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Commissioner of State Revenue v Rojoda Pty Ltd

(2020) 268 CLR 281 · [2020] HCA 7

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Commissioner of State Revenue v Rojoda Pty Ltd [2020] HCA 7 is a High Court of Australia decision on whether deeds declaring fixed trusts over freehold titles that were partnership property of two dissolved, but not yet wound up, partnerships were dutiable declarations of trust under the Duties Act 2008 (WA) [1], [24]. The judgment was delivered on 18 March 2020. The majority described the question at the heart of the appeal as the nature of the interest of partners in partnership property [1]. Bell, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ, in joint reasons, held that the deeds extinguished the partners' unique equitable rights under the trust of partnership property and created new fixed trusts, which was a dutiable transaction [3], [42]. The Court allowed the Commissioner's appeal with costs, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and in their place ordered that the appeal to that court be dismissed with costs [69]. Gageler J dissented: he held that the deeds only acknowledged a trust in fixed shares that already existed by operation of law, and he would have dismissed the appeal [97], [100].

Facts

The Scolaro family ran a business of property ownership and investment through two partnerships [5]. The SIC Partnership was established by a deed of partnership in 1972 with five equal partners, Anthony and Maria Scolaro and their three children Rosana, John and David, and the AMS Partnership was established in 1986 with Anthony and Maria as its two equal partners [5]. Anthony and Maria were registered as joint tenants of freehold titles that were partnership property of each partnership [8]. Anthony died on 12 February 2011, leaving his estate to be divided equally between three testamentary trusts for his children [6]. On his death each partnership dissolved and, rather than the other partners continuing the business, each was subject to a general dissolution under its deed, the AMS Partnership on 12 May 2011 and the SIC Partnership on 15 March 2012 [7]. For each partnership the value of cash and other current assets exceeded the value of the liabilities [7]. As surviving joint tenant, Maria became registered proprietor of the freehold titles, and none of the properties was sold [8]. John died intestate on 7 August 2012 [9]. The litigation proceeded on the basis that the partnership liabilities had not been discharged [10].

On 1 December 2013 Maria, Rosana, David, John's wife Bianca and daughter Diana, and Rojoda entered into two deeds, one for each partnership (the 2013 Deeds) [9]–[10]. The recitals described the titles as held by Anthony and Maria as joint trustees for the partnership, and recited that after Anthony's death they continued to be held on trust for the partnership as before [11]. Clause 1 of each deed recorded the parties' acknowledgment that on dissolution the properties were beneficially owned in shares of 20 per cent for each partner (SIC) and 50 per cent for each partner (AMS) [12]. By a later clause Maria, in the deeds' word, "confirms" that she holds the properties on trust for the partners and the legatees of Anthony and John in their respective shares, and by another she resigned as trustee, with Rojoda to be appointed new trustee and the legal title transferred to it [12]. The Commissioner imposed duty on the declarations of trust in each deed, rejected an objection that the deeds created no new trust, accepted that only nominal duty was payable to the extent the deeds gave effect to distributions of the two estates, and re-assessed duty at $707,285 [13].

Procedural history

Rojoda applied to the State Administrative Tribunal for review, and the Tribunal (the Deputy President, Judge Sharp) dismissed the application [19]. The Tribunal held that after dissolution the partners had only a right to their proportion of the surplus after realisation of assets and payment of debts and liabilities, so that the deeds, by declaring a bare trust, altered the status of the partnership property and were dutiable [19]. It also rejected Rojoda's alternative argument based on s 78 of the Duties Act, because the deeds created new equitable interests rather than transferring existing ones [20].

The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, in joint reasons of Buss P and Beech JA and separate reasons of Murphy JA, allowed Rojoda's appeal [21]. Both judgments accepted that a partner's interest is an indefinite and fluctuating interest, being a right to a proportion of the surplus, and that this remains so after general dissolution until winding up is complete [21]. Both judgments nevertheless held that on dissolution the partners' rights became fixed interests in the partnership freehold titles, so that no duty was payable [22]. Their reasoning was that, in practice, partnership debts would be paid out of cash and other current assets, equity would regard as done that which ought to be done, and the surplus would then be sufficiently ascertained for each partner to have a fixed interest in it, relying on Cameron v Murdoch, In re Ritson and In re Holland [22]. They found it unnecessary to decide whether this was because there was no declaration of trust under s 11(1)(c) or because duty was reduced to a nominal amount under s 78 [22]. Given those conclusions, the Court of Appeal did not address Rojoda's added ground that the deeds were agreements to convert the partnership interests into fixed equitable interests, the Commissioner's notice of contention in answer to it, or Rojoda's s 78 argument [23].

