Lindsay v The Queen
(2015) 255 CLR 272 · [2015] HCA 16
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Lindsay v The Queen [2015] HCA 16 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ), given on 6 May 2015 on appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia. It concerns the common law of provocation as a partial defence to murder and the proviso to s 353(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) [2], [23]. All five judges held that the trial judge did not err in leaving provocation to the jury [40], [88]. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal and in its place ordered that the appeal to that court be allowed, the appellant's conviction be quashed and a new trial be had [50], [89].
Facts
The appellant, Michael Joseph Lindsay, was an Aboriginal man aged 28 or thereabouts, and the deceased, Andrew Roger Negre, was a Caucasian man previously unknown to him [1], [5]. They met at the Hallett Cove Tavern, drank together, and in the early hours of 1 April 2011 went with others to the appellant's Hallett Cove home to continue drinking [5]. The joint reasons place the visit to the tavern on the evening of 31 March 2011, whereas Nettle J places the meeting in the early hours of 1 April and the departure from the tavern at about 2:00am [5], [55].
Two incidents followed, which together gave rise to the trial judge's decision to leave provocation to the jury [8]. In the first, on the patio, the deceased straddled the seated appellant and moved his hips backwards and forwards in a sexually suggestive manner [8]. The appellant told him that he was not gay and not to do such things or he would hit him, the appellant's de facto wife also remonstrated, and the deceased apologised [8]. In the second, in the family room, the appellant told the tired deceased that he could sleep in the spare room, and the deceased replied that he wanted the appellant in there with him and would pay him for sex [10]. The appellant asked him what he had said, and the deceased repeated the proposition, offering several hundred dollars [10].
The appellant punched the deceased, who fell to the floor, kicked and punched him as he lay there, and at some stage repeatedly stabbed him with a knife [10]. Two stab wounds to the aorta caused massive blood loss, unconsciousness within 20 to 30 seconds and death within two to three minutes [11]. The appellant did not give evidence at the trial, and the joint reasons record his case as being that he had not been present at the fatal assault, while Nettle J records his only defence as being that it was not he who inflicted the knife wounds [12], [60]. The joint reasons record as common ground that there was evidence on which a reasonable jury might consider it possible that the deceased's conduct provoked the appellant and that he lost his self-control and carried out the fatal assault before regaining his composure [13].
Procedural history
The appellant was tried on a charge of murder before Sulan J in the Supreme Court of South Australia [1]. Before closing addresses, his trial counsel submitted that provocation should be left to the jury, and the prosecutor, in light of Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334, accepted that provocation was raised and that the prosecution had to negative it [14]. The jury were directed that the prosecution had to prove that the killing was unprovoked, and they found the appellant guilty of murder and his co-accused guilty of the lesser offence of assisting the offender [1], [60].
The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal (Kourakis CJ, Gray and Peek JJ), challenging the accuracy and sufficiency of the directions on provocation [2]. In a decision cited as R v Lindsay (2014) 119 SASR 320, the majority (Peek J, with whom Kourakis CJ agreed) found that the directions were flawed and that their cumulative effect was a miscarriage of justice [2]. According to Nettle J, Gray J was not persuaded that the directions were inadequate or erroneous [51]. The majority also held that, in 21st century Australia, the evidence taken at its highest in favour of the appellant was such that no reasonable jury could fail to find that an ordinary person could not have so far lost self-control as to attack the deceased as the appellant did, so that the trial judge was wrong to leave provocation to the jury [2]. They concluded that the erroneous directions had not occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice, and the appeal was dismissed under the proviso [2].
On 14 November 2014, French CJ and Gageler J granted special leave to appeal [3]. In the High Court, the prosecution did not maintain that the directions on provocation were sufficient [4].
Issues
The joint reasons record three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge was correct to leave provocation to the jury; that the Court of Criminal Appeal's reasons for concluding otherwise wrongly took into account unidentified academic literature; and that it was wrong to apply the proviso without an application by the prosecution [3]. Nettle J describes special leave as granted on two grounds in summary: the application of the proviso when the Crown did not contend for it, and the holding that there was no evidence capable of sustaining provocation [62]. He frames three issues: whether it was open to the Court of Criminal Appeal to invoke the proviso; whether it erred by having regard to academic literature not disclosed to the parties; and whether it erred by focusing on the homosexual nature of the conduct when a jury might have taken the real sting and insult to be something other than or in addition to that [52]. The joint reasons identify the respective roles of judge and jury on the threshold question of law, whether the evidence sufficiently raises provocation to leave it to the jury, as the issue raised by the first ground [16].
