Mighty River International Limited v Hughes
(2018) 265 CLR 480 · [2018] HCA 38 · (2018) 92 ALJR 822
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Mighty River International Limited v Hughes and Mighty River International Limited v Mineral Resources Limited [2018] HCA 38 are two appeals to the High Court of Australia from the Supreme Court of Western Australia about the validity of a deed of company arrangement under Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which imposed a moratorium on creditors' claims while the administrators investigated further and made no property available for distribution to creditors [1]-[2], [22]. The High Court ordered that each appeal be dismissed with costs [3]. Kiefel CJ and Edelman J, with whom Gageler J agreed, rejected the challenge to the deed, while Nettle and Gordon JJ dissented, holding that it was not a deed of company arrangement within the meaning of Pt 5.3A [57]–[58], [70], [98].
Facts
Mesa Minerals Limited is a mining company whose key assets include a 50% joint venture interest in two manganese projects [15]. Mineral Resources Limited, the parent company of the other joint venture partner, holds almost 60% of Mesa Minerals' issued capital, and Mighty River International Limited (Mighty River), a creditor of Mesa Minerals, holds just over 13.5% [2], [15]. On 13 July 2016 Mesa Minerals was placed into voluntary administration, and Mr Hughes and Mr Bredenkamp were appointed as administrators [16].
On 10 August 2016 the administrators issued notice of the second creditors' meeting with a report and statement under s 439A, setting out three options for the creditors: end the administration, wind up the company, or have it execute a deed of company arrangement [18]. They opined that ending the administration or winding up was not in the creditors' interests, but that a proposed deed they called a "Recapitalisation DOCA" was [18]. After the second meeting was adjourned, a supplementary report of 13 October 2016 said that investigations into possible recovery claims against the directors, which Mighty River suggested should be pursued, were continuing, and it again expressed the opinion that the proposed deed best served the creditors' interests [19]. At the adjourned meeting on 20 October 2016 a majority of creditors voted for the proposed deed, which was executed on 3 November 2016 (the Deed) [20].
The Deed recited that its objective was to give the administrators sufficient time to conduct further investigations, to explore a possible restructure or recapitalisation, and to form an opinion as to whether a deed of company arrangement or liquidation was in the creditors' best interests [20]. Clause 9 required the administrators to investigate claims the company may have against third parties, to seek proposals to reconstruct the company with a view to its securities being re-quoted on the ASX, and to convene a further meeting of creditors before any proposal was accepted [21]. Clause 10 imposed a moratorium during which creditors could not, among other things, take steps to wind up the company, institute or prosecute proceedings, or enforce debts [22]. Clause 8 provided that, subject to variation of the Deed, "there will be no property of the Company available for distribution to Creditors under this deed" [22]. By cl 15 the administrators undertook to report to creditors on at least a bi-monthly basis and to give a final report within six months [34]. Clause 18 provided that the Deed continued until terminated by court order under s 445D or by resolution of the creditors [81]. A meeting of creditors was convened on 3 May 2017 and a variation was later executed, but the appeals concerned the Deed as executed on 3 November 2016 [23].
Procedural history
Mighty River sought orders declaring the Deed of no force and effect, terminating or setting it aside, and setting aside the creditors' resolution, while Mineral Resources sought a declaration under s 445G(2) that the Deed was not void or, alternatively, an order under s 445G(3) validating it [24]. Master Sanderson in the Supreme Court of Western Australia dismissed Mighty River's claims and declared that the Deed was not void [25]. The Master found that the Deed was consistent with the object of Pt 5.3A, that it could permissibly provide that no property was available for distribution, and that Pt 5.3A permits time to be extended through two "gateways" (the Master's word), an extension under s 439A(6) or a "holding DOCA" [25]. The Master concluded that it was "hard to see any advantage to anyone from immediate liquidation", since liquidators would follow the same process of realising assets as the administrators but the listed shell would be destroyed [25].
On appeal, Buss P, Murphy and Beech JJA, in separate judgments, each held that the Deed was valid [27]. They held that s 444A(4)(b) only required the instrument to specify the extent to which company property was to be made available for distribution to creditors, an obligation met by the provision that "no property" be available [27]. They also held that the Deed did not sidestep s 439A(6), because although it permitted further investigations outside the convening period it was directed to a better return for creditors than an immediate winding up, and so was consistent with the object of Pt 5.3A [27]. The footnotes cite the Master's decision as Mighty River International Ltd v Hughes & Bredenkamp [2017] WASC 69 and the Court of Appeal's as Mighty River International Ltd v Hughes (2017) 52 WAR 1 [25]-[26].
