CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
(2019) 268 CLR 76 · [2019] HCA 50 · (2019) 375 ALR 47 · (2019) 94 ALJR 140
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ), given on 13 December 2019 on appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court. The question was whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) might not bring an impartial mind to its review of a refused protection visa, because the Secretary of the Department had given it irrelevant and prejudicial material without the appellant's knowledge. [50] By majority the appeal succeeded: Nettle and Gordon JJ and Edelman J found that such an apprehension arose, and Kiefel CJ and Gageler J dissented and would have dismissed the appeal. [40], [49], [51], [110] The Court allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the orders below, quashed the Authority's decision and remitted the matter to the Authority differently constituted. [107]
Facts
The appellant arrived in Australia by boat in August 2013 and was held in immigration detention on Christmas Island. [30] The bar in s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) prevented him from applying for a visa until the Minister lifted it for him on 29 September 2015. [74]–[75] He broke a window while in detention on 20 March 2015, pleaded guilty to damaging Commonwealth property, was convicted, and was released without sentence on condition of good behaviour for six months and payment of $820.60 in reparation. [74] In November 2015 there were protests on Christmas Island, and he was charged, as he put it in his visa application, with "spitting at a guard & breaking a window" during them. [76] He was transferred on 12 November 2015 to a correctional facility in Albany in Western Australia. [30], [76]
On 16 September 2016 he applied for a protection visa, a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa, disclosing the conviction and the pending charges. [77], [113] On 14 March 2017 a delegate of the Minister refused the application on the ground that he was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations, and because he was a fast track applicant the Authority had to review that decision. [113] The delegate's reasons mentioned the conviction in noting that it might have been relevant to another criterion, and did not take it into account. [32]
As well as the visa application and the delegate's reasons, the Secretary gave the Authority some 48 pages of documents in purported compliance with s 473CB(1)(c) of the Act. [31], [33] They comprised letters to the appellant about assistance with his application, the court record of the conviction, a prosecution report, departmental emails about his custody and management from November 2015 to March 2016, and a departmental "Case Review" dated March 2016. [33] Emails described the November 2015 events on Christmas Island sometimes as an "incident" and sometimes as a "riot". [34] A January 2016 email between departmental officers referred to advice that he was "no longer of interest to Det Intel", to an "interview with National Security Monitoring Section", to "possible mental health issues", and to a history of "aggressive and/or challenging behaviour", possibly attributable to frustration at being held in detention or to mental health issues. [35] The Case Review said that he had been "involved in many incidents while in detention" and recorded a recommendation that he remain at Albany until the Australian Federal Police finished a riot investigation. [36] Why the departmental case officer included the 48 pages does not appear from the record. [37]
The Authority wrote to the appellant on 23 March 2017 that the Department had provided "all documents they consider relevant to your case", without identifying them. [79] Without requesting new information or interviewing him, the Authority affirmed the refusal on 12 May 2017, stating that it "had regard to the material referred by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958". [38], [80] It rejected his claims, including that he was stateless and that he faced harm in Iraq because of his Faili Kurd ethnicity, Shia religion and imputed political views. [117] Its reasons did not refer to the conviction, to any events on Christmas Island, or to anything else contained only in the 48 pages. [38] The appellant never had the documents, and the Minister identified the material only when he sought judicial review. [81]–[82]
Procedural history
In the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Judge Street dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that the information was not such that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Authority might not bring an impartial mind to the matter on its merits. [83] The Full Court of the Federal Court, in a decision the High Court cites as (2018) 264 FCR 87, dismissed the appeal by majority, each judge giving separate reasons. [1], [84] Moshinsky and Thawley JJ found that much of the information was already in the visa application and the delegate's reasons, and that the rest was irrelevant to the Authority's task but not prejudicial enough to meet the test. [84] Mortimer J would have allowed the appeal, and Nettle and Gordon JJ quote her Honour's view that the material overall gave "a strong impression that the appellant was not trustworthy". [85]
