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Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor General

(2013) 249 CLR 645 · [2013] HCA 52

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor General [2013] HCA 52 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, given on 6 December 2013, on the words "matters of an administrative nature" in s 6A(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (the FOI Act). [10] Ms Kline sought documents about the Order of Australia from the Official Secretary to the Governor-General, including documents about two nominations she had made. [1]–[3] The Court dismissed her appeal with costs. [57] French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ wrote joint reasons and Gageler J wrote separately, and each set of reasons accepted the distinction the Full Court of the Federal Court had drawn between the Governor-General's substantive powers and functions and what the Full Court called the "apparatus" supporting them. [1], [41], [71]–[72]

Facts

The Order of Australia was established by Letters Patent dated 14 February 1975, and the Constitution of the Order makes the Governor-General its Chancellor and, in that instrument's words, "charged with the administration of the Order". [7]

That instrument provides for an independent Council of 19 members, which considers nominations to the General Division and makes recommendations to the Governor-General. [8]

The Secretary of the Order receives nominations, and by convention and practice the Official Secretary is the Secretary of the Order. [8]

It was not contested that research and inquiry carried out in the Office of the Official Secretary formed the basis of the Council's consideration of any nomination. [8]

The evidence showed that the Office supports the Governor-General in two ways: in all aspects of the Governor-General's role, including the discharge of substantive powers and functions in respect of the Order, and through the management and administration of office resources such as financial and human resources and information technology. [13]

The nomination forms contain criteria and state that all nominations are, in the forms' words, "strictly confidential". [9]

Ms Kline made a request under s 15 of the FOI Act for documents held by the Official Secretary relating to the Order, including two nomination forms and correspondence about those nominations, criteria for making awards, working manuals, policy guidelines and documents relating to review processes. [1]–[2]

She later expanded her request to add a category the judgment quotes as "all file notes from the Secretariat" contained in the nominations, which she made in 2007 and 2009. [2]

The Official Secretary's written decision said that some of the documents did not exist and that, for the rest, "no documents relating to matters of an administrative nature" had been identified, those being the words of that communication. [3]

It also said she would be given one copy of each of her two nominations, but that those documents did not relate to matters of an administrative nature and so were not subject to the FOI Act. [3]

Procedural history

On review under s 55K of the FOI Act, the Australian Information Commissioner affirmed the Official Secretary's decision to refuse access. [4]

The appellant appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which also affirmed the decision, in a decision the judgment's footnote cites as Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor-General (2012) 127 ALD 639. [4]

By agreement between the parties the Tribunal did not scrutinise the requested documents in detail, and it noted that a further hearing might be needed on whether documents were exempt under some other provision of the FOI Act. [21]

The Tribunal considered that documents generated in connection with the conferral of honours in the Order related to substantive functions of the Governor-General, so that none of the documents or categories related to "matters of an administrative nature" within s 6A(1). [22]

On an appeal on a question of law, the Full Court of the Federal Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, in a decision the judgment's footnote cites as Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor-General (2012) 208 FCR 89. [4]

The Full Court held that s 6A(1) reflected a distinction between the substantive powers and functions of the Governor-General and the "apparatus" (the Full Court's word) for their exercise, which was merely supportive, and that the request sought documents relating to a substantive power or function, the administration of the Order. [23]

It also held that the Tribunal did not need to examine each document individually because, in the Full Court's words, "the character of the documents was apparent from the terms of the request". [24]

A panel granted special leave to appeal, limited to three grounds. [5]

Issues

The appeal depended on the proper construction of s 6A(1) of the FOI Act, which provides that the Act does not apply to a request for access to a document of the Official Secretary "unless the document relates to matters of an administrative nature" (the words of the section). [6], [10], [18]

The grounds were that the Federal Court erred in (a) holding that the FOI Act did not apply to her requests of 26 and 30 January 2011 by reason of s 6A, (b) holding that any document relating to a substantive power or function of the Governor-General is not one relating to matters of an administrative nature, and (c) characterising each requested document as one relating to a substantive power or function. [5]

The appellant contended that the exception in s 6A(1) should be construed widely, so that the only documents excluded were those disclosing any aspect of the decision-making process on a particular nomination. [26]

She relied among other things on the examples of "operational information", the distinct exemption of ASIO, Bienstein v Family Court of Australia (2008) 170 FCR 382 and an analogy between the Governor-General and judicial officers as holders of independent office. [27]-[28]

If she succeeded, she sought remittal so that the Tribunal could consider whether any of some 400 documents (about 1500 pages) covered by her request were excluded by another provision of the FOI Act, such as those exempting confidential documents. [25]

