casewise

K-Generation Pty Limited v Liquor Licensing Court

(2009) 237 CLR 501 · [2009] HCA 4 · (2009) 252 ALR 471 · (2009) 83 ALJR 327 · (2009) 192 A Crim R 501

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 11 November 2026

Overview

K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) given on 2 February 2009 on appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia. The appellants argued that s 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA), which protects information that the Commissioner of Police classifies as criminal intelligence, deprived the Licensing Court of South Australia of the independence and impartiality it needed as a court that can be invested with federal jurisdiction, relying on the principle in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [111]. The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs. French CJ, the joint reasons of Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, and Kirby J each held that s 28A(5), on its proper construction, did not deny the Licensing Court the independence and integrity of a court, so the challenge failed; no judge dissented [99], [149], [258].

Facts

K-Generation Pty Ltd, whose sole director is Mr Genargi Krasnov, applied on 20 October 2005 to the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner for an entertainment venue licence for premises at 362-366 King William Street, Adelaide, to be fitted out as a karaoke venue called Sky Lounge KTV [1]–[2]. Under the Act, where the applicant is a trust or corporate entity, each person in a position of authority in it must be a fit and proper person, and an application must be refused if the licensing authority is satisfied that granting it would be contrary to the public interest [35]–[36]. The Commissioner of Police intervened to introduce evidence and make representations on whether Mr Krasnov and Ms Adeline Tay were fit and proper persons [106]. At the hearing a police officer tendered two files of information that had been classified as criminal intelligence under s 28A, and their contents were not disclosed to K-Generation [12]. Mr Krasnov gave evidence and was cross-examined, but not about the criminal intelligence material [140]. On 17 January 2007 Liquor and Gambling Commissioner Pryor, acting on that information, refused the application on the ground that granting it would be contrary to the public interest [4].

Section 28A(1) provides that information given by the Commissioner of Police to the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner and classified by the Commissioner of Police as criminal intelligence may not be disclosed to anyone except the Minister, a court or a person to whom the Commissioner of Police authorises its disclosure [137]. Section 28A(2) provides that a licensing authority refusing an application because of such information need give no grounds or reasons other than that granting it would be contrary to the public interest [138]. Section 28A(5) provides, in its terms, that in any proceedings under the Act the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner, the Licensing Court or the Supreme Court "must, on the application of the Commissioner of Police, take steps to maintain the confidentiality of information classified by the Commissioner of Police as criminal intelligence, including steps to receive evidence and hear argument about the information in private in the absence of the parties to the proceedings and their representatives" [139]. Section 4 defines criminal intelligence as information relating to actual or suspected criminal activity whose disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice criminal investigations or to enable the discovery of the existence or identity of a confidential source of information relevant to law enforcement [135]. As French CJ recorded, the Attorney-General's Second Reading Speech for the amending Bill referred to the infiltration of the liquor and hospitality industries by organised crime, in particular by outlaw motor cycle gangs [54].

Procedural history

K-Generation sought review of the decision in the Licensing Court, constituted by Judge Rice of the District Court of South Australia [107]. Its counsel proposed that the court read the criminal intelligence material and accepted that, if the court found a foundation for the Commissioner's decision, that would effectively be the end of the matter [17]. Counsel conceded that he would have no opportunity to comment on the material, take instructions or put further evidence about it [17]. On 12 February 2007, after reading the material, Judge Rice said he would reach the same view as the Commissioner, and the Licensing Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision [19]–[20].

K-Generation and Mr Krasnov then sought in the Supreme Court a declaration that s 28A was invalid, a declaration that the Licensing Court had failed to observe procedural fairness, and orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus [7]. The matter was referred to the Full Court, which on 30 August 2007 by majority (Duggan and Vanstone JJ, Gray J dissenting) refused the declarations and dismissed the application for judicial review [8]. Duggan J, with whom Vanstone J agreed, held that s 28A did not impose on the Licensing Court a procedure constitutionally incompatible with its status as a potential repository of federal jurisdiction, and that the court could decide what weight to give criminal intelligence that had not been tested [21], [23]. Gray J held that legislation requiring a court invested with federal jurisdiction to exercise federal judicial power without giving a party an opportunity to respond to adverse claims is inconsistent with the integrated federal judiciary established by Ch III of the Constitution, so that s 28A was invalid [24]. Special leave to appeal was granted on 23 May 2008 on a single ground: that the Full Court erred in finding s 28A valid so far as it required the Licensing Court to determine a review without disclosing to the applicant information classified as criminal intelligence [9], [25]. In the High Court the Licensing Court entered a submitting appearance, and the Attorneys-General for the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia intervened [109].

