casewise

Isbester v Knox City Council

(2015) 255 CLR 135 · [2015] HCA 20

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ), dated 10 June 2015. It concerns apprehended bias where a member of a Council panel who was substantially involved in prosecuting charges about a dog also took part in the panel's decision that the dog be destroyed [1]–[2], [11]. The High Court allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and the primary judge, and quashed the Council's decision [51], [71]. Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ gave joint reasons and Gageler J gave separate reasons agreeing in that result, so no judge dissented [1], [53], [71].

Facts

Section 84P(e) of the Domestic Animals Act 1994 (Vic) (the Act) gives the Council power to destroy a dog where its owner has been found guilty of an offence under s 29 [1]. Ms Isbester was convicted, on her plea of guilty, of an offence under s 29(4), on a charge that on 4 August 2012 her Staffordshire terrier, called Izzy, had attacked a person and caused serious injury, and the Council had seized the dog [1]. In that incident two of her dogs were involved in an attack on another dog, and a person who tried to pull one of the attacking dogs off sustained a wound to her finger [3].

Ms Kirsten Hughes was the Council's Co-ordinator of Local Laws, and in June 2013, when Ms Isbester was charged with offences arising out of recent attacks by her three dogs, it came to Ms Hughes' attention that the investigation of the August 2012 incident had not been completed [3]. Ms Hughes directed further investigation, determined that six charges should be laid, signed some of them as informant, including the s 29(4) charge, and instructed the Council's solicitors to prosecute and to negotiate pleas, which were entered in the Ringwood Magistrates' Court on 12 September 2013 [4].

An order for the dog's destruction under s 29(12) could have been sought from the Magistrates' Court but was not; it was the Council's practice to convene a panel of its officers in cases of this kind, and Ms Hughes decided that a hearing should be held by the Knox Domestic Animals Act Committee, called the Panel in the proceedings, and made the arrangements [1]–[2], [5]. A letter drafted by Ms Hughes, sent the day after the Magistrates' Court hearing, told Ms Isbester that a Panel hearing would be held on 30 September 2013 before three Council officers: the chairperson, who was to be the person delegated to make the decision, Ms Hughes, and a third officer who had not been involved in the matters [6]–[7]. The letter also said that the officer involved in the investigation might be present but would not be involved in the decision making, which Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ said was incorrect if it was intended to suggest that Ms Hughes would not participate in the decision-making process [7].

Ms Isbester attended, gave evidence and made submissions to the Panel, which comprised Mr Angelo Kourambas, Director of City Development, Mr Steven Dickson, Manager of City Safety and Health, who was the chairperson, and Ms Hughes, each holding a delegation from the Council for the purposes of s 84P [8]. Ms Hughes made enquiries of the Department of Human Services about whether the dog could return to the house Ms Isbester occupied, and the other Panel members received materials including the briefs of evidence on the 2012 and 2013 attacks and Ms Hughes' notes of the Magistrates' Court hearing, which included comments by the Magistrate adverse to Ms Isbester [9]. It was not disputed that Ms Hughes participated fully in the Panel's decision-making process after the hearing, and she agreed in cross-examination that she played a major role in it [10]. According to Ms Hughes, after a detailed discussion between the members Mr Kourambas gave the instruction that the dog should be destroyed and she drafted reasons for his approval and signature, and Ms Isbester was notified of the decision by a letter dated 15 October 2013 [10].

Procedural history

Ms Isbester sought judicial review of the decision and orders in the nature of certiorari and prohibition under O 56 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic), and failed before the primary judge, Emerton J, in Isbester v Knox City Council [2014] VSC 286 [11]-[12]. Emerton J took the principle for apprehended bias from Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, and referred to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 for the point that its application will not be the same for a decision-maker who is not a judicial officer [12]. She considered that impartiality was required to the extent necessary to give persons affected by a s 84P(e) decision a genuine hearing, referring to the statement of Basten JA in McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council (2008) 72 NSWLR 504 that a fair-minded observer will expect of a councillor little more than an absence of personal interest and a willingness to give genuine and appropriate consideration to the application, and that those requirements could be satisfied even where a decision-maker had been involved in the earlier prosecution [13]-[14], [27]. Her Honour accepted that Ms Hughes participated in every aspect of the Panel decision and that her views would carry considerable weight, but found that the decision to destroy the dog was made by Mr Kourambas, the delegate for this purpose, not the other Panel members [19].

The appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Hansen and Osborn JJA and Garde AJA), in Isbester v Knox City Council [2014] VSCA 214, was limited to apprehended bias, and that Court considered prejudgment and conflict of interest separately, found neither made out and dismissed the appeal [13], [15]-[16]. It concluded that the case did not involve a conflict of interest such as in Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board (1972) 128 CLR 509 and Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 CLR 243, and, agreeing with the primary judge, distinguished Stollery because the Panel hearing was not a quasi-judicial hearing of the type in that case, Ms Hughes was not in the position of accuser at the Panel's hearing, and she had no special or personal interest in the matters in controversy [17]. The Court of Appeal did not base its decision on conflict of interest on the fact that Ms Hughes was not the designated decision-maker, and accepted that she had a material part in the decision-making process [19].

In the High Court the Council applied for leave to file a notice of contention, seeking to contend that, given the primary judge's finding, the Court of Appeal should have found that a fair-minded observer would not reasonably apprehend bias on the part of Mr Kourambas [18]–[19].

Issues

Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ stated the issue as whether the decision should be quashed because of the substantial involvement of a Panel member both in the prosecution of charges concerning the dog and in the Panel's decision on its fate [2]. Ms Isbester did not argue for a finding of prejudgment on the appeal, so only Ms Hughes' possible conflict of interest remained relevant, and Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ put the question as "whether it might reasonably be apprehended that a person in her position would have an interest in the decision which could affect her proper decision-making" [16], [33]. A further question was whether the Council should have leave to file its notice of contention [18], [51].

Held

Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ

Their Honours described the two steps said in Ebner to apply: identifying what it is said might lead a decision-maker to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits, spelling out the nature of any interest relied on, and articulating the logical connection between that interest and the feared deviation from deciding the case on its merits [21]. They said that how the principle is applied "may be said generally to depend upon the nature of the decision and its statutory context, what is involved in making the decision and the identity of the decision-maker" [23]. Jia Legeng and McGovern gave examples of how those factors bear on the impartiality to be expected of certain non-judicial decision-makers, but both concerned possible prejudgment, and neither addressed whether a person's involvement in the matter before the decision is incompatible with participating in the decision [24], [28].

A decision under s 84P(e) involves the safety of the public and also affects the dog's owner, and the Council accepted throughout that it required compliance with natural justice [29]–[30]. Their Honours said "Describing a process as having, or not having, a quasi-judicial quality is rarely helpful", and that here it diverted attention from the real question of the impartiality of the decision-maker given her particular involvement [31]. There was no statutory requirement for a hearing or panel, but they said it was not to be inferred from the Council's ability to decide the matter itself that the McGovern standard, of merely genuine and appropriate consideration, was relevant to, or determinative of, this case [32].

They likened the interest alleged to that which a person bringing charges might be expected to have in the outcome, and said it is generally expected that such a person may have an interest conflicting with the objectivity required of a person deciding the charges and any consequential matters, whether a judge or a member of some other decision-making body [34]. They noted that Isaacs J in Dickason called such cases instances of incompatibility, and that there the District Chief Ranger of a friendly society, whom the plaintiff was accused of insulting, could not sit on the committee hearing the charges [34]–[35]. In Stollery, a manager who accused a greyhound owner of attempting to bribe him, and who was a member of the Greyhound Racing Control Board, remained in the room during the Board's deliberations without taking part, and the High Court quashed the Board's decision [36]. Their Honours said Ms Hughes' position on the charges was analogous to that of the moving parties in those cases, but that neither case addressed whether it could reasonably be apprehended that she also maintained an interest in the outcome of the s 84P(e) decision [39].

The Council argued that the process had two stages and that any interest Ms Hughes had as a prosecutor ended with the Magistrates' Court proceedings, and their Honours accepted that the Panel's question was different, as a penalty proceeding may be regarded as different from one about the underlying offence, but said that much of the evidence relating to the past offence is also to be expected to be relevant to penalty, as it was here [40]–[41]. They said "It is not realistic to view Ms Hughes' interest in the matter as coming to an end when the proceedings in the Magistrates' Court were completed", and that it is reasonably to be expected that her involvement in the prosecution created an interest in the final outcome [42]. They tested this by asking whether, had the Magistrates' Court been asked for a destruction order, it might reasonably be apprehended that she would remain interested in whether it was granted, and they said the answer must clearly be yes [42]. They added that she organised the Panel hearing, drafted the letter advising of it and supplied the Panel with evidence, and that if she could not actually be described as a prosecutor on the s 84P(e) decision "she was certainly the moving force" [43].

On the Court of Appeal's view that the interests in Dickason and Stollery were particularly personal, their Honours accepted that Ms Hughes was not involved at quite the same personal level, but said this did not account for the disqualification in those cases, which arose from the interest of a prosecutor, accuser or other moving party, an interest that points to the possibility of a deviation from the true course of decision-making [44]–[45]. They said a personal interest in this context is not one by which a person will receive a material or other benefit, but for a prosecutor or other moving party refers to a view they may have of the matter, and may be in the vindication of their opinion that an offence has occurred or that a particular penalty should be imposed, adding that this "is not to equate such a person with a judge" [46].

They noted the statement in the joint reasons in Ebner that cases of incompatibility might have a special significance and might operate independently of problems relating to apprehension of bias, and they said that in such cases "disqualification would seem to be the only possible outcome, because the second step will necessarily be satisfied" [47]. The Council submitted that the Court should not apply an automatic disqualification and should apply the Ebner test, and their Honours said Ebner should not be understood to exclude such cases from that test, but that in cases of incompatibility of roles, once the interest is identified as pointing to a conflict of interest, the connection with possible deviation from proper decision-making "is obvious" [48]–[49]. They said the primary judge's finding that Ms Hughes did no more than diligently carry out her responsibility might be relevant to an allegation of actual bias but was no answer to one of apprehended bias based on an interest in the decision [48]. On the Council's point that the decision was made by her superior, Mr Kourambas, they said that, for the reasons given in Dickason and Stollery, the participation of others does not overcome the apprehension that her interest might affect not only her decision-making but that of others, and that the Court of Appeal was correct to approach the question on the basis that she played a material part in the decision, even if Mr Kourambas was responsible as delegate [48].

Their Honours concluded that a fair-minded observer might reasonably apprehend that Ms Hughes might not have brought an impartial mind to the s 84P(e) decision, and that because natural justice required that she not participate and she did, the decision must be quashed [50]. They said this conclusion "implies nothing about how Ms Hughes in fact approached the matter", and does not imply that she acted otherwise than diligently or that she was not in fact impartial [50]. They would refuse leave to file the notice of contention and allow the appeal with costs [51].

Gageler J

Gageler J wrote separately and agreed with the plurality that the appeal should be allowed, that the orders of the Court of Appeal and the primary judge should be set aside, and that the purported legal effect of the decision made in fact by Mr Kourambas should be quashed by an order in the nature of certiorari [71]. He recorded that it was not in dispute that the s 84P(e) power is impliedly conditioned by procedural fairness and that the standard incidents of procedural fairness are not displaced by the Act, and those incidents include, in words he took from Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, "the absence of the actuality or the appearance of disqualifying bias" [54]-[55].

He said that to accommodate a multi-stage process or a multi-member body the test "might sometimes more usefully be stated in a form which focuses on the overall integrity of the decision-making process", which might be stated as whether a hypothetical fair-minded observer with knowledge of the statutory framework and factual context might reasonably apprehend that the question to be decided might not be resolved as the result of a neutral evaluation of the merits [58]. Whether or not that form is useful, he said the test mirrors the curial test in being an objective test of possibility rather than probability, and in involving three analytical steps: identifying the factor which it is hypothesised might cause a question to be resolved otherwise than by a neutral evaluation of the merits, articulating how it might cause that deviation, and considering the reasonableness of the apprehension of that deviation [59]. Where the factor concerns one participant in a multi-stage process or multi-member body, he said the second step divides into how the factor might affect that person and how that effect might in turn affect the ultimate resolution of the question [60]. He said that this is determined from the objective possibilities arising from the externally manifested facts, with no inquiry into the actual state of mind of anyone involved, and that "The touchstone throughout the relevant inquiry remains the appearance rather than the actuality of bias" [61].

Of the rule said in Australian Workers' Union v Bowen [No 2] (1948) 77 CLR 601 that the same person cannot be accuser and judge where natural justice must be observed, he said it "is best understood, at least in an administrative context, not as a free-standing rule of law" but as referring to a factor whose identification will almost inevitably give rise to a clear-cut application of the ordinary test [63]. His reason was that a person who has been the adversary of another in the same or related proceedings can ordinarily be expected to have developed a frame of mind incompatible with the neutrality required to weigh the considerations relevant to a decision that may adversely affect that other person [63]. If a person who has once been an accuser is not the ultimate decision-maker, that person's role must still be examined, but he said it will ordinarily be sufficient that the person participated in, or even was present during, the substantive deliberations resulting in the decision or in a recommendation that it be made [65].

On his Honour's statement of the most critical facts, Ms Hughes as authorised officer charged Ms Isbester, later sat with Mr Kourambas on the three-member Panel which deliberated and recommended to him that he order destruction, and Mr Kourambas, as the Council's delegate, then made the decision [66]. He said nothing in the Act compelled that structure, there was no suggestion that Ms Hughes' participation was a practical necessity, the Council did not need to establish the Panel, and Ms Hughes did not need to be a member [67]. He said Ms Hughes might have developed, as prosecutor, a frame of mind incompatible with dispassionate evaluation, which might have affected the views she expressed as a Panel member and influenced the Panel's recommendation and Mr Kourambas' acceptance of it, and that a fair-minded observer would be quite reasonable to apprehend those possibilities [68]. He said that reasonableness was not negatived by her acting in her professional capacity, by the guilty plea and conviction on agreed facts, by the later and different question under s 84P(e), or by the evidence not demonstrating that she took the position of an accuser at the Panel hearing [69]. He concluded that her involvement in the deliberative process breached the implied condition of procedural fairness, taking the decision of Mr Kourambas beyond the power in s 84P(e) [70]. Unlike Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ, he would grant leave to file the notice of contention, but he rejected the contention that a fair-minded observer would not reasonably apprehend bias on the part of Mr Kourambas [51], [70].

Orders. The order on the judgment's cover is that the appeal is allowed with costs, and that the order of the Court of Appeal made on 10 September 2014 is set aside and, in its place, the appeal to that court is allowed with costs and the order of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 17 June 2014 is set aside. In place of the 17 June 2014 order, the cover orders that the Council's decision notified by letter dated 15 October 2013 be quashed and that the Council pay Ms Isbester's costs of the proceeding, in line with the terms set out in the joint reasons [51]. The order on the cover does not deal with the notice of contention: Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ said leave should be refused, and Gageler J would grant leave and reject the contention [51], [70].

Why it matters

The joint reasons treat a conflict of interest arising from incompatibility of roles as a different question from prejudgment, and say that Jia Legeng and McGovern did not address it [24], [28], [33]. They decide that Ms Hughes' interest arising from the prosecution did not end with the Magistrates' Court proceedings, a question they say Dickason and Stollery did not address, and they say that such an interest need not involve a material or other benefit and is not overcome by the participation of others [39], [42], [46], [48]. The joint reasons use the two steps from Ebner, while Gageler J states three analytical steps and an alternative form of the test focused on the overall integrity of the decision-making process [21], [49], [58]–[59]. Both sets of reasons treat the question as one of appearance, not of how Ms Hughes in fact approached the matter [50], [61].

Cited in 165 later casesRelies on 17 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries