Griffith University v Tang
(2005) 221 CLR 99 · [2005] HCA 7 · (2005) 213 ALR 724 · (2005) 79 ALJR 627 · (2005) 82 ALD 289
Summary updated 3 November 2026
Overview
Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, given on 3 March 2005 on appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland. The question was whether a university's decision to exclude a student from its PhD programme was made under an enactment, so that it could be reviewed under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Q) (the Review Act) [3], [5]. By four judges to one, the High Court allowed the University's appeal and dismissed the student's application for a statutory order of review [25], [97], [174]. Gleeson CJ, and Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in joint reasons, reasoned separately to that result, and Kirby J dissented [23], [96], [174].
Facts
Griffith University is a body corporate established by s 4 of the Griffith University Act 1998 (Q) (the University Act), and the joint reasons describe it as "wholly the creature of statute" [33]. Its functions include providing education at a university standard and conferring higher education awards, and it has all the powers of an individual, including the power to do anything necessary or convenient in connection with its functions [6]. Section 8(1) of the Higher Education (General Provisions) Act 1993 (Q) (the Higher Education Act) prohibited an unauthorised non-university provider from conferring a higher education award, so the PhD sought by the respondent, Ms Vivian Tang, could only be obtained in Queensland from a body such as the University [33]–[34], [101]. The University's Council could make university statutes on matters including the admission, enrolment and disciplining of students, but there were none of relevance, and instead its Academic Committee approved revised policies on academic misconduct and on student grievances and appeals in 2001 [6], [7], [128].
By letter dated 19 July 2002, the University told Ms Tang that the Assessment Board, a sub-committee of the Research and Postgraduate Studies Committee, had found that she had engaged in academic misconduct, referring specifically to her presenting falsified or improperly obtained data as if they were the result of laboratory work [36]. By letter dated 9 August 2002, after she made further submissions, the Board's chair acknowledged that the Board had determined that she be excluded from her PhD candidature programme on the ground that she had undertaken research without regard to ethical and scientific standards [36]. On 17 October 2002 the University Appeals Committee determined that her appeal be dismissed, and its chair's letter of 21 October 2002 said the Committee was satisfied "on a strong balance of probabilities" that an ongoing fabrication of experimental data had occurred, and that the procedures were consistent with procedural fairness [37].
Ms Tang contended that at both levels there were breaches of natural justice, failures to comply with mandatory procedural requirements, improper exercises of power and errors of law [1]. Her complaints included that the officer who chaired the Assessment Board had first investigated the complaint against her, that she had inadequate time to respond to expert witnesses, and that she was denied legal representation [115]–[116]. Kirby J noted that her contentions on the merits have never been tried [105]. She said her exclusion had destroyed her prospects of a professional career in molecular biology and bioscience [2].
Gleeson CJ said there was no evidence of a contract, though there may well have been one, that it was not relied on by either party, and that the silence in the evidence on this matter "is curious" [12]. The joint reasons said it had been common ground throughout the litigation that her enrolment did not give rise to a contractual relationship [57]. Kirby J said it was agreed, "although detailed evidence might have shaken this", that there was no contractual arrangement [130].
Procedural history
By application dated 18 November 2002, Ms Tang sought a statutory order of review setting aside the decisions culminating in and including that of the Appeals Committee [52]. The University applied for an order under s 48 of the Review Act dismissing the application, which may be made if the Supreme Court considers there is no reasonable basis for the application [54]. Mackenzie J refused (Tang v Griffith University [2003] QSC 22), saying that "the tightly structured nature of the devolution of authority by delegation" led to the conclusion that the exclusion was an administrative decision made under an enactment, even though the Council's powers were expressed in a general way [4], [54].
The Court of Appeal (Jerrard JA, Dutney and Philippides JJ) dismissed the University's appeal (Tang v Griffith University [2003] QCA 571) [55]. Dutney J, with whom Philippides J agreed, accepted Ms Tang's submission that the question was answered by asking, in the words the joint reasons set out from the Court of Appeal, "[i]s it something that anyone in the community could do, which is simply facilitated by the statute, or is it something which a person can only do with specific statutory authority?" [55]. Jerrard JA referred to Full Court of the Federal Court decisions, in particular General Newspapers Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation, and on Kirby J's account described the decision as one "as to a central or core function of the University" [56], [149]. The appeal to the High Court was by special leave, on terms that the University bear Ms Tang's costs of that appeal [98].
Issues
The issue was whether the decision to exclude Ms Tang was a decision to which the Review Act applied, which under s 4 depended on whether it was, in that section's words, "a decision of an administrative character made ... under an enactment" [3]. The argument turned on whether the decision was made under an enactment, the relevant enactment being the University Act [5]. That formula was borrowed from the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act), and s 16(1) of the Review Act says that where a provision of it appears to express the same idea as the ADJR Act in different words because of different drafting practice, the ideas must not be taken to be different merely because different words are used [3], [26].
