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Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey

[2007] QSC 270

Supreme Court of Queensland · QLD

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Legal Services Commissioner v Dempsey [2007] QSC 270 is a decision of Chesterman J of the Supreme Court of Queensland, delivered on 25 September 2007. The Legal Services Commissioner applied for declarations on the proper construction of s 48IC of the Queensland Law Society Act 1948, to determine whether the respondent solicitor had overcharged two former clients [1]. Section 48IC sets a formula for the maximum fees a practitioner may charge and recover for work on a speculative personal injury claim [8]. Chesterman J declared that disbursements and outlays paid from the respondent's trust account in the prosecution of the clients' actions, including those paid out of money the clients had borrowed, were disbursements under s 48IC [28], [46]. He declined to declare that the interest the clients paid on those loans was a disbursement [54]. He also declared that the maximum fees under the formula included any GST the respondent had to pay, and that he was not entitled to charge the clients, or deduct from their settlement monies, any amount for GST [63].

Facts

The respondent was the sole principal of a Townsville firm, Dempsey Solicitors, also known as Dempseys Your Lawyers [2]. He was retained by Katherine Anne Wickham in October 2002 to act in a speculative claim for personal injuries she claimed to have suffered at work, and in about the middle of 1999 by Mark Curlewis to act in a speculative claim for injuries he suffered when he was electrocuted while crawling in a ceiling cavity at home [2]. Both claims were complicated, and both were speculative personal injury claims within s 48IA [3], [6]. The respondent conducted both claims professionally, competently and honestly and won a settlement for each client, but his fees were substantial and the clients recovered considerably less in damages than he received in fees [4].

The formula in s 48IC caps the fees at [E – (R + D)] x 0.5, where E is the amount the client is entitled to under the judgment or settlement, R is the total of refunds the client must make, and D is the total amount of disbursements the client must pay, or reimburse, to the practitioner or firm in relation to the claim [8]. Neither client could afford to pay disbursements, and the respondent made it clear he could not afford to pay them either, so it was arranged that the clients would borrow from a litigation lender and use the loans to pay disbursements [10]. Ms Wickham's client agreement, dated 7 November 2002, said that a client who could not fund the outlays and costs would need to enter into a litigation loan [11]. Clause 7 of that agreement required her to pay all GST payable on the firm's fees [13]. No client agreement with Mr Curlewis was put into evidence [14].

Both clients made litigation loan agreements with Bevtech Pty Ltd, which lent Ms Wickham $9,000 between March 2003 and January 2005 and lent Mr Curlewis $27,200 between March 2000 and December 2003 [15]. The loans carried interest at 18 per cent per annum, and each client charged the proceeds of the litigation with repayment and irrevocably directed the respondent to pay the lender out of those proceeds [16]. The advances were paid into the respondent's trust account to the credit of each client, and disbursements were paid from the trust account [17].

Ms Wickham's claim settled on 17 May 2005 for $95,000; she received $14,102.39 and the respondent was paid $33,000 in fees and GST on those fees [19]. In his calculation under the formula, the respondent counted as D only $7,041 of disbursements not paid from the litigation loans [20], although a further $8,965 of disbursements had been paid from the loans [21]. Mr Curlewis' claim settled on 5 April 2004 for $220,000, of which $202,904.75 was paid into the trust account after statutory refunds; he received $45,985.12 and the respondent was paid $88,755.17 in fees and GST [22]. In that calculation too, D was only the $29,349.56 of disbursements not paid by the litigation loans [23], while $28,700 of disbursements had come from loan funds [24]. Without s 48IC, the client agreements would have entitled the respondent to recover more in fees than he charged [25].

Procedural history

The applicant was the Legal Services Commissioner and the respondent was Paul Anthony Dempsey. The application was brought in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Queensland and heard on 10 September 2007. The applicant claimed that the respondent had charged and recovered from the clients more than s 48IC permitted, and sought declarations to vindicate that opinion [5]. The judgment does not describe any earlier court proceedings in the matter.

Issues

There were three points of contention [26]:

  1. What amount should be included as disbursements, D, in the formula [26]? This turned on whether disbursements paid from the money borrowed from Bevtech and deposited into the respondent's trust account were disbursements for the purposes of s 48IC [28].
  2. Should interest paid under the litigation loan agreements be included as a disbursement [26]?
  3. Was GST payable by the client in addition to the maximum fees given by the formula [26]?

Held

Chesterman J

Disbursements paid from loan money. The money had been spent on fees to counsel, expert witnesses and the like, and the respondent himself described the payments as "disbursements" in his statements of account [28]. The respondent argued, relying on the words "to the practitioner" in the definition of D, that money a client pays into a practitioner's trust account and uses to pay disbursements is not paid to the practitioner, so those payments fell outside D [29]. Chesterman J described the definition given by Lord Langdale MR in Re Remnant [1849] 50 ER 949, adopting the advice of the Taxing Masters, as the enduring definition of disbursements [30]-[31]. The Taxing Masters advised that disbursements are payments a solicitor is bound to make in discharging the duty he has undertaken, whether or not the client furnishes him with money for the purpose, and the question is not affected by the state of the cash account between solicitor and client [30]. His Honour noted that Remnant has been accepted as a correct exposition, citing Weiss v Clayton Utz (1993) 114 FLR 159 and re Doyle; ex parte Peak Downs Copper Mining Co (No 2) (1873) 4 QSCR 22 [32]. He also relied on Dal Pont's explanation in Law of Costs that a disbursement is money paid on behalf of a client to a third party, such as witnesses or counsel [33]. So understood, the payments the respondent made to counsel and expert witnesses were disbursements [34].

Because "disbursements" has had a particular and well understood legal meaning at least since 1849, Chesterman J expected the draftsman of s 48IC to have intended that meaning [35]. He quoted O'Connor J in Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales (1908) 6 CLR 469 at 531, who said that words with an acquired legal meaning are taken, prima facie, to be used with that meaning unless a contrary intention clearly appears from the context [35]. The respondent's construction altered that ordinary meaning, and the Taxing Masters' definition in Remnant "covers the very point advanced by the respondent" [36]. The means by which a client recompenses the solicitor does not determine whether a payment is a disbursement [36]. His Honour read Lutwyche J's statement in Doyle as clear authority that a solicitor's payment of counsel or witnesses from money paid into his trust account for that purpose is a disbursement [37]–[38].

Chesterman J then showed that the respondent's construction led to anomalous results, by comparing three ways a solicitor might pay a $1,000 fee to counsel: (a) by a trust account cheque to counsel using the client's money; (b) by a trust account cheque to his general account and then a general account cheque to counsel; or (c) by a general account cheque to counsel, later recouped by a trust account cheque to his general account [40]. He considered it obvious that payments made in ways (b) and (c) fall within the statutory definition, because in each the client has paid or reimbursed the practitioner [41]. Even in way (a), the solicitor discharges his own liability to the service provider with the client's money, and his Honour found it "plain that payment to the trust account for the discharge by the client's money of the solicitor's debt is a payment to the solicitor" [42]. He said Remnant and Doyle are express authorities for that proposition [42]. If the mode of payment decided the question, a solicitor could avoid the section by choosing way (a) and so give D no value at all, inflating the figure to his own benefit [43]. He held that the section should not be construed in that way, because "The evident purpose of Division 2A is to protect litigants who bring speculative personal injuries claims and who retain legal practitioners on that express basis" [44]. His Honour noted that the respondent had acted on the advice of senior counsel, which the Queensland Law Society also accepted, but thought the advice was wrong [45].

Interest on the litigation loans. The applicant argued that the clients could proceed only by borrowing, so that interest was a necessary incident of the claims, and that this sequence, described in argument as a "chain of obligations", made the interest a disbursement under s 48IC [48]–[49]. Chesterman J did not accept the submission [50]. He accepted that without the loans the clients could not have retained the respondent or brought their claims, but held that necessary spending to obtain the settlements was not enough to make the interest a disbursement [50]. No evidence showed a general and established custom that a solicitor pays interest on a client's behalf to a financier [50]. Litigation lending as a business may be new, but litigants have always borrowed to fund actions, and his Honour was referred to no case holding interest on such a loan to be a disbursement [51]. As a further reason, the respondent was under no obligation to pay the interest and did not pay it for the clients, who paid it themselves from their settlement monies, so the payment to Bevtech was not a payment to the respondent [52]. His guarantee of the clients' promise to pay interest was a separate obligation that would arise only on a client's default [52]. The interest was an incidental, though necessary, expense of borrowing, and "a significant step removed from the payment of suppliers of services necessary to put together a case for the client" [53]. His Honour held that the interest was not a disbursement within s 48IC and declined to make the declaration sought [54].

GST. The respondent had added to the fees calculated under the formula a further 10 per cent, which was said to be justified as required by the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act (the GST Act), and which further reduced what the clients received [55]. Chesterman J accepted that from 1 July 2000 the respondent's supply of legal services was a taxable supply on which he had to pay GST of 10 per cent of its value, under ss 9-5, 9-10, 9-40 and 9-70 of the GST Act [57]–[59]. Ms Wickham's client agreement allowed him to recover the GST from her, and his Honour assumed he had a similar right against Mr Curlewis [60]. The question was whether the GST Act and the costs agreements together allowed the respondent to recover more than the formula amount, and his Honour answered it in the negative [60]–[61]. The GST Act imposed the obligation to pay the tax on the respondent and imposed no obligation on the clients to pay it [61]. The respondent's obligation remained his own, and the formula fixed the maximum he could charge in professional fees despite the client agreement, without any increase because he had to pay GST [62]. Chesterman J held: "The two statutes operate independently according to their provisions. The GST Act does not impinge upon or override s 48IC of the Act." [62].

Orders. Chesterman J made three declarations. First, that in respect of Katherine Wickham and Mark Curlewis, disbursements and outlays paid from the respondent's trust account in the prosecution of their actions were disbursements as defined by s 48IC of the Queensland Law Society Act 1948 [46]. Second, that the maximum fees the respondent was entitled to charge them under the formula in s 48IC included any tax payable by the respondent under the GST Act [63]. Third, that the respondent was not entitled to charge either client, or deduct from their settlement monies, any amount for goods and services tax he may have been liable to pay on supplying legal services to them [63]. His Honour declined to make the declaration sought that interest on the litigation loans was a disbursement [54].

Why it matters

The decision applies the settled legal meaning of "disbursements", traced to Re Remnant, to the cap on fees for speculative personal injury claims in s 48IC [35]–[36]. It holds that whether a payment is a disbursement does not turn on how the client puts the solicitor in funds, so outlays paid from loan money held in the solicitor's trust account count in D and reduce the maximum fee [27], [36], [42]–[43]. Chesterman J treated the protective purpose of Division 2A as a reason not to read the formula in a way that would let a practitioner erode its effectiveness [44]. The decision also holds that interest a client pays on a litigation loan is not a disbursement [54], and that a solicitor cannot add GST on top of the s 48IC maximum [62]–[63]. An appeal, [2008] QCA 122 (McMurdo P, Keane JA and White J), was dismissed with costs on 23 May 2008.

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