Gerner v Victoria
(2020) 270 CLR 412 · [2020] HCA 48
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Gerner v Victoria [2020] HCA 48 is a single joint judgment of the High Court of Australia by Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ [1]. Mr Gerner, who lives in Melbourne, and the second plaintiff, which he owns and which runs a restaurant business in Melbourne, challenged directions restricting movement within Victoria during the COVID-19 state of emergency, and the provisions of the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) under which they were made, on the basis that the Constitution implies a freedom of movement [1]–[4]. The Court answered the agreed question against the plaintiffs and ordered that Victoria's demurrer be allowed with costs [6]. It held that there is no basis in the text and structure of the Constitution for a freestanding freedom of movement, and it rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on the implied freedom of political communication and on s 92 [8]-[9], [35].
Facts
The Act empowers authorised officers, appointed by the Chief Health Officer, to exercise emergency powers when the Minister for Health has declared a state of emergency [1]. On 16 March 2020 the Minister declared a state of emergency in the whole of Victoria because of the serious risk to public health posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the declaration was repeatedly extended so that it was still in force when the Court heard and determined the proceedings on 6 November 2020 [1]. Under s 200(1)(b) and (d) of the Act, the emergency powers include power to restrict the movement of any person or group of persons within the emergency area and to give any other direction the authorised officer considers reasonably necessary to protect public health [2]. Directions restricting the movement of people within Victoria, called the Lockdown Directions, were made from time to time from 16 March 2020 and were still in force at the hearing [2]. The first plaintiff, Mr Gerner, lives in Melbourne and owns the second plaintiff, which runs a restaurant business in Melbourne [3]. Before the declaration and the Lockdown Directions, the second plaintiff had annual sales of about $2 million, and the plaintiffs alleged that it had suffered a significant loss of revenue because of the restrictions on movement [3].
Procedural history
The plaintiffs began proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court seeking declarations that s 200(1)(b) and (d) of the Act and the Lockdown Directions were invalid as infringing a guarantee of freedom of movement said to be implicit in the Constitution [4]. Victoria demurred on the ground that the Constitution does not imply the freedom of movement for which the plaintiffs contended [4]. To determine the demurrer, the parties agreed to put to the Full Court the question whether the Constitution provides for an implied freedom for the people of Australia to move within the State where they reside, for personal, recreational, commercial or political purposes or for any reason, free from arbitrary restriction of movement [5]. The Attorneys-General for Western Australia, Queensland, South Australia, the Northern Territory and Tasmania intervened. On 6 November 2020 the Full Court answered the question against the plaintiffs and ordered that the demurrer be allowed with costs [6]. Its reasons were published on 10 December 2020.
Issues
The plaintiffs argued in three alternative ways that the freedom of movement was implied: from the text and structure of the Constitution, as logically and practically necessary to preserve the constitutional structure; from the system of representative and responsible government, as part of the implied freedom of political communication; or as an aspect of s 92 [7]. The central question was whether the Constitution implies a freedom of movement that stands independently of political communication and of interstate trade, commerce and intercourse [9].
Held
Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ
The pleadings. The Court noted that the plaintiffs' amended statement of claim alleged no facts showing that the Act or the Lockdown Directions burdened political communication, or any aspect of interstate trade, commerce or intercourse [8]. The absence of any pleaded basis was sufficient reason to reject the claim for declarations on those two grounds, and answering the question on either basis would have amounted to giving a hypothetical opinion [8]. The contention that there is a freedom of movement standing independently of those two sources was at least supported by the pleaded facts, but it failed because there is no basis in the text and structure of the Constitution for the implication [9].
An implication from federation. At common law people may move about as they see fit, but that freedom is subject to the laws of the land, and the Court cited Blackstone's Commentaries for the view that personal liberties, including locomotion, may be abrogated or regulated only by due course of law [10]. An implied freedom is a limitation on legislative or executive power rather than a personal right, so to assert an implied freedom of movement is to assert that the Constitution impliedly denies the Commonwealth and the States power to make laws whose object is to restrict freedom of movement [10]. The plaintiffs argued that federation produced one people and one nation where there had been several peoples and colonies, and that freedom to move wherever one wishes for whatever reason followed [11]. The Court said that treating a freedom of communication or movement as a freestanding implication, separate from the implied freedom of political communication recognised in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, is contrary to the settled course of authority in the Court [12]. On the orthodox view, freedom of movement or communication enjoys constitutional protection as an aspect or corollary of the protection of freedom of political communication [12].
