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Comcare v Banerji

(2019) 267 CLR 373 · [2019] HCA 23 · (2019) 372 ALR 42 · (2019) 93 ALJR 900

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Comcare v Banerji [2019] HCA 23 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ) given on 7 August 2019. The question was whether ss 10(1), 13(11) and 15(1) of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth), as at 15 October 2012, imposed an unjustified burden on the implied freedom of political communication, so that the termination of Ms Banerji's employment for breaching the Australian Public Service (APS) Code of Conduct was not reasonable administrative action within the exclusion in s 5A(1) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (the Compensation Act) [1]. Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ held that the provisions did not impose an unjustified burden on the implied freedom and that the termination was not unlawful [1]. Gageler J, Gordon J and Edelman J each wrote separate concurring reasons and agreed with the orders proposed in the joint reasons [107], [162], [212]. The Court allowed Comcare's appeal, set aside the Tribunal's decision, affirmed Comcare's reviewable decision of 1 August 2014, which had affirmed the rejection of her compensation claim, and ordered Ms Banerji to pay Comcare's costs of the appeal [11], [47].

Facts

Ms Banerji accepted employment as an ongoing APS 6 employee in what became the Department of Immigration and Citizenship on 10 April 2006 and began work on 29 May 2006 [2]. Before 7 March 2012 she began broadcasting tweets on matters relevant to the Department under the Twitter handle "@LaLegale" [2]. There were more than 9,000 such tweets, at least one sent during working hours, and many criticised the Department, its employees, its policies and administration, Government and Opposition immigration policies, and Government and Opposition members of Parliament [2]. The Tribunal found that some of the tweets were "intemperate, even vituperative" in mounting personal attacks on government and opposition figures [2].

Guidelines issued by the Department cautioned against unofficial public comment so harsh or extreme in its criticism of the Government, a member of Parliament or their policies that it called into question the employee's ability to work professionally, efficiently or impartially [17]. The Australian Public Service Commission's Circular 2012/1 recorded, as a rule of thumb, that anyone who posts material online should assume that at some point their identity and the nature of their employment will be revealed [17].

After complaints and an investigation, a delegate of the Secretary of the Department determined on 15 October 2012 that Ms Banerji had breached the APS Code of Conduct and proposed termination of her employment [3]–[5]. On 19 October 2012 she admitted broadcasting tweets that criticised Government immigration policy and her direct supervisor and offered an apology, but on 17 November 2012 she withdrew the admission and apology [6]–[7]. On 12 September 2013 the delegate decided to impose the sanction of termination of employment under s 15 of the Public Service Act, and the termination took effect from close of business on 27 September 2013 [8]-[9].

Ms Banerji then claimed compensation under s 14 of the Compensation Act for an adjustment disorder, said to be an aggravation of an underlying psychological condition arising out of the termination [10]. A delegate of Comcare rejected the claim and, on 1 August 2014, another delegate affirmed that rejection on the basis that the termination was reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner, so that any injury fell outside the definition of injury in s 5A(1) [11].

Procedural history

Before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the parties agreed that the only issue was whether the termination fell outside the exclusion in s 5A(1) having regard to the implied freedom of political communication [18]. The Tribunal, in Banerji and Comcare (Compensation) [2018] AATA 892, held that the provisions imposed an unjustified burden on the implied freedom [1]. It set aside the decision under review and decided instead that Ms Banerji was entitled to compensation [49]. The joint reasons noted that the Tribunal decided the matter on the basis, in the Tribunal's own words, that the use of the Code to terminate her employment "impermissibly trespassed upon her implied freedom of political communication" [19]. The proceeding, styled as an appeal on a question of law, was commenced in the Federal Court under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and removed into the High Court under s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) on the application of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, who intervened [1], [48]. The Australian Human Rights Commission was granted leave to make written submissions as amicus curiae [51].

