Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission
(2012) 247 CLR 486 · [2012] HCA 39 · (2012) 291 ALR 399 · (2012) 91 ACSR 128
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission and Fortescue Metals Group Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39 are two appeals decided together by the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ) on 2 October 2012. The question was whether public statements that Fortescue had made binding contracts with three Chinese state-owned entities were misleading or deceptive, and whether contraventions of the continuous disclosure and directors' duty provisions followed [2]–[4]. All five judges held that ASIC had not established a contravention of s 1041H, s 674 or s 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) [60], [62], [67], [108], [113], [115]. The Court allowed each appeal with costs, set aside the Full Court's orders, and ordered instead that ASIC's appeal to the Full Court be dismissed with costs [71]. The Court also granted ASIC special leave to cross-appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal with costs [71].
Facts
In 2004, Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (Fortescue) was a public company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (the ASX), and Mr John Andrew Henry Forrest was its chairman and chief executive and a substantial shareholder [1]. Fortescue's proposed Pilbara Iron Ore and Infrastructure Project was to consist of a mine in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, a port at Port Hedland and a railway connecting the mine to the port [2].
Fortescue made agreements with China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC), signed on 6 August 2004, China Harbour Engineering Company (Group) (CHEC), signed on 1 October 2004, and China Metallurgical Construction (Group) Corporation (CMCC), signed on 20 October 2004, each headed "Framework Agreement" [3]. The joint reasons describe the three framework agreements as substantially identical [11].
The CREC agreement's recitals recorded that CREC had submitted an offer to execute the works, that Fortescue had accepted it and that the parties wished to evidence their agreement [12]. Clause 1 provided for the parties to "jointly develop and agree" matters including general conditions of contract, the scope of work, the scheduling of the works and the determination of their value [12]. Clause 5 provided that the agreement would become binding on approval by both boards, and cl 7 said that the document "represents an agreement in itself" and that a fuller and more detailed agreement not different in intent would be developed later [12].
On 23 August 2004 Fortescue sent the ASX a letter saying that it had "entered into a binding contract" with CREC "to build and finance the railway component" of the project [13]. During August and November 2004 Fortescue's letters to the ASX and media releases said, among other things, that it had made binding contracts with each of CREC, CHEC and CMCC to build, finance and transfer the railway, port and mine [4].
In March 2005 a financial press article suggested that the contracts were not binding contracts of that kind, and in response to the ASX's request for comment Fortescue gave the ASX a copy of the CMCC agreement [5].
Procedural history
ASIC commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia in March 2006 [6]. It alleged that Fortescue contravened s 1041H of the Corporations Act by misleading or deceptive conduct and the continuous disclosure requirements of s 674, and that Mr Forrest failed to meet the care and diligence required of a director by s 180(1) [2]. For its s 1041H case ASIC identified 13 communications, including letters to the ASX, media releases, a press conference, a television interview, reports and slide presentations [9].
At trial ASIC alleged that Fortescue, its board and Mr Forrest in particular had been dishonest in making the statements, and its allegations were taken to be allegations of fraud [18], [28]. Gilmour J dismissed ASIC's claims [6].
On appeal ASIC ran its case on what the joint reasons call a "wholly different footing", focused on what the statements would have conveyed to their intended audience [28]. The Full Court of the Federal Court (Keane CJ, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ) allowed the appeal, made declarations of contravention and remitted questions of penalty to a single judge [6]. As the joint reasons describe its reasoning, the Full Court concluded that the statements conveyed the historical fact that agreements had been made, that whether they were contracts was to be assessed objectively, that an Australian court would hold them incomplete because they did not provide for the subject matter, scheduling and price of the work or a mechanism for fixing those matters, and that it was therefore misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, to call each a binding contract [34].
Fortescue and Mr Forrest appealed to the High Court by special leave, seeking reinstatement of the orders made at first instance [7]. ASIC gave notice of a proposed cross-appeal to support the s 674 conclusion on an alternative basis [63].
Issues
- What did the statements convey to their intended audience when they said that the parties had made a binding contract, and was that misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive under s 1041H [31]?
- Should the statements be classified as statements of fact or of opinion, and does that matter [33], [93]–[94]?
- Did Fortescue contravene s 674, including by not disclosing the actual terms of the agreements [61], [63]–[64]?
- Did Mr Forrest contravene s 180(1) [67]?
- Should ASIC have special leave to cross-appeal [65], [114]?