Issues

The Duties Act makes a declaration of trust over dutiable property, which includes land in Western Australia, a dutiable transaction [14]. Section 78 reduces the dutiable value of a transfer, or an agreement for the transfer, of dutiable property to a retiring partner on retirement or dissolution, by applying that partner's partnership interest to the value of the property [16]. The Commissioner's ground of appeal was that both before and after dissolution, but before winding up, the partners had only a non-specific, fluctuating interest in all the partnership freehold titles, so that the deeds created new trusts by a transaction dutiable under s 11(1)(c) [24]. Rojoda's amended notice of contention raised three grounds: first, that the titles were always held on trust for the partners, whose interests became ascertainable on dissolution; secondly, that Maria had no power to declare any trust and the deeds only confirmed a separate agreement of the partners to convert their interests into specific equitable interests; and thirdly, that any declarations of trust were agreements to transfer the titles to the former partners and their successors, not dutiable because of s 78 [25].

Held

Bell, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ

The majority accepted Rojoda's submission that, subject to the partnership agreement, a partner's legal title to partnership property is held on trust for all the partners [3], [26]. They held, however, that the partners' rights under that trust are unique, differ significantly from the rights under a fixed trust, and do not change in nature before winding up is complete [3]. Tracing the history, they noted that in Knox v Gye Lord Westbury said that a surviving partner was not a trustee, while Lord Hatherley LC held that in equity the assets were held subject to the interests of the deceased partner's estate [28]–[29]. "The view of Lord Hatherley prevailed", they said, and it accords with each partner's fundamental obligation to account for dealings with partnership property [30]. They described a basal fiduciary obligation that each partner will hold and deal with legal rights to partnership property for the benefit of all the partners, whose interest lies in a share of the net proceeds after winding up [30].

Some features of the partners' rights are shared with a fixed trust: the interests are in fixed shares, the partners owe each other a trustee's duty to apply the property for the partnership, and a partner can dissolve the partnership and require a winding up [32]. Unlike a beneficiary of a fixed trust, however, a partner has no interest in any specific asset, but only a right, both before and after dissolution, to an account and distribution of the proceeds after sale [33]. For that reason, the majority said, a partner's equitable interest is not accurately described as a beneficial interest, at least in the sense of a right to a proportion of, or the personal use or benefit of, any particular asset [33]. They drew on Lindley's "famous description" of a partner's interest as the partner's proportion of the assets after they have all been realised and all debts and liabilities paid [34].

The majority noted that, as to partnership property, the Partnership Act 1895 (WA) mirrored the United Kingdom legislation of 1890, and held that it reflects the equitable principle that partners hold partnership property on trust for all the partners [27], [36]. Section 30(1) requires partnership property to be held and applied exclusively for the purposes of the partnership, and s 30(2) gives statutory recognition to, rather than creates, the trust of partnership land [36]–[37]. They adopted Deane J's statement in Chan v Zacharia that "there is neither metaphor nor inaccuracy" in describing a partner as a trustee for the partnership [37]. Section 33 defines a partner's share as the proportion of the then existing assets to which the partner would be entitled if the whole were realised and the debts and liabilities discharged, and s 32 treats partnership land as personal, not real, estate between the partners [38]. Until winding up, a partner's interest is an unascertained, non-specific equitable interest concerning all the partnership property, not a right to any particular asset [38]–[39]. On dissolution, but before winding up, the legal owner continues to hold the partnership property on trust with a duty to sell, and only once winding up is complete does s 50 recognise the partners' right to a transfer of the net value of their entitlements [40].