Issues

Ms Banerji argued first that, properly construed, the provisions did not apply to what she called "anonymous" communications, being tweets that did not disclose her name or her APS employment [22]. In the alternative, she argued that if the provisions authorised sanctions for such communications, they imposed an unjustified burden on the implied freedom and were invalid [22]. In the further alternative, she argued that the decision to terminate her employment was vitiated because the decision-maker failed explicitly to take the implied freedom into account [22]. The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, whose submissions Comcare adopted, argued that the provisions can apply to anonymous communications and are valid in all of their applications [170].

Held

Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ

Their Honours held that the way the issue was framed led the Tribunal wrongly to treat the implied freedom as if it were a personal right, like the freedom of expression in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the freedom of speech in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution [19]. They said that "the implied freedom of political communication is not a personal right of free speech", but a restriction on legislative power arising by necessary implication from ss 7, 24, 64 and 128 and related sections of the Constitution [20]. Even a law that significantly restricts the political communication of an individual or group will not infringe the implied freedom unless it has a material unjustified effect on political communication as a whole [20]. The Tribunal's approach was therefore misconceived and its decision had to be set aside [21].

The Court declined to entertain the construction argument because it differed fundamentally from the case Ms Banerji ran before the Tribunal, where Comcare might well have called evidence of the damage such tweets were likely to cause to the APS [23]. Their Honours added that the risk that an anonymous author will be identified is obvious and was borne out in this case, and that tweets about the policies or administration of the employee's own Department can damage the reputation of the APS even if the author is never identified [24]. Because Ms Banerji did not contend that, apart from the implied freedom, s 13(11) was beyond power or that dismissal was not a lawful and proportionate response, she was taken to have accepted that her tweets failed to uphold the APS Values and the integrity and good reputation of the APS and that, but for the implied freedom, dismissal was warranted [27]. Her argument thus amounted to saying that Parliament could not proscribe that conduct, which their Honours described as "a remarkable proposition" [28].

The concession by Comcare and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth that s 10(1) in combination with s 13(11) imposed an effective burden on the implied freedom was rightly made [29]. The maintenance and protection of an apolitical and professional public service is a significant purpose consistent with the system of representative and responsible government, as ss 64 and 67 of the Constitution attest [31]. Applying the tests of suitability, necessity and adequacy in the balance [32], their Honours held that the requirement to uphold the APS Values and the integrity and good reputation of the APS was a rational means of maintaining an apolitical and professional public service [34]. Excluding anonymous communications was not an obvious and compelling alternative, because such communications risk ceasing to be anonymous, may damage the APS even while anonymous, and their exclusion would remove a deterrent against a significant source of damage [35]–[36]. Their Honours also said that any assumption that anonymous communications deserve more protection than those for which the speaker takes responsibility is "not necessarily sound" [37].

Assuming that the extent of penalty was relevant [39], their Honours held that s 15 exposes an employee to no greater penalty than is proportionate to the nature and gravity of the misconduct, and that not every APS employee who breaches s 13(11) by anonymous communications is liable to be dismissed [40]. Given the procedures for determining breach and the rights of review, including unfair dismissal claims under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and judicial review [41], nothing suggested that the benefit of the provisions was manifestly outweighed by their effect on the implied freedom [42].

On the further alternative argument, they held that, provided a decision-maker imposing a penalty under s 15 acts reasonably, there can be no risk of infringing the implied freedom, and a manifestly excessive penalty would be unlawful because it was unreasonable, not because the decision-maker failed to consider or mention the implied freedom [44]. It is no part of the decision-maker's function under s 15 to take the implied freedom into account, although it may be a relevant consideration under different discretions in other legislation, depending on their terms [45]. It was too late for Ms Banerji to argue for the first time, on ultimate appeal, that the penalty did not accord with the nature and gravity of her contraventions or her personal circumstances [46].

Gageler J

Gageler J agreed with the orders proposed by the plurality [107]. His Honour held that the question should be answered by asking whether the provisions infringe the implied freedom across the range of their potential operations, not only as applied to Ms Banerji [50]. Relying on statements of Basten JA in A v Independent Commission Against Corruption, he rejected arguments that the case raised a distinct question about the implied freedom's application to executive power, or a separate administrative law question whether the implied freedom had to be taken into account [51]–[52].