Ms Tang's standing as a person aggrieved was not in controversy, and Kirby J recorded that the University conceded in the Court of Appeal that the decision was of an administrative character [19], [46], [138]. Whether she would have a remedy at common law, for breach of contract or under the powers preserved by s 41 of the Review Act was not a question that arose [3]. Paragraph (b) of the definition, which covers decisions under certain non-statutory schemes involving public funds, was not before the Court [48]–[49], [140].
Held
Gleeson CJ
Gleeson CJ wrote separate reasons, concluded that the appeal should be allowed and agreed with the orders proposed by Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ [25]. He said nothing in the University Act dealt specifically with admission to or exclusion from a research programme, academic misconduct or internal procedures for such issues, and that the powers exercised appeared to flow from the general functions and powers in ss 5 and 6 and the powers of the Council [8]. He said Australian National University v Burns, Australian National University v Lewins and other Federal Court decisions establish, in relation to the ADJR Act, that it is not enough that a decision be within power [10]. He quoted Lehane J in Lewins that a decision meets the test "only if it is one for the making of which the relevant statute either expressly or impliedly provides and one to which the statute gives legal force or effect" [10]. He said it does not follow that any administrative decision made in exercising the general powers in a statute establishing an institution is made under that statute [11].
He explained that in Burns the dismissal of a professor was characterised as a decision under the contract rather than under the Act [12]–[13]. Ellicott J's approach at first instance in Burns, which looked to the nature of the power rather than its immediate source, would have supported Ms Tang, but the Full Court rejected it and Gleeson CJ said the subsequent course of authority made it inappropriate to reconsider the decision [14].
He accepted that, from a practical point of view, it is unrealistic to treat the exclusion as no different from a service provider withdrawing future supply from a consumer [19]. Yet, he said, the legal effect of an otherwise lawful decision to terminate a relationship may be described accurately and sufficiently as a termination, even if the context confers particular benefits on one party [19]. So far as the evidence showed, he said, the relationship was voluntary and neither party was bound to continue it, although Ms Tang would have had a legitimate expectation that certain procedures would be followed [20]. He said the University's decision "was not a decision which took legal force or effect, in whole or in part, from the terms of either statute" [20].
He said that the further test proposed by Ms Tang's counsel, whether the decision's efficacy could be achieved by "anyone in the public" (counsel's phrase), might be a useful question in a given case [21]–[22]. As a free-standing test, he said, it suffers from the defect that the answer may depend on "the level of abstraction" at which the decision or its legal effect is described, since a member of the public cannot exclude a person from a PhD course but can, subject to legal constraints, end a voluntary association [22].
He concluded that the termination occurred under the general law and under the terms and conditions on which the University was willing to enter the relationship, and that although the power was conferred in general terms by the University Act, "the decision to end the relationship was not given legal force or effect by that Act" [23]. He also said that, because of the language taken from the ADJR Act and the history of its interpretation, it could be that the statutory scheme in some circumstances provides "a more restricted form of judicial review than is otherwise available" [3].
Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ
Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ wrote joint reasons and proposed the orders the Court made [25], [97]–[98]. They identified three elements in s 20 of the Review Act: a decision to which the Act applies, an applicant who is aggrieved by it, and reliance on a listed ground of review [41]. On the first two they said: "It is the first which is the precondition for the second, not vice versa" [44]. They said "there are dangers in looking at the definition as other than a whole", and treated whether a decision is made under an enactment as a question of characterisation, to be determined with regard to the subject, scope and purpose of the legislation [60], [64].
They did not accept a construction turning on the immediate or proximate source of power, a distinction drawn in Post Office Agents Association Ltd v Australian Postal Commission, saying the search for such relationships "deflects attention from the interpretation of the Review Act and the ADJR Act in the light of their subject, scope and purpose" [68]–[69]. They also rejected Ms Tang's two-limb development of the criterion accepted by Dutney and Philippides JJ, saying neither Glasson v Parkes Rural Distributions Pty Ltd nor Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin supported its second limb [70]–[71].
Drawing on a Federal Court line of authority beginning with Chittick v Ackland and including Lewins, they said that the enactment's requirement or authority for a decision is "a necessary condition" but "not, by itself, sufficient" [78]. They reasoned that what gives a decision the significance meriting a right of judicial review is, in general terms, "the affecting of legal rights and obligations" [79]–[80]. If a decision derives its capacity to bind from contract or some other private law source, they said, it is not made under the enactment, and a statutory grant of a bare capacity to contract does not give later contracts that character [81]–[82]. To the extent that Australian Capital Territory Health Authority v Berkeley Cleaning Group Pty Ltd decided otherwise, they said it and decisions relying on it should be regarded as having proceeded on an incorrect interpretation of the ADJR Act, although the contract cases could not determine this case because no contractual relationship was suggested [83].
They then stated two criteria, both of which must be met: "first, the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment; and, secondly, the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment" [89]. It is sufficient, they said, that the enactment requires or authorises decisions from which new rights or obligations arise, and the affected rights need not owe their existence to the enactment, since rights or obligations derived from the general law or statute will suffice [89]. They said the ADJR Act's character as a Commonwealth law conferring federal jurisdiction supports that construction, and that although the Review Act lacks that constitutional underpinning, s 16(1) links the two statutes [90].