Held
French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ
In joint reasons, their Honours held that the trial judge did not err in leaving to the jury the alternative verdict of manslaughter based on provocation [40]. They said that provocation at common law reduces what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter and that, although it is commonly called a "partial defence", the true position is that an unlawful intentional killing under provocation is not murder [15]. There are two conditions: the provocation must be capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control and act as the accused did (the objective limb), and it must actually cause the accused to lose self-control, with the killing taking place while the accused is so deprived (the subjective limb) [15]. Where the evidence raises the issue, the prosecution must prove that the killing was not done under provocation, and it may do so by negativing either limb beyond reasonable doubt [15]. Whether the subjective limb is negatived is a question of fact, whether the objective limb is satisfied is a question of opinion or, in Glanville Williams' classification, "evaluative fact", and whether the evidence sufficiently raises the issue is a threshold question of law [16].
The appellant submitted that where evidence can support the subjective limb no threshold question arises about the objective limb, a submission their Honours described as large and as reminiscent of the unsuccessful submission in Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 588 [17]-[18]. They referred to Gibbs J's statement, in dissent in Moffa v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601, that the question "has to be decided in the light of contemporary conditions and attitudes", which this Court approved in Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 [21], [25]. They noted that the majority's analysis in Moffa was directed to findings open to a reasonable jury on all the circumstances, and that no question of a shift in attitudes or conditions was raised by the evidence in Stingel [20], [27].
They said the ordinary person test provides, in words from Stingel, "an objective and uniform standard of the minimum powers of self-control" [25]. Under the common law, the trial judge and the appellate court have the task of fixing the boundaries of those minimum powers before it is open to the jury to find that murder is reduced to manslaughter [26]. The question for both, in words taken from Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58, is whether "on the version of events most favourable to the accused which is suggested by material in the evidence, a jury acting reasonably might fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the killing was unprovoked in the relevant sense" [26]. They added that the appellate court's determination "involves somewhat greater exactitude" than the trial judge's, which reflects the reluctance of trial judges to withdraw the issue from the jury [26].
Referring to Stingel, they emphasised the "limited scope" of the threshold question and the need to exercise caution before declining to leave provocation [27]. In their own words, "[t]here is an evident need for caution before a court determines as a matter of law that contemporary attitudes to sexual relations are such that conduct is incapable of constituting provocation" [28]. The partial defence recognises human frailty and requires the gravity of the provocation to be assessed from the standpoint of the accused, taking into account his or her history and attributes [28].
They then turned to Peek J, who characterised the objective limb as "an instrument of policy employed to keep the partial defence of provocation within bounds acceptable to contemporary society" and who said that "times have very much changed" from former times, when homosexual acts were serious crime and men resorted to weapons and violence to defend their honour [32]–[33]. Peek J reached his "firm view" after considering the authorities and "some of the extensive academic literature", and the joint reasons said it "is not known" whether the many critiques following Green were that literature [33]–[34]. Their reasons contain no separate ruling on the second ground.
They said Peek J's conclusion "would appear to be based upon a view about contemporary Australian attitudes to an uninvited non-violent homosexual advance" [35]. There was no apparent motive for the killing, and the jury might consider that the appellant had been well disposed towards the deceased in the hours leading up to it, while, as Peek J acknowledged, there was ample evidence on which the jury might consider that the prosecution had failed to negative that the deceased's conduct in fact provoked the appellant [35]. Their Honours said that the capacity of the evidence to support a conclusion that the prosecution might fail to negative the objective limb "did not turn upon the appellate court's assessment of attitudes to homosexuality in 21st century Australia" [37]. It was open, as the appellant submitted, for the jury to consider that the sting of the provocation lay in the suggestion that, despite his earlier firm rejection, he was so lacking in integrity that he would have sex with the deceased for money, in his own home and in the presence of his family [37]. It was also open to a reasonable jury, as the appellant submitted, to consider that an offer of money for sex made by a Caucasian man to an Aboriginal man in his home, in the presence of his wife and family, may have had a pungency that such an invitation in other circumstances might not possess [37].
Referring to Dixon J in Packett v The King (1937) 58 CLR 190, they said it may be open to entertain a reasonable doubt about provocation although it would be unreasonable to find affirmatively that provocation existed and was sufficient, and that the need for caution has particular force where, as here, there was evidence capable of supporting the subjective limb [38]. The limited scope of the threshold question recognises the need for restraint lest the court usurp the function of the jury [39]. Peek J did not purport to decide that a non-violent sexual advance might never amount to provocation in law, a conclusion that would be inconsistent with the holding in Green [39]. His assessment that there was more evidence to support the objective limb in Green than here was essentially a factual conclusion, taken to encompass his estimate of the degree of outrage the appellant might have experienced, and it was "for the jury to make that assessment" [39].
The conclusion that provocation was rightly left sufficed to determine the appeal, but they also referred to the third ground, which, if good, would dispose of the appeal without more [41]. On that ground, the appellant submitted that under the adversarial system a court should not dismiss an appeal under the proviso of its own motion, and complained that he had no opportunity to make submissions on the determinative issue [44]. They said the foundation of that complaint was not established, because Kourakis CJ raised the prospect of dismissal under the proviso at the hearing and made plain that the capacity of the evidence to raise the objective limb was the issue, so that counsel was squarely on notice [44]–[45].
The prosecution did not submit that the proviso should be applied on the footing that provocation had been wrongly left, although it did advert to the proviso as one of the ways the appeal might be disposed of [46]. An appellate court, they said, is not governed by the prosecution's conduct at trial in deciding whether in law the prosecution was required to negative provocation [46]. Even if the prosecution had made no reference to the proviso, the appellant's challenge should be rejected where the Court of Criminal Appeal raised the proviso and invited submissions on whether it should be applied [46]. That was because his submission did not address the injunction in Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v The Queen (2012) 246 CLR 92 to give effect to the proviso's text and structure, neither of which supports his proposed limitation, or the proviso's evident purpose of doing away with the old Exchequer rule [47]. They added that the prosecution's failure to rely on the proviso in the intermediate appellate court has been considered no bar to its engagement in the High Court, that an appeal from a jury's verdict is an exception to the principle of finality, and that the observation in Baiada that an appellate court finding no substantial miscarriage of justice could not nevertheless allow the appeal and direct a new trial applies whether or not the prosecution has invoked the proviso [48].
They said that, if the Court of Criminal Appeal's conclusion that the evidence did not raise provocation were correct, the inadequacy of the directions did not occasion a miscarriage of justice, and that the appeal did not provide the occasion to consider whether forensic decisions of trial counsel made in consequence of an erroneous decision to leave a partial defence may constitute a miscarriage of justice [49]. Because it could not be concluded that a correctly instructed jury would inevitably have convicted the appellant of murder, the appeal had to be allowed [4]. Neither party submitted that the Court should substitute a verdict of manslaughter, and the appropriate consequential order was a new trial [4].
Nettle J
Nettle J wrote separate reasons, reached the same result and proposed orders to the same effect [88]–[89]. He said that the argument that the proviso could not be invoked until the Crown identified it "cannot be accepted in the broad terms in which it was stated", since, although the Crown carries the onus of establishing that the proviso applies, it need not be the first to take the point [63]–[64]. Where a court of criminal appeal makes clear that it contemplates the proviso might apply, identifies the basis with sufficient clarity and gives the appellant an appropriate opportunity to respond, "there is nothing in principle or fairness to prevent the court" deciding that there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice and that the proviso should be applied [64].
He qualified this by saying that there are unlikely to be many cases where the Crown does not contend for the proviso and yet the court is satisfied of no substantial miscarriage, that in such a case the court would need to be satisfied that the Crown's reluctance was not based on a consideration suggesting the proviso was inapplicable, and that unfairness in some cases might mean the proviso could not be considered at all [66]. Apart from such cases, the Crown's unwillingness to contend for the proviso is not of itself a sufficient reason to decline to apply it [67]. He rejected the submission that the basis for applying the proviso was never identified, because the exchanges in argument showed that the Court of Criminal Appeal raised it on the basis of insufficient evidence of objective provocation, and counsel had an appropriate opportunity to respond and did respond [68], [72].
