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Melbourne v The Queen

(1999) 198 CLR 1 · [1999] HCA 32 · (1999) 164 ALR 465 · (1999) 73 ALJR 1097

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Melbourne v The Queen [1999] HCA 32 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ), given on 5 August 1999 on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The issue was whether a trial judge who directs a jury that evidence of the accused's good character bears on guilt errs by not also directing that it can be used in assessing the accused's credibility [1]. By a majority (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; Kirby and Callinan JJ dissenting) the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, which left the appellant's conviction for murder standing [55], [81], [131], [158], [211].

Facts

Roy Bernard Melbourne killed his next-door neighbour, Mrs Irene Chambers, by stabbing her three times in July 1995 [4]. At the scene he told one person, in a very flat tone and in his own words, that he "did it because she just wouldn't stop" [4]. Police officers observed that he seemed vacant and dazed or intoxicated or both, he did not respond to their questions, and a breath test showed a blood alcohol content of 0.136 per cent [4]. In a police interview the next day he said he had no recollection of the stabbing [4].

For some time before the stabbing he had been hearing loud knocking or banging noises in his unit at night, which he believed Mrs Chambers was making [5]. He told several people the noises were so bad that he planned to move to Mount Isa, and he had sold most of his furniture and bought a bus ticket [5]. A plumber gave evidence that it was possible there was water hammer, a knocking noise in the pipes, in his unit, caused by the sprinkler system in the grounds [6].

At trial he did not deny the stabbing but sought a conviction for manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility under s 37 of the Criminal Code (NT), which he had to prove [7]. Three defence experts (Dr Vine, Dr Walton and Mr Taylor) gave evidence that he suffered cognitive defects from frontal lobe damage caused by alcohol and benzodiazepine abuse, clinical depression, and a delusional disorder that the deceased was persecuting him by banging on the walls at night [8]. The Crown's medical evidence, in substance, denied frontal lobe damage and a delusional disorder, and denied depression to any relevant extent [10]. The Crown also relied on two CT scans that showed no physical abnormality in his brain [11].

He did not give evidence, and the defence diagnoses rested substantially on his out-of-court statements, including assertions that he had no memory of the stabbing, assertions about his belief concerning the banging, his alcoholism and his benzodiazepine use, and his answers to a Lezak test [12]. Those statements were proved through the witnesses to whom they were made, and the Crown did not object [13].

The good character evidence was that he had no previous convictions other than a drink-driving conviction in 1975 and was not adversely known to the police, and that people who knew him described him as quiet, gentle and amiable [15], [53]. The Crown led no evidence of bad character [85]. In seeking a direction, trial counsel said the improbability of the appellant committing the offence was of considerable significance and that the aspect of credibility was, in counsel's words, "probably of lesser significance" [17].

The trial judge, Thomas J, said she would give the direction the defence sought [19], [20]. Her direction to the jury was that they were "entitled to consider the improbability of Roy Melbourne committing the instant offence, having a history of good character of some 61 years, and that this is of considerable significance" [19]. She gave no direction on how the jury might use the evidence in assessing credibility [19]. Counsel did not seek any further direction [20].

Procedural history

The appellant was convicted of murder on 13 June 1996 after a jury trial before Thomas J in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory [3]. The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was imposed [159]. For the appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, defence counsel swore affidavits saying they had overlooked that the direction given differed from the one they had sought [20]. Under r 86.08 of the Supreme Court Rules of the Northern Territory, that court gave leave to object to the failure to direct that the character evidence was relevant to credibility [20]. The Court of Criminal Appeal (Martin CJ, Gallop and Angel JJ) dismissed the appeal [3]. Kirby J quotes that court's conclusion that "evidence of good character [may not] be used to support the credibility of the accused in interrogation by police or the truthfulness of the history given to experts as a foundation of their respective opinions" [124]. The appellant then appealed to the High Court by special leave [3].

Issues

The central issue, as McHugh J put it, was whether a trial judge who directs the jury that good character evidence is to be taken into account on guilt errs by not also directing that it can be taken into account on credibility [1]. The appeal also raised whether directions on good character should be mandatory or discretionary, the nature of any direction, and the nature and usefulness of good character evidence generally [2]. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court should follow the appellate courts in England and New Zealand and hold that there is now a rule of practice that such a direction should be given [23]. If there was error, a further question was whether there had been a miscarriage of justice [21], which Kirby J framed as whether the conviction should nonetheless be confirmed under the proviso [86].

