John Alexander's Clubs Pty Limited v White City Tennis Club Limited
(2010) 241 CLR 1 · [2010] HCA 19 · (2010) 266 ALR 462
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
This is one judgment of the High Court of Australia, delivered on 26 May 2010 as [2010] HCA 19, in two appeals: John Alexander's Clubs Pty Limited v White City Tennis Club Limited (S309 of 2009) and Walker Corporation Pty Limited v White City Tennis Club Limited (S308 of 2009). French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ wrote one joint judgment, with no separate reasons and no dissent. [1] The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales had declared a tennis club, White City Tennis Club Ltd (the Club), to be the beneficiary of a constructive trust over land on which it had been conducting its activities, and the High Court held that those orders should be overturned and the trial judge's orders restored. [1], [31] The High Court allowed the appeal by John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd (JACS) and Poplar Holdings Pty Ltd (Poplar) with costs, and ordered that the Club's appeal to the Court of Appeal be dismissed with costs. [163] It dismissed the appeal by the mortgagee, Walker Corporation Pty Ltd (Walker Corporation), except on costs, because the orders it wanted set aside were set aside in the JACS appeal, and it ordered the Club to pay Walker Corporation's costs. [162], [164]
Facts
New South Wales Tennis Association Ltd (Tennis NSW) wished to sell land it owned at 30 Alma Street, Paddington (the White City Land), and the appeals concern a part of that land called the Option Land, which is Torrens system land. [3] From 1948 the Club had conducted tennis activities on part of the land under a series of leases and licences. [5] As at 28 February 2005 its lease of its clubhouse area ran until 2020, although Tennis NSW could terminate on six months' notice if it required possession to rebuild, reconstruct or demolish the building. [5]
JACS was a company in the business of developing sites for use by sporting clubs. [8] The Trustees of the Sydney Grammar School (SGS) became interested in acquiring some of the land for playing fields, and another tennis club, Sydney Maccabi Tennis Club Ltd (Maccabi), wished to go on conducting its club on part of it. [4], [6]–[7]
On 28 February 2005 JACS and the Club entered a Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU), which contemplated a new club on part of the land. [10]–[11] By cl 3.7 JACS promised to seek an option to purchase the land or part of it. [14] If it succeeded, it promised by cl 3.7.1 to exercise the option on behalf of a company it was to form, White City Holdings Limited (WCH), upon WCH simultaneously granting a 99 year lease to another company it was to form, John Alexander's White City Club Pty Limited (JAWCC), and entering into an operating agreement. [11], [14], [47] By cl 3.7.2 JACS promised to seek to procure a further option for the Club if JACS was unable to exercise, or failed to exercise, the first option. [14] The Club agreed that it would not seek to buy the land or any part of it until 31 July 2006. [13] The parties agreed that cl 3.7 was binding, but differed about its construction. [16]
SGS lodged a tender on 15 April 2005, and on that day SGS, Maccabi, JACS and the Club entered the First White City Agreement. [17] The same four parties executed a Second White City Agreement on 10 May 2005, the day Tennis NSW and SGS entered a contract for the sale of the land. [18] They entered the Third White City Agreement on 29 June 2005. [20] The land was transferred from Tennis NSW to SGS on 30 June 2005, and part of it was immediately onsold to Maccabi. [19]
Clause 8 of the Third White City Agreement gave JACS or its associated nominated entity an option over the Option Land until 30 June 2007 and, if JACS did not exercise it, gave the Club an option from 1 July to 30 September 2007. [21] Unlike cl 3.7.1 of the MOU, cl 8 did not compel JACS to exercise the option on behalf of WCH and did not refer to a 99 year lease or an operating agreement. [21] The Club received a lease from SGS and Maccabi from 1 July 2005 to 30 September 2007, ending earlier if JACS or the Club exercised a cl 8 option, but gave up its right under its existing lease to occupy parts of the Northern Stand Building as a clubhouse until 2020. [22] Clause 42 said that the MOU continued, and cl 43 said that the Third White City Agreement prevailed to the extent of any inconsistency with any other agreement between any of the parties, unless specifically stated. [23]–[24]
Disputes arose, and on 12 April 2006 JACS served on the Club a notice of termination of the MOU. [27] JACS nominated Poplar, which exercised the cl 8(a) option on 27 June 2007 at a cost of $6.73m and later became registered proprietor of the Option Land. [28] Poplar obtained the funds from a loan by Walker Corporation, secured by, among other things, an unregistered mortgage over the Option Land and a charge over Poplar's assets. [28] The mortgage was executed on 26 June 2007 and secured advances of approximately $16m. [113]
