Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
(2017) 263 CLR 1 · [2017] HCA 33 · (2017) 347 ALR 350 · (2017) 91 ALJR 890
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Te Puia v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33 are two matters (M97/2016 and P58/2016) decided together by the High Court of Australia on 6 September 2017.
Mr Graham and Mr Te Puia, both citizens of New Zealand, challenged the Minister's decisions to cancel their visas under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), in which the Minister relied on information said to be protected from disclosure under s 503A. [1]–[2]
Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ held that s 501(3) is not invalid and that s 503A(2) is invalid to the extent only that s 503A(2)(c) would prevent the Minister from being required to give relevant information to the High Court exercising jurisdiction under s 75(v) of the Constitution, or to the Federal Court exercising jurisdiction under s 476A(1)(c) and (2) of the Act. [66], [70]
They held each decision invalid because the Minister acted on a wrong construction of s 503A(2), and the orders were writs of certiorari and prohibition, with costs against the Minister. [68]–[70]
Edelman J dissented and would have held that neither provision is invalid and that no relief should be granted. [72], [187]
Facts
Section 501(3) of the Act allows the Minister to cancel a visa if he reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test and is satisfied that cancellation is in the national interest. [10]
A person relevantly does not pass the test if the person has a substantial criminal record, or if the Minister reasonably suspects that the person has been or is a member of a group or organisation and that it has been or is involved in criminal conduct. [11]
The power may be exercised only by the Minister personally, and the rules of natural justice do not apply to a decision under it. [13]
Section 503A(2)(c) provides that the Minister must not be required to divulge or communicate to a court, a tribunal, a parliament or any other body or person information that a gazetted agency communicated on condition that it be treated as confidential and that is relevant to a power under s 501, 501A, 501B or 501C. [14]
The Minister may, after consulting the agency, declare that this does not prevent disclosure to a specified court or tribunal, but he has no duty to consider doing so. [16]
Mr Graham has resided in Australia since December 1976 and held a Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa. [1]
On 9 June 2016 he received a letter saying the Minister had decided to cancel it, and the Minister said he had considered information protected from disclosure under s 503A, of which Mr Graham was given neither a copy nor any details. [1]
In 2009 Mr Graham had been convicted and sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment on each of three counts of assault, so he could not have passed the character test because of s 501(6)(a) and (7)(c). [20]
The Minister's stated reason for his suspicion under s 501(6)(b) was that Mr Graham was a member of the Rebels Outlaw Motorcycle Gang and that it had been involved in criminal conduct. [21]
The Minister took those facts and Mr Graham's criminal history into account in determining that cancellation was in the national interest, and he said he had also considered the undisclosed information, which was in an Attachment ZZ to the submission made to him. [22]–[24]
Mr Te Puia held a visa of the same class and has been resident in Australia since 2005. [2]
On 2 November 2015 he was given a letter telling him of the Minister's decision to cancel his visa under s 501(3), said to be based on information protected from disclosure under s 503A, of which he was given neither a copy nor any details. [2]
The Minister relied on s 501(6)(b), the organisation apparently being the Rebels Outlaw Motorcycle Gang, and did not refer to Mr Te Puia's criminal record as relevant to the character test. [25]
The joint reasons say it would appear that the Minister's suspicion was formed by reference only to the undisclosed information, which was in an Attachment Z to the submission to him. [26]–[27]
Neither man sought orders for production of the information, and neither made representations to the Minister under s 501C(3) to revoke the decision. [6], [28]
The information was not given to either man, their lawyers, the Federal Court or the High Court, and the Minister did not seek orders under s 503B in order that he might declare under s 503A(3) that disclosure to those courts could occur. [6]
Procedural history
Mr Graham brought proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, seeking writs of prohibition and a writ of certiorari. [4]
Mr Te Puia applied to the Federal Court under s 476A of the Act for an order setting aside the decision, and the matter was removed into the High Court by order of Gordon J. [5]
In each proceeding the parties agreed a special case stating questions, in practically the same terms, for the opinion of the Full Court, and the same arguments were put for both men. [7], [9]
The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth and the Attorneys-General of Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and South Australia intervened in both matters, and the Attorney-General for New South Wales intervened in M97/2016.
