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Metal Manufactures Pty Limited v Morton

(2023) 275 CLR 100 · [2023] HCA 1 · (2023) 406 ALR 711

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Metal Manufactures Pty Limited v Morton [2023] HCA 1 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, given on 8 February 2023 by Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ on appeal from the Federal Court of Australia. All five judges held that a creditor ordered under s 588FF(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) to repay an unfair preference cannot use s 553C of the Act to set off that liability against a separate debt the company owes it [50], [66]. Kiefel CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ wrote joint reasons, Gageler J agreed with them on the answer, the dismissal and costs and added separate reasons on mutuality, and no judge dissented [1], [66], [67]. The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the costs of the appeal be costs in the cause [61].

Facts

MJ Woodman Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd (MJ Woodman), a company now in liquidation, paid the appellant, Metal Manufactures Pty Limited, $50,000 and $140,000 [1]. Both payments were made in the six months before the winding up, the relation-back period, which it was agreed ran from 13 August 2018 to 12 February 2019 [1], [26]. The liquidator, Gavin Morton, who is the first respondent, sought to recover both payments under s 588FF(1)(a) on the basis that each was an unfair preference under s 588FA, and the company is the second respondent [1], [62]. The appellant alleged, and the respondents conceded, that MJ Woodman owed the appellant $194,727.23, a debt separate and distinct from the liability said to arise under s 588FF(1)(a) [1]. The Amended Special Case did not state when MJ Woodman became insolvent and did not concede that any payment was an unfair preference, and the requirements of s 588FC and s 588FA were assumed for the purposes of the question [27], [28]. The appellant has two further defences that have yet to be resolved [60].

Procedural history

By an Amended Special Case, Derrington J reserved a question for the consideration of the Full Court of the Federal Court [2]. The Full Court, by Allsop CJ with Middleton and Derrington JJ agreeing, said the question should be answered no: Morton v Metal Manufactures Pty Ltd (2021) 289 FCR 556 [3]. In separate reasons, Morton as Liquidator of MJ Woodman Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd v Metal Manufactures Pty Ltd [No 2] [2022] FCAFC 1, the Full Court ordered that the costs of the special case be determined by the docket judge [3], [60]. The appellant appealed to the High Court, which heard the appeal on 12 October 2022.

Issues

The question reserved was whether statutory set-off under s 553C(1) of the Act is available to the appellant in the proceeding against the liquidator's claim for the recovery of an unfair preference under s 588FA [2]. It mattered because the separate debt exceeds the alleged unfair preferences, so if it could be set off the liquidator would not obtain an order for payment under s 588FF(1)(a) [2]. Gageler J put the general question of construction as whether s 553C entitles a creditor to set off an amount it is ordered under s 588FF(1)(a) to repay against another debt it can prove in the winding up [63].

Held

Kiefel CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ (joint reasons)

Their Honours said, drawing on Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Linter Textiles Australia Ltd (In liq) (2005) 220 CLR 592, that neither the company nor the liquidator holds the company's property on trust for creditors and members [6]-[8]. The statutory regime is an exhaustive and sufficient measure for distributing that property, which does not necessitate or justify the intervention of equity [6]. The company remains the beneficial owner of the property the liquidator gathers in and of payments made under a s 588FF(1) order, but they are subject to what Menzies J in Franklin's Selfserve Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1970) 125 CLR 52 called the statutory scheme of liquidation [6], [9].

Section 553 creates an important cut-off date: debts and claims, in the section's words "present or future, certain or contingent, ascertained or sounding only in damages", are provable only if they arise from circumstances that occurred before the relevant date, which is the date the winding up is taken to have begun [12]. Subject to one possible exception, s 588FI, no debt or claim arising from circumstances after the commencement of the winding up is admissible to proof [13], [29]. Section 555 provides for distribution under the pari passu principle, so that proved debts and claims rank equally and are paid proportionately if the property is insufficient, with many exceptions set out in s 556 [14].

Section 553C(1) applies where there have been, in its words, "mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings" between an insolvent company being wound up and a person who wants to have a debt or claim admitted, and only the balance of the account is admissible to proof or payable to the company [15]. Their Honours said this does not offend the pari passu principle, because the purpose of s 553C is to ascertain what is available for distribution on that basis [16]. They noted that s 553C has a temporal element: because the balance is admissible to proof under s 553, the rights of the parties are taken and ascertained as at the time of winding up when assessing mutuality, and the important factor is whether there is an obligation or liability prior to liquidation which might mature into a debt owing [18]. Its second feature is the one explained in Gye v McIntyre (1991) 171 CLR 609, that a mutual dealing has three aspects: the credits, debts or claims must be between the same persons, their benefit or burden must lie in the same interests, and they must be commensurable, meaning that they ultimately sound in money [19].

