Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission
(2019) 266 CLR 250 · [2019] HCA 16
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] HCA 16 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, given on 15 May 2019 by Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ. The question was whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), on reviewing a decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to make a banning order, may take into account spent convictions that ASIC itself cannot take into account [1], [34]. All seven judges answered no, in two sets of joint reasons, and none dissented [1], [33], [34]. The High Court allowed Mr Frugtniet's appeal, ordered that the AAT's decision be set aside and the matter remitted to the AAT for reconsideration in accordance with law, and ordered ASIC to pay his costs in the High Court [55].
Facts
Mr Frugtniet's criminal record included convictions in the United Kingdom in 1978 on 15 counts of handling stolen goods, forgery, and obtaining property by deception and theft, for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and served two years [11]. It also included a finding by the Broadmeadows Magistrates' Court in 1997 that he had committed an offence of obtaining property by deception in relation to the issue of airline tickets, for which no conviction was entered but he was fined $1,000 [11]. Both were spent convictions within the meaning of Pt VIIC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) [43].
In 2014 a delegate of ASIC made a banning order against him under s 80 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), having found in terms of s 80(1)(f) that ASIC had reason to believe he was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities [42]. That Act is called the NCCP Act in the first joint reasons [1] and the Credit Protection Act in the second [34]; this summary uses NCCP Act. ASIC was precluded from having regard to the spent convictions in making that determination [12].
Procedural history
Mr Frugtniet applied to the AAT for review, and in 2015 the AAT, finding on the material before it that it had reason to believe he was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities, affirmed the delegate's decision [43]. The AAT proceeded on the basis that it was entitled to take the spent convictions into account, and it did so, because they were evidence of dishonest conduct relevant under the policy guidelines [12].
Mr Frugtniet appealed to the Federal Court under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act), on grounds including that the AAT had erred in law in taking the spent convictions into consideration [44]. Bromberg J dismissed the appeal (Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2016) 70 AAR 153) [44]. His Honour adopted the reasoning of Middleton J in Toohey v Tax Agents' Board of Victoria [2007] FCA 431; (2007) 171 FCR 291, on comparable Victorian legislation, as in his view directly on point and not plainly wrong, and held that because of s 85ZZH(c) of the Crimes Act the prohibition in s 85ZW of that Act did not apply to the AAT in a merits review of ASIC's decision [13].
A Full Court of the Federal Court (Reeves, Farrell and Gleeson JJ) dismissed a further appeal (Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCAFC 162; (2017) 255 FCR 96) [13]. The Full Court regarded the dissenting reasoning of White J in Kocic v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCA 368; (2014) 88 NSWLR 159, on comparable New South Wales legislation, as persuasive and as fortifying its conclusion [13]. It concluded that s 85ZZH(c) entitled the AAT to take into consideration material which ASIC was prevented from taking into consideration by Div 3 of Pt VIIC [45]. Mr Frugtniet then appealed to the High Court by special leave [46].
Issues
The question for decision was whether, on review of a decision of ASIC to impose a banning order, the AAT may take spent convictions into account [1]. Within that question was the effect of s 85ZZH(c) of the Crimes Act, which the Full Court had concluded entitled the AAT to consider material ASIC was prevented from considering [45]. Also within it was ASIC's argument that the parenthetical language in the chapeau to s 80(2) of the NCCP Act acknowledges that Pt VIIC has a differential operation between ASIC as primary decision-maker and the AAT conducting a review [46].
Held
Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ
Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ wrote joint reasons, agreeing that the appeal should be allowed and that orders be made in the terms proposed by Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ [33]. They set out the scheme: s 80(2) of the NCCP Act provides in substance that, subject to Pt VIIC of the Crimes Act, ASIC must have regard to certain considerations, including the person's criminal convictions within ten years before the banning order is proposed to be made and any other matter ASIC considers relevant [5]. Section 85ZW of the Crimes Act, in Div 3 of Pt VIIC, provides in substance that, subject to Div 6, the fact that a person has been charged with or convicted of an offence that is spent shall not be taken into account by a Commonwealth authority [6]. Section 85ZZH(c), in Div 6, provides in effect that Div 3 does not apply to the taking into account of information by a court or tribunal established under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law for the purpose of making a decision [8].
Their Honours said the AAT Act established a new and substantially unprecedented regime of merits review, distinguished principally by the AAT's jurisdiction to re-exercise the functions of original decision-makers, so that the question on review under s 25 is whether the decision is the correct or preferable decision, determined on the material before the AAT [14]. They added that, as Bowen CJ and Deane J held in Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 and this Court affirmed in Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286, the AAT is not at large: it is subject to the same general constraints as the original decision-maker and should ordinarily approach its task as though performing that decision-maker's function under the law as it applied at the time of the original decision [14]. The AAT may sometimes take into account evidence not before the original decision-maker, including evidence of later events, but, subject to any clearly expressed contrary statutory indication, only so far as it is relevant to the question that decision-maker was bound to decide, and it cannot take into account matters not before that decision-maker where that would change the nature of the decision or the question before the decision-maker [15].
Applying this, the question for ASIC under s 80(1)(f) was whether, having regard to the considerations in s 80(2), which perforce of s 85ZW excluded spent convictions, the appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities [16]. Subject to any clearly expressed contrary legislative intent, the AAT had to decide the same question having regard to the same considerations, and so excluding spent convictions [17]. Section 80(2) expresses no such intent, because its stipulation that the criteria are "subject to Part VIIC of the Crimes Act 1914" is directed only to ASIC, and s 327, which separately provides for AAT review, says nothing about the criteria to which the AAT may have regard [18]. They held it necessarily implicit in s 80(2) that Pt VIIC applies only so far as it is capable of application to ASIC: s 85ZW can apply because ASIC is a Commonwealth authority, but s 85ZZH(c) cannot because ASIC is not a court or tribunal [19].
ASIC contended in effect that s 80(2) also subjects the AAT conducting a merits review to Pt VIIC so far as it can apply to the AAT, so that, because of s 85ZZH(c), the AAT can have regard to spent convictions [20]. Their Honours accepted that it is arguably possible to read the provisions that way, but called the implication obscure, and, against the long-standing principles of merits review, thought it improbable that Parliament would choose "a technique of obscure implication" fundamentally to alter the nature of merits review of a decision under s 80, or of any other administrative decision to which Pt VIIC applies [21]. They added that nothing in the extrinsic materials for s 80(2), including the Explanatory Memorandum and Second Reading Speech, suggested that the AAT was to exercise a function other than the function exercised by ASIC [21].
ASIC also relied on s 290(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 513 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and s 120 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), submitting that where there is a legislative intent to exclude s 85ZZH for a decision-maker conducting a merits review, the legislation expressly so provides or specifically precludes consideration of spent convictions [22]. Their Honours said that the exclusion in s 290(2)(c) of the Migration Act makes plain that the Migration Agents Registration Authority may not take spent convictions into account but has nothing, other than indirectly, to do with the AAT [23], and that the Migration Act is too complex, and in its material respects far too distinct, to bear meaningfully on the construction of s 80(2) [24]. The Fair Work Commission is not directly comparable to ASIC: it is also a tribunal to which, but for the express negation in s 513(2), s 85ZZH(c) would apply, and the apparent purpose of that stipulation is to limit the otherwise general direction in s 513(1) to take convictions into account [25]. The Commissioner of Taxation, the relevant Regulator under the superannuation legislation, is not directly comparable either: the apparent purpose of s 120(4) is to prevent Div 3 from stopping the disclosure of spent convictions to the Commissioner, and s 85ZZH(c) does not apply to the Commissioner [26]. None of those provisions, they concluded, suggests that the absence of an express stipulation about the AAT implies that s 85ZZH(c) applies to the AAT when reviewing ASIC's decision [27].
Turning to Kocic, so far as pertinent the question was whether s 16(1) of the Criminal Records Act 1991 (NSW) permitted the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, on review of a decision not to issue a firearms licence, to have regard to spent convictions that s 12(c)(ii) of that Act had prevented the Commissioner of Police from considering [28]. Basten JA, with whom Leeming JA agreed with additional observations, held that it did not, observing that it presented as "counterintuitive" that an applicant for merits review should be placed in a more disadvantageous position on spent convictions than before the original decision-maker [29]. White J, dissenting, reasoned that it is more accurate to say the tribunal's function is to make the correct decision on the material before it, and that s 16(1) did not vary the relevant considerations but merely the materials that could be taken into account [30].
Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ preferred the reasoning of Basten and Leeming JJA: deciding whether a person is fit and proper according to a restricted range of considerations is a different function from deciding that on a less restricted range, so that applying s 16(1) to the tribunal would have required it to discharge a different function from the Commissioner [31]. Spent convictions could not be regarded as events occurring between the Commissioner's decision and the review, because the fact that they were spent dictated that they occurred long before that decision, and they were excluded considerations [31]. With Basten JA, their Honours said that review by reference to different considerations from those the original decision-maker is required to take into account or prohibited from taking into account is such a substantial departure from established conceptions of merits review that it would require a clearly expressed legislative intent [31]. They said the majority's reasoning in Kocic fortifies their conclusion that, upon its proper construction, s 80(2) does not make s 85ZZH(c) applicable to the AAT in reviewing a decision of ASIC under s 80(1), and, adopting and adapting Basten JA's words, that it is not to be supposed Parliament intended so profound a change to merits review "by a legislative side-wind" [32].
Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ
Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ wrote joint reasons, in which they proposed the orders [33], and held that a spent conviction which ASIC cannot take into consideration in deciding to make a banning order cannot be taken into consideration by the AAT on review of that decision [34]. They noted that Pt VIIC, inserted in 1989, is designed, in words from the House of Representatives Hansard of 11 May 1989, "to give people a chance to live down a minor criminal conviction", and that it applies to convictions under Commonwealth, State, Territory and foreign laws [35]. For Pt VIIC, a conviction is taken to be spent if the person was pardoned for a reason other than wrongful conviction, or if the person was not sentenced to imprisonment or was sentenced to no more than 30 months and a waiting period, ordinarily ten years for an adult, has ended [36]. A Commonwealth authority, as defined for Pt VIIC, includes "a body (whether incorporated or not), or a tribunal, established or appointed for a public purpose by or under a Commonwealth law", and so includes both ASIC and the AAT [37].
ASIC argued that it and the AAT are both permitted by s 80(2)(d) to take into account any matter they consider relevant, but that only ASIC is constrained by Pt VIIC to leave spent convictions out of account [46]. Their Honours held that neither the Full Court's construction of s 85ZZH(c) nor ASIC's construction of the parenthetical language in s 80(2) can be sustained [47]. Section 80 is directed solely to ASIC's power to make a banning order, and the parenthetical language, together with the note to s 80(2), acknowledges that ASIC's power is constrained by Pt VIIC and says nothing of the decision-making power of the AAT [48].
Section 85ZZH(c), they said, says nothing more of present relevance than that Div 3 has no application to a tribunal established by statute taking information into account for the purpose of making a decision; its operation does not go beyond that, it does nothing to alter the tribunal's statutory jurisdiction, and it does not make a spent conviction relevant to be taken into account in exercising that jurisdiction [49]. So understood, the apparent conflict between s 85ZZH(c) and the AAT's review jurisdiction falls away [50].
Except where altered by some other statute, which had not occurred here, the jurisdiction conferred on the AAT by ss 25 and 43 of the AAT Act is, in their Honours' words, "to stand in the shoes of the decision-maker whose decision is under review", so as to determine for itself on the material before it the decision which can, and which it considers should, be made in the exercise of the primary decision-maker's power [51]. The AAT exercises the same power as the primary decision-maker, subject to the same constraints, and must address the same question, so a consideration the primary decision-maker must take into account must be taken into account by the AAT, and one the primary decision-maker must not take into account must not be taken into account by the AAT [51].
Accepting ASIC's argument would distort the powers in s 43(1) of the AAT Act: the AAT could not sensibly remit the matter to ASIC, which would have to ignore the spent convictions, and a varied or substituted decision would be deemed by s 43(6) to be a decision of ASIC even if it took into account spent convictions ASIC was required to ignore [52]. They said the AAT and the primary decision-maker exist within an administrative continuum, citing Shi at a passage quoting Jebb v Repatriation Commission, and that the AAT has no jurisdiction to take into account a consideration which could not have been taken into account by the primary decision-maker in making the decision under review and could not be taken into account by it on remittal [53]. ASIC's power is constrained by Pt VIIC to preclude it taking spent convictions into account, and the AAT's power is subject to the same constraint in the exercise of its jurisdiction under s 327 of the NCCP Act and ss 25 and 43 of the AAT Act [54].
Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed [55]. It set aside orders 2 and 3 of the orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court on 12 October 2017 and, in their place, ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed and that order 1 made by Bromberg J on 22 August 2016 and the order made by Bromberg J on 15 September 2016 be set aside [55]. In place of Bromberg J's orders, it ordered that the decision made by the AAT on 6 March 2015 be set aside and the matter remitted to the AAT for reconsideration in accordance with law [55]. ASIC must pay Mr Frugtniet's costs in the High Court [55].
Why it matters
The case decides that a spent conviction which ASIC cannot take into account in deciding to make a banning order cannot be taken into account by the AAT on review of that decision [34], [54]. Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ stated the limit generally: where application is made to the AAT under an enactment, and except where altered by some other statute, the question raised by statute for the primary decision-maker determines the considerations the AAT must or must not take into account [51]. Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ expressly preferred the majority reasoning in Kocic to White J's dissent [31], while Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ refer to those dissenting reasons only in describing the Full Court's reasoning [45]. The two sets of reasons agree in the answer but state different things about s 85ZZH(c): the first says s 80(2) does not make it applicable to the AAT on such a review [32], and the second says its operation does not go beyond non-application of Div 3 and does nothing to alter the tribunal's jurisdiction [49].
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