In the High Court, no ground of special leave alleged that the Deed should have been terminated under s 445D, and Mighty River made a new oral submission, which, as Murphy JA had noted, had not been made in the Court of Appeal, that the administrators had failed to form the opinions required by s 438A(b) and, at the relevant time, s 439A(4) [2], [26], [49].
Issues
The first issue was whether the Deed was a deed of company arrangement at all, or was in substance an extension of time that required a court order under s 439A(6) and was contrary to the object of Pt 5.3A [29]–[30], [70]. The second was whether s 444A(4)(b) required the instrument to specify some property of the company to be available to pay creditors' claims, or only the property, if any, that was to be available [41]. The third was whether the Deed should have been declared void under s 445G(2) because the administrators failed to form the opinions required by ss 438A(b) and 439A(4) [29], [47].
Held
Kiefel CJ and Edelman J
Kiefel CJ and Edelman J said that the object of Pt 5.3A, set out in s 435A, is pursued by an intended flexibility, that is, a wide variety of possible deeds, including deeds extinguishing or varying debts and imposing moratoria on claims [7]. They said that the label "holding DOCA", which Murphy JA observed is best avoided, is not a legislative expression and directs attention away from the terms of the deed [28].
If the Deed were in reality a deed of extension of time by creditors, s 445G would not be engaged, the Deed would simply be invalid, and it could not be declared valid under s 445G(3) [31]. But the submission that the Deed was not a deed of company arrangement, despite being formally constituted as one, was inconsistent with the general scheme of Pt 5.3A, which treats the formation of such a deed as a formal matter, a deed existing by s 444B(6) when the company and the proposed deed administrator execute the instrument [31]–[32]. That did not make non-compliance inconsequential, because Pt 5.3A has a carefully drafted regime for contraventions and permits a formal deed to be terminated or set aside in a wide range of circumstances, including under the catch-all in s 445D(1)(g), which could include an abuse of the provisions of Pt 5.3A [13], [32]–[33].
An extension under s 439A(6) can be obtained only by court order, but, as Mighty River accepted in oral argument, an otherwise compliant instrument that becomes a deed can incidentally extend time for an administrator's investigations pending a later variation, and the Deed had that effect [34]. Although the s 439A report had loosely characterised the proposed Deed as "essentially an extension of the Administration Period" (the report's words), Kiefel CJ and Edelman J said that was only its incidental effect and that the Deed "created and conferred genuine rights and duties", the administrators' duties being given in return for the creditors' acceptance of a moratorium [34].
They gave three reasons why the moratorium and the Deed were not contrary to the object of Pt 5.3A, the first being that, putting to one side the difficulties in treating that object as a condition of validity independent of the Part's provisions, the Deed aimed to fulfil it [35]. Even an approved variation under which all the assets were sold would, they said, be preferable to winding up because, as the Master explained, the valuable listed shell would be preserved, and there was evidence before the Master that the value of a listing could be between $400,000 and $900,000 [35]. Secondly, schemes of arrangement were an appropriate comparator and had been recognised before Pt 5.3A as capable of having the central or sole purpose of securing a moratorium, as in National Bank of Australasia Ltd v Scottish Union and National Insurance Co (1952) 86 CLR 110 and F T Eastment & Sons Pty Ltd v Metal Roof Decking Supplies Pty Ltd (1977) 3 ACLR 69 [36]. If a moratorium-only scheme was and is permissible, Kiefel CJ and Edelman J reasoned, then a fortiori a deed, intended to be a more flexible device, "may provide predominantly, or solely, for a moratorium" [36]. Thirdly, the short convening period protects creditors by reducing the period of the statutory stay, and its objectives are not compromised if creditors choose in a deed to extend a moratorium, which s 444A(4)(c) contemplates [37].
On s 444A(4)(b), they noted linguistic considerations each way and said that neither construction strained the language so as to be implausible, but that context and purpose supported the respondents' construction [42]. The purpose of ss 444A(4)(b) and (h) is to direct attention to a subject that must be addressed, the property, if any, available to pay creditors' claims, and not to prescribe a minimum obligation to distribute some property [43]. They gave examples of deeds under which no company property is made available for distribution: a debt for equity swap, a creditors' trust funded by third parties, a transfer of shares from members to creditors, and, "most pertinent" here, a deed of moratorium only, which allows the company to trade out of solvency difficulties [45]. A requirement to distribute some property would undermine the intended flexibility, and Mighty River's construction served no purpose, as on its face it would be satisfied by property of merely nominal value [45]–[46].