Applying the test, they accepted as correct the submission of counsel for the University that, given how Ms Tang framed her application, no legal rights and obligations under private law subsisted that the decisions could affect [91]. There was, they said, "at best a consensual relationship", and its ending involved no decision made by the University under the University Act [91]. They accepted for the purposes of argument that she had an expectation that any withdrawal would only follow fair treatment of complaints, but said such an expectation created no substantive rights under the general law that would make the decisions ones made under the Act [92]. Nor did she have any presently subsisting statutory rights, or statutory rights contingent solely on re-admission, because she would still have had to satisfy the requirements for the degree [93]. They said that had she done so a question may have arisen, which it was unnecessary to decide, whether she had a statutory or other right to the award [93]. The fact that she had to obtain the award from an authorised institution such as the University did not, they said, make the exclusion a decision made under the University Act [94]. They concluded that the decisions were "authorised, albeit not required" by the University Act, but "did not affect legal rights and obligations" and so were not made under that Act in the sense required for review [96].
Kirby J (dissenting)
Kirby J dissented and would have dismissed the University's appeal with costs [174]–[175]. He said the Court was, for the second time in less than two years, adopting "an unduly narrow approach to the availability of statutory judicial review directed to the deployment of public power", the first occasion being NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd [99]. He said Australian universities, established by public law with large public funding, are part of the network of public authorities that must, to the extent provided, conform to the law, including procedural fairness [110]. He said that, because the law was uncertain, the summary relief sought by the University should have been postponed until after a substantive hearing and evidentiary findings [121]–[123].
He surveyed five approaches to the phrase, which he called the core functions test, the proximate source test, the authorised or required test, the rights and duties test endorsed by the majority, and the need for statutory authority test [149]. He called the last the correct test: it asks first whether the lawful source of the power lies in the enactment, and second whether an individual would, apart from that source, have the power under the common law or another statute, and if not, the decision is made under the statute or is made without power [149].
He said that requiring affection of legal rights and obligations was a judicial gloss contrary to the text of the Review Act, which allows persons whose interests are adversely affected to invoke it [104], [152]. In his view the Review Act is concerned as well with a party's interests, "a much broader notion, and deliberately so" [155].
Applying his test, he said that, apart from a university established or recognised under an Act, no corporation or individual in Queensland could lawfully provide education at university standard and confer higher education awards, because of the prohibition in the Higher Education Act [157]. So the power to withdraw education from an admitted candidate and deny access to an award had to find its source in the University Act, since "[t]he power to withhold is included in the power to grant" [158]. He concluded that the decisions were made under the University Act "or they were unlawful" [159]. He said describing the events as the termination of an arrangement or relationship at general law could not alter their character, because the termination was "indistinguishable from the University's refusal to exercise the relevant statutory powers" [162].
He accepted that courts sensibly decline to review matters such as the marking of an examination paper or the academic merit of a thesis [165]. Relying on Maurice Kay J in R v University of Cambridge; Ex parte Persaud, he distinguished disciplinary cases from pure academic judgment and placed Ms Tang's claim in the disciplinary class [166]. He said the fear of an undue opening of floodgates was unpersuasive, and that in exercising the discretion to grant relief, if a university's decision was made fairly by the appropriate body in accordance with the applicable policy, "the risks of judicial interference would be slight indeed" [168], [171].
Orders. The formal orders appear at the head of the judgment and carry no paragraph number. The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed. It set aside the order of the Court of Appeal made on 19 December 2003 and in its place ordered that the appeal to that Court be allowed. It set aside the orders of Mackenzie J made on 14 February 2003 and in their place ordered that the application for a statutory order of review be dismissed. It ordered that the University pay the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal, remitted the question of the costs of the application before Mackenzie J to the Supreme Court of Queensland, and ordered that the University pay Ms Tang's costs of the appeal to the High Court. The joint reasons explained that the costs of the appeal to the High Court followed the terms of the grant of special leave, and that Mackenzie J had reserved the costs of the s 48 application [98].
Why it matters
The joint reasons state two criteria for deciding whether a decision is made under an enactment, as a construction of the Review Act read with the ADJR Act through s 16(1) [89]–[90]. Those criteria are the reasoning of Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ, because Gleeson CJ's stated agreement was with the orders they proposed and his own reasons ask whether a statute gave the decision legal force or effect [10], [23], [25]. On the joint reasons, a statutory body's decision may be authorised by its Act and still not be made under it, because both criteria must be met [89], [96]. The appeal concerned only the statutory review scheme, since Gleeson CJ said whether Ms Tang had another remedy did not arise, and the joint reasons said it is undisputed that the Review Act does not exhaustively cover the field of administrative law [3], [32]. The joint reasons also noted that, had contract been relied on, the occasion may have arisen to consider the apparent exclusion of issues of academic judgment from justiciability in Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside, an English Court of Appeal decision [58]. Kirby J said the principle upheld "has an application far beyond universities and affects other statutory authorities", and he referred to uncertain consequences for the accountability of public decision-makers to the law [114], [174].
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