Held

McHugh J

McHugh J would dismiss the appeal [55]. He noted that in Simic v The Queen (1980) 144 CLR 319 this Court held there was no miscarriage of justice when a trial judge did not direct the jury on how to use good character evidence, and he quoted the joint judgment's statement that there is "no rule of law" that a direction must be given in every case [22]. He set out the position in England, where R v Berrada required a direction on credibility where it is in issue, R v Vye extended that limb to exculpatory statements to police even if the defendant did not testify, and R v Aziz held that where the accused has no prior convictions the judge is prima facie bound to direct, subject to a residual discretion [24]–[26]. A majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Falealili held that when good character evidence is adduced an appropriate direction should be given, generally covering both credibility and propensity, but did not accept that an absence of convictions was synonymous with good character [28]–[29].

In his opinion, notwithstanding those cases, this Court "should not depart from the rule that a judge is not obliged to direct the jury concerning the accused's good character" [30]. Instead the trial judge must retain a discretion whether to direct, after evaluating the probative significance of the evidence for both the accused's propensity to commit the crime and the accused's credibility [30]. The judge may find the evidence significant on either, both or neither, and whether the discretion has miscarried depends on the facts of the case [31].

He gave two considerations: the difference between the use of good and bad character evidence is logically anomalous and should not be widened, and where good character evidence has no logical connection with the elements of the offence a mandatory direction is likely to divert the jury and may even confuse it [32]. On the first, he contrasted the strict conditions on bad character evidence with good character evidence, which he said is "admitted condition free" [39], [47]. He described the right to tender it as an indulgence to the accused maintained for historical reasons [47]. He said it would be anomalous if good character evidence of dubious probative value had to attract a mandatory favourable direction even where the judge thought the direction unwarranted [48]. It was too late to require good character evidence to meet conditions before admission, but that did not mean it should automatically be treated as negating the parts or details of the transaction [49]. Not having a mandatory direction also avoids having to define good character in advance [52].

He noted that the appellant's out-of-court statements were hearsay, much of which would be inadmissible at common law as self-serving, but that the Crown did not object [13]. He accepted that the appellant's credibility was an issue of great importance, because the jury could not rationally accept the experts' opinions without first accepting their factual basis, and whether they did so depended largely on his credibility [13]–[14]. He saw no reason to doubt counsel's sworn statements and accepted that counsel's request covered credibility as well as probability, though it seemed likely counsel did not have in mind the answers and assertions to the experts [21].

He held that the character evidence was not of such probative significance on credibility as to require a direction [53], since none of it "had any direct probative bearing on the truthfulness or credibility of the accused" and all of it went to the unlikelihood that he would commit the offence [54]. The direction given on that matter was adequate and no miscarriage of justice had occurred [54]. In his opinion a credibility direction would have given the appellant an advantage to which he was not entitled in law and would have been a wrongful exercise of discretion [54]. He also said the trial judge erred in refusing to let the Crown lead its medical evidence in reply, because a plea of diminished responsibility, like a plea of insanity, is a plea of confession and avoidance that the person relying on it must prove [9].

Gummow J

Gummow J agreed with the reasons of Hayne J, would dismiss the appeal, and added further reasons [59]. He said that if the appellant had been trying to establish a false basis for a later plea in what he told police and experts, that may have had some significance, as a matter of inference, in deciding his mental condition at the time of the killing [60]. He said the description "good character" appears to assume polarities, allows too little for the variety of mental processes behind action, and uses a term with various shades of meaning [63]. The law, he said, does not always clearly distinguish character from reputation, nor indicate the probative force to be given to either [64]. He noted that in Attwood v The Queen this Court stated that good character evidence is regarded as really bearing on the probability or improbability of guilt, and he added that the issues in the particular case and the nature of the evidence guide the reasoning of the tribunal of fact [72].

He held that there should be no departure from the Australian position established in Simic [77]. In his words, so-called standard rules of practice "too readily ossify into rules of law which are difficult to vary or displace" [78]. He preferred, as consistent with the established position in this Court, the statement of Thomas J of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, dissenting in R v Falealili, that a judge will almost as a matter of course direct where the evidence is both probative and relevant, may decide no direction is warranted where it lacks probative force and is of remote relevance, and that requiring a direction on both limbs whenever character evidence is adduced is an unnecessary fetter on the discretion [79]. He concluded that the character evidence did not require a direction further to the one given [80].

Hayne J

Hayne J, with whose reasons Gummow J agreed, would dismiss the appeal [59], [158]. He did not accept that trial counsel's request went so far as a direction about the accused's out-of-court statements, and read it as limited to the use of good character in deciding whether the appellant had committed murder [135]–[136]. He said that counsel's failure to seek such a direction presented a considerable difficulty for the appellant [137]. In deciding whether a trial miscarried for want of a direction, he said, it is essential first to identify the issues in the case [138].