On the opinions point, the most basic difficulty was that the 10 August 2016 report and statement expressly stated the three opinions, supported by 26 pages of substantial reasoning, so that Mighty River's submission in effect required a conclusion that they could not have been genuinely held [50]–[51]. The opinions were no less genuine for being based only on what the report called "the information available", because the requirement in s 438A(b) to form them as soon as practicable means they might be formed without full investigation and assessment of all relevant matters [53]. Kiefel CJ and Edelman J wrote that "Opinions have no fixed voltage", and said that s 439A(4) did not require a quantitative opinion comparing the likely recovery under each option [53]. There may be circumstances in which there is simply insufficient information to express an opinion, even where an alternative is a deed imposing a moratorium, and then the only possibility is an application to extend the convening period under s 439A(6), as in Re Riviera Group Pty Ltd (2009) 72 ACSR 352 [54]. Because the Deed was a genuine deed of company arrangement, it was legitimate for the administrators to express their opinions by comparing its terms with ending the administration or winding up [55]. The recital about forming an opinion did not show that the earlier opinions were not genuine since, properly construed, it referred to an opinion about whether to propose a variation of the Deed [56]. They accepted the respondents' primary case that the Deed was consistent with the object of Pt 5.3A and did not contravene the Part as alleged, and joined in the orders dismissing the appeals with costs [57].
Gageler J
Gageler J said that his reasons were substantially reflected in those of Kiefel CJ and Edelman J, "with which I completely agree", and wrote separately to explain his rejection "at the level of principle" of the argument that the Deed did not comply with the procedural requirements of Pt 5.3A [58]. That argument had two strands, non-observance of ss 438A(b) and 439A(4)(b) and impermissible circumvention of s 439A(6), and Gageler J considered it "without merit" [59], [61].
Fundamental to the scheme, he said, as recognised by the plurality in Lehman Bros Holdings Inc v City of Swan (2010) 240 CLR 509, is the policy of allowing creditors themselves to decide by majority what is in their own best interests, and the strict time limits exist to allow them to do so as soon as practicable [61]. The scheme, he said, exhibits no reason why creditors should not be able to decide on a deed providing for an agreed moratorium while a deed administrator investigates with a view to a further proposal, which could be reflected in an amendment agreed under s 445A at a later meeting convened under s 445F [63]. Such a deed has the potential to be contrary to the interests of a minority of creditors, as does any deed, but Pt 5.3A addresses that through provisions empowering the Court to make orders, ss 445D, 447A and 447E being of particular significance [64]–[65]. The only answer suggested to the sufficiency of those provisions was that they place the onus on minority creditors, and Gageler J's response was that they do, and that this is the price paid for a scheme designed, in the words of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992, for "minimisation of expensive and time-consuming court involvement" [66].
He said that an instrument becomes a deed by force of s 444B(6) on execution, and that "under" in s 444B(1) refers to a document made in purported compliance with the relevant procedural provisions [67]. If actual compliance were necessary for a deed to exist, s 445G(2), which applies only where a deed exists, would be self-defeating, and Gageler J wrote that it "might as well be relabelled 'Catch-22'" [68]. Section 445H, he said, makes explicit that a non-compliant deed remains binding on the company, the administrator and the creditors unless and until the Court, on application, orders otherwise [69].
Nettle and Gordon JJ (dissenting)
Nettle and Gordon JJ held that the Deed was not a deed of company arrangement within the meaning of Pt 5.3A, because the Part conceives of administration and the arrangements that may be the subject of such a deed as mutually exclusive, and in substance the Deed "did no more than purport to extend the administration of the Company" [70]. They described the convening period as "designedly brief", said that there is no provision for creditors to extend it, and said that the evident purpose of Pt 5.3A is to confine administrations to strict time limits, subject only to extensions the courts consider appropriate under s 439A(6) or s 447A(1) [72], [74]. They noted that there is a presumptive expectation that extensions will be brief, but that courts have come to recognise that significant extra time may be required, and should be allowed, in complex cases [73]. One reason creditors need protection, they said, is an asymmetry of information, which Pt 5.3A addresses by empowering the court to supervise extensions, and action under s 445D(1)(f) does not meet potential abuse because the uncertainty and delay would be contrary to the strict time limits [75].