Procedural history
The Club began proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 27 June 2007. [29] Its contentions still live on appeal were that JACS's conduct was a breach of a fiduciary duty to hold the Option Land on the Club's behalf if JACS exercised the cl 8(a) option, or an equitable fraud, or unconscionable or unconscientious conduct. [29] The only relief pressed in the Court of Appeal and the High Court was a constructive trust over the Option Land, on terms that the Club pay Poplar $6.73m. [29]
The trial judge, Young CJ in Eq, dismissed the proceedings ([2008] NSWSC 1225). [30] He found no fiduciary duty, because the Club had no special vulnerability, had not relied on JACS to protect its interests, was run by people experienced in business and advised by independent solicitors, and had equality of bargaining power with JACS. [30] He also found that JACS had validly terminated the MOU on 12 April 2006, that this would have ended any fiduciary duties arising from it, and that there was no equitable fraud or unconscionable conduct. [30]
The Court of Appeal (Macfarlan JA, Giles and Basten JJA concurring) allowed the Club's appeal on 3 June 2009 ((2009) 261 ALR 86), declaring that Poplar held its interest in the Option Land on a constructive trust for the Club and ordering Poplar to transfer the land on the Club paying $6.73m. [31] It found that it would be unconscionable for Poplar to deny the Club any entitlement, on three points: that the MOU impliedly prohibited JACS exercising the option on its own behalf, that JACS acquired the option because of the Club's involvement in the White City Agreements and its undertaking to surrender its rights, and that Poplar could not be in a better position than JACS. [31] The third point was no longer in issue in the High Court. [31] The Court of Appeal also held that there was a fiduciary relationship, although it did not see that as necessary to its conclusion. [32] It criticised the method by which the trial judge concluded that the MOU had been validly terminated, but did not overturn that conclusion. [33] It declined to remit the question whether the Club should pay a just allowance for Poplar's skill, expertise and expenses. [34]
An injunction preventing the Registrar-General of New South Wales from registering an interest over Poplar's interest in the Option Land, first granted by Tobias JA on 6 April 2009, was extended by Macfarlan JA on 10 June 2009 until further order. [35] Walker Corporation then moved to be joined as a respondent to the appeal and to have the declaration and the transfer order set aside, and the Court of Appeal dismissed its Amended Notice of Motion on 23 July 2009 in a second judgment ((2009) 261 ALR 112). [31], [35] On that motion the majority was Macfarlan and Giles JJA, and Basten JA reasoned differently on when the orders had been entered. [131], [145]–[146] In the High Court the Club obtained leave to file out of time a Second Notice of Contention about its fiduciary relationship case. [84], [163]
Issues
Did JACS's procuring Poplar to exercise the cl 8 option amount to equitable fraud, unconscionable conduct or breach of fiduciary duty? [56] Was JACS bound by a fiduciary duty to the Club in its exercise of the cl 8(a) option? [82] Should the Court of Appeal have taken into account the impact of a constructive trust on Walker Corporation's unregistered mortgage? [75], [126] Was Walker Corporation a necessary party, was it entitled to have the orders set aside, and was it estopped? [131], [137], [141] Was it necessary to decide whether the MOU had been validly terminated? [102] Did the Court of Appeal err in failing to remit JACS's claim for just allowances? [110]
Held
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ
All five judges joined in one set of reasons, so each view below is that of the whole High Court, called the Court in this section. [1]
The Court noted that the Club was no longer suing in contract for breach of any term, so that its claims were only non-contractual. [36] It also noted that the claims had an all-or-nothing character: the Club wanted the whole of the Option Land on paying only the price Poplar paid, had not sought a negative interlocutory injunction against JACS, and rejected any route to a just apportionment. [37] The constructive trust was in substance an order that the Club replace Poplar on the Register, made without consideration of its impact on others such as Walker Corporation. [38] The Court described this as "a very ambitious claim" that "calls for close scrutiny". [41]
As a point which was not decisive but raised a doubt, the Court observed that the Court of Appeal had described the relationship as that of joint venturers seven times in the opening of its reasons, although cl 7.1 of the MOU said that nothing in it constituted the parties as partners or joint venturers for any purpose. [42] The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal's own statement that the label has no particular legal consequences, and found its frequent use hard to understand, particularly since the Club had disavowed any joint venture at trial. [44]
The Court identified two critical elements in the Court of Appeal's reasoning: a construction of cl 3.7.1 under which JACS could exercise an option only on behalf of WCH, and the view that JACS obtained its option only because the Club agreed to surrender its rights. [45] On the first, the Court held that the Court of Appeal's acceptance of the Club's construction was unsound, because it gave "too much weight to the definition, and too little weight to the operative words of cl 3.7.1". [49] The duty to exercise the option on behalf of WCH came from cl 3.7.1 and was linked, by that clause's word "simultaneously", to the 99 year lease and the Operating Agreement, so JACS's procuring Poplar to exercise the cl 8 option was not a contractual breach of the MOU. [49] The Third White City Agreement contained no such stipulations, and because cl 43 made it prevail over inconsistent agreements, the Court held that "Clause 3.7 had to give way, and cl 8 had to prevail". [50]
The Court called it a "key flaw" that the Court of Appeal had assumed that the series of different agreements should be treated as a unity taking shape entirely from the MOU. [52] That overlooked how the arrangements changed through the three White City Agreements once SGS and Maccabi became involved. [52]–[55] The Club faced a "fundamental difficulty": JACS's obligation under cl 3.7.1 was conditional on two events which never happened, and the clause was then cancelled and replaced by a quite different scheme to which the Club agreed. [56] The Club did not allege that its consent was brought about by mistake, misrepresentation, undue influence, duress, overbearing of the will, unequal bargaining power or concealment, and those who decided that it should consent were experienced in business and legally advised. [56] The Court distinguished Carson v Wood, because it had no condition corresponding to the 99 year lease condition and involved a corporate joint venture or partnership. [57] It also distinguished Chan v Zacharia, on fiduciary duties between partners after a partnership ended, and Baumgartner v Baumgartner, on the property rights of de facto spouses after their relationship ended. [58]
On the second element, the Court held that the Court of Appeal's reasoning departed from a finding of the trial judge, unchallenged in both appeal courts, about the insistence of SGS and Maccabi on surrender of the lease and licences, a finding that was "fatal to this second critical aspect of the Club's case". [61] The desire of SGS and Maccabi to clear their titles was the crucial matter, not something JACS was pressing, and the Club could have relied on its rights under the lease and declined to agree to the Third White City Agreement. [62] The agreement to surrender the lease was independent of all questions about options, and there was no evidence and no finding that JACS put pressure on the Club to agree to the surrender and to JACS receiving an option capable of being exercised unconditionally. [63]
The Court rejected the analogy with Avondale Printers & Stationers Ltd v Haggie, in which a plaintiff abandoned rights to purchase in reliance on the defendants' promises, because there was no demonstrated connection between the grant of the unconditional option to JACS and the Club's agreement to surrender its rights. [65], [67] It held that no analogy could be drawn with Pallant v Morgan or Banner Homes Group Plc v Luff Developments Ltd, accepting JACS's submissions that each turned on a finding that the non-acquiring party had acted on a firm arrangement to stay out of the market, whereas the Club had negotiated its own alternative option. [68] Those were cases where an agreement that one party should buy for the advantage of both induced the other not to bid, and here there was no general agreement or inducement of that kind. [69] Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd was no good precedent for a constructive trust, because the House of Lords refused that remedy and ordered quantum meruit relief, which was not sought here, after rejecting a proprietary estoppel claim, which was not made here. [70] The Club's wider submission, that the Pallant v Morgan line applies where an arrangement fails through uncertainty, deficiency or unenforceability to address an eventuality contrary to its central tenet, was rejected because those cases depend on something more. [73] The Court concluded that each of the two critical integers in the Court of Appeal's conclusion was "intrinsically flawed", and that each operated at a high level of abstraction, using words from Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi about unconscientious conduct "in some loose sense where all principles are at large". [74] It also found it "a curious outcome in a court of equity" that the Club's defence of the constructive trust brushed aside the non-existence of WCH and the non-fulfilment of the conditions on which JACS's exercise of the option depended. [76]