Trial counsel had told the jury that the appellant, although genuinely trying to answer the police, was, in counsel's words, "just lost", and gave examples of what counsel called "false memories" [139]. Counsel did not argue that character could support acceptance of what the appellant told the experts, and made only the most passing reference to it on whether he tried to tell the truth to police [140]. Hayne J therefore did not accept that there was any issue at the trial about using good character to decide whether to accept the accuracy of what the appellant said out of court or whether he had tried to tell the truth, and he said that would be reason enough to conclude that the trial did not miscarry [141]. He noted that debate at the trial focused on the validity or accuracy of the experts' opinions rather than their factual basis, and that the appellant's belief in what he said did not become a significant issue [147].

He then considered wider questions, stating by reference to Alford v Magee that a judge must instruct the jury on only so much of the law as they need to decide the particular case [143]. He distinguished warnings such as those on identification evidence, given because a jury might otherwise omit important matters and wrongly conclude that guilt was proved, from the direction sought here, which would not warn the jury against a false chain of reasoning [144]–[145]. Accepting the descriptions of the appellant's personality as accurate, he asked what they said about whether he was confabulating or deliberately feigning mental illness, and answered, "The short answer is, nothing" [149]. In his view the evidence gave the jury no assistance on any question of the appellant's credibility [152].

The rules adopted in New Zealand and in England and Wales seemed to him to be influenced more by the desire for a certain, easily applied rule than by the place of such directions in a trial, and he saw no point in requiring such a direction unless it assists in achieving a fair trial [155]. Where the prosecution and the accused make contrary submissions to the jury about how the evidence may be used, the judge must tell the jury the true position in law [156]. Even without that conflict it may be wise to draw the matter to the jury's attention, as where an accused of previously undoubted honesty in money matters is tried for a fraud offence, but he said that on those bare facts the judge is not required to do so [156]. He held there is no reason to depart from Simic, added that a direction that is given must be accurate, and said that ordinarily, unless the character evidence has an "immediate and obvious connection with an issue in the case", it is better that the judge say nothing of how the jury may use it beyond any restatement of counsel's arguments thought necessary or desirable [157]. He concluded that the evidence did not require a further direction [158].

Kirby J (dissenting)

Kirby J would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial [131]. He treated the credibility direction as expressly requested and the point as properly reserved at the trial [85], [86]. He recorded that the appellant accepted some of his statements to police were false, such as that he cut his finger cutting up a chicken, but distinguished deliberately dishonest statements from honest ones reflecting an amnesic, confused state [88]. He also recorded the Crown's argument that a credibility direction was discretionary, that counsel's failure to seek further direction was fatal, and that the statements were for the most part inadmissible hearsay used by the experts, so that no miscarriage had occurred [89].

He said the issue was not determined by the existing authority of this Court, and that neither Attwood nor Simic was a full treatment of the rules, so that the opinion in Simic had to be reconsidered [93], [96]. He said the idea of character as predictive "looks somewhat shaky" against modern psychological research, so that directions, if they are to continue, must rest on legal history and authority or established legal policy rather than demonstrable science [107]. He rejected the notion that good character is synonymous with an absence of prior convictions, so that proof of that absence without more would not attract an obligation to direct [108]. He said abolition of the law's directions on good character was for the legislature, not the courts, and that judges should not be compelled to give meaningless or absurd directions [109].

Allowing that the arguments against a general rule "carry the majority in this Court", he concluded on balance that the change in English law, substantially accepted in New Zealand and probably Canada, should also be accepted in Australia [112]. First, the trend of Australian authority had been towards an accused's entitlement to a direction [113]. Second, a charge that omitted established good character evidence would ordinarily be unbalanced, and a failure to explain its use would make the direction incomplete [114]. Third, a general rule avoids accidental injustice, unnecessary appeals, costly retrials and uncertainty [115]. Fourth, jurors have probably reasoned in the same way as judges about the predictability of conduct, so it is reasonable to expect the judge to assist them [116]. Fifth, any apparent over-generosity is another instance of the common law's protections against wrongful conviction [117].

He then modified the propositions of King CJ in R v Trimboli [120]. Under his first proposition, where there is evidence of the accused's good character a direction must be given on its use, covering both propensity and credibility (including out-of-court statements) unless in the particular circumstances that is unnecessary or unwarranted for reasons the judge gives [120]. Under his second, no particular form of words is needed, but the jury are entitled to conclude that a person of established good character may be less likely to commit the crime charged or to make false statements relevant to guilt [120]. Under his third, directions must be tailored to the case and should generally be brief, and in an appropriate case the judge may remind the jury that people do commit crimes for the first time and that good character is not a defence in itself [120]. He left to a future case the directions proper to a trial of co-accused [121].

The obligation arose here, he said, not because the appellant had no relevant prior convictions but because additional affirmative evidence suggested he was a person of good character [118]. By those rules the directions were inadequate, and there was a misdirection [122]. On the proviso, he said it was wholly unrealistic to put aside the appellant's statements as used by the experts, since at the trial both sides proceeded on the footing that the opinions were to be considered by the jury [125]–[126]. Because the Crown challenged the truthfulness of those statements in its final address, it was impossible to suggest the direction could have had no substantial effect on the jury's deliberations [127]. He said it would be rare for the proviso to be applied where a credibility direction should have been given and was not, and the challenged statements concern an important and contested issue [128]. Since the expert evidence was divided, it could not be said that the appellant lost no real chance of a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder [129]. He concluded that there must be a retrial [130].

Callinan J (dissenting)

Callinan J would have allowed the appeal and ordered a retrial [211]. He proceeded on the basis that there was no deliberate decision not to seek a further direction and that leave should be given if it was needed, adding that it might even be arguable the point was properly taken at trial [176]. After quoting Lord Steyn in R v Aziz at length, he agreed generally with those observations, saying that prima facie the direction should be given and that ordinarily strong contra-indicative factors would have to be present before a judge concluded it should not be given [197]–[198]. The fact that an accused has not given evidence, he said, is not of itself a conclusive reason for declining to give it [198]. He noted that the use of good character evidence to support the credibility of out-of-court statements had been accepted in New Zealand and endorsed in R v Gillard and R v Trimboli [199].

He held that the appellant's reliability and credibility were issues at the trial, although the appellant did not give evidence and the substantial issue was diminished responsibility [201]. He found that the Crown Prosecutor, "guardedly but nonetheless plainly, and in no way improperly", sought in cross-examining the experts to put in issue both the reliability and the credibility of the appellant [201]. The record of interview was tendered and relied on by the Crown, so the jury had to consider the appellant's honesty in deciding whether to believe it, which made his character a relevant factor in determining guilt [202].

He drew a distinction for psychiatric evidence, where what a patient says may itself be a manifestation of illness and where, in his words, "the assertions are the conduct", so that such statements may be received as original evidence [203]. If such statements were not honestly made, the opinions based on them would be shaken or perhaps even demolished, so their genuineness could be an issue on which good character has a bearing [205]. He said, however, that very little of what the appellant told the doctors and the psychologist fell into that category [206]. Most of it was assertion that ordinarily should be received only if the maker gives it in evidence at the trial, and regard could be had to it here only because of the absence of objection and the way the trial was conducted [206]. What the appellant said to other witnesses shortly after the event was capable of being evidence of conduct, admissible as original evidence of his state of mind [207]. He concluded that a credibility direction should have been given and that the proviso should not be applied, as he could not say the appellant had not lost a real chance of a verdict of diminished responsibility [211].

Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, as McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ would have done [55], [81], [158]. Kirby J would have allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal, and ordered that the appeal to that court be upheld, the conviction set aside and a new trial had [131]. Callinan J would have allowed the appeal and ordered a retrial [211].

Why it matters

On the reasons of McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, a trial judge is not bound by a rule of law to direct a jury on good character in every case where such evidence is given, which is the position stated in Simic [30]–[31], [77], [157]. Those judges declined to adopt the rule urged from the English and New Zealand cases [23], [30], [77], [157]. Their approaches are not identical: McHugh J speaks of a discretion exercised on an evaluation of probative significance [30], while Hayne J, with whom Gummow J agreed, looks to what is in issue at the trial and whether the evidence has an immediate and obvious connection with an issue [155], [157]. In dissent, Kirby J would have required a direction wherever there is evidence of good character [120], and Callinan J would have treated a direction as one that prima facie should be given [198].

The joint judgment's remark in Simic that if such a direction is asked for it would be wise to give it is set out by McHugh J and Gummow J [22], [75]. Several judges also questioned the notion of good character as a guide to conduct or guilt, including McHugh J [35], Gummow J [63], Kirby J [107] and Hayne J [152]. Gummow J notes that the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) did not apply at the trial [56], and Kirby J records that it was not suggested any statute governed the issue [104].

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