In the High Court the appellant submitted that the material was capable of having a subconscious effect on the Authority, and that the apprehension was strengthened because the Secretary had considered the material relevant. [87] The Minister submitted that the material was not prejudicial, that the Authority was capable of putting it aside, and that over-provision by the Secretary would rarely, if ever, be an error. [89]–[90] Edelman J records that, during submissions in the High Court, the Court raised an anterior issue about s 473CB(1)(c), on which the parties made oral and further written submissions. [109]
Issues
The central issue was whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Authority might not bring an impartial mind to the review because of the material. [50] A further issue was whether giving the material failed to comply with s 473CB(1)(c) and, if so, whether that failure was material so as to invalidate the Authority's decision. [46], [109] The Minister also contended that remittal would again expose the Authority to the prejudicial material. [106]
Held
Nettle and Gordon JJ
Nettle and Gordon JJ held that a fair-minded lay observer, cognisant of the way Pt 7AA works, might have apprehended that the Authority might not have brought an impartial mind to the review, by reason of the irrelevant and prejudicial material it was mandated to consider. [51] That material might have led the decision-maker to the view that the appellant was not the sort of person who should be granted a visa or was not a person who should be believed, and the observer might have apprehended that effect even if it was subconscious. [51]
The rule against bias is one aspect of procedural fairness, and breach of it is jurisdictional error attracting relief under s 75(v) of the Constitution. [54] The test asks whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the question, and a finding of apprehended bias is not to be reached lightly. [56] It requires identifying what might lead the decision-maker to decide other than on the legal and factual merits, and articulating a logical connection between that thing and the feared deviation from the merits. [57] One form of disqualification is by extraneous information, as to which their Honours quoted Deane J in Webb v The Queen: "knowledge of some prejudicial but inadmissible fact or circumstance [may give] rise to [an] apprehension of bias". [57] Where the statutory context is complex, the observer must at least know its key elements, which here included that the Authority must consider what the Secretary gives it as relevant, without new information or an interview except as Pt 7AA provides, and need not give the applicant material that was before the Minister. [59], [94]
Their Honours dealt with bias first because the rule is concerned with procedures rather than outcomes, and the test does not depend on anything that happens at the time of decision or later, or on the final decision actually made. [67]–[70] A remedy should be sought at the earliest possible time, since, in their words, "There is no utility in allowing a flawed process to run to its conclusion". [72]
Applying the test, what might lead the Authority away from the merits was prejudicial material that was irrelevant to the question before it and that it was mandated to consider, and influence from that material, whether conscious or subconscious, would be a deviation from the merits. [92] The material included assertions that the appellant had a history of aggressive or challenging behaviour, had some link to investigations of a "riot" and was himself the subject of investigations for unspecified matters, had been of interest to "Det Intel", and had been refused bridging visas in the past. [96] These matters were not disclosed in his application or in the delegate's reasons, and in many cases he was not even aware of the information. [96] It did not matter whether the Authority actually had a bias or in fact put the information aside, because the risk of subconscious bias cannot be cured in that way. [97] The idea of putting the information aside was also difficult to reconcile with the scheme, because the Secretary endorses the material as relevant and the Authority must then consider it, and the Authority did not expressly state that the material had been put to one side. [98]–[99]
An observer might apprehend a lack of impartiality where material is designated relevant by the Secretary, the Authority must have regard to it, it is prejudicial to the applicant, and it is hidden from the applicant. [100] In their Honours' words, "A fair-minded lay observer may well ask why prejudicial information is provided and hidden from the applicant, if that information was not to be taken into account". [100] They said that this conclusion depends on the facts, that other material might be somewhat prejudicial without raising an apprehension, and that "[t]he particular point at which prejudicial information will lead to apprehended bias cannot be identified in the abstract". [101]
A decision-maker may need to invite an applicant to comment on adverse information to counteract an apprehension of bias, and s 473DA(2) does not stop the Authority inviting comment under s 473DC(3) if that would be the best way of avoiding the apprehension. [102] Because the Minister accepted that relief would be granted if apprehended bias was demonstrated, the role (if any) of materiality in jurisdictional error did not arise, and given their conclusion on bias it was unnecessary to address the other grounds. [104]–[105] They rejected the Minister's contention that remittal would put the Authority in an "impossible bind" (the Minister's phrase), because s 473EA(4) requires the Authority to return the Secretary's documents after its review and the matter would go to a differently constituted Authority. [106]