The first respondent contended that the exception should be construed narrowly, obliging the Official Secretary to give access only to documents involving the management or administration of the Office, and submitted that the appellant was instead seeking documents that would elucidate the failure of her two nominations. [29], [31]

Held

French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

The joint reasons noted that the grant of honours, once regarded as part of the prerogative of the Crown, is now encompassed in the executive power conferred by s 61 of the Australian Constitution, and that the Governor-General's role in respect of the Order reflects ceremonial and community responsibilities as well as the office's constitutional position. [11]

They said construing s 6A(1) is governed by what the Court has recently said about the importance of the text of a statute, whose meaning and effect are not to be displaced by statements in secondary materials, and that a purposive construction accords with s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). [32]

They treated as "of considerable contextual significance" that the Governor-General is not subject to the FOI Act, not being an "agency" or "prescribed authority" because appointed by Letters Patent under s 2 of the Australian Constitution and not holding office under an enactment of the federal Parliament or an Order-in-Council. [33]

So the government processes and activities opened to increased public scrutiny by the FOI Act do not include those associated with the exercise of the Governor-General's substantive powers and functions. [34]

They said that "freedom from interference or scrutiny by members of the public (or other branches of government) is an essential aspect of the making of decisions in relation to the General Division of the Order". [34]

Although the Official Secretary is a prescribed authority subject to the FOI Act, s 6A(1), with ss 5(1) and 6, reveals "a plain intention to constrain the extent to which the FOI Act pursues its purposes and objects" against those providing administrative support to holders of independent offices who are not subject to it. [35]–[36]

The FOI Act does not pursue its objects at any cost, and its scheme balances public scrutiny of some government processes against a competing public interest in non-disclosure for others, the exemption of ASIO being a clear example. [37]

Responsibility for administering the Order is "a sui generis role involving processes and decision-making triggered by the nomination of a person for an appointment or award", and its proper independent discharge requires full and frank assistance from the Council, which in turn requires it from the Office of the Official Secretary. [39]

The confidentiality of the selection process avoids the possibilities of giving offence to failed nominees, defamation or political controversy. [39]

The question is not resolved by asking whether a document relates to processes and activities "supporting" the Governor-General's role, because documents of that description fall within both the exclusion and the exception in s 6A(1). [40]

The exclusion refers to documents relating to the discharge of the Governor-General's substantive powers and functions, whereas the exception connotes documents concerning the management and administration of office resources. [41]

They called this a common enough connotation of the word "administrative" and said the Full Court had apprehended the distinction correctly in referring to the office "apparatus", the Full Court's word. [41]

The limited construction is appropriate because s 6A(1) must apply equally to powers and functions of the greatest sensitivity and to those of lesser sensitivity. [42]

Applied to the Order, it strikes a balance between the public interest in maintaining an Australian system of honours and the public interest in efficient public administration. [42]

The excluded documents relating to the Order must include all unpublished documents associated with the administration (that is, the operation) of the Order, while the exception can only be read as referring to documents relating to the management and administration of the resources of the Office. [43]–[44]

They saw the position of courts and specified tribunals, authorities and bodies as analogous, so that the only documents those bodies must open to increased public scrutiny are those relating to the management and administration of registry and office resources. [45], [47]

The construction "plainly emerges" from the text and context and is "fortified" by secondary materials, including Senator Evans's statement in the Senate debates that courts and certain industrial tribunals were not exempt so far as their "administrative procedures, properly so-called" were concerned, those last words being the Senator's. [48]–[49]

The appellant relied on Bienstein, which decided that "relates to matters of an administrative nature" in s 5 can include documents relating to judicial functions and decision-making, and that documents not impinging on the independence essential to those functions relate to matters of an administrative nature. [51]

The joint reasons said: "That aspect of the reasoning in Bienstein is erroneous". [51]

First, Bienstein misread references in extrinsic materials to examples of administrative matters, such as the number of sitting days of a court, as suggesting that documents held by a court relating to individual cases might be characterised as administrative. [51]

Secondly, its reasoning that administrative powers and functions not closely related to judicial independence needed no protection from the FOI Act, derived from the different factual circumstances in Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166, gave no weight to the circumstance that a judicial officer is not subject to the FOI Act. [51]

The approach was "not apt for application to s 6A(1)" because it would not give proper weight to the Governor-General not being subject to the FOI Act and would be impractical and unwieldy, contrary to the provision that public access be achieved promptly and at the lowest reasonable cost. [51]

On the request itself, correspondence and file notes relating to the appellant's nominations directly relate to the Governor-General's exercise of substantive powers and functions in respect of the Order and are excluded. [52]

Relevant criteria are explained in the publicly available nomination form, and to the extent they are further explained in working manuals or policy guidelines, the evidence showed those documents were used in processes and activities concerned with those substantive powers and functions, so they are excluded too. [53]–[54]

The appellant's reliance on the "operational information" provisions was answered on the basis that the Governor-General's information relevant to decisions on the Order is not subject to the FOI Act and the Official Secretary does not make decisions or recommendations affecting members of the public, those being for the Council and the Governor-General as Chancellor. [55]

No documents relating to review processes exist, and the Official Secretary accepted that any later created would be available to the public without recourse to the FOI Act. [56]

There was no error in the Tribunal's decision, the grounds of appeal were not made out, and the appeal should be dismissed with costs. [57]

Gageler J

Gageler J wrote separate reasons, concluding that the Full Court rightly held the Tribunal correct in law and that the appeal should be dismissed. [80]–[81]

He framed the question as when a document "relates to matters of an administrative nature" (the words of the section), and said that in answering it "a page of history is worth a volume of logic", a phrase his footnote compares with New York Trust Co v Eisner 256 US 345 at 349 (1921). [61]–[62]

Sections 5 and 6 were inserted into the Bill for the FOI Act by Senate amendment in 1981, to give effect to 1979 recommendations of the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs. [63]

The Committee recommended limiting a proposed wholesale exemption of courts and industrial bodies, explaining that the independence of the judiciary should not be interfered with, but that documents associated with the functioning of registries and the collection of statistics on judicial administration, such as the number of sitting days, should in its words be "opened up to public gaze". [64]

Gageler J pointed to what the Division of Judicial Administration in the Attorney-General's Department was doing in 1979, which included assisting with the planning and fitting out of the High Court building, and to the High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth), under which from 1980 the High Court was responsible for administering its own affairs. [65]–[66]

He said "administrative" was being used by the Committee and by Senator Evans in a sense narrower and more specific than in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). [68]

The focus was not on the separation of judicial from executive power, since the same distinction applied to industrial bodies that did not exercise judicial power, but "more prosaically" on documents relating to matters of organisation and management. [68]

Section 6A was inserted by the Public Service Reform Act 1984 (Cth), consequential upon the creation of the statutory office of Official Secretary, and the identity of language suggests the same distinction was being drawn as in ss 5 and 6. [69]–[70]

The legislative history, he said, "compels the conclusion" that the Full Court's distinction between substantive powers and functions and the supporting "apparatus" is correct for s 6A and also for ss 5 and 6, and Bienstein, which reached a different conclusion on s 5, "was wrongly decided". [71]–[72]

He took "administrative" in what he called its primary sense, drawn as his footnote shows from the Oxford English Dictionary, of "[p]ertaining to, or dealing with, the conduct or management of affairs", and said the relevant matters are distinct from but incidental to substantive powers or functions, in the sense of providing logistical support (or infrastructure or physical necessities or resources or platform) for their exercise or performance. [73]–[74]

He said the appellant's distinction between documents relating to administrative tasks and those disclosing the decision-making process is "too fine to be sustained", and that the true distinction is "more robust and more practical". [75]

Matters not relating to logistical support do not become administrative merely because they are in some way preparatory to an exercise of a substantive power or the performance of a substantive function. [76]

His example was that if the Governor-General travelled to a remote location for a ceremony, documents about travel and accommodation would fall within the FOI Act, but documents about her participation in the ceremony would not. [77]

The categories of document still material (correspondence, working manuals, policy guidelines and criteria, documents relating to review processes, and file notes) all on their face relate to the substantive function the Governor-General performs as Chancellor. [78]–[79]

All relate to the "administration" of the Order within the meaning of the Letters Patent, but none relates to matters of an "administrative nature" within s 6A, so none falls within the scope of the FOI Act. [79]

Orders. The order on the judgment's cover is "Appeal dismissed with costs". [57]

The joint reasons concluded that the appeal should be dismissed with costs, and Gageler J that it should be dismissed, his reasons not mentioning costs. [57], [81]

No judge dissented. [57], [81]

Why it matters

The case gives the exception in s 6A(1) a limited construction: the joint reasons read it as documents concerning the management and administration of office resources, and Gageler J read it as matters providing logistical support for the exercise of substantive powers or functions. [41]–[42], [74]

The joint reasons said their construction governs s 6A(1) across the range of diverse powers and functions of the Governor-General, not only the Order. [42]

Both sets of reasons also address ss 5 and 6 of the FOI Act, which use the same words for courts and specified bodies. [47], [60], [72]

Both reject the reasoning in Bienstein on s 5, the joint reasons calling the relevant aspect erroneous and not apt for s 6A(1), and Gageler J saying the case was wrongly decided. [51], [72]

The joint reasons treated secondary materials as fortifying a construction that emerged from text and context, while Gageler J said the legislative history compels the conclusion. [48], [72]

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