Issues

The first issue was whether the Licensing Court was a court of a State within s 77(iii) of the Constitution and s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): the appellants and the Commissioner of Police accepted that it was, but Queensland argued that it was not [110], [113]. The central issue was whether s 28A, and in particular s 28A(5), conferred on the Licensing Court and the Supreme Court functions incompatible with their status as courts of a State in which federal jurisdiction could be invested, so that it was invalid [41], [139]. Victoria argued that on a review the Licensing Court was discharging an administrative function, so that the State could modify the rules of procedural fairness [43]. A further question was what would follow if s 28A(5) had that effect: Queensland and Western Australia argued that the Licensing Court would cease to be a court of a State, while the appellants, the Commissioner of Police and the Commonwealth argued that the provision would be invalid [152], [154].

Held

French CJ

French CJ held that s 28A infringes the open justice principle, and also infringes procedural fairness so far as it authorises and effectively requires the courts to consider criminal intelligence without disclosing it to the party to whom it relates [10]. He held, however, that it does not confer on the Licensing Court or the Supreme Court functions incompatible with their institutional integrity as courts of the States or with their roles as repositories of federal jurisdiction [10]. He began with the construction of s 28A, applying the presumption that statutes are construed, where constructional choices are open, so as not to encroach on fundamental common law rights and freedoms, a presumption he noted has been described in the United Kingdom as an aspect of a "principle of legality" [46]–[47]. He said that it is an aspect of the rule of law that courts sit in public and accord procedural fairness, and that this requires a conservative approach to statutes affecting those principles [48]. He held that in South Australia the common law allows extrinsic material such as a Second Reading Speech to be used to identify a statute's purpose without first finding ambiguity, but that such material cannot be substituted for the text [51]–[53].

In his view the statutory requirement that disclosure "could reasonably be expected" to cause prejudice is objective and is not satisfied merely by the Commissioner of Police's opinion, and a court could decide that information did not, on its face, meet the definition [62]–[63]. He held that s 28A(1) is directed to the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner and does not itself prevent a court from disclosing classified information to the parties [64], [67]. He treated the Attorney-General's statement in the Second Reading Speech that the court "must hear the information in a court closed to all" as a statement of intention that could not replace the words of s 28A(5) [70]. He preferred "the better view" that the court is "authorised but not required to exclude legal representatives" from the part of the proceedings in which it receives evidence or hears argument about the classified information [73]. He said the court may disclose the material to legal representatives on conditions of confidentiality enforced by undertaking or order, breach of which would be punishable as a contempt, although the court could decide that such disclosure carried too high a risk [10], [74]–[75]. He held that nothing in s 28A requires the Licensing Court to accept or act on the information even if it is properly classified, and that the court may consider its relevance, reliability and weight, including the fact that it could not be tested by cross-examination [77].

On the status of the Licensing Court, he held that, particularly because the State Parliament designated it a court of record, it should be regarded as a court of a State for the purposes of s 77(iii), and he agreed with and adopted the joint reasons for that conclusion [85]–[86]. He held that the Licensing Court and the Supreme Court can look behind the Commissioner of Police's classification to determine whether it meets the objective criteria on which it must be based [94]. The affected party's representatives may therefore make submissions on the validity of the classification, and the court may in an appropriate case give a summary of the conclusions or inferences from the material without disclosing its detailed content or sources [95], [97]. He concluded that s 28A(5) does not subject the courts to the direction of the executive, does not require them to receive or act on the material, does not deprive them of discretion as to how confidentiality is maintained, and does not mandate a general exclusion of legal representatives in all circumstances [98]. He held that s 28A(5) did not undermine the institutional integrity of either court, agreed with the joint reasons in rejecting the Queensland and Western Australian submission that the Licensing Court would have ceased to be a court of a State, and would dismiss the appeal with costs [99]–[100].

Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ

The joint reasons rejected Queensland's submission and held that the Licensing Court is a court of the State of South Australia within s 77(iii) of the Constitution and s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act [114]. They relied on the linking of membership of the Licensing Court to tenure as a District Court judge, who cannot be removed except on an address from both Houses of Parliament [127]. They accepted the Commonwealth's submission that there was no scope for purely arbitrary removal by the Executive, because varying or revoking a proclamation would itself be an administrative decision open to challenge in the Supreme Court for bad faith or improper purpose [116]. They held that, even if the Licensing Court lacked a broad contempt power, that could not deny it the character of a court of a State, given the long history of inferior courts in Australia [129]–[131]. They found it unnecessary to consider further the argument that its review jurisdiction was administrative, because the Act confers authority that appears plainly judicial, such as imposing fines in disciplinary matters [134].

On s 28A, they said that the phrase "could reasonably be expected" in the statutory definition is significant, so that the Licensing Court would have to be satisfied that facts existed sufficient to found that expectation [136]. They said it was unnecessary for present purposes to decide whether that construction, or the Commonwealth's submission that the classification must be objectively correct, should be preferred [136], [143]. The classification would therefore have been open to collateral attack by the appellants in the Licensing Court, and it was not correct that the court had been obliged to accept the information classified as criminal intelligence [144]. Under s 28A(5) the court must take steps towards maintaining confidentiality, but it is not directed as to which steps to take and is not denied submissions from other parties' legal representatives about what those steps should be [146]. They held that the statutory words "including steps" do not mandate the reception of evidence and hearing of argument in private in the absence of the parties, but mark out the limits of the range within which the court may act [147]. The court is not bound to accept the criminal intelligence in its terms, may question the evidence in closed session, and in some cases may feel disinclined to place weight on material that the applicant could not test or even see [148]. They concluded that s 28A(5) did not deny the Licensing Court the constitutional character of an independent and impartial tribunal in the sense considered in North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley, and that the Full Court majority was correct [111], [149].

They rejected the submission of Queensland and Western Australia that a law with the alleged effect would mean the Licensing Court was no longer a court of a State, holding that the States may not establish a court of a State and deprive it, whether when established or later, of the minimum characteristics of institutional independence and impartiality [152]–[153]. If s 28A(5) had the vice alleged, it would be invalid and questions of severance might arise, but the Licensing Court would keep its character as a court of a State [154]. They added that where interveners advance arguments not accepted by the parties, the Court may in future give directions for a procedure analogous to a notice of contention under r 42.08.5 of the High Court Rules 2004 [155]. They would dismiss the appeal with costs [156].

Kirby J

Kirby J agreed that the appeal failed, holding that the invocation of Kable failed and that the impugned legislation was not invalid, but he said that several arguments of the intervening States should be rejected [158]–[159]. He rejected Western Australia's submission that the Kable principle applies only to State Supreme Courts, as inconsistent with the language of the Constitution, s 77(iii) of which allows federal jurisdiction to be invested in "any" court of a State [208]–[210]. He also rejected Queensland's submission, holding that the statutory title of the Licensing Court, though not conclusive, is a very strong consideration, and that criteria such as the public interest and whether a person is fit and proper are commonly applied by undoubted courts [219], [223]. He accepted that there was substance in Victoria's point that State courts and judges are not subject to all the separation of powers requirements that apply to federal courts, but held that Kable applied here because the Licensing Court was exercising judicial power on a justiciable issue between contesting parties and because an appeal or review could lie to the Supreme Court [229]–[233]. He left undetermined the ambit of the Kable principle as it applies to purely administrative functions performed by State judges in State courts [234]. He rejected Western Australia's alternative submission that the Licensing Court would simply cease to be a court for s 77(iii) purposes, saying among other reasons that it would let a State Parliament decide the consequences of invalidity under the federal Constitution [235], [238].

He held that the decision in Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police was "not determinative", because the South Australian Act differed enough to require a fresh consideration [252]. In his view the Kable principle is engaged only by legislation imposing on courts functions "seriously repugnant to, or incompatible with, the institutional independence and integrity of such courts" [256]. Construing s 28A(5), he held that the courts may scrutinise the Commissioner of Police's classification against an objective standard and must judge for themselves whether the information is reasonably capable of meeting the statutory description [257]. He accepted Victoria's submission that the duty to take steps is not rigid or prescriptive, so that the steps could give a party or its legal representative an expurgated and anonymised summary of the evidence [257]. He said that a court could give little weight to classified evidence that was unpersuasive, untested, remote or hearsay [257]. In his view the appellants' error was "to read s 28A(5) too absolutely" [257]. Referring to the reasons of Blaxell J of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police [No 2], he said that review under such legislation is not without real and substantive judicial content, and saw no reason to think the position under s 28A(5) would be different [257]. He concluded that s 28A(5), properly construed, did not offend the Kable principle: it diminished a court's role in deciding claims to privilege over criminal intelligence, but did not involve the State Parliament or the Commissioner of Police impermissibly instructing a court on a particular case [258]. He found it unnecessary to decide whether, had the provision been invalid, the remedy would have been severance or invalidation, and would dismiss the appeal with costs [259]–[260].

Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs. French CJ, the joint reasons and Kirby J each concluded that the appeal should be dismissed with costs [100], [156], [260].

Why it matters

All three sets of reasons rested on the construction of s 28A, reading it as leaving the courts able to test the Commissioner of Police's classification, to choose the steps for keeping the material confidential, and to decide what weight it should receive [10], [144]–[148], [257]. In rejecting the Queensland and Western Australian argument, the joint reasons held that a State may not establish a court of a State and then deprive it of the minimum characteristics of institutional independence and impartiality [153]. French CJ agreed with the joint reasons in rejecting that argument [99], and Kirby J rejected Western Australia's submission to the same effect [235], [237]. Kirby J noted that, apart from Kable itself, no State legislation had been held invalid by the High Court under the Kable principle, and that this invocation of it also failed [158].

Cited in 359 later casesRelies on 83 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries