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Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru

(2015) 258 CLR 31 · [2015] HCA 43

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru [2015] HCA 43 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Kiefel, Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ), given on 2 December 2015 on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. It concerns the interaction of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) (the Immunities Act) with the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) when a creditor registers and enforces a foreign judgment against a foreign State. [4], [150] All five judges held that Firebird's registration proceeding was one to which the s 9 immunity from jurisdiction applied, that the commercial transaction exception in s 11(1) removed that immunity, and that Nauru's Australian bank accounts were nevertheless immune from execution. [128], [131], [153], [185] French CJ, Kiefel, Nettle and Gordon JJ also held that the Immunities Act did not require service on Nauru before an ex parte registration order was made, while Gageler J held that it did. [91]–[92], [96], [132], [215] The Court varied the Court of Appeal's orders so that the registration of the Tokyo judgment was no longer set aside, and otherwise dismissed the appeal. [129]–[130]

Facts

Between 1988 and 1989 the Republic of Nauru Finance Corporation (RONFIN), a statutory corporation established under a Nauruan Act and no longer in existence, borrowed a total of ¥9 billion in the form of Japanese bearer bonds, and Nauru guaranteed payment. [1], [154] RONFIN defaulted and Nauru refused to meet its obligations as guarantor. [154] Firebird held ¥6.5 billion of the bonds and sued RONFIN and Nauru in the Tokyo District Court, where Nauru unsuccessfully asserted sovereign immunity and raised other defences that were only partially successful. [155] In October 2011 Firebird obtained judgment against Nauru for ¥1.3 billion plus interest and costs. [1], [155]

Nauru has no central bank and holds a large proportion of its money in Australia in accounts with Westpac Banking Corporation, the second respondent, and for this reason Firebird sought to register the judgment in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. [156] Part 53 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) allows an application for registration to be made by summons without service on the defendant, requires notice of registration to be served only after the order is made, and bars enforcement until the time to apply to set the order aside has expired. [157] Firebird filed a summons in May 2012 and a Deputy Registrar made the order for registration in June 2012, without the summons having been served on Nauru. [2], [158] In March 2013 a judge ordered that the order for registration could be served on Nauru's Secretary for Justice, and it was served on 18 August 2014. [158] After the time to apply to set the registration aside had expired, Firebird obtained a garnishee order against Westpac attaching Nauru's accounts. [3], [158]

Procedural history

Nauru applied under s 38 of the Immunities Act to set aside the order for registration and the garnishee order, on the basis that it was entitled to immunity. [159] Whether Nauru could still apply after the time had passed no longer remained in issue in the High Court. [3] The primary judge, Young AJA, set aside both orders on the basis that Nauru enjoyed immunity from suit and that the Immunities Act's service requirements had not been complied with when the registration order was made: Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (2014) 289 FLR 373. [31], [159]

The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Basten JA) dismissed Firebird's appeal: Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (2014) 316 ALR 497. [31], [160] It held that Nauru was entitled to the s 9 immunity, that the s 11(1) exception did not apply to the registration proceedings, that Firebird's argument of inconsistency between the two Acts failed, and that Nauru should have been served before the judgment was registered. [31] Bathurst CJ, with Beazley P agreeing, also held that the funds in all the accounts were immune from execution, by reference to a certificate from the head of Nauru's diplomatic mission tendered under s 41 and evidence from Nauru's Minister for Finance. [32] Basten JA preferred not to decide that issue. [225]

Firebird appealed to the High Court by special leave granted on 13 February 2015. [161] Nauru filed a notice of contention on s 27 and on the finding that the term deposit funds were not in use. [92], [108] The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth intervened by leave. [136]

Issues

French CJ and Kiefel J identified the issues as immunity from jurisdiction, implied repeal, service and immunity from execution, and Gageler J took up that list. [26]–[30], [131] On jurisdiction, the questions were whether an application to register a foreign judgment is a "proceeding" within s 9 and, if so, whether it "concerns a commercial transaction" within s 11(1). [27] On implied repeal, the question was whether the later Foreign Judgments Act repealed the Immunities Act to the extent of any inconsistency between s 38 of the Immunities Act and the requirement that a judgment be registered. [28] On service, the question was whether non-compliance with the service requirements in Pt III of the Immunities Act, and s 27 in particular, founded an order under s 38 setting aside the registration. [29] On execution, the question was whether Nauru's bank accounts were "commercial property" within s 32(3), so that the s 30 immunity did not protect them. [30] Nettle and Gordon JJ framed three questions, answering yes to whether s 11(1) applied to the registration application, yes to whether the judgment could be enforced without first serving the initiating process under Pt III, and no to whether the s 32 exception applied to the bank account deposits. [152]–[153]

Held

French CJ and Kiefel J

French CJ and Kiefel J wrote joint reasons and proposed the orders the Court made. [129]–[130], [256] They explained that the Immunities Act, now the sole basis for foreign State immunity in Australian courts, was based on draft legislation prepared by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), which reported on the subject in 1984. [5] They traced the restrictive doctrine of immunity to English decisions of the 1970s confirmed by the House of Lords in I Congreso del Partido, where Lord Wilberforce gave two main foundations: the interests of justice in allowing individuals to bring such transactions before the court, and that requiring a State to answer such a claim involves no challenge to any act of sovereignty. [51]–[52]

They gave "proceeding" in s 9 "its widest meaning", because s 9 is intended to provide an immunity from all proceedings against a foreign State, subject only to the Act's exceptions. [35] They rejected Firebird's argument that s 9 covers only proceedings in which a cause of action is pleaded, since the generality of its language does not support that construction. [37], [39] That a statute permits steps to be taken ex parte, as with the similar Queensland registration procedure described in Hunt v BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 565, does not detract from the characterisation of something as a proceeding. [40]-[41] By applying under s 6(1) of the Foreign Judgments Act, Firebird invoked federal jurisdiction invested in the Supreme Court in order to obtain rights against Nauru and its property, and registration, if valid, created new rights enforceable against Nauru. [42] They added that s 9 ought, so far as its language permits, to be construed in conformity with international law, and they referred to Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraq [2010] 2 SCR 571 and Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) [2012] ICJ Reports 99, where immunity was treated as arising on applications to render foreign judgments enforceable. [44], [46], [48] An application for registration is therefore a "proceeding" within s 9, and Nauru had general immunity unless an exception applied. [49]

It has never been disputed that the foreign judgment was based on a commercial transaction, the guarantee of the bonds, which falls within the definition in s 11(3). [58] Bathurst CJ had preferred the construction that the registration proceedings concerned registration of the judgment rather than liability under the bonds, accepting that this was a narrower construction which might not accord with the position at international law. [58] His Honour found some, though limited, contextual support in s 17(2) on arbitral awards, which he reasoned would not be necessary on a broader meaning of "concerns", at least where the underlying transaction was commercial. [59]–[60] French CJ and Kiefel J answered that the Act provides a broad immunity and then specific exceptions that may overlap, so that potential redundancy has little, if any, significance. [62] The territorial nexus in ss 12-16 did not assist Nauru, because s 11(1) has a different operation and applies to commercial transactions of foreign States regardless of territorial nexus. [66] Nor could it be inferred from ss 17(2) and 19 that s 11(1) was not meant to apply to foreign judgments; at most, those drafting the Act had not directed attention to registration proceedings, and what was or was not in their minds is not relevant to construing s 11(1). [68]–[69] Reading s 11(1) as referring to the commercial transaction on which the foreign judgment is based is not an "unduly strained construction", and it gives effect to the provision's purpose of restricting the general immunity. [70]–[71]

They then turned to NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina [2011] 2 AC 495, where members of the United Kingdom Supreme Court differed on provisions of the State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) on which sections of the Immunities Act were based, with those differences not decisive of the outcome. [72]-[73] Two matters that appeared influential to Lord Mance JSC's reasoning, that the law on restrictive immunity was not settled when the United Kingdom Act was passed and that the rules of court then provided no basis for service out of the jurisdiction, did not hold here, because I Congreso del Partido had been decided when the ALRC reported and provision for service out had existed in Australia for some time. [75]–[76] They noted the view of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers PSC, with whom Lord Clarke agreed on the point, that immunity should depend on the nature of the underlying transaction rather than the process of enforcement. [77] They also noted that the approach in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State directs attention to the underlying commercial transaction. [79] Consistently with their approach to s 9, a wider meaning should be given to "the proceeding concerns a commercial transaction", and that construction gives effect to Australia's international obligations. [80] Section 11(1) therefore applies to proceedings to register a foreign judgment based on a commercial transaction, and Nauru's immunity from jurisdiction was lost. [81], [128]

Firebird's implied repeal argument failed: a court must be satisfied that two statutes are so inconsistent that they cannot stand together, and the potential conflict here is resolved by reading the Foreign Judgments Act as applying only where a defendant, including a foreign State, is amenable to the jurisdiction. [87] The Immunities Act deals comprehensively with the special and discrete topic of foreign State immunity, and it is not to be supposed that a later general statute on enforcing foreign judgments was intended to derogate from it. [85] Section 7(4)(c) of the Foreign Judgments Act, assuming it applies to foreign States, deals only with immunity in the foreign proceedings and says nothing about immunity in Australia. [84]

On service, they held that s 27(1) requires proof of service under Pt III only where a judgment in default of appearance is entered, which is not the case for ex parte proceedings. [92] Sections 23 and 24 concern methods of service rather than when it is to be effected, and s 25 is limited to service in Australia. [94] They accepted there is "a basis for an implication" that a foreign State be served so that it can effectively assert immunity, but said the Foreign Judgments Act procedures do not deny that opportunity, because the registration was liable to be set aside on Nauru's application. [96] They added that where a foreign State is named as judgment debtor it "may be as well" for the court to consider whether service should be effected before registration, and that using Pt III may be preferable, but said this appeal was not concerned with such matters. [90]–[91]

On execution, s 32(3) asks of bank accounts whether they are "in use" or "apparently not in use": if in use, the party seeking execution must show use substantially for commercial purposes, and if not in use, they are deemed to be used for commercial purposes unless the foreign State shows they were set aside otherwise than for those purposes. [104] They read "in use" as distinguishing accounts in which monies may be idle, not as referring to particular uses of a bank account, and saw no reason, subject to what followed, to doubt Bathurst CJ's approach in holding that all the accounts but the term deposit were in use. [106]–[107] They accepted that the Minister's evidence appeared to support Firebird's contention that three aircraft leasing accounts were not in use, but said the critical enquiry for those accounts was also purpose. [111] Funds may be set aside without any formal act, because s 32(3) is concerned with the fact of property being in use, not in use or set aside for a discernible non-commercial purpose. [110]

On purpose they accepted Nauru's submission: the words of s 32(3) "direct attention to the reason why, objectively, the property is used or set aside". [114]–[115] Firebird's test, which looked to the nature of the transactions conducted through the accounts, was the very problem the separate definition of commercial property was meant to avoid, following the ALRC's response to the difficulty in Alcom Ltd v Republic of Colombia [1984] AC 580. [102]-[103], [116] Bathurst CJ had taken into account that Nauru is remote and small, with a small population and no central bank, and French CJ and Kiefel J said such evidence is "relevant and necessary" to understand that what might be thought a commercial enterprise is in fact the provision of essential services by government. [122], [125] The Minister's evidence was that the government had to operate an airline because private airlines would not serve Nauru, and had to buy and sell fuel because no one else would, with the cost of fuel calculated to cover costs rather than obtain profits. [123]–[124] The term deposit funds were held as cash reserves against future needs for government services, and earning interest in the interim did not detract from that purpose. [119] They saw no reason to doubt Bathurst CJ's conclusions on the loan account, which funded non-profit loans to small businesses, or on the phosphate compensation account, which they described as used to pay government employees and compensate land owners. [126]–[127] They concluded that Nauru was immune from execution against the accounts because the purposes for which they are in use, or for which the monies in them are set aside, are not commercial purposes. [128]

Gageler J (dissenting)

Gageler J agreed with French CJ and Kiefel J on immunity from jurisdiction, implied repeal and immunity from execution, and differed only on service. [131] On service he preferred the view of Basten JA in the Court of Appeal that s 27(1) prevents a court from making an ex parte order to register a foreign judgment against a foreign State. [132] He noted that customary international law, as explained in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, requires a court asked to render enforceable a foreign judgment against a third State to ask whether it would have been obliged to accord immunity had it been seised of the merits of an identical dispute. [133] Where competing constructions are equally consistent with the Immunities Act's purpose, one conforming to customary international law is to be preferred to one that would place Australia in breach. [134] On that construction, "concerns" in s 11(1) looks to the source of rights in issue, so the exception covers an application to register a foreign judgment where the rights determined by it arose out of a commercial transaction. [135]

Neither the parties nor the Attorney-General argued that a customary rule governs international service of an initiating process, but he held that the preferred construction of Pt II has consequences for Pt III. [136]–[137] "Judgment" in Pt III is naturally read as commensurate with "proceeding" in Pt II and so is broad enough to encompass an order for registration under s 6(3) of the Foreign Judgments Act. [137] The Act assumes that a foreign State becomes a party only through service of initiating process under s 23 or s 24, and the ALRC described Pt III as extending "procedural immunities" to foreign States. [138], [142] In his view s 27(1) is "protective of a foreign State whenever a foreign State has for any reason not appeared in a proceeding". [144] It therefore bars any order against a foreign State that has not appeared unless service under s 23 or s 24 is proved, the time for appearance has expired and the court is satisfied that the State is not immune. [145] That requires immunity to be addressed at the threshold, as a precondition to an order for registration, after the State has been served and has had an opportunity to appear. [146] Because Nauru was not served under s 23 or s 24 or at all, the Supreme Court acted inconsistently with the procedural immunity in s 27(1) and was required by s 38 to set the order aside, so that Young AJA and the Court of Appeal were correct on that ground. [148] He would have dismissed the appeal with costs. [149]

Nettle and Gordon JJ

Nettle and Gordon JJ wrote separately, reached the same answers as French CJ and Kiefel J on jurisdiction, service and execution, rejected implied repeal, and agreed with the orders French CJ and Kiefel J proposed. [153], [210], [256] They held that s 9 applies because its evident purpose is to provide comprehensively for immunity in all forms of proceedings, and an application to a State Supreme Court under the Foreign Judgments Act is, as explained in PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd (2015) 89 ALJR 975, a proceeding in federal jurisdiction from its inception. [185] They said the starting point for s 11(1) is its words rather than NML, and that on the plain and ordinary meaning of those words a proceeding to register a foreign judgment for a money sum owed under a commercial transaction "concerns" a commercial transaction. [186] That such a proceeding could also be described as concerning the registration of a judgment does not matter, because "concerns" connotes a relationship and does not require that the proceeding bear only one character. [187] From the perspective of a party seeking to recover a debt from a foreign State, there is no distinction between initiating proceedings, registering the judgment and enforcing it, since each stage is directed towards the same end. [188] Nothing in or beyond the Act shows a purpose of exempting registration proceedings from s 11(1), and "proceeding" is presumed to have the same meaning in s 11(1) as in s 9. [189]–[190]

They rejected Nauru's argument from s 17, saying its evident purpose is to provide comprehensively for arbitral supervision and enforcement whether or not commercial transactions are concerned. [191]–[192] They rejected the related submission of the Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, because s 17(2) operates only where a foreign State has contracted out of s 11(1) under s 11(2)(a)(ii), and without it such an award could not be enforced. [203]–[204] They also rejected Nauru's argument from the links to Australia in ss 12-16, which drew on observations of Lord Mance JSC in NML, saying it is not the function of the Immunities Act to regulate a foreign State's susceptibility to the foreign court's jurisdiction. [194], [197], [201] If the foreign State is not immune from the foreign court's jurisdiction under public international law, it is "both logical and appropriate" that it be amenable to an Australian registration proceeding where the judgment concerns a commercial transaction. [202] It was unnecessary for them to consider whether s 11(1) has an ambulatory or updated operation. [209] Because the two Acts can operate harmoniously, they rejected the submission that the Foreign Judgments Act impliedly repealed the Immunities Act. [210]

On service, they said an order for registration is not a judgment in default of appearance or a default judgment, and that, as held in Hunt v BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd of the Queensland predecessor, an application for registration does not necessitate service of the initiating process. [213] They rejected the Court of Appeal's reasoning, which relied on the definition of "initiating process" in s 3(1) and "like procedure" in s 3(6): no default is involved in a designedly ex parte procedure, s 6(4) of the Foreign Judgments Act implies service of notice of registration, and s 7(2) allows the debtor to apply to set aside on the ground of immunity from the Australian court's jurisdiction. [214]–[215] A court may still require service of the summons before registration where that is considered expedient, and would usually set a longer period for a foreign State to apply to set aside, but the rules are facultative and impose no inevitable service requirement. [216]

On execution, they explained that commerciality for jurisdiction is discerned from the nature of the specific transaction, while for execution purpose is the principal consideration, with "commercial purpose" defined in s 3(5) to include trading, business, professional and industrial purposes. [218] They pointed out that the Act does define "commercial purpose", contrary to Bathurst CJ's observation, while holding that his conclusion on the airline accounts was correct. [228], [230] Part IV was designedly different from the United Kingdom approach and calculated to avoid the result in the English Court of Appeal in Alcom, which treated money held to pay an embassy's running expenses as used for commercial purposes, a decision later overturned by the House of Lords. [222] A court must bear in mind the individual circumstances of the foreign State, since what is a commercial purpose for one State may well be a governmental purpose for another. [223] Immunity will depend on "whether the activities for which the property is used are ordinary aspects of the governmental functions of the sovereign state". [224]

Firebird challenged seven classes of accounts, and they upheld the Court of Appeal's conclusion on each. [225], [230], [234], [239], [243], [248], [251], [255] Funding Nauru Airlines was part of Nauru's ordinary governmental functions in providing an otherwise isolated community with aircraft services, and any commercial activity of the airline itself was beside the point. [230] Compensating landowners for damage done to their lands by phosphate mining was well within Nauru's ordinary governmental functions. [234] On the Fuel Accounts they accepted that, on some of the evidence, it might be said that the government was in the business of trading in petrol, but because no oil company was prepared to service an island of only 10,000 people, its buying and selling of petroleum were governmental activities. [237]–[239] It might have been different had there been evidence that oil companies were willing to supply fuel and were kept out by a State monopoly, but there was none. [240] So far as the evidence showed, the Utilities Account was used only to fund a State-owned not-for-profit corporation providing power and water, which may properly be regarded as a governmental function. [244] The small business loans appeared to be essentially in the nature of social or economic advancement payments, and presented as no different in principle from sums the Commonwealth Government may set aside for Newstart allowance or business incentive allowances. [248] The four Residual Accounts each presented as a clear example of funds held for governmental non-commercial purposes. [249], [251] They rejected Firebird's argument that Bathurst CJ had reversed the onus under s 32(3)(b) on the Term Deposit, because the s 41 certificate was evidence that the funds were set aside as reserves for government services, the Minister was not cross-examined on it and nothing contradicted it. [254]–[255]

Orders. The Court ordered that paragraph (1)(ii) of the order of the Court of Appeal made on 23 October 2014 be varied by deleting the order that the summons filed on 9 May 2012 be dismissed and, in lieu, that order 1 of the orders of Young AJA made on 3 October 2014 be set aside insofar as it orders that the registration of the foreign judgment be set aside. The appeal was otherwise dismissed. The parties were to file written submissions as to costs on or before 9 December 2015. French CJ and Kiefel J explained that the orders below should reflect the fact that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to register the foreign judgment. [129] Nettle and Gordon JJ agreed with the orders French CJ and Kiefel J proposed, and Gageler J would instead have dismissed the appeal with costs. [149], [256]

Why it matters

All five judges accepted that a proceeding to register a foreign judgment under the Foreign Judgments Act is a "proceeding" to which s 9 of the Immunities Act applies, and that the s 11(1) exception reaches such a proceeding where the judgment is based on a commercial transaction. [49], [81], [135], [185]–[186] French CJ and Kiefel J and Nettle and Gordon JJ each reached that result without adopting Lord Mance JSC's reading of the United Kingdom provision in NML Capital. [75]–[76], [186], [197] The case also shows that loss of immunity from jurisdiction does not carry loss of immunity from execution, because s 32(3) looks to the purpose for which property is used or set aside rather than to the nature of transactions. [115]–[116], [128], [218] French CJ and Kiefel J and Nettle and Gordon JJ treated a foreign State's own circumstances as relevant to that purpose, and on that footing Nauru's supply of fuel was treated as governmental. [124]–[125], [223], [238]–[239] On service, four judges accepted that registration against a foreign State could proceed without prior service, while noting that a court may consider or require service first. [90], [92], [215]–[216]

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