Held
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ wrote joint reasons, holding that the statements were not misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, that ASIC therefore failed to show a contravention of s 674, and that with no breach of s 1041H or s 674 it was not shown that Mr Forrest failed to meet s 180(1) [8].
ASIC's central s 1041H case was treated in argument as sufficiently identified by Fortescue's letter to the ASX and media release of 23 August 2004 about the CREC agreement [10]. Their Honours rejected ASIC's complaints about the words build and finance and Build and Transfer: the payment terms were aptly described as CREC agreeing to build and finance the railway, and Build and Transfer was the parties' own description and an accurate general one [15]–[17].
The body of ASIC's statement of claim was 108 pages long [9]. Their Honours said its allegations mixed "two radically different and distinct ideas": that Fortescue knew the statements were false and that it should have known [22]. The plea that Fortescue had no genuine or reasonable basis added nothing to ASIC's case that the statements conveyed untrue facts, and it distracted attention from what the statements conveyed to their intended audience and whether that was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive [23]. They said this was "no pleader's quibble", because the party alleging a contravention must identify its case clearly and distinctly [25]. A case of fraud cannot properly be seen as a fallback claim and should be pleaded specifically and with particularity [26]. The pleader's task, they said, "does not extend to planting a forest of forensic contingencies and waiting until final address or perhaps even an appeal hearing to map a path through it" [27].
Their Honours called the determinative issue what the statements conveyed to their intended audience when they said that the parties had made a binding contract [31]. Of three possibilities (a message about what the agreements said, a message about legal enforceability, or a mixture of the two), the first was decisive: the statements conveyed what the parties had done and said they had done [32]. It was "ultimately unprofitable" to classify the statement according to a taxonomy such as fact and opinion or fact and law, and what was needed was to identify more precisely what the statements conveyed [33].
In their Honours' view the critical step in the Full Court's reasoning was its move from what the parties had said and done to the legal consequences of that, assuming that the statements conveyed that the parties had made what an Australian court would decide to be a binding contract [35]. They found at least two difficulties in that analysis, both stemming from the need to identify the intended audience and the message conveyed to it [36].
As to the first, the intended audience was investors, present and possible future, and perhaps some wider section of the commercial or business community [36]. Their Honours preferred the view that this audience would take the statements as saying what the parties understood they had done and intended would happen, rather than asking "a lawyer's question" about what could or would happen in a court if the parties fell out [37]. The Full Court's assumption that the words contract and agreement necessarily conveyed a message about legal enforceability in an Australian court was "too broad a proposition" [38]. The whole of the statements had to be examined in context, without assuming that what was said must go into a box marked fact or a box marked opinion [38]. No evidence was led at trial to show that investors or others in the business or commercial community would have understood the words as also conveying that a court would grant relief if a party did not perform [39].
The provisions of the agreements showed, and ASIC expressly accepted at trial, that the parties intended them to be legally binding [40]. ASIC did not establish that Fortescue did not believe the agreements were binding: that allegation was rejected at trial and the findings on it were not set aside by the Full Court [42]. ASIC's submission, that the statements also conveyed that the agreements were not open to legal challenge in an Australian court, should not be accepted, and no further message was shown to have been conveyed to an ordinary or reasonable member of the audience [43].
The second difficulty, "no less fundamental", was the unjustified assumption that the legal character or effect of the agreements was to be determined by Australian domestic law [44]. The work was to be done by state-owned entities of a foreign government, the agreements were executed at signing ceremonies in Beijing, and they contained neither a choice of law nor a choice of forum clause [46]. The place of signing and the counterparties' status pointed to the "real and lively possibility" that the formal and essential validity of the agreements might be governed by the law of the People's Republic of China, and that status raised an immediate question about the manner and extent of enforceability [47]. Their Honours asked whether a state-owned entity's public acceptance of obligations described as binding may have been a more powerful spur to performance than any legal action by Fortescue [49].
ASIC did not establish that the statements conveyed that it was practicable to force the counterparties to perform (the words of ASIC's statement of claim), or that this was to be judged by the principles applied to a suburban land sale or house construction agreement [50]. Because the statements accurately conveyed what the agreements said, it would be extreme or fanciful for the audience to understand them as directing attention to enforcement by an Australian court, and their Honours, citing Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Ltd, said that such an understanding should not be attributed to the ordinary or reasonable member of the audience [50].
