Diemasters Pty Limited v Meadowcorp Pty Limited
(2001) 52 NSWLR 572 · [2001] NSWSC 495
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Diemasters v Meadowcorp and Jain v Registrar General [2001] NSWSC 495 is a decision of Windeyer J, sitting alone in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, given on 18 June 2001 in two proceedings heard together about land under the Real Property Act 1900, whose mortgagor procured a discharge of the registered mortgage by fraud and then sold the land to two purchasers [1], [18]. Windeyer J held that the registered mortgagees kept priority over the purchasers, declared that the mortgage was entitled to remain registered with priority, ordered the discharges delivered up to the mortgagees for cancellation, and gave the mortgagees judgment for possession and their costs [24], [41]. He dismissed the purchaser Mr Jain's claim for compensation from the Torrens Assurance Fund and ordered him to pay the Registrar General's costs [28], [42].
Facts
Meadowcorp Pty Limited bought a property at 120 Moss Vale Place, Lakesland, in 1997 for $320,000, and by a registered mortgage dated 29 May 1998 the plaintiffs (the mortgagees) lent it $367,000 on the security of the property [5]. Mr Tooth was Meadowcorp's sole director, and at the time of the judgment he was serving a four year sentence for an unconnected fraud [6]. After Meadowcorp fell into arrears and the property failed to sell at auction, Meadowcorp contracted on 29 January 2000 to sell it to Mr Chelliah, an acquaintance of Tooth, and Mr Jain for $420,000, with six months for completion [6]. Tooth said that, desperate for money, he contacted a man known to him as Daniels, who said he had access to stolen bank cheques, and that he later told Chelliah he would sell the property at a reduced price, matters which were partly in dispute [7].
On 29 February 2000 Tooth settled the discharge of the first mortgage with a bank cheque for $390,627.75 and received the mortgage, four discharges (one executed by each mortgagee) and the certificate of title, all of which were on their face in order for registration [9]. The bank cheques Tooth used were stolen and forged, and Daniels had provided them [1], [8]. The purchasers' solicitor, Mr Sullivan, then produced a new contract for $300,000 from Meadowcorp to Jain and Chelliah, a deed terminating the earlier contract, and an acknowledgement under which $150,000 of the price was stated to be forgiven [6], [10]–[11]. The new contract did not say whether the purchasers took as joint tenants or tenants in common, and on its terms joint tenancy applied in that case [10]. Meadowcorp executed a transfer to Chelliah and Jain as joint tenants [12]. Jain brought three cheques made out to Meadowcorp, at least two of them procured by cash withdrawals from credit card accounts, and on Tooth's own figures he turned them into cash and passed $60,000 to Daniels [12].
The settlement cheque for the discharge was dishonoured, and when the mortgagees' solicitor learned of this on 8 March he lodged a caveat to prevent registration of any discharge of the mortgage [13]. The discharge and the transfer to Chelliah and Jain were never lodged for registration [1], [13]. Tooth's evidence was that, at a meeting at Jain's office, Chelliah told Jain that the money to pay out the mortgages would be provided in stolen bank cheques, and Jain denied that the meeting took place [14].
Procedural history
In the first proceedings the mortgagees sued Meadowcorp, Jain and Chelliah, alleging that the discharge was obtained by Meadowcorp's fraud through Tooth with the knowledge of Jain and Chelliah, and seeking delivery up and setting aside of the discharge, a declaration of priority, and possession against Meadowcorp [2]–[3]. Jain denied knowledge of the stolen and forged cheques and denied fraud [3]. Meadowcorp was served but did not appear, and Chelliah filed a submitting appearance at the start of the hearing [2]. In the second proceedings Jain, having obtained leave under s132(2) of the Real Property Act 1900, claimed compensation from the Torrens Assurance Fund under s129(1)(e), with the Registrar General as defendant and Chelliah joined as a defendant [4], [26]. The two proceedings were heard together, the evidence in one being evidence in the other so far as relevant [1]. Because the joint tenancy point had not been argued at the original hearing, Windeyer J drew counsel's attention to Myers v Smith and relisted the matter for further submissions [17].
Issues
The issues were whether Chelliah and Jain knew of or were party to Tooth's fraud [15]; whether a purchaser without notice taking as joint tenant with a purchaser who was party to the fraud takes subject to the mortgagees' interest [16]–[17]; whether the registered mortgage had priority over the purchasers' unregistered interests [18]; whether s43A of the Act protected Jain, including the effect of an unstamped transfer and of the failure to lodge the dealings [19]–[23]; and whether Jain's loss arose as a result of the operation of the Act and from his being deprived of an interest in land as a consequence of fraud, as s129(1) requires [25], [30].
Held
Windeyer J
Chelliah filed no defence and chose not to contradict the allegations, and Windeyer J found that he was aware of the stolen and forged bank cheques, was party to Tooth's fraud and took the discharges and transfer with knowledge of it [15]. As to Jain, he did not accept Tooth's evidence of the meeting at Jain's office, because Tooth was an admitted fraudster, that evidence was challenged, and Jain's evidence that he had moved office was not [15]. He did not accept that Jain intended the remaining $150,000 ever to be paid, found that Jain was aware of the acknowledgement, and was unwilling to consider him a reliable witness [15]. He said that all this made it "difficult to believe that Jain was not involved with the fraud", but because of the seriousness of the finding and its partial dependence on Tooth's uncorroborated evidence he was not satisfied that such a finding should be made [15]. He declined to infer that Chelliah's evidence would not have assisted Jain, saying that "A party should not necessarily be expected to call a fraudster to give evidence in support of that party's case" [15].
Chelliah was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the mortgagees' interest [16]. Windeyer J said it would seem to follow, as a matter of pure land law, that joint tenants each have the same title and interest, so that each would take subject to the mortgagees' interest, otherwise lost by a fraud in which one joint tenant participated [16]. He noted that in Myers v Smith (1992) 5 BPR 11494 Hodgson J had held that, where two persons took a legal estate as joint tenants and only one had notice of an outstanding interest, only the interest of the one with notice was subject to it [16]. Although comity required him to follow Myers unless convinced there was good reason not to, he decided not to follow it, as he did not consider there was "good reason to make additional inroad on the general concept that joint tenants are considered as one" [17]. He reasoned that the doctrine of the unities requires unity of title and unity of interest, so that one joint tenant cannot take more than the other, and he distinguished the cases founded on Lord Abergevenny's case, in which one joint tenant's interest had become bound during the joint tenancy [17]. He drew support from the rule that an innocent partner is responsible for the fraud of a partner in the course of the partnership business, citing ex parte Adamson: In re Collie [1878] LR 8 ChD 807 [17]. He accepted that purchasers taking as tenants in common, who each take a separate title, might be treated differently, but held that "purchasers taking as joint tenants must be treated as one" [17]. He added that this principle would not decide the joint tenants' rights between themselves, so that on severance and an accounting the encumbrancee's entitlement could, so far as possible, be satisfied out of the share of the party with notice [17].
Windeyer J said that his view on joint tenants was irrelevant to the mortgagees' action [18]. Chelliah and Jain held only an unregistered discharge and an unregistered transfer, so that, subject to s43A, their interest was equitable [18]. The mortgage remained registered and was a legal interest under ss 36(6A) and 41 of the Act, so that, subject to s43A, it had priority over Chelliah and Jain, a conclusion he thought in conformity with Forsyth v Blundell (1973) 129 CLR 477 and Sinclair v Hope Investments Pty Limited [18]. For that reason it was not necessary to consider the cases on priorities between the holder of a mere equity and a later bona fide purchaser of an equitable interest, such as Latec Investments Limited v Hotel Terrigal Pty Limited (1965) 113 CLR 265 [18].
Even assuming that registration would have left the mortgage charged only on Chelliah's interest, s43A did not help, because Meadowcorp had obtained the discharge by fraud with notice of the mortgagees' interest and could obtain no protection from it [19]. A purchaser from Meadowcorp before registration could get no protection either, as the successive effect of s43A did not apply, citing Jonray (Sydney) Pty Limited v Partridge Brothers Pty Limited (1969) 89 WN Pt 1 NSW 568 [19]. He said it was therefore not really necessary to deal in detail with Jain's other hurdles under s43A, but dealt with them briefly because they had been argued [20]. The contract and transfer had not been stamped, and s301 of the Duties Act 1997 prohibits registering an instrument chargeable with duty unless it is duly stamped or stamped as the Chief Commissioner approves [21]. The wording of s43A(1) seemed to him to indicate that a transferee holding an unstamped transfer does not gain protection, but he was reluctant to reach that conclusion when it was not necessary, because many conveyancing transactions settle before the transfer is stamped [22]. He added that Jain's case would be "quite undeserving", as his undertaking to pay the duty was given about eleven months after duty became payable [22]. In his view the protection of s43A "is not everlasting", because its purpose is to assist a party who lodges a dealing for registration, not one who makes no effort to get the protection of registration [23]. Had the dealings been lodged before the mortgagees' caveat, registration would have proceeded, and the purchasers could have lodged them and acted under s74I or s74MA against the caveat, so that, if it were necessary to decide, he would have held that the protection of s43A was lost after fourteen months without action [23]. The result in the first action was that Chelliah and Jain took any interest they held subject to the mortgagees, who were entitled to delivery up of the discharge, the mortgage and the certificate of title, and to possession [24].
On the compensation claim, Windeyer J observed that s133(4) of the Act was "not a particularly happily expressed provision" and that the Registrar General could have raised an issue against Chelliah only by cross-claim, though no claim was made by Jain against Chelliah [26]. Because he did not accept that a joint tenant is unaffected by his co-owner's fraud, he considered that Jain's claim against the Fund failed [28]. Jain's counsel had argued that Chelliah was innocent and seemed to accept that Jain could not recover if Chelliah was party to the fraud [29]. Windeyer J nonetheless considered the claim on the basis that Jain was not affected by his co-owner's fraud [28]. On that basis Jain's case was that he had been deprived of an unencumbered estate in fee simple as joint tenant with Chelliah, whose interest was encumbered, which would or could follow from Myers v Smith [29]. The Registrar General argued that Jain had suffered no loss as a result of the operation of the Act and had not been deprived of the land or an interest in it as a consequence of fraud [30].
Windeyer J noted that the words requiring loss as a result of the operation of the Act did not appear in the former s126, that an interest in land under that section included an unregistered interest and would do so under s129, citing Robinson v The Registrar-General [1983] NSW Conv R 55-128, and that deprivation can extend, in Professor Butt's words, to "being outranked in priority by other interests" [31]. He called the question "a difficult matter", explaining that in the ordinary case deprivation results from an interest lost through indefeasibility when a later dealing is registered, whereas here the mortgagees' interest was not a subsequently acquired registered interest but a right to retain priority as registered mortgagee [32]. Had the land been under Old System title, Jain, as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, would have taken a clear title, so it was because the land was under the Act that the mortgagees had maintained their priority [33]. He thought it "quite unlikely" that the new words were intended to make access to the Fund more restrictive than under the former s126, referring to the Law Reform Commission's Report 76 (1996) and the Minister's second reading speech [34]. He did not accept the submission that, on the authority of Robinson's case, Jain's claim would certainly have succeeded without the new words, and said it "may well be the case" that Robinson's case would be decided differently under the new legislation, a result he thought quite unlikely to have been intended [35].
Answering the Registrar General's argument that the loss arose through fraud and not by reason of the Act, he said that "The question however is whether or not the loss has arisen as a result of both" [36]. He said that the purpose of the Fund is "to balance disadvantage which can otherwise be brought about by indefeasibility of title", that he could see no reason in principle to confine it to interests lost through the registration of a subsequent dealing, and that damage from fraud which enables a registered proprietor to maintain an indefeasible title by continued registration "seems to me to arise out of the operation of the Act" [37]. On deprivation, he relied on dictionary meanings of "deprive" that include keeping a person from possessing something, and on Finucane v The Registrar of Titles [1902] St R Qd 78, and concluded that Jain's claim, "had he been a sole purchaser, would have fallen within s129(1)(e)" [38]. He added that the amount of any compensation could not yet be ascertained, because it would depend on the outcome of a mortgagee sale and any surplus [39].
On costs, he held that because Chelliah submitted only just before the hearing and the case against him had to be proved anyway, costs in the main proceedings should be awarded against all defendants [40]. Because the second mortgagees, Staunton & Thompson, were not parties, he considered it may be appropriate for the discharge of their mortgage to go to the Registrar General, to be dealt with after notice to the interested parties [8], [40].
Orders. In the mortgagees' proceedings (3238/00), Windeyer J declared that the plaintiffs are entitled to have mortgage 5034297 remain registered with priority from the date of registration, ordered the discharges of that mortgage delivered up to the plaintiffs for cancellation, and ordered the certificate of title, the mortgage and those discharges handed out to the plaintiffs' solicitor [41]. He ordered the discharge of mortgage 5475552, part of Exhibit 2, handed out to the Registrar-General, gave judgment for the plaintiffs for possession of the land, ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' costs, and ordered the exhibits returned except as otherwise ordered [41]. In Jain's proceedings (1374/01), he dismissed the amended statement of claim, ordered Jain to pay the costs of the Registrar General as first defendant, made no order as to the costs of Chelliah as second defendant, and allowed the exhibits to be returned [42].
Why it matters
The decision is reported at 52 NSWLR 572. Windeyer J declined to follow Hodgson J's decision in Myers v Smith and held that purchasers who take as joint tenants must be treated as one, a view that led him to hold that Jain's claim against the Fund failed because his co-purchaser was party to the fraud [15], [17], [28]. The case also shows a registered mortgage, a discharge of which the mortgagor had obtained by fraud, keeping priority over a purchaser's unregistered interest while the mortgage remains registered [18]. Windeyer J held that a purchaser from a fraudulent mortgagor before registration could not rely on s43A [19], and expressed, only "if it were necessary to so hold", the view that s43A protection is lost where the dealings are never lodged and no step is taken against a caveat [23]. His reading of s129(1), that loss can result from the operation of the Act where fraud allows a registered interest to keep its priority and that "deprived" includes being kept from an interest, was reached on an assumption he had rejected, so it did not decide Jain's claim [28], [37]–[38].
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