He described the constraint as "both substantial and directly targeted at political communication", although it applies to a specified class and does not discriminate on the basis of any particular viewpoint [90]. However, it cannot be equated with a statutory prohibition enforced in a court, because s 13(11) sets a highly situation-specific professional standard of restraint or moderation and is not self-executing [92]–[94]. In practice, the burden requires an APS employee to exercise restraint and moderation in expressing political opinion for so long as he or she remains an APS employee, to avoid an administrative sanction that at worst ends that employment [95].

Applying Wotton v Queensland, he said that where a law confers an administrative discretion, the first question is whether the burden is justified across the range of potential outcomes, and if it is, the constitutional inquiry ends [96]. Because the discretion could be exercised to impose a direct and substantial burden on political communication, he applied "close scrutiny corresponding to a compelling justification" [97]. He held that the object in s 3(a) of the Act, an apolitical public service, is not only consistent with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government but serves positively to promote responsible government [54], [100].

Three considerations showed the provisions to be reasonably appropriate and adapted to that object with minimal impairment of political communication [102]: the requirement is only a statutory incident of employment, whose most extreme consequence is administrative termination [103]; the APS Value in s 10(1)(a) is tailor-made to the object, and its vagueness and intrusion into private life are unavoidable and ameliorated by directions and the promotion of the APS Values [104]; and the sanction process requires reasonableness and procedural fairness and is subject to merits review [106]. He held that the Tribunal erred in finding s 13(11) overbroad in its application to anonymous comment, because that view focused only on the appearance of impartiality and ignored "the even greater importance of the actual observance of impartiality" [105]. In his Honour's words, "[c]onfidence cannot exist without trust, and trust cannot exist without assurance that partisan political positions incapable of being communicated with attribution will not be communicated anyhow under the cloak of anonymity" [105]. He concluded that the provisions are "narrowly tailored to achieve that object in a manner which minimally impairs freedom of political communication", so that the burden is justified [54].

Gordon J

Gordon J agreed with the orders proposed by Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ [162]. Her Honour held that the requirement to uphold the apolitical nature, integrity and good reputation of the APS "not only is consistent with, but is a defining characteristic of, the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and, in particular, responsible government" [111]. Reviewing guidelines published since 1979, she found that for decades the regulation of public comment by public servants had been undertaken to maintain an apolitical and impartial public service [126].

She said that the implied freedom is a limit on legislative and executive power [135], and that the appellant and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth correctly accepted that s 13(11), read with s 10(1)(a), effectively burdens it [137]. She identified four features of the burden: the provisions are not self-executing and are given legal "teeth" only through a determination of breach [138]; they are targeted at APS employees, not the public at large [139]; they do not in their terms directly target political communication, since conduct is caught only if it fails to uphold the APS Values or the integrity and good reputation of the APS [140]; and the burden is transparent, with procedures that include merits review [141]. Whether conduct is caught requires an evaluative judgment depending on the employee's seniority, when, where and how a public comment is made, and its language and tone [140].

The purpose of the provisions was to maintain an apolitical public service of integrity and good reputation [142], which is a defining characteristic of the system of responsible and representative government and so a legitimate end [155]. Because the provisions and the action taken against Ms Banerji were directed wholly to that purpose [156], and their scope was tailored and limited [157], the closeness of the means to the end concluded the issue [159]. She held that attempts to carve out anonymous communications "create an illusory category", because anonymity can and often eventually will be lost, and it is then seen that the public servant was not apolitical [160]. Stressing that the implied freedom should be applied case by case, she held that the connection between the provisions and the maintenance of responsible government was immediate and direct, and that "[n]o greater justification is required" [161].

Edelman J

Edelman J agreed that orders should be made as proposed in the joint judgment [212]. His Honour said that the absolute ban on public political communication by public servants that applied for much of the century since Federation has been tempered, but that the Code, properly interpreted, "still casts a powerful chill over political communication" [164]. He emphasised that the implied freedom is not an individual freedom but a constraint operating directly on legislative power only so far as necessary for the effective functioning of representative and responsible government [164], and that it is not a trump over other values that legislation implements [165].