Issues
Question 1 asked whether either or both of s 501(3) and s 503A(2) are invalid because they require a federal court to exercise judicial power in a manner inconsistent with the essential character of a court or the nature of judicial power, or so limit the right or ability to seek relief under s 75(v) of the Constitution as to be inconsistent with the place of that provision in the constitutional structure. [7]
Question 2, as put in Mr Graham's special case, asked whether the Minister could be satisfied that cancellation was in the national interest without findings on his knowledge of, opinion of, support for or participation in the gang's suspected criminal conduct, and/or on how cancellation would disrupt the criminal activities of such gangs. [70]
Question 3 asked whether the decision to cancel was invalid because of the answer to Question 1, because the Minister acted on a wrong construction of s 503A(2), or because he failed to make those findings. [70]
Questions 4 and 5 asked what relief should be granted and who should pay the costs. [70]
Held
Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ
Their Honours took the questions as directed only to s 503A(2), because the invalidity of s 501(3) was not addressed in submissions for the plaintiff. [8]
Mr Graham and Mr Te Puia argued, starting from Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, that finding facts relevant to the determination of rights in issue is an essential function of courts and that s 503A(2) interferes with it. [29]
Their Honours said that proposition requires qualification, because Parliament can regulate aspects of judicial fact-finding and laws may regulate the method or burden of proving facts, even where that may have a serious effect on the outcome of proceedings. [30]–[33]
They accepted the Minister's submission only to the extent that where the balance lies in the public interest has never been said to be the exclusive preserve of the courts, nor has it been said that legislation may not affect that balance. [35]
They added that whether the Constitution permits legislation to deny a court exercising jurisdiction under s 75(v) the ability to see the evidence on which a decision was based "is another matter". [35]
The argument from Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, that s 503A(2) substantially impairs a court's institutional integrity, was "not compelling", and control of disclosure by a gazetted agency and the Minister does not affect the appearance of the court's impartiality. [37]
On s 75(v), their Honours returned to first principles: all power of government is limited by law, and the function of the judicial branch, within its jurisdiction, is to declare and enforce the law that limits its own power and the power of the other branches. [38]–[39]
Section 75(v) confers original jurisdiction on the High Court in all matters in which mandamus, prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth, and s 77(i) and (iii) empower Parliament to confer or invest equivalent statutory jurisdiction on or in other courts. [42]
Quoting R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598, they said it is "impossible" for Parliament to limit a body's authority, intending that any excess means invalidity, and yet deprive the High Court of authority to restrain the invalid action by prohibition. [43]
Quoting Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, they said Parliament may determine the content of the law to be obeyed but "cannot deprive this Court of its constitutional jurisdiction to enforce the law so enacted". [44]
A privative clause would be invalid if read literally so as to deny a court exercising jurisdiction under or derived from s 75(v) the ability to enforce the legal limits of the power conferred, and another provision, not cast as a privative clause, must likewise be invalid if and to the extent that it has the legal or practical operation of denying that ability. [45]–[46]
Parliament can confine the statutory jurisdiction it confers under s 77(i) or (iii), and can under s 51(xxxix) regulate procedure, including by limiting admission of relevant evidence. [47]
What it cannot do, under any source of legislative power, is enact a law denying the High Court under s 75(v), or another court exercising jurisdiction conferred by reference to s 75(v), the ability to enforce the legislated limits of an officer's power. [48]
Whether a law does so is "one of substance, and therefore of degree", requiring examination of its legal operation and of its practical impact on a court's ability to discern and declare whether the conditions of and constraints on the power have been observed. [48]
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651, which held invalid a blanket and inflexible time limit in s 486A of the Act, was given as an illustration. [49]
Section 503A(2)(c) imposes "a similarly blanket and inflexible limit" on obtaining and receiving evidence relevant to whether the conditions of and constraints on the Minister's powers have been observed. [50]
Gazetted agency is defined widely, the Gazette notice then in force specifying 42 Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities and departments and 285 countries or parts of countries. [51]
The practical impact is that the High Court and the Federal Court cannot require production of information that by definition is relevant to the purported exercise of power under review, whatever the importance of the information to the determination. [52]
The Minister is in practice entitled to base a purported exercise of power on information unknown to the court, unless he chooses to make a declaration under s 503A(3), and to that extent s 503A(2)(c) shields the exercise of power from judicial scrutiny. [53]
The court also cannot draw an inference adverse to the Minister while he says his decision is based on information protected by s 503A(2). [54]
The Minister's suspicion and satisfaction must each be formed reasonably and on a correct understanding of the law, and the national interest, "although broad and evaluative, is not unbounded". [57]
The Minister had regard to information within s 503A(1) on both the character test and the national interest, and for Mr Te Puia it was the only information on the character test, so whether he acted reasonably and within power "cannot be known to this Court or to the Federal Court". [58]–[59]
Their Honours rejected the analogy with public interest immunity, saying that the view of history behind it is too narrow and citing Robinson v State of South Australia [No 2] [1931] AC 704 for the better view that a court always had in reserve a power to inquire. [60]
They added that a court upholding a claim for immunity has itself weighed the competing interests and has not been deprived of access to the material at the outset. [61]
The analogy with statutory secrecy provisions upheld in other contexts also failed, because in Gypsy Jokers, K-Generation and South Australia v Totani the provisions did not prevent the reviewing court having access to the information on which the decision was based. [62]
General secrecy provisions could not be suggested to be invalid merely because they might incidentally deny particular evidence to a reviewing court, which emphasises that validity is a question of substance and degree. [63]
The problem lies in the inflexibility of s 503A(2)(c) in withholding information from the High Court under s 75(v), or the Federal Court under s 476A(1)(c) and (2), irrespective of the importance of the information to the review, and to that extent the provision "amounts to a substantial curtailment of the capacity of a court exercising jurisdiction under or derived from s 75(v) of the Constitution to discern and declare whether or not the legal limits of powers conferred on the Minister by the Act have been observed". [64]
Their Honours found it unnecessary to further analyse matters of substance and degree, though it may be necessary in the future, and said that here s 503A(2) effectively denied the court the evidence on which the decision was based, in Mr Te Puia's case the whole of it, and "strikes at the very heart of the review for which s 75(v) provides". [65]
The Minister and the Attorney-General did not suggest reading s 503A(2) down, and the invalid application was severed: applying s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), the reference to a court in s 503A(2)(c) must be read to exclude those two courts when exercising that jurisdiction. [66]
The inference from the Minister's reasons was that he made the decisions understanding that s 503A was valid in its entirety and prevented him in any circumstances from being required to divulge the information, including to a court reviewing the decisions. [68]
That error was not as to the question to be asked but as to "an important attribute of the decision to be made", namely whether it would be shielded from review so far as it was based on the information. [68]
Quoting Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, they said the result was "a purported but not a real exercise of the power conferred by s 501(3)". [68]
Writs of prohibition, and by way of ancillary relief writs of certiorari, were therefore appropriate, and the further argument about how the Minister's reasons explained the national interest need not be addressed. [69]
Edelman J (dissenting)
Edelman J agreed, for the reasons in the joint reasons, that the challenge based on a court's institutional integrity should be dismissed, but on the implied constitutional constraint on Parliament's ability to restrict judicial review he departed from "the reasoning and the conclusions in the joint reasons". [72]
He said the implication of a minimum provision of judicial review was first suggested in obiter dicta in Plaintiff S157/2002, and that this appeared to be the first case in any court since Federation seeking to apply it to ensure a minimum content of judicial review rather than merely to secure the existence of judicial review. [73]–[74]
In the absence of submissions to the contrary, and "not without doubt", he proceeded on the basis that such an implication exists. [75]
He said its essential content is to be found from its textual basis, function, and legal and contextual background and history, and assessed for its fit with established constitutional doctrines. [94]
He distinguished a restricted conception of the Plaintiff S157/2002 passage, under which a legislature cannot abolish in form or in substance the subjects of the s 75 jurisdiction, from a larger conception concerned also with the content of judicial review, and said there are strong reasons for a cautious approach to the larger one. [103], [105]–[106]
He read Bodruddaza as not inconsistent with the narrow conception, because s 486A in a number of circumstances precluded a s 75(v) claim entirely as a matter of practical effect. [109]–[110]
He gave two, or possibly three, reasons for rejecting the submissions, the first being that they are ahistorical. [78]–[79]
He pointed to the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848, whose standard form conviction contained none of the evidence and so removed much of the record reviewable on certiorari, standardising an approach already adopted in legislation for more than a century. [127]
In R v Nat Bell Liquors Ltd [1922] 2 AC 128 the Privy Council said of that Act that the face of the record became "the inscrutable face of a sphinx", which Edelman J, following Costello, called an exaggeration, partly because jurisdictional error could still be proved by affidavit. [128]-[129]
He said s 503A(2) removes far less of the record than that form of legislation. [170]
He also relied on Beatson v Skene (1860) 5 H & N 838, the leading case at Federation, which held that whether production would be injurious to the public service was for the head of the department having custody of the paper and not the judge. [137]
In his view, at Federation a certificate from a Minister or head of department that disclosure would be injurious to the public interest was conclusive, with only a theoretical exception for an extreme case where the description of the document showed it fell outside the protected class. [148]
He said the Court in Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Co Ltd v The Commonwealth [No 2] (1913) 16 CLR 178 was unanimous about the conclusive nature of such a certificate and divided only on the scope of the extreme case. [151]
He said Robinson v State of South Australia [No 2], which the joint reasons cite, confused a power to consider whether a document was in the class for which the certificate was conclusive with a general power to inquire, and that it appears such a general power had never been exercised in the many cases litigated over half a century. [60], [165]
After Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 was adopted in Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, Australian courts from 1978 no longer treated such a certificate as conclusive, but he said the rule's unquestioned existence at Federation and for decades beyond "remains an extremely important matter of historical context". [167]
He said s 503A(2) achieves by legislation a very similar effect to a nineteenth century certificate from the Minister, and that in two respects it is more liberal: s 503A(3) permits disclosure to a court after consultation with the agency, and the conditions for s 503A(2) must be considered in every case. [171], [173]
The second reason was that invalidity would create inconsistencies with the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, including Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319, where the Court unanimously held s 46A of the Act valid although the Minister had no duty even to consider exercising the power. [122], [174]
He said that holding the technique of reducing the record unconstitutional "would cause intolerable inconsistencies with the decisions of this Court" and would recognise "a vague and uncertain implication without any clear criterion of application". [99]
A possible third reason, not essential to his conclusion and not the subject of submissions from the Minister or any intervener, was the difficulty of a constitutional implication protecting an unreasonableness ground that itself arises only by implication from the statute. [86]
He did not decide that point, saying that in the absence of submissions it was unnecessary to do so. [178]
He said s 503A does not generally prevent judicial review or oust the jurisdiction in s 75(v), and that its effect is to make a ground such as unreasonableness more difficult to establish in some cases. [169]
On the national interest ground, he said the Minister did not move uncritically from suspicion of membership to his conclusion about Mr Graham, because he relied on numerous matters including Mr Graham's history of criminal convictions. [182]
As to Mr Te Puia, he said it was possible that much weight had been placed on the protected information, but the submissions essentially invited a fresh assessment of the merits of what is, quoting Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, "largely a political question", and could not have succeeded even if the information had been disclosed. [183]
He found it unnecessary to consider how the implication would extend to jurisdiction under s 77(i), or whether s 503A(2), if invalid, could be read down. [185]–[186]
He would have answered that neither s 501(3) nor s 503A(2) is invalid, that the Minister could be satisfied of the national interest without the findings in Question 2, that the decision was not invalid, that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief and that the plaintiff should pay the costs, with identical answers for the applicant. [187]
Orders. In each matter the Court answered Question 1 as follows: s 501(3) is not invalid, and s 503A(2) is invalid to the extent only that s 503A(2)(c) would apply to prevent the Minister from being required to divulge or communicate information to the High Court when exercising jurisdiction under s 75(v) of the Constitution, or to the Federal Court when exercising jurisdiction under s 476A(1)(c) and (2) of the Act, to review a purported exercise of power by the Minister under s 501, 501A, 501B or 501C to which the information is relevant. [70]
Question 2 was unnecessary to answer. [70]
On Question 3, the decision of the Minister to cancel the visa was invalid because the Minister acted on a wrong construction of s 503A(2). [70]
On Question 4, there should be directed to the Minister a writ of certiorari quashing the decision and a writ of prohibition preventing action on it. [70]
On Question 5, the Minister should pay the costs of the special case and of the proceeding. [70]
Why it matters
On the joint reasons, a law need not be cast as a privative clause to infringe s 75(v), since another provision is invalid if and to the extent that its legal or practical operation denies a court the ability to enforce the limits set on an officer's power. [46]
The joint reasons apply that principle to a limit on evidence, treating s 503A(2)(c) as a substantial curtailment of a court's capacity to discern and declare whether those limits have been observed. [50], [64]
They also keep the holding confined: validity is a question of substance and degree, general secrecy provisions could not be suggested to be invalid merely because they might incidentally deny evidence to a reviewing court, and further analysis may be necessary in the future. [63], [65]
The joint reasons also hold, following Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor, that a Minister's error about whether a decision would be shielded from review can mean that the power was purportedly but not really exercised. [68]
Edelman J said this appeared to be the first case in any court since Federation seeking to use the implication to ensure a minimum content of judicial review, and that since 2003 the constraint had been applied only once in the High Court, in Bodruddaza. [74], [91]
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