Applying these principles, before the 2013 Deeds Maria held the freehold titles of each partnership on trust for the partners, each of whom had a non-specific interest in all the titles and current assets, with a right on dissolution to compel sale of the titles to realise a fund [41]. Although in the deeds Maria only confirmed the trust, the majority held that the confirmations had a substantive effect: they extinguished the partners' unique equitable rights and created new fixed trusts [42]. The deeds removed the freehold titles from the fund available to pay partnership debts, including debts to external creditors, limited that fund to current assets, left no partner able to compel a sale of the titles, and gave each partner new ascertained equitable rights in them [42]. The majority rejected Rojoda's reliance on a distinction between the internal and external perspectives of partnership property, holding that it does not change the nature of the partners' rights, and that the nature of the equitable rights is the basis for assessing duty [43]. They also rejected the argument that no dutiable property had moved, because the creation of a trust always creates new equitable obligations and never involves a conveyance of title from one person to another [44]. As Rojoda accepted, replacing a discretionary trust with a fixed trust for the same persons could attract duty although no property moved, and the Act operates no differently where the rights extinguished are the partners' sui generis rights [45].

The majority held that the Court of Appeal misapplied the maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to be done [47]. Adopting Professor McFarlane's observation, they said the maxim operates not on moral obligations but only on duties recognised in equity independently of the maxim, and they noted that Bowen LJ had applied it in the partnership context to the opposite effect, treating a partner's interest as a right to money on winding up [47]. Using the maxim to create fixed trusts was unnecessary to give effect to any right or duty recognised by equity, was inconsistent with the equitable principles in the Partnership Act concerning external creditors, and was contrary to the partnership agreements [48]. Section 50 implies that each partner can insist on the sale of partnership property to pay the firm's debts and liabilities, and s 57(3) gives external creditors first priority when the assets are applied after dissolution [49]. Clause 19 of the AMS deed of partnership and cl 18 of the SIC deed of partnership similarly provided for a full account and for the assets to be sold and realised [50].

None of the three decisions relied on by the Court of Appeal supported its use of the maxim [51]. In Cameron v Murdoch, neither Brinsden J nor the Privy Council suggested that the testator had a vested or ascertained interest in the land before accounts were taken, and the reference to a 10/27 interest went only to the value of what was devised [52]–[53]. That case, and In re Holland, showed only that a testator's beneficiaries are bound as between themselves to give effect, as far as they can, to the testator's wish to deal separately with an interest in particular partnership property [54], [56]. In re Ritson held that a partnership debt secured on the deceased partner's own land was to be paid first from partnership assets, but it did not follow that a deceased partner's estate could require the other partners to use personal property alone to pay the debts so that the land could be distributed in specie [58].

On the conversion agreement ground, the majority found it unnecessary to decide whether the point was raised below or whether the Commissioner would be prejudiced, because the submission involved "a simple category error" [60]. Trusts can be created by agreement as well as by unilateral declaration, so any conversion agreement, by extinguishing the existing rights and creating new equitable rights annexed to the titles, was the declaration of fixed trusts [60]. They accepted that Maria had no power to declare such trusts without the agreement of the other partners or their representatives, but held that the deeds were an agreement among all of them to extinguish their existing interests and create new trusts [61].

On s 78, the majority explained that its purpose is to prevent duty being levied both on a conveyance of property into a partnership and, on dissolution, on a conveyance of the same property to the partners in their partnership shares [63]. They rejected Rojoda's argument that "transfer" in s 78 is used loosely to include the creation of new equitable rights, because a declaration of trust does not transfer rights [64]–[65]. The definition of "transfer" in s 9 includes an assignment or exchange but not a declaration of trust, which is separately defined, and s 11(1) lists transfers and agreements for transfer (s 11(1)(a) and (b)) separately from declarations of trust (s 11(1)(c)) [65]. Like ss 11(1)(a) and 11(1)(b), s 78 is concerned with true transfers of rights or agreements for such transfers [65]. Commissioner of State Taxation (SA) v Cyril Henschke Pty Ltd did not help Rojoda: the deed there was a conveyance because it extinguished the partnership interests and re-vested in the new partnership the enlarged interests of the other partners, and nothing in that decision suggested any transfer [66]–[68].