On the fiduciary question, the Court of Appeal had accepted a submission of the Club resting heavily on the twin ideas of vulnerability and reliance. [81] The Court answered that the contracts were important: the Club, as a party to the Third White City Agreement, consented to the unconditional nature of JACS's option, and could have bargained for more precision in cl 8 by using its ability to refuse to surrender the lease, but apparently did not. [82] The Club was not relying on representations by JACS, was not overborne by some greater strength and was not depending on JACS to carry out dealings of which it was necessarily ignorant, and the parties acted "consulting their own interests, with knowledge of what the other was doing". [82] In the Court's words, "The only vulnerability of the Club was that which any contracting party has to breach by another", and "The only reliance was that which any contracting party has on performance by another". [83] The Club's points about the difficulty of a social club giving an undertaking as to damages, the inutility of damages to it and the impecuniosity of JACS and Poplar did not justify converting the contractual relationship into a fiduciary one. [83]
The parties accepted that the relevant principles were those stated by Mason J in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation, although Mason J was in dissent in that case. [85]–[86] Mason J identified the critical feature of the accepted traditional categories of fiduciary relationship as an undertaking or agreement to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion affecting that person's interests. [87] Drawing on Justice Lehane's extra-judicial writing, the Court said such phrases must be understood in a reasonably strict sense, and that commercial transactions outside the traditional categories often give rise to no fiduciary duties not because they are commercial but because they do not meet the criteria. [88], [90] The Court accepted that a statement of principle by Mason J governed this appeal, namely, quoting Mason J, that a fiduciary relationship "must accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so that it is consistent with, and conforms to, them" and "cannot be superimposed upon the contract in such a way as to alter the operation which the contract was intended to have according to its true construction". [91] It added that where a term to like effect as the suggested fiduciary obligation cannot be implied, "it will be very difficult to superimpose the suggested fiduciary obligation upon that limited contract", and the Club had eschewed any attempt to imply such a term into the MOU. [92] The limited fiduciary obligation Mason J found sprang from a remote manufacturer entrusting its distributor with the protection, promotion and custodianship of its product goodwill in Australia, whereas the Club was in constant contact with JACS and in an excellent position to protect its interests, so that "There was no entrustment or custodianship to be abused". [86], [93]
The Club contended that any gap in the arrangement would be filled by fiduciary duties, and stressed the proposition that cl 8(a) answered cl 3.7.1 and cl 8(b) answered cl 3.7.2, which the Court held unsound when cl 3.7 was read with cl 1.8.2, saying that cl 8 "moves sharply away from cl 3.7". [94]–[95] A new construction argument based on cll 3.7.2, 8(b) and 42 also failed, because its conclusion did not follow from its earlier steps, and if it were correct the breach would primarily be of a contractual covenant, an allegation not persevered in at trial. [96]–[97] The Court said that to impose a constructive trust for a breach of contract would be, "if not an impossible step, at least a very unusual and extreme one". [97] It found it unnecessary to deal conclusively with other difficulties in the Club's position, but raised questions about whether JACS held the option on trust and who the beneficiary was before WCH existed, and said it was unlikely that a court would decree specific performance of any part of the MOU. [98]–[100] Quoting Judge Learned Hand that "in commercial transactions it does not in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect themselves", the Court added that a strained application of equitable ideas does not promote justice either. [101]
Because there was no justification for a constructive trust even assuming that the MOU remained on foot, the Court held that it was not necessary to consider whether the MOU was validly terminated. [102] It left unanswered the question of when duties arising from a fiduciary relationship can end if the relationship has broken down without formal termination by an innocent party. [103] It did say that the Court of Appeal's criticism of the trial judge's method rested on a misunderstanding, since he did not just record a bare acceptance of JACS's submissions. [107] Whether or not the trial judge's conclusion on termination was correct, his manner of expressing it was not open to criticism. [109] On just allowances, the Court said that it is generally procedurally essential for a defendant who may have to rely on such a claim either to obtain an order for a separate trial of that issue or to call evidence on it, and that neither course was taken here. [110] The JACS appeal therefore had to be allowed. [111]