Edelman J
Edelman J agreed with Nettle and Gordon JJ that the conclusion below that there was no apprehension of bias was in error, and agreed that the appeal should be allowed and orders made as they proposed. [110], [143] For his Honour, apprehended bias arose "in an indirect way", through an anterior issue about s 473CB(1)(c). [109] Compliance with the duty in s 473CB(1) was a prima facie precondition to the Authority's jurisdiction, and, contrary to the Minister's submission, s 473CB(1)(c) carries an implied prohibition against providing other material which the Secretary could not reasonably consider relevant. [116] No reasonable grounds existed for forming the opinion that this material was relevant. [109]
His Honour divided the material into three overlapping categories about the appellant's character: detention and offences, described with language suggesting grave concerns; vague suggestions and opinions that could raise concerns about his joining the Australian community; and material that might tacitly suggest he might be a national security risk. [119]–[123] He put to one side the reference to "possible mental health issues", which a fair-minded lay observer would not today treat as prejudicial. [122] The material had no legal relevance to the issues before the Authority, including any assessment of credibility, yet it could be seen as "painting a picture of the appellant as a man of poor or doubtful character". [124]
Section 473CB does not, however, contemplate jurisdictional error or invalidity unless the Secretary's failure is "material", and his Honour noted Professor Daly's three senses of that word: a threshold of sufficient seriousness, a required connection between the administrative injustice and the decision, and the residual discretion to refuse relief. [125]–[128] Only the first sense needed consideration, because the Minister accepted that a reasonable apprehension of bias would make the non-compliance material, but submitted that any apprehension did not reach a threshold of reasonableness. [129] Contrary to the appellant's submissions, the receipt of prejudicial information, no matter how trivial, will not necessarily give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. [126]
The Authority should not be equated with a judicial officer, whose independence and security of tenure might permit a more robust approach, nor with a purely lay body such as a jury. [136] Where bias is assessed at the end of a hearing, the reasons for decision might reveal relevant matters, although they are only one of the circumstances. [135]
Three matters combined to compel the conclusion that the observer might reasonably apprehend that the Authority might not have brought an impartial and independent mind to the issue. [137] First, the material was "qualitatively and quantitatively significantly prejudicial" to an assessment of the appellant's character on grounds other than legal grounds, while what he had disclosed himself was factual and relatively minor and involved none of the opinion, suggestion or innuendo. [138]–[139] Secondly, the observer would expect the Authority to know that the Secretary provided the material as relevant and that it had to consider it, and would be aware that the Authority remains part of the Executive Government. [140] Thirdly, the Authority told the appellant it would decide on the information sent by the Department unless it decided to consider new information, said in its reasons that it had regard to the Secretary's material, and nowhere suggested that any of it was not relevant or had not been given weight, which his Honour called "a deafening silence". [141]
The observer would therefore apprehend that the material might cause the Authority to form adverse views of the appellant's character and, consciously or subconsciously, be influenced by them, directly or through conclusions based on his credibility. [142] Since the Authority will have returned all materials to the Secretary, the new hearing will require the Secretary to consider again what material is relevant. [143]
Kiefel CJ and Gageler J (dissenting)
Kiefel CJ and Gageler J described Pt 7AA as imposing three cumulative and consecutive duties: the Minister must refer the decision, the Secretary must give the review material, and the Authority must review the decision by considering that material. [4] To consider material relevant under s 473CB(1)(c), the Secretary must form the opinion, reasonably and on a correct understanding of the law, that it is capable directly or indirectly of rationally affecting assessment of the probability of the existence of some fact about which the Authority might be required to make a finding. [6] The Authority need not adopt that opinion: it must examine the material and form its own assessment, and may treat material as wholly irrelevant, but it cannot fail or refuse to turn its attention to any of it. [7] The absence of any reference to material in the Authority's reasons will ordinarily support the inference that it was not intentionally relied on. [12]
Their Honours identified two distinct limitations which the giving of irrelevant but prejudicial material could transgress: failure of a precondition to the Authority's jurisdiction, and non-compliance with the need to avoid any appearance of bias. [13] On the precondition, compliance with the Secretary's duty is required, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between under-compliance and over-compliance, and the decision will not be invalid where the non-compliance could not realistically have made any difference. [14]–[15] On bias, the question is decided in the totality of the circumstances, which include the decision and reasons where it arises after the decision, and it requires identifying the factor that might have diverted the Authority, articulating how, and assessing whether the observer might reasonably apprehend that departure. [20]–[21]
If the observer might interpret material as a communication of the Secretary's opinion, the observer would view it with justifiable suspicion, a concern made more acute by the marked discrepancy in hierarchical position between the Secretary and a Reviewer. [23], [25] If the material is merely capable of founding an inference of bad character, the observer can be expected to be more circumspect, recognising that a professional decision-making body can ordinarily be expected to be capable of discarding prejudicial material, but that discarded information might still sometimes have a subconscious effect. [26], [28] They illustrated that last point with Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 (2017) 254 FCR 534, an earlier Full Court judgment whose correctness was not challenged in this appeal, where the material revealed that the applicant had been charged with a serious sexual assault while in immigration detention. [29]
Here, they said, the 48 pages were looked at and consciously discarded as irrelevant by the Authority. [39] Differing from the majority in this Court, they were unable to conclude that the observer, acting reasonably, would entertain as realistic the possibility that anything in the 48 pages might have diverted the Authority from an independent and impartial evaluation of the merits, and they would have dismissed the appeal. [40], [49] The observer would recognise that most of the information fleshed out the references to the conviction and pending charges in the application, and would question the case officer's judgment but not, without undue suspicion, the case officer's motive. [41]–[42] Nor would the observer see the documents as an attempt to communicate an opinion that the appellant was of bad character or unworthy of a visa, or regard them as so shocking as to play on the Authority's subconscious. [42]–[43] The Authority could be expected to evaluate the merits untainted by what their Honours called "the dashes of colour added by the contents of those pages". [43]
On the precondition, they concluded that the information was not reasonably capable of being regarded by the Secretary as capable of rationally affecting assessment of any fact the Authority might need to find, a conclusion they said was raised without objection by a ground of appeal and effectively conceded by the Minister, so that including it did not comply with s 473CB(1)(c). [44]–[46] Materiality is a question of counter-factual analysis by the court as a matter of objective possibility, different in concept from the question of perception that bias raises. [47] The same considerations nevertheless informed both questions, and the negative answer on bias led "inexorably to a negative answer" on whether the information could realistically have made any difference. [48]
Orders. The High Court allowed the appeal with costs. [107] It set aside orders 1 and 2 made by the Full Court on 21 September 2018 and order 1 made by the Full Court on 12 October 2018. [107] In their place it ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed with costs and that orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court dated 8 November 2017 be set aside. [107] In place of those Federal Circuit Court orders, the Authority's decision of 12 May 2017 was quashed, the matter was remitted to the Authority differently constituted, and the first respondent was to pay the applicant's costs. [107] Those orders were the ones Nettle and Gordon JJ proposed and Edelman J adopted. [107], [143]
Why it matters
Kiefel CJ and Gageler J described the problem as arising in an "apparently not-uncommon scenario" in the administration of Pt 7AA, in which a large amount of material from a departmental file is given to the Authority. [1], [9]–[10] On the reasoning of Nettle and Gordon JJ and Edelman J, irrelevant and prejudicial material given to the Authority by the Secretary can found an apprehension of bias even though the Authority's reasons do not refer to it. [38], [100], [141]–[142] They also set limits: Nettle and Gordon JJ said their conclusion depends on the facts, and Edelman J said that the receipt of prejudicial information, no matter how trivial, will not necessarily give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. [101], [126]
Kiefel CJ and Gageler J and Edelman J each treated the Secretary's compliance with s 473CB(1) as a precondition to the Authority's jurisdiction (for Edelman J, a prima facie precondition), subject to materiality, whereas Nettle and Gordon JJ found it unnecessary to address the lawfulness of the Secretary's actions. [14]–[15], [105], [116], [125] The judges also differed on the place of the Authority's reasons: Nettle and Gordon JJ said the test does not depend on anything which happens at the time of decision or later, while Kiefel CJ and Gageler J and Edelman J treated the reasons as among the circumstances when the question arises after a decision. [20], [69], [135]
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