Gageler J (dissenting)

Gageler J considered that the better answer to the question of the nature of partners' interests in partnership property was different from the majority's [70]. He said the difference illustrated the observation, which he cited from Henschke (itself quoting Sandhu v Gill), that the nature of those interests is "conceptually somewhat opaque" [70]. He said that each partner has two kinds of rights in respect of partnership property, which it is important to keep conceptually distinct [72]. The first is a right against the other partners to have the property applied for partnership purposes and, on dissolution, to have the debts paid and the surplus distributed, which is itself property of the partner, an equitable chose in action [73]. Against the rest of the world, he said, the partners collectively have the beneficial interest in each item of partnership property, and each partner individually has a share in it [74]. Partnership land, and property held in the name of only some partners, is held on trust for all the partners as co-owners in equity [76]. Each partner's undivided interest is that of a tenant in common, and the critical question is how and when each partner's share in each item is to be ascertained [77].

Gageler J held that, unlike the 1890 United Kingdom Act, the Western Australian Act speaks directly to that question in its definition of a partner's share (s 33), and that the definition has independent operation [78]. Its language was drawn almost word for word from Pollock's Digest of the Law of Partnership [79]. In his view, the statutory adoption of Pollock's definition resolves a temporal ambiguity in Lindley's statement: whether a share can be ascertained only when liquidation is in fact complete, or whether the statement gives a formula for ascertaining an existing share at an earlier time [82]–[83]. He noted dicta, including in the High Court, supporting each reading, and that Kitto J in Maslen v Perpetual Executors Trustees & Agency Co (WA) Ltd recognised that the Western Australian definition indicates the latter [84]–[85]. He pointed out that the statutory words "at any time is" and "would be entitled if" do not say "will be entitled when" [85]. Each partner's share is therefore ascertained by hypothesising the immediate liquidation of all the partnership property and payment of all the debts and liabilities [86].

While the partnership carries on business, Gageler J said, each partner's interest in each item necessarily remains unascertained and may change from moment to moment [87]. Once the partnership is dissolved, however, each partner's share in each item can be fixed without actual liquidation or payment of debts, provided the partnership is solvent on dissolution [88]. A particular item might remain unrealised until winding up is complete, but the partner's proportionate share in it is by then fixed [89]. He found support in Re Holland and in the Privy Council's decision in Cameron v Murdoch, in each of which a deceased partner's specific gift by will of a share in partnership property was held effective, the share being fixed by reference to the partner's share in the surplus assets of a partnership able to meet its debts [90]–[92]. Re Holland distinguished Farquhar v Hadden because the partnership in that case had been insolvent on dissolution [93].

Applying this, Gageler J treated two facts as critical: the partnerships had been dissolved when the deeds were executed, and they were solvent [94]. Each partner's proportionate share in the surplus, and therefore in each parcel of land held on trust by Maria, was calculable, and it was correctly stated in cl 1 of each deed [95]–[96]. Gageler J held that cl 3 of each deed "did no more than acknowledge the legal position that had then come to exist": Maria "did not declare a new trust" and so did not engage in a dutiable transaction [97]. The replacement of Maria by Rojoda as trustee showed the parties' agreement that the land would not be liquidated, releasing them from the obligation to sell, but there was no suggestion that those releases made the deeds dutiable [98]. He said his conclusion did not depend on "a distorted application" of the maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to be done, but only on recognising the fixed share each partner had on the dissolution of a solvent partnership under the statutory hypothesis [99]. He would have upheld the notice of contention and dismissed the appeal with costs [100].

Orders. The Court ordered that the appeal be allowed with costs, and that the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia made on 21 December 2018 be set aside and replaced by an order that the appeal to that court be dismissed with costs [69]. The result was that Rojoda's appeal from the Tribunal's dismissal of its application for review of the Commissioner's decision failed [2], [69]. Gageler J dissented and would have dismissed the Commissioner's appeal with costs [100].

Why it matters

The majority held that partnership property is held on trust for the partners, but that the partners' rights under that trust are unique, are not the rights of beneficiaries of a fixed trust, and do not change in nature on dissolution before winding up is complete [3], [26]. On that view, a deed by which all the partners of a dissolved partnership replace those rights with a fixed trust over partnership land creates new equitable rights by a declaration of trust, rather than confirming an existing trust or transferring property within s 78 of the Duties Act [42], [60], [65]. The majority also held, adopting Professor McFarlane's observation that the maxim bites only on duties recognised in equity independently of it, that the maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to be done could not be used to treat the land of a dissolved partnership as held on fixed trust [47]–[48]. Gageler J's dissent rested on the definition of a partner's share in the Western Australian Act, which he held fixes each partner's share in each item of property once a solvent partnership is dissolved [78], [88].

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