Nettle and Gordon JJ said, drawing on Lehman Bros and by analogy with Pt X of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), that whether a compromise or arrangement is commercially more desirable than liquidation is for the creditors, but that "the essence of a Pt 5.3A deed of company arrangement is that it provide for an arrangement alternative to liquidation for the whole or partial payment or satisfaction of creditors' debts or claims against the company or, more generally, for the whole or partial resolution of creditors' debts or claims against the company by alteration of rights on one side or the other" [77].
On their account the administrators, having concluded that they could not gather sufficient information within the convening period, did not apply for an extension but recommended the Deed, which the supplementary report described as "essentially an extension of the Administration Period" (the report's words) [78]–[79]. In their view the Deed purported to effect essentially the same result as a court-ordered extension, except that the extension was determined by the creditors and was to be indefinite, and it ran counter to the evident policy that the only permissible extensions are those granted by the courts [82]–[83].
They rejected the submission that the Deed was no different from a simple moratorium, saying that qualifying moratoria are alternatives to liquidation which are calculated to enable a company to trade out of financial difficulties or are coupled with full or partial releases of debts or claims in return for payment or other consideration, whereas the only purpose of this moratorium was to keep the company, de facto, in administration and give the administrators more time to seek proposals [84]–[85]. They distinguished Commissioner of Taxation v Comcorp Australia Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 356, where creditors gave up their claims in return for the chance of a return from a legal action, because the Deed contained no commitment by creditors to compromise their debts or claims and provided only that they would defer a decision until a later, unspecified date, which was not non-compliance that a court could remedy under s 445D, s 447A or s 447E [86]-[87].
Their conclusion drew support from ss 438A and 439A, which contemplate that creditors armed with the administrators' opinions will choose, "there and then and not otherwise", between executing a deed, winding up and ending the administration [88]–[89]. In their view the administrators were unable within the convening period to form the requisite opinions, and the opinion given did not comply with s 439A(4)(b) because it would not enable the creditors to make that choice [90]–[91]. Nettle and Gordon JJ held that s 444B(6) is "not a deeming provision but a timing provision", and that because the creditors had not resolved to execute a deed of company arrangement within s 444A(1), s 444A did not apply and s 444B(6) was not engaged [93]–[94].
Nettle and Gordon JJ rejected Mighty River's contention that a deed must distribute at least some company property, for the reasons given by Buss P in the Court of Appeal, saying that such a deed "may provide for the distribution of the company's property to creditors but it need not do so" [95]–[97]. That did not detract from their conclusion, since the discrimen of a deed of company arrangement is that it embody the creditors' agreement, as an alternative to winding up in insolvency, on a compromise of their debts or claims or an arrangement falling short of compromise for their resolution [97].
Orders. In each matter, the High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs, making that order on 19 June 2018 at the conclusion of oral submissions [3]. The cover page records that the reasons were published on 12 September 2018. Nettle and Gordon JJ would have allowed the appeals with costs, set aside orders 1 and 2 of the Court of Appeal in each matter, allowed the appeal to the Court of Appeal with costs, set aside order 1 of Master Sanderson, declared that the Deed was not a deed of company arrangement within the meaning of Pt 5.3A, and remitted the matters to Master Sanderson for determination according to law [98].
Why it matters
The case concerns a deed described as a "holding DOCA", and on the reasons of Kiefel CJ, Gageler J and Edelman J an otherwise compliant deed may provide for a moratorium on claims that incidentally extends time for further investigations, without a court order under s 439A(6) [28], [34], [36], [58], [63]. Those reasons leave the Court a role in other ways: where there is simply insufficient information to express an opinion the only possibility is an application under s 439A(6), and a creditor who establishes a ground may obtain orders under provisions such as s 445D [33], [54], [66]. Kiefel CJ and Edelman J, with Gageler J agreeing, and Nettle and Gordon JJ, for the reasons of Buss P, all rejected the contention that s 444A(4)(b) requires a deed to distribute some company property [46], [58], [96]. The majority and the dissent differed on s 444B(6): Kiefel CJ and Edelman J treated it as part of the formal constitution of a deed, Gageler J explained that it operates on an instrument made in purported compliance with the procedural provisions, and Nettle and Gordon JJ treated it as a timing provision that was not engaged [32], [67], [93]–[94].
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