Crystal Auburn Pty Ltd v I L Wollermann Pty Ltd
[2004] FCA 821
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Crystal Auburn Pty Ltd v I L Wöllermann Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 821 is a decision of Goldberg J of the Federal Court of Australia, sitting alone in Melbourne, given on 25 June 2004. It assessed the damages owed to the buyers of the "Wobbies World" theme park, who had been misled about the park's attendance figures in contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) [1]. It also decided a cross-claim by the landlord, Macleay Pty Ltd, for rent and other amounts under the lease of the park's land [2]. Goldberg J held that the applicants were entitled to judgment for total damages of $924,267.54, less $250,000 the respondents had advanced on account, and that Macleay was entitled to judgment on its cross-claim for $227,073.14 [172]-[173]. The damages covered the difference between the price and the true value of the business, interest and charges under a hire purchase agreement, some unpaid labour, and reimbursement of most of the cross-claim award [172]. Claims for rent paid while the business traded, capital contributions, relocation costs, anxiety and stress, opportunity cost and the costs of the purchase failed [130], [136], [161], [163], [164], [166]. Interest was left for the parties to address on the form of the orders [174].
Facts
The second respondent, Valespring Investments Pty Ltd, sold the Wobbies World business to the first applicant, Crystal Auburn Pty Ltd, on 19 December 1997 for $550,000 [1]. The second and third applicants, Mr Siberas and Mr Davies, guaranteed Crystal Auburn's obligations under the sale contract and under the lease that Macleay granted over the land [1]–[2]. The first respondent, Wöllermann, was the business broker acting for Valespring, and the fourth and fifth respondents, Mr and Mrs Laurie, were the directors of Valespring and Macleay [3]. The park occupied about seven acres in Springvale Road, Nunawading, with attractions including a monorail, miniature trams and fire trucks, minigolf and trampolines [4]. At the sale, title to the plant and equipment passed to Bendigo Finance Pty Ltd, a company connected with Bendigo Bank, with which Crystal Auburn entered into a hire purchase agreement [6].
Mr Siberas and Mr Davies decided to buy the business in reliance on a Business Profile and attendance sheets, in particular the 1997 attendances and a represented average sale of $11.20 per visitor [12]. By the end of February 1998 it was apparent that attendances were nowhere near those represented, and attendances from late December 1997 to April 1998 were just under 60% lower than in the same period a year earlier [12]. The business was put on the market on 24 March 1998 for $650,000, and on 28 April 1998 the applicants' solicitors advised that they had little option but to seek to set aside the contract and the lease [16]. On 17 June 1998 the solicitors told Valespring that Crystal Auburn was rescinding the contract and the lease, and the next day the business was taken off the market [30]. Crystal Auburn ran the business until 2 August 1998 and vacated it on 6 August 1998, after Macleay served a notice of default for unpaid July 1998 rent [30]–[31]. Crystal Auburn paid no rent or outgoings from 1 July 1998, the date on which the monthly rent doubled from $6,250 to $12,500 [139], [141].
Mr Laurie operated the business over the summer of 1998-1999 and tried to sell it as a going concern [50]. After Macleay sold the land and demanded removal of the plant and equipment, Bendigo Bank caused an on-site auction of the plant and equipment on 8 July 1999, which grossed $60,705 [43], [46].
Procedural history
In his first judgment, given on 6 July 2000, Sundberg J found that the applicants would not have entered into the contract, the lease or the guarantee had they known the attendance figures were false [5]. He declared that Wöllermann, Valespring and Macleay had contravened s 52 and that Mr and Mrs Laurie were involved in the contravention, and ordered that the applicants' loss be assessed by a Registrar in default of agreement [11]. On 9 August 2000 the respondents advanced $250,000 to the applicants on account of damages [13].
In his second judgment, given on 18 June 2001, Sundberg J refused the declarations sought by the applicants that the contract and lease had been rescinded [14]–[15]. He found that restitution was not possible because Bendigo Bank owned the plant and equipment, and that by keeping the business on the market after receiving legal advice Crystal Auburn had affirmed the contract [6], [16]. In his discretion he made no order under s 87(2)(a) of the Act avoiding the contract and the lease [16]. Goldberg J read the second judgment as placing the election to affirm when the applicants received legal advice, not on 24 March 1998 as the respondents contended [6].
When the assessment came before a Registrar, it was decided that the damages were more appropriately assessed by a judge [17]. On 26 June 2002 Sundberg J ordered that the evidence in the two earlier trials could be used in the assessment [8]. The applicants claimed total damages of $1,225,127.13 [18]. They made no claim for loss of profits and instead claimed additional losses, including capital contributions [19].
Issues
The first issue was the true value of the business at the purchase date of 19 December 1997, where the parties agreed that the valuation method depended on whether the business was then profitable [7]. The second was whether Sundberg J's findings in the first judgment estopped the respondents from claiming that the business was worth more than the $550,000 paid [7]. The third was whether all the losses claimed were caused by the respondents' contravening conduct, which raised whether the applicants had acted unreasonably or failed to mitigate their losses [7]. There were also disputes about the value of the plant and equipment and the conduct of its auction [7]. Finally, the Court had to decide the applicants' claims for consequential losses and Macleay's cross-claim for rent, outgoings and costs under the lease [2], [7].
Held
Goldberg J
Goldberg J treated as apposite the joint judgment in Marks v GIO Australia Holdings, in which McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ said that the inquiry is whether loss was caused by the contravening conduct, and that the amount recoverable is not limited by analogy with contract, tort or equitable remedies [20]. He held that to recover losses after a purchase it is not enough that the purchase was induced by the misrepresentation and that the losses would not otherwise have occurred: the applicants had to show that the loss flowed directly from the inducement [22]. He adopted Hill J's statement in Argy v Blunts & Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd that the normal measure is the difference between the real value of the property at the time of purchase and the price paid [22]. He said that "Clearly, the right to damages, the difference between the price paid and the value received, survives affirmation" [26]. He added the present circumstances, where the buyer's dealings with a third party made rescission impossible, to the situations in which damages beyond the usual measure may be awarded, as Jordan CJ had contemplated in McAllister v Richmond Brewing Co (NSW) Pty Ltd [26].
Because Sundberg J had found that Crystal Auburn affirmed the contract and lease, Goldberg J held that the question was whether the applicants abandoned the business and failed to mitigate their losses [35]. He accepted that a sale of the business was not feasible when it was on the market in 1998, noting the lack of usable financial information for buyers and that no offers were made at $650,000 in four months [36]. The applicants were under no obligation to help Mr Laurie sell the business as a going concern after his company re-entered the premises [39]. He found that the short time available to organise the auction was "the direct result of Macleay's own misleading conduct", that it was not the applicants' fault, and that a private orderly sale was not an option [47]. He also noted that Bendigo Bank, as owner of the plant and equipment, arranged the auction [47].
On deterioration of the plant and equipment, Goldberg J generally preferred the evidence of Mr Siberas and found that much of the damage Mr Laurie described was consistent with vandalism [55]. He held that the applicants' course of conduct was not unreasonable, and he was not satisfied that any deterioration was contributed to by their inaction while they owed a duty to protect and preserve the equipment [56]. He held that the extra items Mr Laurie listed were not part of the plant and equipment, because they were not specified in Schedule 3 to the contract [58]. He was not satisfied that any items left out of the auction warranted a reduction in the damages [64].
On issue estoppel, Goldberg J did not accept that Dixon J's statement in Blair v Curran supported the respondents, and he applied the questions it raises about what was legally indispensable to the earlier conclusion [66]–[67]. He held that a finding of loss and damage was essential to the legal foundation of Sundberg J's finding of a breach of s 52, being "neither collateral nor subsidiary in its nature" [68]. The respondents were therefore estopped from contending, or leading evidence, that the business was worth more than the $550,000 Crystal Auburn paid for it [68].
It was common ground that profitability at 19 December 1997 decided the valuation method, and drawing on the Australian Property Institute's Practice Standard 10, Goldberg J noted that a profitable business is valued as a going concern while an unprofitable one is valued on the value of its assets [70]. He accepted the opinion of the applicants' accountant, Mr Wight, that the business was never profitable and made losses in each financial year from 1994 to 1997 [80]. He found unreliable the earnings-based value of $200,000 to $225,000 given by the respondents' accountant, Mr Lom, because it used Business Profile expense figures and failed adequately to consider Sundberg J's finding (q) [87]. He rejected Mr Bent's first valuation of $445,955, which was made for a finance application on the basis closest to existing use, and gave little weight to his revised valuation because there was no evidence of how it was reached [89], [93]. He was not satisfied that Mr Lockwood reasoned independently of Mr Gollant and gave his opinion no weight [97]. He found the respondents' valuer, Mr Henderson, not credible, given the changes and inconsistencies in his reports and evidence and the influence of information from Mr Laurie and the respondents' solicitors, and gave his valuations little weight [118], [121].
Goldberg J found that the business was not profitable when bought and that its true value was the value of its underlying assets, the plant and equipment in Schedule 3 to the contract [119]–[120]. He found Mr Gollant's auction realisation valuation of $41,670 the most reliable, but held that the figure obtained at the auction could not be ignored [122]. He fixed the true value of the business at the auction proceeds of $60,705 less costs of $6,381, and awarded $495,676 as the difference between that value and the price paid [122]. As to the $26,658.50 that Mr Laurie bid at the auction but refused to pay, he rejected the respondents' argument based on Bendigo Bank's title, but said the applicants had no claim on that sum, which Mr Laurie owed to Bendigo Bank [123].
On consequential loss, Goldberg J adopted Sundberg J's findings that Crystal Auburn may have suffered additional loss and that Mr Siberas and Mr Davies did work for the business that went unpaid [124]. He said the lack of evidence, including unaccounted cash takings, made the assessment particularly difficult, and that "It is not for the Court to embark upon speculation" [128]–[129]. He inferred that the business generated enough income to pay Macleay and Bendigo Bank at least until the end of the 1998 financial year, and so rejected the claim for $37,500 rent paid up to June 1998 [130], [138]. He said that claim "is either a component of a loss of profits claim which was not made or it is a claim in respect of which there must be taken into account income derived as a result of that expense" [130]. He refused the $51,000 claimed for capital contributions, because the intermingling of funds in Crystal Auburn's account with those of the security service businesses made it impossible to determine that the money was directed to the business [131], [134]–[136].
Goldberg J took into account that both men also worked on the Thiess and Transfield businesses and generated income, but held it was not appropriate that their time on the theme park go unpaid [157]. He awarded each of them unpaid labour pro rata at $33,000 a year, which the expert evidence showed to be a full-time wage for running this type of business, less drawings paid to their wives, giving $12,038.46 to Mr Siberas and $6,025.38 to Mr Davies [158]. He refused Mr Davies's relocation costs of $7,585.80, finding no sufficient connection between the move and the contravening conduct and saying that "Lifestyle choice is a matter which must be factored into the decision" [159], [161]. He accepted that compensation for anxiety, stress and upset is available in appropriate cases, but refused the $10,000 claimed, noting the absence of medical evidence and having regard to all the circumstances [162]–[163]. He refused the claim for the opportunity cost of the $87,500 each man invested, because alongside the claim for interest on borrowings it was a double claim of the kind Tamberlin J referred to in Top Snack Foods [164]. Following Hill J in Argy, he held that conveyancing costs and valuation fees are awarded only where a contract is rescinded, refused them together with the lease preparation costs, and refused the stamp duty on the lease, distinguishing Pine River Pty Ltd v Scorda [166].
Goldberg J held that the applicants' entry into the hire purchase agreement and their liability for its payments were caused by the respondents' misleading conduct [170]. He accepted that affirmation was no bar to that claim, because the hire purchase agreement was made on 19 December 1997, well before the affirmation in April 1998 [167]. He refused the legal fees claimed under the agreement as costs arising from the applicants' commencement of the proceedings [168]. He held that entry into the agreement "was unavoidable" and that the interest, stamp duty and bank fees were additional loss not otherwise accounted for, and awarded $196,432.97 under this head [171].
On the cross-claim, Goldberg J accepted the respondents' submission that Macleay had no obligation to mitigate its damages from Crystal Auburn's breach of the lease [144]. The applicants relied on the Full Court's view in Karedis that a successful applicant's damages would be increased by rent payable on a cross-claim [145]. Goldberg J rejected the respondents' argument that Sundberg J's affirmation finding stood in the way, and held that the applicants were entitled to be indemnified for their obligations under the lease and guarantee after they closed the business and vacated the premises [146]. He awarded Macleay $220,982.14 for unpaid rent for the rest of the two-year term and $6,091 for outgoings, a total of $227,073.14, but held that the applicants' damages were to be increased by that amount, save for one month before they closed the business [148]. He put this rent in a different category from the rent paid while the business was earning income [148]. He rejected Macleay's claim for maintenance and security costs for lack of documentary evidence [149]. He rejected its claim of $44,753 for clearing the site, because the applicants had not installed the plant and equipment and it belonged to a third party [150]. He also held that Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd did not support the respondents' claim to legal costs on a solicitor and client basis [147].
Orders. The reasons contain no separate block of formal orders; Goldberg J set out the amounts for which judgment should be entered and left interest for further submissions [172]–[174]. The applicants were entitled to judgment for total damages of $924,267.54 [172]. That total was made up of $495,676 for the difference between price and value, $196,432.97 under the hire purchase agreement, unpaid labour of $12,038.46 for Mr Siberas and $6,025.38 for Mr Davies, and reimbursement of the $227,073.14 cross-claim award less $12,978.38 for one month's rent and outgoings [172]. The $250,000 the respondents advanced on 9 August 2000 was to be deducted [172]. Macleay, as cross-claimant, was entitled to judgment for $227,073.14 for unpaid rent and outgoings from 1 July 1998 to 19 December 1999 [173]. Goldberg J noted that s 51A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) requires an award of interest and that O 35 r 8 prescribes a rate of 10.5%, and gave the parties the opportunity to speak to the form of the orders for the interest on the claim and the cross-claim [174].
Why it matters
The decision applies the rule that the right to damages for the difference between price and value survives affirmation, while testing the buyer's later conduct by whether it failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate its loss [26], [35], [48]. It holds that a finding at the liability trial that the business was worth less than the price paid, being essential to the finding of a contravention, estopped the respondents at the later assessment from contending for a higher value [68]. It also shows the valuation method turning on whether the business was profitable when bought [70], [120], benefits from running the business being set against rent paid during that period [130], and interest on borrowing made unavoidable by the purchase being recovered as additional loss [171].
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