Turning to the Walker Corporation appeal, the Court said it is now settled that s 43A of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) gives the holder of an interest under a registrable instrument, before registration, the same protection against notice of an earlier unregistered interest as a purchaser who acquires the legal estate at common law. [31], [114] The Club could make good a better claim to registration as unencumbered proprietor only if it had no notice of the mortgage, and there was evidence that it had notice. [115] Whenever the constructive trust arose, the Club could not have obtained unencumbered registration unless it was taking for value and without notice of prior interests. [118] The evidence included evidence that in early June 2007 Walker Corporation's managing director told the Club's president that Walker Corporation was funding the purchase and preparing to take security over the Option Land. [121]–[122] The Club tendered no evidence to contradict Walker Corporation's evidence that, before Poplar acquired the land, the Club knew that Walker Corporation was financing the purchase and would take security. [124] Walker Corporation also tendered evidence that it would not have funded the acquisition if the Club had claimed that whoever acquired the land would hold it on trust for the Club. [125]
The Court held that the Court of Appeal ought to have borne in mind the impact of the constructive trust on Walker Corporation's unregistered mortgage, for reasons given in the line of cases associated with Giumelli v Giumelli. [126] It said that "A constructive trust ought not to be imposed if there are other orders capable of doing full justice". [128] The Club had abandoned its claims for equitable compensation and an account of profits in the Court of Appeal, and the possibility that JACS and Poplar lacked significant assets did not affect an account of profits. [128] The Giumelli line of cases shows that care must be taken to avoid equitable relief going beyond the necessities of the case and that third party interests must be borne in mind, and it "does not permit a constructive trust to be declared in a manner injurious to third parties merely because the plaintiff has no other useful remedy against a defendant". [129] On this ground alone, the Court said, it would be appropriate to allow the Walker Corporation appeal, were it necessary to do so. [130]
The Court accepted Walker Corporation's submission that where a court is invited to make, or proposes to make, orders directly affecting the rights or liabilities of a non-party, the non-party is a necessary party and ought to be joined, and it held that the Court of Appeal majority erred in holding otherwise. [131] It quoted the Full Federal Court in News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd, which said that where orders sought establish or recognise a proprietary or security interest in land, chattels or a monetary fund, all persons who have or claim an interest in the subject matter are necessary parties. [132] The constructive trust, a proprietary remedy, resolved issues against Walker Corporation by creating indefeasible proprietary rights without its being heard, which would not have been so if only personal remedies had been granted. [133] Walker Corporation's claim was not merely about priority, since one of its claims was that the Club never had any interest in the land at all, and it was entitled to call evidence against the Club's substantive case and to be heard on its weaknesses. [134] The majority's view that separate proceedings would protect Walker Corporation also took no account of s 63 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), which requires the Supreme Court to grant remedies so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy are finally determined and multiplicity of proceedings avoided. [135]
The Court accepted, as a general proposition, that a person who should have been joined as a necessary party is entitled to have an order affecting that person set aside, although the order is not a nullity, and is not limited to seeking the favourable exercise of a discretion. [137] It used the words of Rich J in Cameron v Cole that setting aside "lays the ghost of the simulacrum of a trial, and leaves the field open for a real trial". [137] The Court of Appeal majority erred in treating the matter as one of discretion and in treating joinder, rather than setting aside the orders, as decisive. [138] The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether there is any exception to the principle, saying that any exception could have no application where there was evidence that a plaintiff claiming a constructive trust over Torrens system land was cognisant of a mortgage its claim would affect. [138]
Walker Corporation was aware of the first proceedings, but the Court said it had no duty to seek to be joined and its delay did not in this case call for explanation. [140] The Club's estoppel argument, which drew on the probate practice explained in Osborne v Smith and on cases said to extend it, failed for lack of a factual foundation: it was not shown that Walker Corporation conducted, controlled or managed the proceedings or was the only party likely to gain from them, or that the Club suffered detriment by being induced to believe the suit was sufficiently constituted. [141]–[144]
The Court also addressed reasoning of Basten JA, defended by the Club, that the orders were entered on 3 June 2009 according to the court's computerised record, so that under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) the relevant parts of the motion, filed more than 14 days later, were too late. [145] The Court gave several reasons why the restriction did not apply: the computerised record appeared unreliable, so it was safe to conclude that the orders were entered on 12 June 2009 and the Amended Notice of Motion was filed within 14 days; the order said in the document headed "AMENDED JUDGMENT/ORDER" to have been entered on 12 June 2009 was an instance of the court ordering otherwise; and only four of the seven orders appeared in the computerised record, so that the 14 day period had not started to run. [150]–[151] It said that if the Club's submission on r 36.11(2) were sound, the good sense of the rule would be open to debate, because entry into the computerised system is a secret process outside the parties' knowledge. [152] It also said that Walker Corporation's position did not depend on its being a party or on the rules of court, but on matters of right affecting non-parties resting on general law principles of natural justice. [153]
The Court did not accept the Club's submission that the Court of Appeal's orders avoided injustice because Walker Corporation could seek a ruling on priority in separate proceedings. [154], [161] Those orders had closed off any possibility of challenging the constructive trust declaration or the transfer order. [156] Walker Corporation was prejudiced in two ways: by the failure to discharge the injunction unless security for the undertaking as to damages was provided, which prevented it from selling the land under the mortgage and charge and from registering the mortgage, and by being bound to the result of proceedings to which it was not a party and which it could have affected by evidence or argument. [157]–[158], [161]
The Court said there was no point in allowing the Walker Corporation appeal, because its relief assumed that the JACS appeal would be dismissed, but stressed that if the JACS appeal had failed, the Walker Corporation appeal would have succeeded and orders for a new trial would have been made. [162] Because it was necessary for Walker Corporation to bring its appeal, the Club had to pay its costs in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal despite the dismissal. [162]
Orders. In S309 of 2009, the High Court gave the Club leave to file its Second Notice of Contention out of time and allowed the appeal with costs. [163] It set aside the orders of Tobias JA made on 6 April 2009, order 1 of the Court of Appeal's orders of 5 May 2009, the Court of Appeal's orders of 3 June 2009 as amended on 23 July 2009, order 7 of its orders of 10 June 2009, and orders 3 and 6 of its orders of 23 July 2009. [163] In their place it ordered that the Club's appeal to the Court of Appeal be dismissed with costs and that the Club pay the costs of JACS and Poplar of the Club's Notice of Motion dated 5 June 2009. [163]
In S308 of 2009, the High Court set aside so much of the Court of Appeal's orders of 23 July 2009 as ordered Walker Corporation to pay the Club's costs of Walker Corporation's Amended Notice of Motion, including the Notice of Motion it superseded. [164] In their place it ordered the Club to pay Walker Corporation's costs of its appearance before Macfarlan JA on 10 June 2009 and of its Notice of Motion dated 11 June 2009 and Amended Notice of Motion dated 22 June 2009. [164] The Club was also ordered to pay Walker Corporation's costs of the appeal to the High Court, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed. [164]
Why it matters
The reasons apply Mason J's statement in Hospital Products, although made in dissent, that a fiduciary relationship founded on a contract must conform to the contract's terms, and treat that statement as governing this dispute between commercial parties. [86], [91] In rejecting a fiduciary relationship, they treat the Club's vulnerability and reliance as only those of any contracting party. [83] The Court said that the circumstances of Walker Corporation's mortgage provided "an example of the caution required in imposing a remedial constructive trust to ensure that the legitimate interests of third parties will not be adversely affected". [116] The reasons also state a rule that a person directly affected by an order in proceedings to which that person was not a party is entitled as of right to have it set aside, which the Court accepted as a general proposition. [136]–[137]
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