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Commissioner of Taxation v Bamford

(2010) 240 CLR 481 · [2010] HCA 10

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 11 November 2026

Overview

Commissioner of Taxation v Bamford and Bamford v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 10 are two appeals decided by the High Court of Australia on 30 March 2010. They concern the operation of Div 6 of Pt III of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), headed "Trust income", in the 2000 and 2002 income tax years [1]. In one joint judgment, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ dismissed each appeal [1], [3]. The Commissioner failed in his argument that "the income of the trust estate" in s 97(1) did not include a capital gain the trustee had treated as income available for distribution [7], [9], [42]. The taxpayers failed in their argument that "that share" in s 97(1) meant the specific amount they were entitled to, because the Court accepted Sundberg J's analysis in Zeta Force that it means a proportion [44]–[46].

Facts

The facts were not in dispute [4]. P & D Bamford Enterprises Pty Ltd (the Trustee) was trustee of the trusts of a settlement established by a deed of settlement made on 9 February 1995 (the Deed) [5]. Mr and Mrs Bamford, who were directors and employees of the Trustee, and Church of Scientology Inc (the Church) were among the class of Eligible Beneficiaries defined in the Deed [5]. The Trustee was to hold the income arising from the Trust Fund for such of the Eligible Beneficiaries as it selected, under a clause of a kind found in what the Court said are commonly called "discretionary trusts" [6]. Clause 7(n) of the Deed empowered the Trustee to determine whether any receipt was or was not to be treated as being on income or capital account [6].

For the 2002 year, it was common ground that the Trustee treated as income available for distribution a net capital gain of $29,227 from the sale of real property in which it had held a half share [7]. That gain was divided equally and included in the distribution to Mr and Mrs Bamford, who each lodged a tax return in accordance with that distribution [7]. The Commissioner considered that the gain was not included in "the income of the trust estate" of which s 97(1) speaks, so that there was no income of the trust estate to which s 97(1) could apply and the Trustee itself was to be assessed under s 99A [8].

For the 2000 year, the Trustee determined that the income for the year ended 30 June 2000 be distributed in this order: consecutive amounts of $643 each to a child of Mr and Mrs Bamford, the next $12,500 to Narconon Anzo Inc, the next $106,000 to the Church, the next $68,000 to Mr and Mrs Bamford in equal shares, and the balance to the Church [12]. The Trustee also determined under cl 7(n) that certain outgoings be treated as expenses and, in error, treated them as allowable deductions in computing the net income of the trust estate for s 97(1), which was shown as $187,530 [12]. Following that order, there was not enough left to provide the $68,000 to Mr and Mrs Bamford and no balance to go to the Church, and the remaining $67,744 was distributed equally between Mr and Mrs Bamford, so that each received $33,872 [13].

The net income of the trust estate was not merely $187,530, because it included the non-deductible outgoings of $191,701 [14]. The Commissioner calculated the ratio which the actual distributions of $33,872 bore to the total of $187,530, applied that ratio to the excess of the net income addition of $191,701 over the distributable income, and included the product, $34,624, in the assessable income of each taxpayer [14].

Procedural history

The appeals came from the Full Court of the Federal Court (Emmett, Stone and Perram JJ), in Bamford v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 176 FCR 250, and were heard together, the taxpayers' appeal concerning the 2000 year and the Commissioner's appeal concerning the 2002 year [1]. Mr and Mrs Bamford are the appellants in the taxpayers' appeal and the first and second respondents in the Commissioner's appeal, and the Trustee is the second respondent in the taxpayers' appeal and the third respondent in the Commissioner's appeal [5].

The Full Court had decided that "the income of the trust estate" included the capital gain amount, which the Commissioner disputed in the High Court [9]. The taxpayers' contention about how to work out their share of the net income was also contrary to the Full Court's decision [14]. On the second day of the High Court hearing, the Commissioner made clear that he accepted his appeal should be dismissed if "the income of the trust estate" within s 97(1) includes statutory income such as capital gains brought in as assessable income [10]. The reasons say nothing about any hearing below the Full Court.

Issues

Section 97(1) applies where a beneficiary of a trust estate is presently entitled to "a share of the income of the trust estate", and the beneficiary's assessable income then includes "that share of the net income of the trust estate" [2].

The first construction issue, in the Commissioner's appeal, arises because the expression "the income of the trust estate" in ss 96 and 97 is not defined [35]. The Commissioner submitted that it did not include the capital gain amount because, while available for distribution under the Deed, that amount was not, in the sense of the 1936 Act, income according to ordinary concepts [9].

The second construction issue, in the taxpayers' appeal, is how the phrase "that share" in s 97(1) applies where beneficiaries are entitled not to fixed proportions of the income of the trust estate but, as to some, to specific amounts and, as to another, to the residue [11], [43]. The taxpayers contended that their share of the net income should be ascertained as if the terms of the Deed, including the effect of any exercise of power of appointment over income, applied to the calculation of that net income [14]. The Court illustrated the difference with trust income of $300,000, net income of $180,000 and a beneficiary with a $100,000 annuity: on the taxpayers' case the beneficiary's assessable income would be fixed at $100,000, and on the Commissioner's case it would be the same one-third proportion, that is $60,000 [15].

Held

French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ

These five judges gave one joint judgment, with no separate reasons and no dissent [1].

Both sides accepted that, whichever construction of Div 6 was adopted, examples of apparent unfairness could readily be given [17]. The Court noted that it was more than 20 years since Hill J, in Davis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 86 ALR 195, had observed that "the scheme of Div 6 calls out for legislative clarification, especially since the insertion into [the 1936 Act] of provisions taxing capital gains as assessable income" [17]. As Stone and Perram JJ emphasised in the Full Court, the distinction between income and capital in trust law was a product of administering successive equitable estates, balancing the concerns of those with life interests in the receipt of income and those with remainder interests in conserving and augmenting capital [17]. The rules developed in Chancery on apportioning receipts, outgoings and losses between capital and income largely took the form of presumptions that would yield to provision in the trust instrument [17]. Against that background, the Court said it was to be expected that a trustee's treatment of receipts and outgoings would not necessarily correspond with that in a taxing statute such as the 1936 Act [17]. How far a revenue statute adopts, qualifies or supplants the general understanding of property law terms is a matter of statutory construction, bearing in mind Lord Wilberforce's caution in Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners that the transfer from one context to another may breed confusion [17]. Although ss 17 and 19 of the 1936 Act speak of income derived by a person, and a trustee answers that description, the trust itself is not a separate entity with the character of a taxpayer unless the legislation makes special provision [18].

The Court set out Professor Ford's description, written in 1958, of two possible methods: treating the trust as a separate entity assessed as one unit, or treating it as a mere conduit through which beneficiaries receive income, with that income aggregated with their income from other sources [19]–[20]. The Court stated that Div 6 implemented the second approach [21].

The Court called s 96 the primary provision, under which, in the words of that section, "Except as provided in this Act, a trustee shall not be liable as trustee to pay income tax upon the income of the trust estate" [22]. The Court called s 97 a central provision and said these appeals turn on its construction [25]. The expression "net income" is defined in s 95(1), and the relationship in s 97(1) between "the income of the trust estate" and "the net income of the trust estate" gives rise to difficulties, some of which the Court said required resolution in these appeals [26]. Section 95(1) defines net income, in relation to a trust estate, as the total assessable income calculated as if the trustee were a taxpayer and a resident, less allowable deductions, with stated exceptions [34]. A net capital gain is taken into account in computing that net income as part of the assessable income [32].

The definition of "trustee" in s 6(1) takes the reader beyond the trusts of a settlement or testamentary trust, but it applies unless the contrary intention appears, so not every person who answers it will be a trustee for Div 6 [27]-[28]. The Court illustrated the reach of Div 6 beyond settlements and testamentary trusts with three of its decisions: Fox's Case (the official receiver of the estate of a bankrupt), Harmer (moneys paid into the Supreme Court of Western Australia) and Registrar of the Accident Compensation Tribunal (awards of compensation paid into a fund under the Registrar's control) [29]–[30].