Tracing the history from early regulations prohibiting public comment by public servants on political matters, through reg 8A(i) of 1987, to the 1999 Act [171]–[174], he held that s 13(11) did not reinstate the absolute prohibition repealed in 1974 [177]. The requirement in s 13(11) to "uphold" the APS Values was only a requirement not to act inconsistently with them [175], and s 10(1)(a) did not require an employee to be absolutely apolitical [178]. On his interpretation, s 13(11) does not preclude political comment on social media, and the boundary is crossed only "when comments sufficiently imperil the trust between, on the one hand, the APS and, on the other, Parliament, the executive government, or the public" [182]. He identified six factors of particular significance: the public servant's seniority; whether the comment concerns matters within the person's direct duties or responsibilities; where the content sits between vitriolic criticism and objective and informative policy discussion; whether broad dissemination was intended or reasonably foreseeable; whether association with the APS was intended or reasonably foreseeable; and, if so, what the public servant expected, or could reasonably have expected, an ordinary member of the public to conclude about the effect of the comment on the person's duties or responsibilities [183].

An anonymous communication can breach s 13(11), which was enough to reject Ms Banerji's submission that anonymous public communications can never do so [184]. But he did not accept the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth's submission that attempted anonymity could only be relevant, if at all, to sanction, holding that intended anonymity is one factor relevant to whether there is a breach [185]–[186]. He said it was unnecessary to consider whether applying this interpretation to Ms Banerji's tweets could show that her termination was not reasonable administrative action, and that the fact that she sent more than 9,000 tweets was by itself neutral [187].

Applying structured proportionality [188], he noted that Ms Banerji correctly accepted that the purpose of establishing an apolitical public service is legitimate [190]. He held that the burden is deep, because it targets political communication and the loss of employment could be catastrophic [195], and wide, because it applies at all times, not merely in the course of APS employment, and affects thousands of people [196]. Yet it is shallower and narrower than the outright prohibition that existed for the better part of a century [197], and it is mitigated by review mechanisms, including unfair dismissal review by the Fair Work Commission [198]. A law excluding anonymous communications was not an obvious and compelling alternative, because its terms were unclear and such an exception could substantially undermine Parliament's purpose of an apolitical public service [200]–[201].

On adequacy in the balance, he said that a law impairing political communication by reasonably necessary means should be held unconstitutional only if there is such a gross imbalance between the importance of its object and the magnitude of the burden as to threaten the integrity of the constitutionally prescribed system of government [205]. Although the burden was "deep and vast", it pursued a purpose of "embedded and long-standing constitutional significance", and "[t]he law is not inadequate in its balance" [206]. He held that "[t]he legislation is valid in all of its applications" [166].

Rejecting Ms Banerji's alternative submissions, he held that nothing in s 15 makes the implied freedom a mandatory relevant consideration and that the implied freedom does not operate directly on an executive act authorised by legislation [208]. He accepted the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth's submission that the constitutional constraint invalidates an executive act only by operating on the legislation, a process he said is best described as "disapplication" [209], [211].

Orders. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Tribunal and, in its place, ordered that the reviewable decision of 1 August 2014 be affirmed [47]. Ms Banerji was ordered to pay Comcare's costs of the appeal [47]. Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ each agreed with the orders proposed in the joint reasons [107], [162], [212].

Why it matters

The joint reasons restate that the implied freedom is not a personal right of free speech and that the question is a law's effect on political communication as a whole [20]. Each set of reasons held that the provisions did not impose an unjustified burden on the implied freedom [1], [54], [111], [166]. Each also rejected the argument that the provisions should not reach anonymous communications [36], [105], [160], [201]. The sets of reasons used different methods: the joint reasons and Edelman J applied the tests of suitability, necessity and adequacy in the balance [32], [188], Gageler J applied close scrutiny requiring a compelling justification [97], and Gordon J stressed a case-by-case approach [161].

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