casewise

Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v The State of New South Wales

(2001) 205 CLR 399 · [2001] HCA 7 · (2001) 177 ALR 436 · (2001) 75 ALJR 501 · (2001) 120 LGERA 120

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v The State of New South Wales [2001] HCA 7 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ), given on 15 February 2001, on an application for special leave to appeal from the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The applicant's compensation for coal that had vested in the Crown was capped by an instrument authorised by the Coal Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1990 (NSW), and it argued that the cap was beyond power and that the New South Wales Parliament could not acquire property without just compensation [4], [6]–[8]. The Court dismissed the application for special leave to appeal with costs. Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ held in joint reasons that an appeal would have no prospects of success, and Callinan J agreed generally with their reasons [1], [79]. Kirby J rejected every argument advanced for the applicant and would have granted special leave and dismissed the appeal, but joined in the order dismissing the application [69], [78].

Facts

On 1 January 1982, coal in certain lands in New South Wales vested in the Crown in right of the State by s 5 of the Coal Acquisition Act 1981 (NSW) [2]. Kirby J records that the applicant, a company incorporated in New South Wales, had bought certain coal deposits in the State between 1969 and 1974 intending to mine them [19]. Section 6 of the Act empowered the Governor to make arrangements for determining the cases, if any, in which compensation was payable and the amount and method of payment, and provided that compensation was otherwise not payable [20]. On 19 June 1985 the Governor made the Coal Acquisition (Compensation) Arrangements 1985 (NSW), which established the Coal Compensation Board, and the applicant lodged a claim in April 1986 [15], [21]. According to the joint reasons, the applicant received interim payments under the Arrangements totalling $27,006,254 between 1986 and 1995 [2].

The Coal Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1990 (NSW) added s 6(3), which allowed the arrangements to provide that specified persons, or persons of a specified class, were not entitled to be paid more than a specified sum for coal vested in the Crown, irrespective of how much coal they had owned [3], [22]. By an instrument dated 27 June 1990, the Arrangements were amended to limit to $60 million the total compensation payable to certain coal mining companies, of which the applicant was one [4]. The rate of compensation rose from 50 cents to 90 cents per tonne, but the new cl 22AA(3) capped the total compensation payable to the applicant at $23,250,000 [4]. Kirby J notes that the cap, together with interest, applied irrespective of what the applicant would otherwise have been entitled to, including under the Arrangements as originally made [23]. He also notes that the Parliamentary debates show a deliberate policy decision by the Government, explained to Parliament before s 6(3) was enacted, to impose the $60 million limit on the three largest claimants, including the applicant, which the debates attributed to the need for budgetary constraint [36]. On 22 August 1997 the Board assessed the applicant's total compensation on ordinary compensation principles at $93,397,327, less interim payments of $27,001,727, but determined that because of cl 22AA(3) the applicant was entitled to nothing beyond what it had already been paid [24].

Procedural history

The applicant sued in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, claiming $93,397,327 less the interim payments, plus interest, and declarations that the legislative scheme was invalid [5]. Kirby J records that the applicant also appealed to the Coal Compensation Review Tribunal, and that the Supreme Court proceedings were removed to the Court of Appeal [25]. The Court of Appeal (Spigelman CJ, Handley and Giles JJA) ordered that the proceedings be dismissed [5]. The joint reasons cite that decision as Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (1999) 47 NSWLR 340 [1]. The Court of Appeal held that s 6(3) expressly authorised cl 22AA(3) [26]. Although prepared to assume that the compensation was not just, proper or adequate, it held the applicant's constitutional propositions legally untenable and declined to develop new common law doctrine [26]. In a footnote, Kirby J records that the application was referred to the Full Court by order of McHugh and Callinan JJ on 10 March 2000 [15]. The application was heard as on an appeal, with extensive argument from the parties and the intervening States [78].

Issues

The first issue was whether cl 22AA(3) was beyond the power conferred by s 6, as amended, because s 6 had to be read with the presumption that the legislature does not intend to acquire property without compensation [6], [26]. The second was whether the New South Wales Parliament lacked power to make laws acquiring property without just, proper or adequate compensation [7], [26]. The applicant also argued that the legislation was in the nature of a Bill of Pains and Penalties, confiscating its property as a punishment [8], [67].

Held

Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ

The joint reasons held that the terms of s 6(3) rebut any operation of the presumption, and that the reasons of the Court of Appeal on this contention were "plainly correct" [6]. The observations of Beaumont J in Commissioner of Taxation v Northumberland Development Co Pty Ltd, on which the applicant relied, were made about s 6 before sub-s (3) was added [6]. On power, their Honours said that numerous statements in the High Court deny that the New South Wales Parliament lacks power to acquire property without compensation, and that the existence of the presumption suggests that the power against which it operates does exist [7]. They observed that the acquisition occurred in 1982 under s 5, with the compensation scheme then attached, so the substance of the complaint was the quantum of the additional compensation under the cap rather than acquisition without compensation [8]. They put aside the Bill of Pains and Penalties argument because nothing showed any punishment of the applicant [8].

Quoting Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King, they noted that a power such as that conferred by s 5 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) to make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of New South Wales is, within the limits of the grant, "as ample and plenary as the power possessed by the Imperial Parliament itself" [9]. They added that s 2(2) of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) declared that the legislative powers of each State Parliament include all the powers that Westminster might have exercised for the peace, order and good government of the State [9]. That power is subject to the Commonwealth Constitution, to which the States owe their existence, and s 106 continues each State's Constitution subject to the Commonwealth Constitution [10]. They noted that Union Steamship left open whether State legislative power is subject to some restraints by reference to rights deeply rooted in our democratic system of government and the common law [11]. They identified the question the applicant had posed for the Court of Appeal as whether a right to just or properly adequate compensation is such a deeply rooted right as to restrain the legislative power of the New South Wales Parliament and, adopting the Court of Appeal's description, said that the applicant could point to no judicial pronouncement, let alone a decided case, showing that any such principle had ever existed in the common law of England, the Australasian colonies or Australia [12].

They held that accepting the applicant's reliance on decisions about the powers of several States of the United States would not develop the common law of Australia but would modify the State Constitutions within the meaning of s 106 [13]. The applicant had to introduce into the constitutional text, in particular s 2(2) of the Australia Act, a limitation not found there [14]. While accepting that, having regard to the federal system and s 106, there are undoubtedly limits on State legislative power that the constitutional text does not spell out, they held that the limitation the applicant contended for was not, as a matter of logical or practical necessity, implicit in the federal structure [14]. Whatever the scope of the question left open in Union Steamship, they held that a requirement that compensation be just or properly adequate falls outside that field of discourse [14]. The Court of Appeal had correctly refused to disturb what, since the Wheat Case, has been taken to be the settled position on State legislative power [14].

Kirby J (concurring in the order)

Kirby J accepted, as the State did not contest, that courts presume that legislation does not derogate from important common law rights except by clear language, and that this presumption applies to taking property without compensation [28]. But he held that any such presumption is subject to valid legislative provisions to the contrary: once a law is clear and unambiguous then, subject to any constitutional invalidity, a judge has no authority to ignore or frustrate the lawmaker's commands, and to do so "would be to abuse judicial power, not to exercise it" [31]. He noted that s 6, as first enacted, contemplated that no compensation at all might be payable, and that arrangements had in fact been made under which the applicant claimed, so its complaint was really about the formula for quantifying compensation [33], [34]. Beaumont J's minority opinion in the Federal Court did not help the applicant, because it did not concern the issue in this case and omitted reference to s 6(3) [32], [35]. In Kirby J's view the provision "might be regarded as unjust, discriminatory, exceptional and a departure from ordinary Australian norms", but it "undoubtedly constituted 'compensation'" and was clear in its terms [35]. He found that the limits imposed, the discrimination effected and the compensation paid on terms less than just were all deliberate acts of the Government and Parliament of the State [36]. He rejected the submission that such a law could only be unmistakably clear if it named the applicant and specified the limit, because that submission could not stand with the clear terms of s 6(3) and any ambiguity was contradicted by the Minister's statements to Parliament [37]. The Court of Appeal was therefore correct to dismiss the construction argument [38].

On power, Kirby J set out the applicant's argument that State lawmaking powers were largely determined by the common law, and that A V Dicey's theory that Parliament is sovereign and omnipotent was historically inaccurate and wrong in principle [41], [42]. The applicant relied on old English authority, statements of Cooke J in the New Zealand Court of Appeal, Sir Owen Dixon's reminder that parliamentary supremacy is itself a doctrine of the common law, and Egan v Willis [43]–[49]. Kirby J held that the applicant could point to no case, and no judicial opinion, supporting its attempt to revive the question reserved in Union Steamship [52]. He noted that the Westminster Parliament had authorised acquisitions of property without compensation, including the statutes appropriating the lands of the monasteries and the Imperial Acts that deprived the indigenous peoples of Australia of any rights they might have enjoyed in land acquired for British settlement [53]. He held that no doctrine of repugnancy to the law of England was available, because the New South Wales Parliament is now the Parliament of a State under the Constitution, and the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp) had restricted the earlier repugnancy doctrines [54]. He held that the words "peace, welfare, and good government" are words of grant, not words of limitation, as Union Steamship established [55]. He said that a long line of opinions in the High Court upholds a State Parliament's power to permit acquisition without compensation, and while the federal Constitution requires just terms for acquisitions by federal law, it contains no equivalent provision for State acquisition laws [56].

Kirby J noted that in Mabo v Queensland all members of the Court had rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Queensland Parliament lacked power to deprive indigenous peoples of property rights without compensation, and held that this barred the applicant's argument [57]. To succeed, the applicant would have to persuade the Court to overrule at least that part of Mabo, and Kirby J held that this application was not a suitable vehicle for re-arguing so large a proposition [59]. He added that considerations of legal policy and political theory reinforce the authorities: members of a legislature answer regularly to the electors while judges do not, and in the modest conception of their role that most Australian judges would probably share, the duty to obey a State law rests on parliamentary procedure and conformity with the State and federal Constitutions, not on a judge's own notions of fundamental rights [60], [61]. He observed that the idea that some common law rights lie so deep that even a Parliament acting within its powers cannot contradict them has so far gathered few adherents in Australia [62]. He also treated the rejection at a 1988 referendum of a proposal to require that State laws acquiring property afford just terms as a reason for special caution, while accepting that the defeat of a proposal may be explained by many reasons [63]–[65].

Kirby J rejected the Bill of Pains and Penalties argument at the threshold, because neither the Act nor the Arrangements imposed punishment for guilt of any offence or a judgment on the applicant, or involved a legislative exercise of judicial power, even assuming that to be forbidden to the New South Wales Parliament [69]. In remarks on points that were not argued, he said that protection against extreme derogations from fundamental rights lies partly in the presumptive principle of construction and also in the federal Constitution, whose implications, as in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), can sometimes protect against State legislation, rather than in judges asserting that the common law lets them ignore an otherwise valid State law [70], [72], [73], [75]. He suggested that certain extreme laws might fall outside the kind of law of a State that the Constitution envisages [74]. The present case, although apparently involving discrimination and arguably injustice to the applicant, fell far short of any such extreme instance, because compensation was provided and could be recovered by due process of law [76]. For Kirby J the complaints of discrimination and injustice were "of a political and not of a legal character", to be addressed to the government and members of the Parliament of the State and ultimately to the electors [77]. He would have favoured granting special leave and dismissing the appeal, but because the other members of the Court would dismiss the application and nothing turned on the disposition, he joined in their order [78].

Callinan J

Callinan J reserved his position on two matters he found unnecessary to decide: the existence or nature of any unexpressed limits on the legislative powers of the States, and the drawing of inferences to support substantive implications in the Constitution [79]. Otherwise he agreed generally with the reasons of Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ [79].

Orders. The application for special leave to appeal was dismissed with costs. Kirby J joined in that order, although he would have been inclined to grant special leave and dismiss the appeal [78].

Why it matters

The joint reasons hold that the Court of Appeal correctly refused to disturb the settled position, taken since the Wheat Case, that a State Parliament has power to acquire property without just compensation [7], [14]. Both the joint reasons and Kirby J hold that clear statutory words such as s 6(3) displace the presumption against acquiring property without compensation [6], [31], [35]. Kirby J's remarks that protection against extreme State laws may lie in implications from the federal Constitution were made on points not argued, and Callinan J expressly reserved his position on any unexpressed limits on State legislative power and on drawing substantive implications in the Constitution [70], [79].

Cited in 91 later casesRelies on 65 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries