "no facts or circumstances were proven which displaced the application of the normal measure of contract damages" [30]. By leading evidence of the costs of acquiring Xytex sperm, Dr Clark discharged her onus [36]. Her later dealings with patients "did not avoid, or increase or diminish, the loss of her bargain" [37]. Regulatory constraints on a promisee's later dealings have no necessary relationship with the market price the promisee may pay, and they cited Lord Denning's description, for the Privy Council in Mouat v Betts Motors Ltd [1959] AC 71, of a buyer's entitlements in a market under price controls [38]. As there was no cross-examination or evidence directed to whether Xytex costs were an appropriate proxy, they rejected the notice of contention and found no error in the primary judge's decision [39].
Gageler J (dissenting)
Gageler J would have dismissed the appeal with costs [74]. He said the choice between the two approaches required a return to first principles, quoting Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60 on compensation and the rule that a plaintiff cannot recover more than he or she has lost [59]. He treated the expectation interest as a reflection of the ruling principle and its corollary, and as "no less, but no more" than the interest in the value of the expectancy created by the promise [61]. He recorded that Dr Clark accepted the Court of Appeal's identification of her loss as the cost of acquiring replacement sperm, never suggested that her loss was the difference in value between the business acquired and the business contracted for, and abandoned a claim for consequential loss of profits [63]. He noted the disparity between damages of $1,020,252.70 and a total price of $386,950.91, but said Dr Macourt did not seek to attach any particular legal significance to it [64]. The precise question, given how issue had been joined, was which approach goes furthest in placing her, so far as money can, in the position she would have been in had she been able to use a further 1,996 straws in the normal course of her practice [65].
He said statements of subsidiary principle must be approached with circumspection and, quoting Radford v De Froberville, that the appropriate measure cannot be divorced from the claimant's personal position and obligations, legal and moral [66]. The type of measure used by the primary judge is ordinarily appropriate where a seller fails to deliver marketable goods, because market value ordinarily equates to the value to the buyer [67]. This case did not fit that category, and the critical difference lay not between goods and a business, or in allocating the price, but in "the limited value to the buyer" given the peculiar nature of the asset [68]. There was no suggestion the sperm was of any use except for treating patients, and Dr Clark was ethically bound in 2002 not to charge patients more than the costs and expenses of acquiring it, a submission to the contrary being rejected [69]. The value of compliant sperm to her lay rather in being relieved of the need to source sperm elsewhere as and when needed [70]. She was worse off to the extent she was later forced to incur, but could not recoup from patients, the additional costs of sourcing 1,996 straws [71]. The appropriate measure was so much of that cost as she had been and would be unable to recoup, the measure adopted by the Court of Appeal [72]. That this left her without an award was, he said, explained by her "forensic choice" to eschew that measure [73].
Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed with costs. It set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal made on 9 November 2012, 13 December 2012 and 24 December 2012. In their place it ordered that the appeal to that court be dismissed with costs and the cross-appeal to that court be allowed in part with costs. It also set aside paragraph 3 of the order of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 8 November 2011 and ordered instead that, subject to paragraph 5 of that order and to all costs orders already made in the proceedings, Dr Macourt pay Dr Clark's costs of the proceedings in that court on and after 30 May 2009 on an indemnity basis and otherwise on the ordinary basis. Dr Clark had sought orders reinstating the primary judge's award, and Hayne J said consequential orders should be made in the terms she sought [6], [23].
Why it matters
Keane J's reasons, adopted by Crennan and Bell JJ and generally agreed with by Hayne J, apply the ruling principle to goods supplied under a contract for the sale of the assets of a business, without characterising the contract as one for the sale of goods [23], [24], [108]. Those four judges treated Dr Clark's later charges to patients as not reducing the loss she claimed [22], [24], [37], [128]. Hayne J's reasons distinguish the value of what should have been received from how much worse off the plaintiff is, and identify two separate ideas within mitigation [15], [17]. Crennan and Bell JJ left room for a seller to rely on the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale where a figure lower than the normal measure should apply, while deciding this appeal on the basis that no displacing facts were proven [29], [30]. Gageler J's dissent puts the competing view that the peculiar nature of the asset limited the value of performance to this buyer, so that the standard measure did not fit [68], [70].
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