The plaintiffs relied on a suggestion by Murphy J in McGraw-Hinds (Aust) Pty Ltd v Smith that such a freedom may be drawn from the nature of Australian society, but the other members of the Court in that case decided it under s 92, and a majority in Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd expressly rejected a broad implied freedom of communication [13]. The Court said Murphy J's suggestion is "distinctly inconsistent with the settled approach to the drawing of constitutional implications" [13]. The question is not what federation requires; it is now well settled, the Court said (citing Lange), that what the Constitution implies depends on what its terms and structure prohibit, authorise or require [14]. Because federation is not a "one size fits all" proposition, the legal nature and effect of the federation the Constitution established can be known only from its own terms and structure [14].
The legislative powers of the States are expressly preserved by s 106, and the proposition that they are necessarily limited by the asserted freedom draws no support from the text or structure of the Constitution [15]. The Court found it "surprising, to say the least" that the plaintiffs suggested State laws licensing road users must conform to the asserted limit, a suggestion rejected in Higgins v The Commonwealth [15]. In Higgins, Finn J rejected a challenge to a law suspending unemployment benefits for recipients who moved to an area with lesser employment prospects, saying it was inconceivable that the Constitution implicitly puts at risk a significant range of routine Commonwealth and State laws, such as criminal, curfew, town planning and road traffic laws, merely because they limit freedom of movement [15]. The Court added that Finn J might equally have instanced quarantine laws, the essence of which, as Latham CJ put it in McCarter v Brodie, is that the actual movement of persons is restricted or altogether prohibited [16]. Section 51(ix) gives the Commonwealth Parliament express power to make laws with respect to quarantine, and s 106 expressly preserves the States' concurrent power over the same subject matter [16]. The Court quoted the joint reasons of Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ in the Engineers' Case that "the doctrine of 'implied prohibition' finds no place where the ordinary principles of construction are applied" to discover the meaning of the actual terms of the instrument [16].
The plaintiffs relied on reasoning like that of Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth v The Commonwealth, who suggested that specific constitutional provisions reflecting an underlying principle are a manifestation of it rather than a basis for denying its existence, but that approach did not find favour with the majority in Leeth and has not commanded majority support in any later decision of the Court [17]. Seeking to infer a broader limit on legislative power by induction from specific express restrictions is, the Court said, "distinctly inconsistent with the orthodox approach to constitutional interpretation established by the Engineers' Case" [17]. As to the plaintiffs' warning that State Parliaments might divide the people by creating "enclaves", the Court said that the possibility that legislative power may be misused is not a sufficient reason to deny its existence, and the Constitution is not to be interpreted with a jaundiced view of the integrity, wisdom or practical competence of the people's representatives [18]. In any event, the plaintiffs pleaded no facts to suggest that the Act or the Lockdown Directions could divide the people into enclaves so as to impede their political sovereignty [18].
The plaintiffs' closest support was in observations of Griffith CJ and Barton J in R v Smithers; Ex parte Benson, which concerned a New South Wales law making it an offence for a resident of another State to enter New South Wales if he or she had been convicted in his or her home State of an offence punishable by death or imprisonment for a year or more and less than three years had passed since release from any imprisonment [19]. Griffith CJ held that law invalid because the States' power to exclude residents of other States had been cut down by the fact of federation, irrespective of ss 92 and 117, and Barton J reasoned similarly, both drawing support from Crandall v State of Nevada [19]. The Court said those observations concerned movement between the States, and to what is now the Australian Capital Territory, not State power over intrastate movement, and that the other members of the Court did not follow that approach, Isaacs and Higgins JJ holding the law invalid because it interfered with the freedom of interstate intercourse guaranteed by s 92 [20]. In Pioneer Express Pty Ltd v Hotchkiss, Dixon CJ spoke of an implied immunity from State interference with the Australian Capital Territory as the centre of the national government, but he concluded that pressing that implication so far as to disable a State from making a law about intrastate movement would go beyond the doctrines by which implications are authorised [21]. Nothing in Smithers or Pioneer Express therefore recognises a constitutional impediment to regulating intrastate movement, and the kind of implication spoken of there is better understood today under the implied freedom of political communication, for access to the seat of government, or under Ch III, for access to the courts of the Commonwealth [22].