On the first issue, the Court said the very juxtaposition in s 97(1) of the defined "net income of the trust estate" and the undefined "the income of the trust estate" suggests that the latter "has a content found in the general law of trusts, upon which Div 6 then operates" [36]. The Court said the language of present entitlement is that of the general law of trusts, adapted to the operation of the 1936 Act upon distinct years of income [37]. The Court noted that in Harmer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation it was accepted that a beneficiary is presently entitled if, and only if, the beneficiary has an interest in the income both vested in interest and vested in possession, and has a present legal right to demand and receive payment, whether or not the precise entitlement can be ascertained before the end of the year and whether or not the trustee has funds available for immediate payment [37]. The Court said the elaboration that may be called for in applying s 98, to which Kitto J adverted in Taylor v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, need not be examined in this matter [37].

The identification in s 97(1) of a trust estate of which there is a beneficiary also points to the general law of trusts, and although there may be a trustee of a trust created by the operation of a legislative regime, there must still be a trust estate [38]. The phrase "presently entitled to a share of the income" in s 97(1) directs attention to the processes in trust administration by which the share is identified and entitlement established [39]. The Court set out the description of those principles by Bowen CJ, Deane and Fitzgerald JJ in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Totledge Pty Ltd: a beneficiary entitled to income will ordinarily only be entitled to receive actual payment of the appropriate share of surplus or distributable income, the trustee being entitled and obliged to meet revenue outgoings from income before distributing [39].

The Commissioner relied on a passage in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australia and New Zealand Savings Bank Ltd, but the Court said there was no submission in that case that a trust deed could operate to treat as capital receipts what otherwise might have been included as income of the trust estate, and the argument there was on other issues [40]. The Commissioner also only partially invoked the 1936 Act to give content to "income of the trust estate", and would exclude statutory income, which is not income according to ordinary concepts, and the Court said "The lack of consistency which this involves tells against the submission" [41]. The result was that the Commissioner's appeal should be dismissed [42].

On the second issue, the Court said the phrase "that share" in s 97(1)(a)(i) links the identification of present entitlement to "a share" of the income of the trust estate to the defined expression "the net income of the trust estate" [43]. The Court said that on its face the section "may appear to postulate the same share of two subject matters which do not correspond" [43]. Emmett J had referred to the submissions of Mr and Mrs Bamford that, where a beneficiary is entitled to a specified amount and not a proportionate part, "share" means that amount, and that the amount assessable must be calculated as if the trust instrument and any appointment operated on the net income as if it were the distributable income [44]. The Court said "These submissions were correctly rejected" [44].

The Court found the resolution of the second issue in the analysis by Sundberg J in Zeta Force Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 84 FCR 70, who had also dealt with the first issue to the same effect as the Court [45]. In the passage the Court set out, Sundberg J said the words "income of the trust estate" in s 97(1) "refer to distributable income, that is to say income ascertained by the trustee according to appropriate accounting principles and the trust instrument" [45]. Sundberg J also said that "net income of the trust estate" in par (a)(i) has the s 95(1) meaning, taxable income as opposed to distributable income, and that "that share" refers back to the earlier "share" and indicates that the same share is applied to an income amount calculated by a different formula [45]. Because the amount may differ with the formula, Sundberg J said "the natural meaning to give to 'share' where it appears for the second time is 'proportion' rather than 'part' or 'portion'", noting that Parliament used "part" in ss 99 and 99A when it wanted the latter meaning [45]. Sundberg J concluded: "Once the share of the distributable income to which the beneficiary is presently entitled is worked out, the notion of present entitlement has served its purpose, and the beneficiary is to be taxed on that share (or proportion) of the taxable income of the trust estate" [45]. The Court said "That analysis should be accepted", and that it followed that the taxpayers' appeal should be dismissed [46].

Orders. In each matter, the appeal was dismissed [47]. The Court said no costs orders should be made in the High Court, and none had been made in the Federal Court because the parties had an agreement about costs [47].

Why it matters

The case matters because the Court decided how the two expressions in s 97(1) relate, a relationship it said gives rise to difficulties [26], [45]–[46]. By accepting Sundberg J's analysis, the Court treated a beneficiary's present entitlement as fixed by reference to distributable income, and treated the beneficiary as taxed on that share, or proportion, of the taxable income of the trust estate [45]–[46].

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