He saw force in the further submission about the conduct of the trial: assuming provocation should not have been left, it would be difficult to exclude as a reasonable possibility that raising it, and defence counsel having to adapt her final address, deprived the appellant of a chance of acquittal otherwise fairly open to him, but the point was moot because provocation was rightly left [73]–[74]. After setting out Peek J's reasoning on the objective limb, he said: "With respect, that was exceptionable" [75]. Peek J did not identify the academic literature or reveal how it assisted him, and there was force in the complaint that the majority appears to have had regard to literature not disclosed to the parties, although if that were the only criticism it might be inconsequential [76]–[78].
He said the degree of provocation to which the ordinary person must be assumed to be subjected is the degree subjectively perceived by the accused, and he quoted Stingel to the effect that the objective test is not applied in a vacuum [79]. If Peek J considered the gravamen of the evidence to be the homosexual nature of the advances, "his Honour erred by failing to take into account the full context of the events" [80]. That context included that the appellant was hosting the deceased as a guest, had reacted with anguish and loathing to the first advance, had threatened violence if anything of the kind were repeated, and was then insulted in the presence of his partner, sisters and friends with an offer of several hundred dollars to prostitute himself [81]. He added, noting that no such submission was advanced below, that it is not impossible that a jury could reasonably infer that, because the appellant is Aboriginal, he perceived the deceased's conduct to be racially based and for that reason especially insulting [81].
He said the policy of the objective test is to limit the defence to what a reasonable jury might consider to be the standard of the minimum powers of self-control of an ordinary person, and "not what academics, the press, pressure groups or judges might hope or wish" those powers to be [82]. It is the jury, as representatives of the community, who are entrusted to embody and apply community standards, and, quoting Barwick CJ in Moffa, he said that, subject to very limited exceptions, whether an ordinary man would lose self-control "is a question exclusively for the jury, however much a court may be inclined to think that a jury should not do so" [82]. A reasonable jury "is by no means a perfect jury", he said, and, subject to very limited exceptions, an accused has the immutable right to the full benefit of any reasonable doubt that the influences within it might yield [83]. The law remains as it was when Green was decided in 1997, he said, that the application of the objective test depends on the jury's evaluation of the degree of outrage the accused might have experienced [84].
He said that what was said in Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300 must now be understood in light of Baini v The Queen (2012) 246 CLR 469, albeit decided in the context of s 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), and Pollock v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 233, on the common form proviso, so that where error has produced a miscarriage of justice a court of criminal appeal cannot fail to be satisfied of a substantial miscarriage of justice unless it determines that, absent the error, it would not have been open to the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt as to guilt [65], [86]. In words from Baini, the court must conclude from its review of the record "that conviction was inevitable", which he explained to mean that, assuming no error, the result was bound not to have been any different for the jury acting reasonably on the evidence properly before them and applying the correct onus and standard of proof [86]. The jury's assessment of the extent to which the appellant was in fact provoked was critical to how an ordinary person might have reacted and so to the objective limb [87]. He concluded that the trial judge was right to leave provocation to the jury, that it was not open to the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal to be satisfied that the inadequate directions did not deprive the appellant of a chance fairly open to him of a manslaughter verdict, and that the majority was wrong to find no substantial miscarriage of justice [88].
Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed [50]. It set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia made on 3 June 2014 and, in its place, ordered that the appeal to that court be allowed, the appellant's conviction be quashed and a new trial be had [50].
Why it matters
The joint reasons state that criticism of provocation led to its abolition or modification in all Australian jurisdictions except South Australia, where the common law of provocation remained the law and governed this appeal [23]. A footnote to that passage records that a 2013 South Australian Bill, under which conduct of a sexual nature would not constitute provocation merely because the person was the same sex as the defendant, was withdrawn and referred to a Legislative Review Committee, whose majority resolved not to support it on a view that the decision in R v Lindsay made the reform unnecessary [23]. On provocation, the case matters because the joint reasons call for caution before a court decides as a matter of law, by reference to contemporary attitudes to sexual relations, that conduct cannot be provocation, and Nettle J says that the application of the objective test depends on the jury's evaluation of the degree of outrage [28], [84]. On the proviso, both sets of reasons accept that a court of criminal appeal may apply it although the prosecution has not sought that outcome, if the court raises the proviso and the appellant has an opportunity to respond, with Nettle J adding the qualifications noted above [46], [64].
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