It was therefore not to the point that the agreements did not fix the work or the price with greater particularity [51]. Their Honours found it unnecessary to decide whether the agreements provided a mechanism for fixing those matters, saying only that the better view "would appear to be" that cl 1.2 did not [52].
The joint reasons also rejected the Full Court's reliance on the later negotiations, including an email in which Mr Forrest described the points he wanted to achieve as "all hard asks" [53]–[55]. The email showed only that Mr Forrest sought to use the negotiations to improve Fortescue's position [55]. Trying to strike a better bargain does not, without more, show that the parties are not bound or did not intend to be bound [56].
Their Honours concluded that Fortescue's letter about the CREC agreement was not misleading or deceptive and not likely to mislead or deceive, because it accurately recorded what the agreement provided and conveyed no message about whether an Australian court would enforce it [58]. It was unnecessary to consider the other statements separately, or the likely to mislead or deceive limb on which Emmett J had based his reasons, because the inquiry into how an ordinary or reasonable member of the audience would receive a message is of its nature hypothetical and answers both limbs [59].
ASIC's primary s 674 case proceeded from the premise that the statements misrepresented the effect of the agreements, and that premise was not established [61]–[62]. ASIC's alternative case was that, if the statements were expressions of opinion, Fortescue had to disclose the terms of the agreements themselves [64]. That also failed, because the statements "did not express any relevant opinion" and accurately conveyed what the agreements provided, so that s 674 did not require Fortescue to publish their text [65]. Their Honours said ASIC should have special leave to cross-appeal but that the cross-appeal should be dismissed [65]. With no failure to disclose, it was neither necessary nor appropriate to consider s 674(2A) or s 674(2B) [66]. The s 180(1) claim depended on a contravention of s 1041H or s 674 and so also failed [67].
Their Honours said that their reasons had not endorsed the trial judge's approach [68]. They also said that they established no general proposition that a public statement that one company has made a contract with another necessarily conveys only what the document contains, because the facts and evidence of the particular case are "all important" [69]. On the concern that the result might limit investor protection, they said that a party who says something knowing that what is conveyed is false, or reckless as to its truth or falsity, is guilty of deceit, and that "[c]oncerns about dishonesty provide no reason to distort settled understandings about misleading or deceptive conduct" [70].
Heydon J
Heydon J wrote separate reasons, adopting the joint reasons' statement of the background, and said that at its heart the case "is much simpler than it appears to be at first sight" [72]. His Honour agreed that the appeals should be allowed with costs and consequential orders made, but would have refused special leave to cross-appeal with costs [117].
His Honour said that saying nothing was not available to Fortescue, because it would probably have been in breach of the ASX listing rules [76]. He rejected the submission that s 1041H required the agreements to be released in full, saying this would not assist a speedily informed market and would often be extremely inconvenient [77]. That left a summary, which Fortescue released [78].
Heydon J read ASIC's pleas as alternatives, one treating the announcement as a statement of fact and the other as a statement of opinion [82]. He said that ASIC's approach, though criticised in the Full Court, "was not only common but endeavoured to set up the case which Fortescue had to meet" [82].
His Honour gave three points which together were complete answers to ASIC's allegations on the CREC agreement [84]. First, leaving aside whether it was contractually binding, the agreement was calculated to ensure that CREC built and financed a railway by compelling the parties to enter further negotiations and agreements within its intent [85]. Secondly, even if it was not a binding contract to build the railway, it was a binding contract to engage in those negotiations and enter those agreements [85]. Thirdly, so far as Fortescue represented a binding contract to build the railway, that was a statement of opinion, and it fell within s 1041H only if ASIC established that Fortescue did not hold the opinion or had no reasonable basis for stating it, which ASIC did not establish [85].
On the first point, the recitals and cll 2.1, 4, 5 and 7 meant that there was an agreement to build and transfer the railway [87]. The payment terms meant that the works were to be carried out on credit terms, not paid for in full until three years after completion [88]. By "unattributed quotation, paraphrase and summary", his Honour said, the ASX release correctly represented the effect of the agreement, leaving aside its contractual force [90].
Heydon J found it unnecessary to decide whether the agreement was a binding contract to build the railway, saying that there was force in many of Fortescue's arguments but difficulty in some [93]. At least in the context of this case, he said, whether an agreement is a binding contract involves a question of law, that is, a question of opinion, and is "an inherently controversial matter of professional judgment" distinct from the historical facts [94]. His Honour quoted Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Pty Ltd, in which the Full Court of the Federal Court said that an expression of opinion identifiable as such "conveys no more than that the opinion expressed is held and perhaps that there is basis for the opinion" [94]. He said that the Full Court in this case appeared to disagree with this approach, but that many doctrines applying to general enactments of this kind, though not expressly stated, are necessary implications in them [94].
His Honour divided ASIC's allegation into two parts: that Fortescue knew the agreement was not a binding contract, and that it believed it was but ought reasonably to have known otherwise [95]. The first part was an allegation of fraud and failed for five reasons [96]–[101]. ASIC had conceded, as the trial judge recorded, that the agreements were intended to be legally binding, and no ground of appeal challenged that finding [97]. The trial judge found no basis to assert dishonesty, the Full Court did not expressly overturn that finding, and the negotiating conduct it pointed to did not establish dishonesty [98]. Fortescue's board minutes of 28 August 2004 and other contemporary communications supported the view that it believed the agreement was binding [99]. Mr Heyting, the former Fortescue employee who prepared the CREC agreement and whom ASIC called, gave evidence in cross-examination "radically opposed to ASIC's case" [100]. CREC, CHEC and CMCC appeared to share the view that the agreements were binding [101].
On the second part, Heydon J raised a question which the parties had not raised explicitly: whether Fortescue must fail if it lacked a reasonable basis for its opinion [102]. Of the saying that to state an opinion one holds implies reasonable grounds for it, he said that in some circumstances that may be so, "but why should it be so in all?" [102]. He said that the matter "calls for examination on some future occasion" [103].
Even assuming that Fortescue's opinion implied reasonable grounds, whether it had them depended on what its audience must have understood it to have said [104]. That audience was a section of the public, including superannuation funds, other large institutions, stock brokers, financial advisers and specialised financial journalists, and it was "sufficiently tough, shrewd and sceptical" to know something of the difficulties of forcing a builder to build and finance anything [105]. ASIC bore the burden of proof and did not establish that the audience took from the statements that the parties had agreed on all the terms necessary for it to be practicable to force CREC to perform (the words of ASIC's statement of claim) [106]. The audience probably took the representation to be that there was a binding contract containing machinery capable of procuring voluntary performance by CREC, and because the agreement was such a contract there were reasonable grounds for the representation [107]. It followed that Fortescue's conduct was not misleading, not deceptive and not likely to mislead or deceive [108].
His Honour said that ASIC's other s 1041H criticisms mostly failed for similar reasons, and that the balance concerned statements of opinion not shown to be misleading to the target audience [111]. The Full Court's finding that Mr Forrest was involved in the contravention within s 79(c) could not stand [112]. ASIC's argument that a contravention of s 1041H required disclosure under s 674 failed because s 1041H was not contravened [113]. Nothing in s 674 supported ASIC's further argument that Fortescue had to disclose the terms of the agreements even without any announcement, because on ASIC's own case the agreements were no more than unenforceable agreements to agree, of trivial significance and not likely to influence the share price [114]. Heydon J would have refused special leave to cross-appeal, partly because granting it would require analysis of expert evidence which the trial judge rejected and the Full Court did not consider [114]. Since Fortescue had not contravened s 1041H or s 674, Mr Forrest was not in breach of s 180(1) [115]. On ASIC's notice of contention, that the Full Court ought to have found no reasonable basis for believing the announcements accurately described the agreements, Heydon J said that the Full Court did make that finding at least in the s 674 case, but that under s 1041H ASIC bore the burden of proof and did not discharge it [116].
Orders. In each matter the High Court allowed the appeal with costs [71]. It set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court and ordered instead that ASIC's appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs [71]. It granted ASIC special leave to cross-appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal with costs [71]. The formal order on the cover identifies the Full Court's orders as those made on 18 February 2011 as varied on 20 May 2011, and treats the cross-appeal as instituted and heard instanter.
Why it matters
The joint reasons direct attention in a s 1041H case to what the statements conveyed to their intended audience, rather than to classifying them as fact or opinion [33], [38]. Their Honours limited the decision by saying that it establishes no general proposition about public statements that a contract has been made [69]. They also said that it is "greatly to be doubted" that it will ever be appropriate to pile up as many alternative allegations as were made in this case [26].
The two sets of reasons reach the same result by different routes: the joint reasons held that the statements expressed no relevant opinion [65], while Heydon J treated the statement that the contract was binding as one of opinion [93]–[94]. Heydon J left open whether stating an opinion implies reasonable grounds for it [102]–[103].
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