casewise

Masson v Parsons

(2019) 266 CLR 554 · [2019] HCA 21 · (2019) 368 ALR 583 · (2019) 93 ALJR 848 · (2019) 59 Fam LR 503

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Masson v Parsons [2019] HCA 21 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ), given on 19 June 2019 on appeal from the Family Court of Australia. The principal issue was whether s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) picks up ss 14(2) and 14(4) of the Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW) and applies them to applications for parenting orders under Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), so that the appellant is irrefutably presumed not to be the father of his biological daughter [1]. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside orders 2, 3, 4 and 8 of the Full Court of the Family Court, ordered in their place that the appeal to the Full Court be dismissed, and ordered the first and second respondents to pay the appellant's costs [56]. Six judges in joint reasons held that the State provisions were not picked up by s 79(1), because they do not regulate the exercise of jurisdiction, and did not apply of their own force, because they were inconsistent with Div 1 of Pt VII of the Family Law Act [1]–[2], [52]. Edelman J wrote separately, reasoning that the State provision applied of its own force but was inoperative for inconsistency, and agreed with the orders [72]–[73].

Facts

The appellant and the first respondent were close friends for many years [3]. In 2006 the appellant provided his semen to the first respondent so that she might artificially inseminate herself and conceive a child, which she did [3]. At the time of conception he believed that he was fathering the child and that he would, as her parent, support and care for her, and his name was entered on her birth certificate as her father [3]. The child lived with the first respondent and the second respondent, who is the first respondent's female partner [3]. The appellant had, and continues to have, an ongoing role in the child's financial support, health, education and general welfare, and he enjoys what the primary judge described as an extremely close and secure attachment relationship with her [3]. By 2015 the first and second respondents resolved to relocate to New Zealand and to take the child with them [4]. The appellant then began proceedings in the Family Court of Australia seeking orders including shared parental responsibility, a restraint on relocating the child, and time with the child on a fortnightly cycle [4].

Under s 61DA of the Family Law Act, when making a parenting order the court must apply a rebuttable presumption that it is in the child's best interests for the child's parents to have equal shared parental responsibility [7]. Section 60H provides rules for the parentage of children born of artificial conception procedures, and under s 60H(1), where the woman was married to or the de facto partner of another person (the other intended parent) and either the required consents were given or a prescribed law so provides, the child is the child of the woman and the other intended parent and not of any other person who provided genetic material [10]. Section 14(2) of the Status of Children Act provides that if a woman becomes pregnant by a fertilisation procedure using sperm obtained from a man who is not her husband, that man is presumed not to be the father of any child born as a result, and s 14(4) makes that presumption irrebuttable [16]. Section 79(1) of the Judiciary Act makes the laws of each State, including laws relating to procedure, evidence and the competency of witnesses, binding on all courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth [21].

Procedural history

At first instance there was no question that the first respondent, as the child's biological and birth mother, was a parent; the issue was whether the appellant or the second respondent was a legal parent of the child [22]. The primary judge, Cleary J, found that the first and second respondents were not in a de facto relationship when the child was conceived, so that s 60H(1)(a) was not satisfied and the second respondent did not meet the requirement to be the other intended parent [23]. Following the reasoning of Cronin J in Groth v Banks, her Honour held that s 60H expands rather than restricts the categories of people who can be parents, so that where s 60H is not engaged a person may still be a parent within the ordinary meaning of the word [24]. She held that the appellant was a parent within that ordinary meaning, because he is the biological father and provided his genetic material to father a child whom he expected to help parent by financial support and physical care, as he had since done [24]. On appeal, the Full Court of the Family Court (Thackray J, with whom Murphy and Aldridge JJ agreed) also accepted that s 60H is not exhaustive, but held that s 79 of the Judiciary Act picked up s 14 of the Status of Children Act and applied it as a law of the Commonwealth, so that the appellant was irrebuttably presumed not to be the child's parent [25].

Issues

The first issue was whether s 60H of the Family Law Act is exhaustive of the persons who may be a parent of a child born of an artificial conception procedure, and what "parent" means in that Act [26]–[29]. The principal issue was whether s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act picks up ss 14(2) and 14(4) of the Status of Children Act and applies them to applications for parenting orders under Pt VII of the Family Law Act [1]. A further issue was whether, even if those provisions regulated the exercise of State jurisdiction, the Family Law Act had "otherwise provided" within the meaning of s 79(1) [40]. Another was whether ss 14(2) and 14(4) apply of their own force in federal jurisdiction as valid State laws, or are inoperative under s 109 of the Constitution [2], [49]. The last was the argument of the first and second respondents and Victoria that the ordinary meaning of "parent" excludes a "sperm donor" [53].

Held

Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ

The joint reasons held that the primary judge and the Full Court were correct that s 60H is not exhaustive of the persons who may be a parent of a child born of an artificial conception procedure [26]. Although the Family Law Act does not define "parent", a court will not depart from a word's natural and ordinary meaning unless it is plain that Parliament intended a different meaning, and their Honours found no basis in the text, structure or purpose of the legislation for any other meaning [26]. The provision in s 4(1) that "parent" in Pt VII includes an adoptive parent implies an accepted meaning of the word which would or might not otherwise extend to an adoptive parent [26]. Their Honours said that s 60B(1) perhaps suggests that a child cannot have more than two parents under the Act, but that, whether or not that is so, it is not inconsistent with an ordinary conception of parent [26]. The Act proceeds from the premise that "parent" refers to a parent within the ordinary meaning of the word except when an applicable provision of the Act otherwise provides [27]. Their Honours rejected the argument that the definition of "parent" in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), which refers to s 60H, shows s 60H to be exhaustive, noting that an Act does not alter the law merely by betraying an erroneous opinion of it and that the meaning of s 60H is not obscure or ambiguous [28]. Referring to Baroness Hale of Richmond's observation in In re G (Children) that a person may be a natural parent genetically, gestationally or psychologically, their Honours said that may also be true of the ordinary meaning of "parent" in Australia, but that it was unnecessary to reach a concluded view [29]. Whether a person is a parent according to the ordinary meaning is a question of fact and degree, determined according to the ordinary, contemporary Australian understanding of "parent" and the circumstances of the case [29].

As explained in Rizeq v Western Australia, the purpose of s 79(1) is to fill a gap in the laws regulating matters before courts exercising federal jurisdiction, a gap that exists because State legislatures lack power to command a court as to the manner of its exercise of federal jurisdiction [30]. Section 79(1) fills that gap by picking up the texts of State laws governing the manner of exercise of State jurisdiction and applying them as Commonwealth laws, but it does not add to or subtract from laws that determine the rights and duties of persons [30]. Their Honours illustrated the distinction with Rizeq, where the majority verdict provision in s 114(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) was picked up by s 79(1), while the offence provision in s 6(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) applied of its own force [31]. A rebuttable presumption of law that merely facilitates proof is a rule relating to evidence and, generally speaking, capable of being picked up by s 79(1), but a conclusive presumption alters the rule that attaches legal consequences to the presumed fact, and if that rule is directed to the status, rights and duties of persons, so too is the presumption [32]. Their Honours said it may be that the rebuttable presumptions in Div 1 of Pt 3 of the Status of Children Act are capable of being picked up by s 79(1) [33]. By contrast, ss 14(2) and 14(4) operate as an irrebuttable rule of law that, in specified circumstances, the biological father of a child born as a result of a fertilisation procedure is not the father, which is a rule determinative of parental status applying independently of anything done by a court, not a law relating to evidence or regulating the exercise of jurisdiction [34]. Their Honours rejected the respondents' submission that s 18, which stops a prosecutor relying on the presumptions in criminal proceedings, shows the presumption to be procedural, since s 18 says nothing about the nature of the presumptions to which it applies [35]. They also rejected the submission based on s 17(1), which resolves conflicts between irrebuttable presumptions, holding that the presumption in ss 14(2) and 14(4) is rightly called irrebuttable, is also properly described as conditional, and is not rebuttable by evidence of competing facts [36]–[37]. They contrasted s 4 of the Civil Liability (Third Party Claims Against Insurers) Act 2017 (NSW), which, although determinative of rights and obligations, is directed to the manner of exercise of jurisdiction and would be picked up by s 79(1) if such a claim were brought in federal jurisdiction, for example in the Federal Court [38]. They concluded that ss 14(2) and 14(4) are not provisions to which s 79(1) is capable of applying [39].

Although that was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, their Honours accepted the appellant's further submission that, even if ss 14(2) and 14(4) regulated the exercise of State jurisdiction, they could not be picked up because the Family Law Act has "otherwise provided" within the meaning of s 79(1) [40]–[41]. Principles for resolving conflicts between statutes from the same source give little help, and, accepting the Commonwealth Attorney-General's submission, the meaning of a State law cannot be adjusted to avoid the inconsistency [42]. Because s 79(1) operates only in an area of exclusive Commonwealth power where s 109 of the Constitution has no application, their Honours held that "otherwise provided" in s 79(1) is to be equated with the concept of inconsistency in s 109 [43]. Section 60H may be seen as expanding the conception of "parent" beyond its ordinary meaning, and s 60G lets a person qualify as a parent by adoption, but neither is exhaustive, so that apart from them the question is whether the person is a parent according to the ordinary meaning [44]. If a person qualifies as a parent under s 60G, under s 60H or according to the ordinary meaning, it is beside the point that a State provision like s 14(2) otherwise provides [45]. Division 1 of Pt VII leaves no room for contrary State or Territory provisions, and in effect contains an implicit negative proposition that nothing other than what it provides with respect to parentage is to be the subject of legislation [45]. Their Honours traced the history of the Commonwealth provisions, from s 5A in 1983, through the referrals of power by four States in 1986 and 1987 and the enactment of s 60B, to s 60H, which in 2008 first provided that the biological father is not a parent where s 60H(1) is engaged, with no such provision added to s 60H(2) or (3) [46]. From that history they concluded that Div 1 of Pt VII is a Commonwealth scheme complete on its face which, for the purposes of s 79(1), otherwise provides [46]. They accepted Victoria's contention that the States long regulated the status of children, but held that the referrals aimed at a uniform Commonwealth scheme and that Div 1 of Pt VII is designedly selective as to which State and Territory parentage provisions it permits to apply [47]. The evident purpose of Div 1 of Pt VII is that the Commonwealth is to have sole control of the provisions determinative of parentage under the Act [48].

Their Honours accepted the first part of the argument of the first and second respondents and Victoria: ss 14(2) and 14(4) are not picked up by s 79(1), and but for inconsistency they would form part of the single composite body of law applying of their own force in federal jurisdiction [49]–[50]. They rejected the second part, holding that Div 1 of Pt VII evinces an intention to be a complete statement of the law on the subject matter to which ss 14(2) and 14(4) apply, so that those provisions are inconsistent with it [51]. By s 109 of the Constitution, Div 1 of Pt VII prevails over ss 14(2) and 14(4) to the extent of the inconsistency, which in practical result excludes the whole of those provisions [52].

Their Honours rejected the argument that the ordinary meaning of "parent" excludes a "sperm donor" [53]–[54]. Calling a biological father a sperm donor suggests that he did no more than provide semen on the understanding that he would have nothing to do with the child, and those are not the facts of this case [54]. The undisputed finding was that the appellant provided his semen on the understanding that he would be the child's parent, would be registered on her birth certificate as her parent, and would support and care for her, as he has done since her birth [54]. To characterise the appellant as a sperm donor, their Honours said, "is in effect to ignore all but one of the facts and circumstances which, in this case, have been held to be determinative" [54]. They held it unnecessary to decide whether a man who does no more than provide his semen for an artificial conception procedure is a parent within the ordinary meaning, and saw no reason to doubt the primary judge's conclusion that the appellant is a parent of his daughter [55].

Edelman J (concurring)

Edelman J began by distinguishing three concepts: jurisdiction, meaning an authority to decide; the powers a court can exercise to make substantive orders; and laws that regulate or govern the federal authority to decide [57]–[59]. His Honour explained that his primary difference from the other members of the Court in Rizeq concerned whether laws conferring powers on a court to make substantive orders regulate the federal authority to decide, which in his view they do not, but that issue was not argued and did not need to be decided on this appeal [60]. In his view s 79(1) assumes that the court already has federal jurisdiction and existing powers to make substantive orders, and it is concerned only with laws that regulate or govern the court's authority to decide [61]–[62]. Section 79(1) is not limited to procedural or evidentiary matters, and his Honour gave limitation laws that bar a remedy without extinguishing the underlying right as another example [63]. In Rizeq, he said, the offence and penalty provisions in ss 6(1)(a) and 34(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act applied of their own force, while s 114(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act and the presumption in s 11(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act were picked up by s 79(1) [65]–[66]. His Honour said a more natural characterisation of s 4 of the Civil Liability (Third Party Claims Against Insurers) Act might be as conferring a substantive power to enforce rights and duties directly against an insurer, in which case it would apply of its own force [68]. Edelman J said that "An irrebuttable presumption is an oxymoron" and is really a rule of substantive law, and he agreed with the joint judgment that s 14(1)-(3) are substantive rules of law [69]. The rule in s 14(2), in his view, appears to be concerned with the general statutory rights and duties of persons, but it can also be seen as inseparable from the court's powers to determine who is a parent, given s 17(1) and the irrebuttable presumption in s 12(1) [70]–[71]. He held that it does not matter which characterisation is adopted, because under either s 14(2) applies of its own force and would not need to be picked up by s 79(1) [72]. He held, for the reasons given in the joint judgment, that s 14(2), read with s 14(4), is inconsistent with Div 1 of Pt VII of the Family Law Act and is inoperative under s 109 of the Constitution [72]. His Honour agreed with the orders proposed in the joint judgment [73].

Orders. The appeal was allowed [56]. Orders 2, 3, 4 and 8 made by the Full Court of the Family Court on 28 June 2018 were set aside and, in their place, it was ordered that appeal number EA 111 of 2017 to the Full Court be dismissed [56]. The first and second respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to the High Court [56]. Edelman J agreed with these orders [73].

Why it matters

The joint reasons hold that s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act picks up only State laws that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction, not laws determinative of the rights, duties or status of persons [30], [34]. They equate "otherwise provided" in s 79(1) with the concept of inconsistency in s 109 of the Constitution [43]. They also hold that "parent" in the Family Law Act bears its ordinary meaning except where the Act otherwise provides, and that whether a person is a parent in that sense is a question of fact and degree [27], [29].

Cited in 227 later casesRelies on 42 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries