CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue
(2005) 224 CLR 98 · [2005] HCA 53 · (2005) 221 ALR 196 · (2005) 79 ALJR 1724 · (2005) 60 ATR 371
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
This is a decision of the High Court of Australia given on 28 September 2005 in two groups of appeals heard together, CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue and Commissioner of State Revenue v Karingal 2 Holdings Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 53. The question was whether holders of issued units in unit trusts, whose trustees were the registered proprietors of land, were "owners" of that land under the Land Tax Act 1958 (Vic) [3]–[4], [7]. In one joint judgment, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ decided that they were not, whether they held some or all of the issued units, and including where the units were held through a sub-trust [1], [12]–[13]. The Court dismissed the Commissioner's four appeals and allowed CPT's two appeals and Karingal's two cross-appeals, all with costs [54]–[55]. On the CPT appeals and the Karingal cross-appeals, it set aside the amended assessment in each matter and remitted the subject-matter to the Commissioner for reconsideration [54]–[55].
Facts
The litigation concerned land on which stand the Glen Shopping Centre at Glen Waverley, the Keilor Downs Plaza at Keilor Downs, the Cranbourne Park Shopping Centre at Cranbourne and the Mildura Centre Plaza at Mildura [3]. The registered proprietors of the land were trustees under trust deeds constituting what have been identified as unit trusts [3].
The Commissioner of State Revenue issued amended assessments of Karingal 2 Holdings Pty Ltd for the land tax years 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 and of CPT Custodian Pty Ltd for the land tax years 1998 and 1999, and both companies objected [1]. The Commissioner relied on ownership of issued units in these unit trusts, and in unit trusts on similar terms in which the first trust owned issued units [4]. He also relied on s 44 of the Act, under which, if its circumstances apply and the Commissioner so determines, related corporations may be taken to be a single corporation, and in this way Karingal was assessed by reason of the holdings of 333 Queen Street Pty Ltd and Centro Properties Ltd [4].
The deeds were not in identical form, but the High Court took their relevantly salient features from the Keilor Downs Deed, of which CPT was the Trustee at all material times [18]–[19]. The Fund was vested in the Trustee on trust for the Unit Holders, its management was vested exclusively in the Manager, and the Trustee and the Manager were entitled to fees in significant amounts out of the Fund and to monthly reimbursement of their costs, charges and expenses [19].
The beneficial interest in the Fund was divided into units, each said to confer an equal interest in all property for the time being held by the Trustee on the trusts of the Deed, excluding that part of the Fund credited to a distribution account [20]. But, in the words of cl 3.2 of the Deed, no unit conferred "any interest in any particular part of the Trust Fund or any investment" [20]. Unit holders could not require the transfer of any property in the Fund except as the Deed provided, and could not lodge a caveat claiming an estate or interest in any investment that was realty [20]. The Deed contemplated that all units might be held beneficially by a single unit holder (cl 29.4) [20].
Procedural history
Nettle J in the Supreme Court of Victoria made orders setting aside the disallowance of objections to certain amended assessments, and the Commissioner appealed to the Victorian Court of Appeal (Phillips, Buchanan and Eames JJA), which heard six appeals and cross-appeals together and delivered one set of reasons [1]. The same bench delivered judgment on the same day in Arjon Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue, from which there was no appeal to the High Court, and Phillips JA gave the leading judgment in both [2].
The Court of Appeal concluded, referring to Arjon, that "the holder of all of the units in a unit trust may be said to be entitled, in equity, to the freehold estate in possession in land which is an asset of the trust" [10]. It said that reasoning applied equally to the sole unit holder in a trust which is itself the sole unit holder in a land-holding trust [10]. It held that the holder of some only of the units has no more than the entitlements the deed gives a unit holder, which, in the Court of Appeal's words, "are surely personal property quite different from the realty held by the trustee" [11].
The Court of Appeal therefore upheld Nettle J's holding that a unit holder with less than 100 per cent of the issued units was not an owner [12]. It set aside Nettle J's holding on ownership of 100 per cent of the issued units and held the definition satisfied in that case, and also in what the submissions called a sub-trust, where the land was vested in the trustee of a unit trust in which the first trust held the issued units [12]. The Commissioner and both taxpayers challenged that outcome in the High Court, each to the extent it was adverse to them, by six appeals, two cross-appeals and two notices of contention [13].
Issues
Sections 6, 8 and 39 of the Act impose land tax on the total unimproved value of all land of which the taxpayer is the owner at midnight on 31 December of the immediately preceding year [7]. The main issue was whether a unit holder fell within para (a) of the definition of owner in s 3 of the Act, "every person entitled to any land for any estate of freehold in possession", a definition on which the High Court said the outcome largely turned [7], [9]. The parties agreed, as the Court of Appeal noted, that ss 51 and 52 of the Act were not charging provisions, so no party could be taxed under them unless it answered the definition of owner [8]. The further issues were whether the answer differed for a sub-trust and for a holder of all the issued units, given the rule in Saunders v Vautier, and whether the provisions on joint owners could help the Commissioner [23], [38], [41]–[42].
Held
Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ (joint reasons)
All five judges joined in these reasons, and there were no separate reasons and no dissent [1].
Their Honours said the task had two steps, correctly identified in the taxpayers' submissions to the Court of Appeal: first to ascertain the terms of the trusts on which the land was held, then to construe the definition to see whether the taxpayers' rights under those trusts fell within it [14]. They said a priori assumptions about unit trusts under the general law and principles of equity "would not assist and would be apt to mislead" [15]. All depends, they said, as Tamberlin and Hely JJ put it in Kent v SS "Maria Luisa" (No 2), on the terms of the particular trust [15]. In the absence of an applicable statutory definition, they said, the term unit trust "does not have a constant, fixed normative meaning which can dictate the application to particular facts of the definition in s 3(a) of the Act" [15].
Asking first, as Nettle J and the Court of Appeal appear to have done, whether a unit holder has a proprietary interest in each asset of the trust fund did not immediately assist, because the definition "does not speak of ownership of proprietary interests at large, but of entitlement to any estate of freehold in possession" [16]. They referred to Lord Wilberforce in Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners for the point that it is one thing to identify rights protected by a court of equity, and another to identify an interest with, in his words, "the necessary quality of definable extent which must exist before it can be taxed" [17]. Here the definable extent was that specified by the statutory definition, and rights protected by equity did not require the conclusion that unit holders were owners in the statutory sense [17].
The Commissioner submitted that (i) because the deeds gave each unit holder fixed and ascertainable rights to income and capital, not depending on any discretion, each held an equitable estate or interest in each asset of the fund, (ii) no one else had such rights or interests, and (iii) those interests met the statutory requirement of entitlement to land for any estate of freehold in possession [22]. Their Honours put (i) and (ii) to one side and went first to (iii), which they called "the critical issue posed by the taxing law itself" [24]. They said the sub-trust submissions could not succeed if propositions (i), (ii) and (iii) failed [23].
They then returned to Glenn v Federal Commissioner of Land Tax (1915) 20 CLR 490, which construed the similar definition in the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910 (Cth) [9], [24]. In Glenn, Griffith CJ said an argument for the Revenue assumed that, whenever the legal estate in land is vested in a trustee, some other person must be entitled to it in equity for an estate of freehold in possession, and he said there is a prior inquiry whether any such person exists and that, if not, the trustee is entitled to the whole estate in possession, legal and equitable [25]. The joint reasons called that "a prescient rejection" of what they labelled a dogma, namely that where ownership is vested in a trustee, equitable ownership must necessarily be vested in someone else [25]. They said the current state of authority, exemplified by Commissioner of Taxation v Linter Textiles Australia Ltd (In liq), bears out what Griffith CJ said [25]. General remarks in Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties v ISPT Pty Ltd "may be at odds" with Glenn so far as they go beyond the New South Wales stamp duty legislation, but their Honours found it unnecessary to pursue the question [25].
Griffith CJ read the statutory expression "estate in possession" as "an estate of which some person has the present right of enjoyment", and said that because land tax is annual the owner is the person in present enjoyment of the fruits which presumably afford the fund from which the tax is paid [26]. On that reasoning, where a trust for accumulation was in operation, those who were afterwards to take the trust estate were not entitled to an estate of freehold in possession and were not owners [26]. Nettle J applied the reasoning in Glenn to s 3(a) and rejected the Commissioner's submission that the entitlements of unit holders made each an owner, and their Honours said "His Honour was correct in doing so" [28].
Their Honours said proposition (iii) depended to a significant degree on an alleged hallmark of any unit trust, that unlike shareholders, unit holders have beneficial interests in the trust assets and no one else does [29]. Referring to Lord Wilberforce in Gartside and Viscount Radcliffe in Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Livingston on the different meanings of "interest" and "property", they said such terms "lack a universal contemporary or historical meaning, divorced from the context, particularly any statutory context in which they are employed" [31]. They found it unnecessary to determine whether Costa & Duppe Properties Pty Ltd v Duppe correctly decided the requirements in Victoria for a caveatable interest, but said it gave "no authority of the general significance assumed for it" in the Commissioner's submissions [32].
The Commissioner said Charles v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1954) 90 CLR 598 was consistent with his analysis, and in that case Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ said that, unlike a share in a company, a unit under the deed before them conferred a proprietary interest in all the property for the time being subject to the trust [33]-[34]. Their Honours said Karingal and CPT "rightly stress" that the deeds here were differently cast, in terms which do not support any direct and simple conclusion about unit holders' proprietary interests such as that reached in Charles [36].
On the interest of a unit holder under the Deed, they said remarks by Nettle J were "in point and conclusive" [37]. Nettle J said each deed empowered the trustee to provide out of receipts for future and contingent liabilities, to apply receipts in buying property or a business and to invest them, and that the only right of the unit holder is to a proportionate share of the income of the fund for the year [37]. Nettle J distinguished a simple trust with one beneficiary, where the trustee's entitlement to apply receipts determines the amount of income the beneficiary has a right to receive, from a complex unit trust, where that entitlement informs the nature of the income the unit holders have a right to receive [37].
Drawing on Knox CJ in Terry v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, their Honours said a joint owner must jointly occupy the same position regarding entitlement for an estate of freehold in possession as an individual would in his own person, so the notion of joint ownership in s 45 could not overcome the failure of the Commissioner's case on the definition of owner [38]. They added that the units "are discrete bundles of rights" and that each unit is not held in joint ownership with the totality of issued units [39]. The Commissioner's reliance on the closing words of the definition of joint owners failed, because those words are only part of the phrase "whether as partners or otherwise" and do not lessen the requirement for ownership jointly or in common, and because the assumption about beneficial ownership was misplaced [40].
The Court of Appeal's distinction for the holder of all issued units rested on Arjon, where Phillips JA said that, where the deed declares the fund vested in all the unit holders together, a sole holder must be regarded as in equity entitled to an interest vested in possession in all the trust assets, and, referring to Saunders v Vautier, that the holder of all the units will ordinarily have the power to end the trust and take the assets [41]. Their Honours said the result was apparently that an unrealised potential at each relevant 31 December to end the trusts made the unit holders entitled on that date to an estate of freehold in possession [42].
They said the rule was not explicitly formulated in Saunders v Vautier itself, and that it has been seen in Anglo-Australian law to embody a consent principle, identified by Mummery LJ in Goulding v James as recognising the rights of beneficiaries who are sui juris and together absolutely entitled to the trust property [43]. They said there is "force for Anglo-Australian law" in the statement that the rule gives beneficiaries a Hohfeldian power correlating to a liability of the trustees, rather than a right correlative to a duty, because, as Professor J W Harris wrote, breaking up the trust brings the trustees' office to an end [44]. The Commissioner said in oral argument that, in effect, the rule was a red herring, being but a corollary of the beneficial ownership he contended for, but those beneficial ownership submissions had already been rejected [45]–[46].
The Deed recognised that all units might be in one beneficial ownership, but its trusts "were drawn in terms conferring individual rights attached to each unit" [46]. They "were not drawn to provide a single right of a cumulative nature so that the whole differed from the sum of the parts", and there could be no such single right unless held jointly or in common, which was not how the Deed was cast [46]. Further, their Honours said the facts did not in any event answer the modern formulation of the rule stated in Thomas on Powers, which speaks of an adult beneficiary or beneficiaries with an absolute, vested and indefeasible interest in the capital and income of property [47].
They noted that Isaacs J in Glenn concluded the principle could not apply because the trusts there were not exclusively for the appellants' benefit, and that Kearney J in Sir Moses Montefiore Jewish Home v Howell and Co (No 7) Pty Ltd treated the power as reposed in the entire range of persons entitled to call for due administration of the trust [48]. That approach, they said, "would not meet the case of the Deed", because the Manager covenanted with the Trustee (cl 23.4) to ensure sufficient readily realisable assets for the Trustee to raise the fees of both, which made them interested in due administration in Kearney J's sense [49]. Put differently, "the unit holders were not the persons in whose favour alone the trust property might be applied by the trustee of the Deed" [49].
They said the classic nineteenth century formulation of the rule did not consider the trustee's general law right to reimbursement or exoneration for liabilities incurred in administering the trust [50]. They read Lord Davey's discussion in Wharton v Masterman as indicating that the rule could not apply where those seeking to end accumulations were, in his words, "only entitled to an undetermined and uncertain surplus (if any) which might be left of the fund after payment of the legacies" [50]. Here the unsatisfied trustees' right of indemnity was expressed as an actual liability in each relevant account at each 31 December, which made the sense of those words applicable [51]. In their Honours' words, "Until satisfaction of rights of reimbursement or exoneration, it was impossible to say what the trust fund in question was" [51].
As a further related point, suggested by remarks in Kent v SS "Maria Luisa" (No 2), they said it is one thing for a court of equity to refuse to enforce a trust for accumulations in which only the legatee has an interest, and another to find for a statutory purpose a presently subsisting interest in all the trust assets at a particular date because of what could later be done under a power of termination but had not been done at that date [52]. They said "Equity often regards as done that which ought to be done, but not necessarily that which merely could be done", and that in any event what was at stake was "the operation of statutory criteria upon general law concepts of equitable ownership" [52]. These conclusions made it unnecessary, given the agreement on ss 51 and 52, to consider arguments about the construction of and relationship between those sections [53].
Orders. In M217/2004 and M218/2004, the Commissioner's appeals against Karingal were each dismissed with costs [54]. In M215/2004 and M216/2004, the Commissioner's appeals were each dismissed with costs and Karingal's cross-appeals were allowed with costs [54]. In those two matters the orders of the Court of Appeal were set aside and, in their place, the appeal to that Court was dismissed with costs and the cross-appeal to that Court was allowed with costs [54]. The orders of Nettle J were varied so that the appeal to the Supreme Court on amended assessment S 012493235-2 (M215) and on amended assessment S 014593439-2 (M216) was in each case allowed with costs, the amended assessment was set aside and the subject-matter was remitted to the Commissioner for reconsideration and determination in accordance with law [54]. In M222/2004 and M223/2004, CPT's appeals were each allowed with costs and the same form of consequential orders was made, the assessments being S 020601711-2 (M222) and S 020601703-2 (M223) [55].
Why it matters
The reasons show that liability as an owner under the Land Tax Act 1958 (Vic) turned on the terms of the particular trust and the words of the statutory definition, not on any general idea of what a unit trust is [14]–[16]. They treat as borne out by current authority Griffith CJ's statement in Glenn that there is a prior inquiry whether anyone other than the trustee is entitled in equity to an estate of freehold in possession [25]. On the rule in Saunders v Vautier, they show that, on the Deed considered, the holder of all issued units was not made an owner by an unexercised power to end the trust, and that the Trustee's and the Manager's claims on the fund were a further obstacle to the rule applying [42], [49]–[52].
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