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Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton

(2012) 246 CLR 498 · [2012] HCA 7 · (2012) 286 ALR 12

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7 is a decision of the High Court of Australia on five appeals by Equuscorp Pty Ltd from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, about whether money lent under loan agreements that were unenforceable for illegality could be recovered as money had and received [2]-[3]. The respondents were three investors: Mr Haxton (M128), Mr Bassat (M129) and Cunningham's Warehouse Sales Pty Ltd (M130, M131 and M132) [84]. In each appeal the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs [67], [115]. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that the illegality that made the loan agreements unenforceable also denied the lender, Rural Finance Pty Ltd, any right to recover the advances as money had and received, and that such rights, although they would have been assignable, were not assigned to Equuscorp by the deed of assignment [3], [45]. Gummow and Bell JJ held that the deed did assign any such claims, but that the scheme and purpose of the prescribed interest provisions of the Companies Code stood against an action for money had and received against the investors, which disposed of the appeals [75], [99], [111]. Heydon J dissented: he held that the Code did not prevent the actions, that the lender's action would have succeeded, that it was assignable and that it was assigned, and he would have allowed the appeals with costs [126], [149], [156], [159], [160], [162].

Facts

In the mid to late 1980s the brothers Anthony and Francis Johnson promoted tax driven schemes inviting members of the public to invest in a blueberry farming enterprise at Blueberry Hill, between Coffs Harbour and Grafton in north-east New South Wales [1], [4]. The attraction for investors was that non-farmers could claim amounts spent on the farming enterprise as tax deductions against their non-farming incomes [1]. Each investor entered into a farm agreement, a management agreement and a sale agreement with companies controlled by the Johnson brothers, and could choose to borrow from Rural Finance Pty Ltd (Rural), a member of the promoters' group of companies, to finance the prepayment of management fees [2], [4]. When the investors were offered what was a prescribed interest, no prospectus, or no valid prospectus, had been registered, contrary to s 170(1) of the Companies Code of each investor's home State [10]. On 7 January 1991 Equuscorp, an arms length financier of the group, was granted a registered mortgage over the land, and three days later it registered charges over the assets of the group companies, including Rural [2], [7]. Equuscorp appointed receivers and managers to Rural, which was wound up by resolution of its creditors on 6 March 1996 [8]. By an asset sale agreement of 16 May 1997, Rural, acting by its receivers and managers, sold the loan agreements to Equuscorp, and under that agreement Rural executed a deed (the Deed) assigning its interests under the loan agreements and the debts owing under them [9], [17]. The price was $500,000, while the face value of the debts under the loan agreements, as found by the primary judge, was $52,584,005 [17]. Clause 2 of the Deed provided that the assignment took effect as a legal assignment of, among other things, the legal right to the debts and "all legal and other remedies" for those matters [20]. The investors were given written notice of the assignment in November 1997, and between November 1997 and March 1998 Equuscorp commenced proceedings against them [9].

Procedural history

In the Supreme Court of Victoria, Equuscorp claimed against each respondent for breach of the loan agreements and, in the alternative, for money had and received [2], [11]. The respondents relied on limitation, illegality, restitution, assignability and assignment defences [11]. The primary judge, Byrne J, held that the invitation to each respondent to invest breached s 170(1) of the Code, and Equuscorp conceded that, if so, the agreements by which the respondents acquired their interests would be illegal and unenforceable against them [11]. Byrne J held that the loan agreements were all unenforceable for illegality, that the limitation defence succeeded where an acceleration provision had been enlivened, and that the restitution defence succeeded where the loan agreement contained a non-recourse provision [12]. He held that the Code did not preclude the claims for money had and received and that, where restitution was available to Rural, the right to claim it had been assigned under the Deed, and he ordered restitution against Mr Haxton and Mr Bassat [12]–[13]. The Court of Appeal (Ashley, Neave and Dodds-Streeton JJA) rejected the assignability defence but upheld the restitution and assignment defences, reversing those orders [13], [68]. Equuscorp was granted special leave to appeal on 3 September 2010 [14]. By notices of contention the respondents asserted that the restitution claims could not be assigned at law [16].

Issues

The first issue was whether Rural had a right to recover the advances from the respondents as money had and received, despite the unenforceability of the loan agreements [3]. The second was whether any such right could be assigned [3], [16]. The third was whether the Deed had in fact assigned it to Equuscorp, a question Equuscorp argued through cl 2(b) of the Deed and s 199(1)(b) of the Property Law Act 1974 (Q) [3], [54], [59]. Heydon J framed four questions: whether the Code prohibited the actions for money had and received, whether those actions lay, whether they could be assigned, and whether they were assigned [117].

Held

French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ

Drawing on the joint judgment in Miller v Miller, French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said an agreement may be unenforceable for statutory illegality where a statute expressly or impliedly prohibits it, or where the courts treat it as unenforceable because it is associated with or made in furtherance of an illegal purpose [23]. They said the policy of the prescribed interest provisions was to protect members of the public by requiring prior disclosure of information relevant to their investment decisions [22]. The loan agreements were unenforceable because they were made in furtherance of an illegal purpose, a conclusion not challenged in the Court of Appeal or in the High Court [27]. Summarising David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, they said recovery depends on a recognised qualifying or vitiating factor, such as mistake, duress, illegality or failure of consideration, which gives rise to a prima facie obligation to make restitution that can be displaced [30]. They said the unenforceability of a contract for illegality may constitute a failure of consideration capable of supporting a claim to recover a payment, and that it was not necessary for present purposes to discuss whether a total failure of consideration is required [33]. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said there is "no one-size-fits-all answer" to recoverability: the outcome depends on whether it would be unjust for the recipient to keep the benefit, on the scope and purpose of the relevant statute, and on the coherence of the law [34]. Relevant matters include whether the statutory purpose protects a class of persons from whom the claimant seeks recovery, and whether the claimant is an innocent party or involved in the illegality [34]. They referred to Professor Birks's proposed test, whether allowing the restitutionary claim would make nonsense of the refusal to enforce the contract, and said that avoiding that kind of self-stultification may be expressed positively as maintaining the coherence of the law discussed in Miller [37]–[38]. In their view, earlier intermediate appellate decisions such as Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd and Australian Breeders Co-operative Society Ltd v Jones had not considered the specific issues that arise where a contract is unenforceable for illegality, and Amadio Pty Ltd v Henderson, though not said to be incorrect, offered little guidance [41], [43]–[44].

Their Honours held that Rural was not an arms length financier but part of the closely related group of companies involved in promoting the schemes, and that the loans were an integral part of the schemes and furthered their illegal purpose [45]. Recovery would have been from persons whose protection was the object of the statutory scheme, and the respondents were not in pari delicto with Rural [45]. The failure of consideration Equuscorp relied on was the product of Rural's own conduct in offering the loan agreements in furtherance of an illegal purpose [45]. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ described this as "a clear case" in which the coherence of the law and the avoidance of stultification of the statutory purpose meant that Rural had no right to recover the advances as money had and received, so there was no such right to assign to Equuscorp [45].

On assignability, they did not accept the respondents' submission that a claim for money had and received is a bare right of action: such a claim under an unenforceable loan agreement is inescapably linked to the performance of that agreement, and when assigned with the contractual rights it is not assigned as a bare cause of action [48], [53]. Since the purported contractual rights were assigned to Equuscorp for value, it had a genuine commercial interest in the restitutionary rights, and despite the difficulties that might attend such claims their Honours held that the better view was the Court of Appeal's, that the claims were assignable [53]. They said s 199(1) of the Property Law Act 1974 (Q) was modelled on s 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873 (UK), which operated as a machinery provision and did not alter the substantive law relating to assignments [55], [57]. Drawing on Lord Esher MR's description in Read v Brown, they said the legal and other remedies passed under that provision are those that can be invoked to enforce the debt or chose in action assigned [63]. Because an action for money had and received under an unenforceable agreement is not an action to enforce it, and cl 2(b) of the Deed adopted the language of s 199(1)(b) with its inherent limitations, cl 2(b) did not transfer Rural's rights to claim money had and received, if they existed [64]. Clause 1 of the Deed, on which Equuscorp did not rely, was not apt to encompass non-contractual restitutionary claims either [65]. They would dismiss the appeals with costs [67].

Gummow and Bell JJ

Gummow and Bell JJ preferred the reasoning of Byrne J on the Deed: although cl 1 did not catch Rural's claims for money had and received, cl 2 also assigned what the Deed called "other remedies for these matters", and any such claim was a remedy for those matters because it arose out of or by reason of the failure of the loan agreements [75]. They said there would have been little sense in the receivers and managers keeping those actions while Equuscorp paid for some but not all of Rural's rights against the borrowers [75]. Even if the actions were no more than expectancies when the assignment was made, the value Equuscorp gave would in equity have transferred the equitable title to it when they accrued [76]. The assignment was not open to the objection that it dealt only with bare rights of action, because Equuscorp's charge over Rural's assets gave it a genuine and substantial commercial interest [79].

Gummow and Bell JJ said the Full Federal Court decisions in Australian Breeders Co-operative Society Ltd v Jones and Amadio, that nothing in the Code suggested an intention to exclude restitution, were reached without regard to the body of High Court authority now expounded in Miller v Miller [95]. They accepted the respondents' submission that the scheme and purpose of Pt IV Div 6 of the Code, particularly ss 170 and 174, was at odds with permitting an action for money had and received against holders of prescribed interests under loans made as a direct consequence of contravening s 170, and held that this was dispositive of the appeals [99]. They rejected the assumption that refusing a contractual remedy necessarily denies an action for money had and received, noting that illegality may itself be a qualifying or vitiating factor that enlivens a restitutionary action [101]. The determinative issue, as Equuscorp accepted, was whether the policy of Pt IV Div 6 of the Code denied any scope for an action for money had and received [103].

Gummow and Bell JJ noted the principle that recovery may be permitted where the statutory scheme making a contract illegal was enacted for the benefit of a class including the claimant, and held that it applied here to the opposite effect, because the prospectus provisions protected the investors, not Rural and the other Johnson interests [108]–[109]. Noting Heerey J's remark that a breach of the prospectus provisions could result in five years' imprisonment, they concluded that the investors should not be in the same position as if Pt IV Div 6 had not been enacted or had been complied with by Rural and the loans had been effective [111]. They held that permitting recovery would stultify the statutory policy of Pt IV Div 6, and agreed with what French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said on this point [111]. In the words of Gummow and Bell JJ, Equuscorp, as Rural's successor, "cannot complain that the loss is left to lie where it has fallen" [111]. They also accepted the respondents' point that Deane J's words in Muschinski v Dodds, about benefits enjoyed in circumstances not specifically intended or provided for, would be fatal to Equuscorp's reliance on total failure of consideration, and said this led back to the determinative issue of statutory interpretation [112]. They would dismiss the appeals with costs [115].

Heydon J (dissenting)

Heydon J said the transactions were "redolent of tax avoidance", but noted that it was not squarely suggested that they were shams or that their atmosphere was relevant to the legal issues [116]. He applied the principle that legislation is not construed as cutting down property rights without clear words, and accepted the appellant's submission that a party's rights are unaffected by a statute unless it indicates clearly which rights are affected and how [120], [122]. In his view s 174(2) of the Code preserved Rural's liability to the borrowers under the loan contracts, but the other rights and liabilities under them did not survive s 170(1), so the investors could resist enforcement of their obligations to repay [123]. Heydon J held that the Code did not prevent Rural from recovering in an action for money had and received, even though it prevented Rural from suing on the loan contracts [126].

His first two reasons were that the Code did not expressly negate such actions, and that, given the need for clear words to extinguish property rights, no implication to that effect could be found [127]–[128]. Thirdly, the respondents' construction would vest the economic value of Rural's rights in the investors, who were willing participants in the unenforceable contracts, and would be "extremely unjust in its operation" [129]. Fourthly, the penalties of $20,000 and five years' imprisonment, taken with s 174(2), indicated that the statutory sanctions were sufficient to deal with the breach [130]. Fifthly, the loans were important in facilitating the tax deductions but were not integral to the profit-making aspect of the schemes, and sixthly, actions on the loan contracts and for money had and received have different elements and limitation periods [131]–[132]. He said that upholding the respondents' submissions would require overruling or disapproving statements in numerous authorities, and that it did not follow that the legislation protected investors further than by imposing criminal sanctions and making the loan contracts unenforceable [133].

Heydon J found a failure of consideration, because the state of affairs contemplated when Rural made the payments, that the loan contracts were enforceable, either never existed or ceased to exist when the respondents pleaded that the contracts were unenforceable at their option [134]. He held that a total failure of consideration was not required, since Rural had no remedy other than an action for money had and received [136]–[137]. He held that none of the six reasons the Court of Appeal gave, nor three further reasons the respondents advanced, for holding that it was not unjust for the investors to keep the loan funds, negated the injustice done to Rural, alone or taken together [138]. He said the loans were not shams but real loans, from which the respondents derived tax advantages and the right to participate in the schemes [146]. He concluded that an action for money had and received brought by Rural would have succeeded [149].

On assignability, Heydon J held that Poulton v The Commonwealth was distinguishable, because Equuscorp had a genuine commercial interest in the sense used in Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse, arising from its charge of 10 January 1991 over Rural's assets, the assignment being a means by which Equuscorp recovered part of the assets that charge secured [156]. He also rejected the submission that a claim for money had and received is too personal in nature to be assigned [159]. He held that the trial judge was correct that cl 2(b) of the Deed, in assigning, in the Deed's words, "all legal and other remedies" for the debts, assigned the claims for money had and received [160]. Accepting that the question was one of impression and that an action for money had and received is fundamentally different from an action on the loan contracts, he said it is difficult to see any commercial point in cl 2(b) unless it bears the wider meaning [161]. Heydon J would have allowed the appeals with costs and made consequential orders [162].

Orders. In each appeal the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs [67], [115]. Heydon J, dissenting, would have allowed the appeals with costs and made consequential orders [162].

Why it matters

For French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ and for Gummow and Bell JJ, a lender whose loan agreements were unenforceable because of their connection with the illegal offer of prescribed interests could not recover the advances as money had and received, because recovery would stultify the purpose of the statute, which was to protect the investors [45], [109], [111]. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ framed the question in terms of the coherence of the law, the scope and purpose of the statute, whether the statute protects the class from whom recovery is sought, and whether the claimant was involved in the illegality [34]. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, Gummow and Bell JJ, and Heydon J each rejected the objection that the restitutionary claims were bare rights of action that could not be assigned [53], [79], [156], [159]. The judges divided on whether cl 2(b) of the Deed assigned the claims: French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that it did not, while Gummow and Bell JJ and Heydon J held that it did [64], [75], [160].

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