The right to recover an unfair preference under s 588FF is part of the statutory scheme concerned with maximising the distributable pool of assets, and its primary objective, in words the joint reasons quote from G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd v Walsh (2001) 203 CLR 662, is "securing equality of distribution amongst creditors of the same class" [22]. Their Honours accepted the respondents' submission that in bringing proceedings under s 588FF the liquidator acts not as agent of the company but as an officer of the court, although amounts recovered are then dealt with under the statutory scheme of liquidation [24].

The appellant argued that there was a mutual dealing that included the trading transactions in the relation-back period for which it had been paid, and that when its liability under s 588FF(1)(a) crystallised an account would be taken against the amount still owed to it [32]. It said it did not matter that the liability did not exist at the commencement of the winding up, because it existed as a contingent liability, the contingencies being the liquidator bringing an action and the court being satisfied that there had been a voidable transaction [33]. It relied on Gye, on Hiley v Peoples Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 468, on Day & Dent Constructions Pty Ltd v North Australian Properties Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 85, and on the Australian Law Reform Commission's 1988 report known as the Harmer Report, asking the Court to infer a legislative choice to permit set-off from the fact that no exclusion for liabilities arising from voidable transactions was enacted [34], [38], [43], [44].

Their Honours said the appellant's proposition, that a contingent right to sue existed at the commencement of the winding up, "suffers from a fatal flaw", because s 553C(1), construed in the context of the statutory scheme, requires credits, debts or dealings "arising from circumstances that subsisted in some way or form before the commencement of the winding up" [45]. That is because s 553C exists in aid of s 553, and its function and purpose is "to permit a reckoning of amounts owing to and by the company during the relation-back period prior to the appointment of the liquidator" [45]. Immediately before the commencement of the winding up there was nothing to set off, because the company owed money to the appellant but the appellant owed nothing to the company [46]. The liquidator's capacity to sue under s 588FF could not and did not exist before then, and it was wholly "new" in the sense Dixon J described in Hiley, so it was not eligible to be set off against the amount owed to the appellant [46]. The appellant therefore could not identify a relevant mutual dealing, and s 553C(1) "does not address dealings which straddle the period before and after the commencement of the winding up" [47].

Dixon J's statement in Hiley that "the decisive date is that of the commencement of the winding up" referred, their Honours said, to "the moment immediately before the commencement of the winding up", and his Honour went on to observe that new claims arising after the start of the winding up could not be set off against previous claims [39], [40]. Hiley did not assist, because what existed before the winding up there was a cause of action for the re-transfer of a mortgage and Mr Hiley's rights under a contract of life assurance, whereas here the right to sue arose from the commencement of the winding up and was not, and never could be, payable to the company for the purposes of s 553C(1) and s 553 [48]. At the commencement of the winding up the liquidator held no vested or contingent right and the appellant owed no obligation in the sense used in Hiley, since a contingent liability requires, at the time of winding up, an existing obligation out of which an obligation to pay a sum of money will arise on a future event [49]. Their Honours said that "[a]t most, the liquidator held an expectancy, unsupported by any underlying right or obligation which pre-existed the liquidation" [49]. Day & Dent was different, because vested rights existed at the commencement of the winding up under a guarantee given previously [49]. The ability to sue under s 588FF depended on the liquidator's decision to sue and the court's satisfaction of s 588FE(2), so it "rose no higher, as at the commencement of the winding up, than a mere possibility without more" [49]. It followed that any liability under an order under s 588FF(1)(a) cannot form part of identifying provable debts and claims under s 553, and cannot be the subject of a valid set-off under s 553C against pre-existing amounts owed to the preferred creditor [50].

Their Honours said this was consistent with the function and purpose of the voidable transactions regime and the proof and ranking regime, and that it "would be a gross distortion of the statutory scheme of liquidation if a creditor could, in effect, avoid the consequences of having received a preferential payment by the happenstance that it was also owed money by the company in liquidation" [51]. Such an outcome would diminish the pool of assets available for priority payments and rateable distribution [51]. Section 588FI, under which a creditor who has put the company in the same position as if the transaction had not been entered into may then prove as if it had not been, also supported the outcome, because a set-off would undermine a purpose of recovering unfair preferences, namely restoring those payments to the pool of distributable assets [58].

"In any event", their Honours gave two further reasons why the liability could not be a mutual credit, debt or dealing with the pre-existing amount owed by the company [52]. First, there was no dealing between the same persons: the alleged preferences were paid by MJ Woodman to the appellant, while the s 588FF(1)(a) liability, though owed to the company, arises on the application of the liquidator in his or her own right as an officer of the court [52]. Secondly, there was no mutuality of interest, a consideration not confined to whether both parties are beneficially or legally entitled to what they are owed [53]. They referred to the observation of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, in Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (In liq) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (2018) 53 WAR 325, that the benefit of equitable interests in a transaction is only an example of when two parties can enjoy mutuality of interest [53]. The amount recovered must be applied under the statutory scheme, including for priority payments and pari passu distribution, so the appellant's interest in being paid is not the same as the interest of the liquidator and the company in recovering the payment [54]. Their Honours described the right of recovery as "a unique statutory ability to recover the proceeds of a voidable transaction", and said it is precisely the presence of the detailed statutory scheme that denies mutuality of interest [54], [55].

To the extent that Re Parker (1997) 80 FCR 1, Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (In liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 47, Shirlaw v Lewis (1993) 10 ACSR 288, Hall v Poolman (2007) 65 ACSR 123 and Stone v Melrose Cranes & Rigging Pty Ltd [No 2] (2018) 125 ACSR 406 are inconsistent with this analysis, their Honours said they "should now be considered to be wrongly decided" [56]. On the Harmer Report, they said Parliament's inferred decision not to enact an express exclusion for voidable transactions "may have taken place because, for the reasons set out in this judgment, no such exclusion was ever needed" [57]. On costs, the Full Court's order should not be disturbed, because the success or failure of the two further defences would bear on costs, and this justified making the costs of the appeal costs in the cause so that they can follow resolution of all outstanding questions, including whether the litigation should be treated as public interest litigation [60].

Gageler J (concurring)

Gageler J agreed with the joint reasons that s 553C does not entitle the creditor to the set-off, that the Full Court gave the right answer, that the appeal must be dismissed, and that the costs of the appeal should be costs in the ongoing Federal Court proceeding [66]. Gageler J observed that the set-off would be "at odds with the scheme of Pt 5.6 of the Act", because an unfairly preferred creditor could rely on the preference to improve its position in relation to other creditors [64]. Gageler J set out Allsop CJ's example in the Full Court of a creditor with two debts of $100 each who is unfairly preferred as to one in full: if the creditor repays under an order, the property available for distribution increases by $100 and the creditor can prove for $200 [65]. If s 553C allowed set-off, the creditor would automatically receive the functional equivalent of 50 cents in the dollar, without needing to prove at all, because s 553C is self-executing [65].

Gageler J wrote to address an aspect of the concept of mutuality, saying that it was central to the Full Court's reasoning and "must be understood purposively within the statutory context in which it is employed" [67], [68]. The purpose of s 553C, like that of s 86 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) on which it is modelled, is to prevent a creditor who is also a debtor of an insolvent company having to pay the full debt yet receiving only a fraction of the credit due, where that would result in substantial injustice [69]. With the object of confining set-off to substantial injustice to a creditor, "as distinct from unfairness to other creditors", mutuality has long been understood to entail that the burden of the debt and the benefit of the credit lie in the same equitable or beneficial interests [69]. Gageler J said Allsop CJ correctly rejected the appellant's central proposition that the analysis of interests must be confined to interests enforceable in equity, as that "would divorce the statutory inquiry into mutuality from the statutory object of avoiding substantial injustice" [70], [71]. Legislation can restrict dealings with property for the benefit of persons other than the legal owner without any intervention of equity [71].

A winding-up order does not put the company's property on trust, but it restricts dealings with that property to dealings for the purposes of the winding up [72]. An amount ordered under s 588FF(1)(a) must be paid to the company to be dealt with as its property in the winding up, and Gageler J said it "is not one which is or ever could be recovered by the company itself, or which is or ever could be paid to the company for the benefit of the company alone" [72]. Gageler J described the right to apply for the order as a statutory right "given for the benefit of the general body of creditors", quoting Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 407 [73]. There is accordingly no mutuality of interest between an amount of an unfair preference ordered to be repaid and a debt provable by the creditor in the winding up [74].

Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the costs of the appeal be costs in the cause [61]. The Full Court's answer that set-off under s 553C(1) was not available therefore stands, and its order on the costs of the special case was not disturbed [3], [60].

Why it matters

All five judges' answer means that a preferred creditor's liability under an order under s 588FF(1)(a) cannot be set off under s 553C against a separate debt the company owes it [50], [66]. The joint reasons said that allowing it would let a preferred creditor use each dollar owed to it by the company to set off in full each dollar of liability arising from the receipt of an unfair preference [51]. The joint reasons rest the answer on the temporal reach of s 553C(1), and add in any event that there was no dealing between the same persons and no mutuality of interest [45], [52], [53]. Gageler J's separate reasons address mutuality and likewise find no mutuality of interest [67], [74]. The joint reasons treat five earlier decisions as wrongly decided to the extent that they are inconsistent with this analysis [56]. The joint reasons quote the Full Court's remark that, if the further defences succeed, "the special case, while fully argued, may be of no moment as between the parties (though of significance to insolvency practice generally in Australia)" [60].

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