Political communication. The plaintiffs argued that movement for any purpose is political communication, and that freedom of movement is necessary to maintain the system of representative and responsible government as an aspect of the implied freedom of political communication [23]. The Court said the implied freedom recognised in Lange protects, in words it quoted from McCloy v New South Wales, "political communication, not communication in general", and is a necessary implication from ss 7, 24 and 128 and related provisions because it is indispensable to enabling the people, in Lange's words, to "exercise a free and informed choice as electors" [24]. Limits on movement that burden political communication may be invalid, as limits on movement for political protest were held to be in Levy v Victoria and Brown v Tasmania, but limits on communication or movement without a political character are not [24]. So a statute limiting freedom of movement may be invalid, but that is because it is an impermissible burden on political communication, and the plaintiffs had not pleaded that the Act or the Lockdown Directions restricted political communication [25].
Section 92. The plaintiffs submitted that intrastate movement is a necessary incident of the freedom of interstate intercourse guaranteed by s 92 [26]. The Court held that argument "distinctly contrary" to Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd, where a majority held that a guarantee of freedom of communication, which can be taken to include movement of persons, cannot be implied from s 92 [27]. The argument was also logically deficient because it did not explain why a law burdening interstate intercourse by restricting intrastate movement should be tested against a freestanding freedom rather than directly against s 92 [27]. The asserted freedom would "swallow the freedom expressly guaranteed by s 92" and make otiose the line s 92 draws between protected interstate intercourse and intrastate intercourse, which s 92 does not purport to protect [28]. Accepting it would mean an implied restriction on power wider than the express terms of s 92, contrary to the Engineers' Case, where the plurality applied Lord Loreburn LC's statement that "if the text is explicit the text is conclusive, alike in what it directs and what it forbids" [28]. The Court said this was not slavish adherence to the maxims expressio unius est exclusio alterius or expressum facit cessare tacitum, but recognition that the powers granted or preserved by the Constitution are not to be confined by implications which are not necessary and which would undermine s 92 [29]. It quoted Mason J in Miller that there is no "basis for implying a new s 92A into the Constitution" [29].
The mischief at which s 92 was directed was legislative interference with trade, commerce or intercourse between the States, and the possibility that State laws might restrict intrastate trade, commerce or intercourse was not identified as an impediment to a successful federation [30]. The Court drew on the Convention Debates: Isaac Isaacs at the 1897 Adelaide Convention said the provision was aimed at border duties rather than the internal management of a State, and Richard O'Connor at the 1897 Sydney Convention said the States would keep police powers to prohibit persons and animals with contagious diseases from entering their territory [30]–[31]. The plaintiffs argued that the words of s 92 about trade, commerce and intercourse among the States should be read pragmatically as meaning throughout the Commonwealth, but that wording was considered and rejected in the Convention Debates, by Isaacs and, at the 1898 Melbourne Convention, by Edmund Barton [32]–[33]. The Court said it would be "a distinctly unsound approach" to give the constitutional text a meaning that the framers were evidently united in rejecting [34]. For these reasons the plaintiffs' contention was rejected and the demurrer allowed [35].
Orders. On 6 November 2020 the Court answered the agreed question against the plaintiffs and ordered that the demurrer be allowed with costs [6]. The formal order reads: "Demurrer allowed with costs."
Why it matters
The Court confirmed that freedom of movement enjoys constitutional protection as an aspect or corollary of the implied freedom of political communication, not as a freestanding implication [12]. It also confirmed that what the Constitution implies depends on its terms and structure, not on general ideas of what federation requires, and that inferring broad limits on power from specific express restrictions is inconsistent with the approach established by the Engineers' Case [14], [17]. On s 92, the Court rejected an implied freedom that would protect intrastate intercourse, which the text of s 92 does not purport to protect [28].
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