Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden
(2016) 240 FCR 158 · [2016] FCAFC 28
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28 is an appeal decided by three judges of the Federal Court of Australia (Allsop CJ, Griffiths and Wigney JJ) on 9 March 2016. It concerns whether the cancellation of Mr Eden's visa on character grounds under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was legally unreasonable [1], [4]. The primary judge had quashed the decision as disproportionate and unreasonable [2]. In joint reasons the Court held that the primary judge erred and that the decision was within the range of possible lawful outcomes of the power [104]. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge's orders, dismissed Mr Eden's application for judicial review with costs, and ordered him to pay the Minister's costs of the appeal [105].
Facts
Mr Eden was born in Iran and is a citizen of New Zealand, and he has effectively resided in Australia since travelling here in October 2007 [5]. According to the sentencing judge's remarks, on 5 December 2009, while working as a taxi driver, he groped a 20 year old woman who was a passenger in his taxi [6]. The sentencing judge said that Mr Eden thought she was consenting and that she did not consent, although she never said no and did ask him to stop the car at various places [6]. The sentencing judge was satisfied from a victim impact statement that his actions had a traumatic effect on her [6].
On 16 May 2011, in the Queensland District Court in Brisbane, Mr Eden pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault [5]. He was convicted and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, the whole of it suspended, with an order that he be of good behaviour for two years [5]. The Court said it was apparent that he was sentenced on the basis that he honestly believed the victim consented, but that his belief was not objectively reasonable [7]. His wife and son, who was then about a year old, joined him in Australia in 2011, after the offence [5].
In early January 2014 he declared his conviction on an incoming passenger card, which the Court said would appear to have been the catalyst for the events that followed [8]. A notice of the Minister's intention to consider cancelling his visa was sent on 7 November 2014, and representations were made for him on 1 December 2014 and 5 January 2015 [9]. An officer of the department prepared an undated submission to the Minister, with a 16 page issues paper and attachments that included the sentencing remarks and the representations [10]. On 17 April 2015 the then Assistant Minister, whom the judgment calls the Minister, signed the submission to denote her decision to cancel the visa under s 501(2), and signed a statement of reasons [1], [11].
Broadly, the factors the Minister considered favoured cancellation were the nature and seriousness of the offending, the risks to the Australian community and, it appears, the community's expectations [23]. The factors against included the best interests of Mr Eden's son, his ties to Australia, the impact on his business and the hardship he might face on returning to New Zealand [23]. The Minister's Reasons described the offending as "very serious" and treated the sentence as indicative of its seriousness [24]. She accepted that the risk of re-offending was low, but found an ongoing low risk and that the harm would be significant if he offended in a similar manner [25], [26]. The decision ultimately turned on her conclusion that the risk to the Australian community outweighed the competing considerations [28].
Procedural history
Mr Eden challenged the decision by judicial review in the Federal Court, on the sole ground of jurisdictional error resulting from an unreasonable exercise of the discretion [2], [29]. The primary judge, Logan J, referred to the principles that the Court is concerned with the legality of a decision and not its merits, and that reasons must not be read critically with an eye for error [30], [46]. He also referred to Gageler J's observation in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) on the stringency of the test, and noted that legal unreasonableness is not confined to Wednesbury unreasonableness [18], [31].
He nonetheless found that the outcome was unreasonable, saying, in language he adopted from French CJ in Li, that the Minister had "taken a sledgehammer to crack a nut" [2], [32], [36]. The Court said it would appear that the conclusion had two bases: that the outcome was unreasonable or plainly unjust or lacked an evident and intelligible justification, in the language of the joint judgment in Li, and that cancellation was a disproportionate exercise of the discretion [34], [35], [37]. Three matters led him there: the objective seriousness of the offence, delay, and the competing considerations [38].
On seriousness, he concluded that the offence was objectively not very serious, apparently relying on the conduct itself and on the sentence, which he called "eloquent" [39]–[41]. On delay, he said that lethargy on the part of the Minister and officers of the Commonwealth, while a family relationship with a young child developed, "may well be a factor which warrants a conclusion that this particular outcome was oppressive and unreasonable" [42], [85]. The competing considerations were Mr Eden's personal circumstances and the hardship that he and his family would suffer from cancellation [44].
The Minister appealed on six grounds, which her submissions refined into three contentions [3], [46], [47]. Mr Eden is the respondent to the appeal, which was heard on 9 December 2015 and came from Eden v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 780.
Issues
The Court said the issues revolved around two central questions [4]. First, in quashing the decision, did the primary judge correctly apply the principles for deciding whether a decision is legally unreasonable and therefore beyond power, or did he simply remake the decision on his own view of what was reasonable [4]? Second, if he applied the correct principles, was he correct to find the decision legally unreasonable, that is, outside the range of legally permissible and justifiable outcomes given the subject matter, scope and purpose of the power in s 501(2) [4]?
The Minister contended that the primary judge substituted his own assessment of the seriousness of the offence for hers [48], that he could not, or should not, have had regard to delay because she was not bound to consider it [50], and that he essentially remade the decision according to what he considered a reasonable outcome [52]. Mr Eden answered that the Minister's "very serious" view was not open given his mistaken belief and the fully suspended sentence [49], that the passage of time was part of the factual matrix [51], and that no reasonable Minister could have concluded on the objective facts that his visa should be cancelled [53].
Held
Allsop CJ, Griffiths and Wigney JJ (joint reasons)
The reasons are given jointly as those of the Court, with no separate concurrence and no dissent.
Referring to Griffiths J in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 (Stretton), with whom Allsop CJ and Wigney J agreed, the Court set out five features of s 501(2) [14]. The power is enlivened only if the Minister reasonably suspects the visa holder does not pass the character test and the visa holder does not satisfy the Minister otherwise, and a person does not pass if sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twelve months or more [15]. There was no question that the discretion was enlivened in Mr Eden's case [15], [21]. The discretion is substantially unfettered, in that there is no list of factors the Minister must consider, but the power is not without limit and the Minister may not, for example, act arbitrarily or capriciously [16]. It was common ground that the Minister must consider the protection of the Australian community and any risk of harm from the visa holder's continued presence, and the Court found it unnecessary to consider whether she is bound to have regard to anything else [17]. Consistently with Li, the discretion must be exercised reasonably [18]. Indicators suggest the discretion is, and is intended to be, broad, including the absence of an express list of considerations, its conferral on a Minister accountable to Parliament, and the absence of merits review of a decision she makes personally, and that breadth is relevant in assessing legal unreasonableness [19]. The power is substantive, not procedural [20].
The Court then reduced the principles of legal unreasonableness, on which there was no substantial disagreement, to short propositions, saying the summary was not intended to supplant the analysis in Li, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 (Singh) and Stretton [55]-[57]. Legal reasonableness is an essential element in the lawfulness of decision-making [58]. The Court's task is strictly supervisory, and it does not involve reviewing the merits under the guise of evaluating reasonableness, substituting the Court's view for the decision maker's, or remaking the decision on the Court's own view of reasonableness [59]. Legal unreasonableness may be a conclusion following a recognised species of jurisdictional error in the decision making process, or an outcome focused conclusion with no specific jurisdictional error identified [60]. This appeal was primarily concerned with the outcome, although some of the primary judge's reasons and some of the grounds and submissions were directed at the Minister's reasons and alleged errors in the process [61]. Drawing on Li, the Court said that within the boundaries of power there is an area in which reasonable minds might differ and any outcome is within the bounds of legal reasonableness [62]. Identifying that area requires construing the statute, and the evaluation looks at the nature and quality of the decision by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the power, together with common law principles and values concerning reasonableness [63]. Where reasons are available they are likely to be the focus, and a decision whose reasons provide an evident and intelligible justification is unlikely to be legally unreasonable, but unreasonableness may be inferred even if no error in the reasons can be identified [64]. Perhaps most importantly, the Court said, the evaluation should not proceed by applying particular definitions, fixed formulae, categorisations or verbal descriptions, and it is not a checklist exercise, although descriptive expressions from earlier cases may assist [65]. The Court must evaluate whether, having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the power, the decision has qualities of that sort such that it falls outside the range of lawful outcomes [65].
On appeal grounds 1, 2 and 5, the Court found a number of difficulties in the primary judge's reasoning on seriousness, which tended to reveal that he misapplied the principles and undermined his ultimate conclusion [67]. It was somewhat unclear whether he found the Minister's view was not open, because he also said she was "perfectly entitled" to form a subjective view [68]. If the view was open on the facts, it was not for him to replace it with his own finding [69]. On balance, it would seem to the Court that he did effectively find that the view was not open on the objective facts [70]. The Court said there would appear to be no sound basis for that conclusion [72]. The Minister had the sentencing remarks before her, and the issues paper clearly indicated that the sentence was fully suspended [73]. A fully suspended sentence is nonetheless a sentence of imprisonment, and the Court cited Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 113 (Rares J, with whom Moore J agreed) for its being regarded as a "very serious form of punishment", and Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321 for its being treated as the penultimate punishment in the hierarchy of sentencing options [73]. It was open to the Minister to conclude that the sentence indicated the seriousness of the offending, and the full suspension did not mean the offence was not very serious [73].
Mr Eden's mistaken belief was spelt out in the sentencing remarks and referred to in the submission and issues paper, and the absence of express reference to it in the Reasons did not mean the Minister necessarily ignored it [74]. The mistake was undoubtedly relevant to the seriousness of the offending, but it did not compel a finding that the offending was not very serious [74]. The Court accepted that the discussion of seriousness in the Reasons was "brief and somewhat cursory" and its generalisations "far from illuminating or helpful", but held that the Minister's "very serious" view was open on the facts and not in any sense irrational or illogical [75]. In any event, even if that view was not open, the offence could be viewed as serious, which Mr Eden had conceded "without reservation" in his representations to the Minister [76]. The decision did not depend on so fine a distinction, because it primarily turned on the risk to the Australian community, which the Reasons treated as a function of the risk of re-offending and the harm if he did re-offend [77].
On appeal ground 4, the Court held that the Minister's submissions on delay were misconceived and that the ground had no merit [79], [88]. The Minister proceeded as if the primary judge had found delay to be a consideration she was bound to, but did not, take into account, whereas his finding was that the outcome was unreasonable and that delay was one factor relevant to that [79], [80]. The Court held that he was correct to treat the time elapsed since the conviction as relevant to the reasonableness of the outcome [81]. It was relevant in at least two ways: to the risk of re-offending, which the Minister herself took into account, and to the hardship of cancellation, because Mr Eden's and his family's ties to Australia had strengthened [81]–[83]. Whether delay was a mandatory consideration distracted from the central question, which was whether the outcome was legally unreasonable [84]. The Minister led no evidence of when her department first became aware of the conviction or why it appeared to take so long to act, so the Court thought it perhaps understandable that the primary judge characterised the decision as involving delay, and equally understandable that he inferred a lack of urgency or lethargy [86]. The observations on delay in the United Kingdom decisions Handscomb and Doody were made in an entirely different context, but the primary judge appears to have referred to those cases merely as illustrations of unacceptable delay and not as authority for a legal principle [43], [87].
On appeal ground 6, two questions arose: whether the primary judge remade the decision on his own view of reasonableness, and, if he asked the correct question, whether his conclusion was correct [89]. On the first, the Court observed that nowhere did he refer to a range of possible lawful outcomes or acknowledge an area in which the decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion [91]. He did not appear to accept that reasonable minds might differ, and appears instead to have assessed what he considered the reasonable outcome and effectively concluded that any other view was unreasonable [91]. His acknowledgment that there was "nothing bizarre or irrational in the sense of incomprehensible about the Minister's reasons" may, on one view, be seen to amount to an acknowledgment of an evident and intelligible justification, just not one he agreed with [92]. The Court concluded that it was "difficult to avoid the conclusion" that he did not correctly apply the principles, and that he "remade the decision on the basis of his own view of reasonableness" [93].
On the second question, the Court quoted Allsop CJ in Stretton at [25] to the effect that there can legally be only one correct answer and that the appeal is not review of a discretion [94]. The Court said there could be little doubt that Mr Eden's circumstances presented the Minister with "a difficult decision about which reasonable minds could differ" [97]. He received the bare minimum sentence needed to enliven the discretion, he was sentenced on the basis of a mistake not based on objectively reasonable grounds, his offence was "perhaps towards the low end of the scale of seriousness of sexual assault offences", his risk of re-offending was accepted to be low, and in the four years since his conviction he had committed no further offences while he and his family developed further ties with Australia [97]. On the other hand, given the sexual nature of the offence and the harm in fact suffered by the victim, the Minister's view that the risk of harm was unacceptable was open on the facts and could not be considered in any sense unreasonable, illogical or irrational [98]. Her findings on that risk provided an evident and intelligible justification for the decision, "albeit not a justification that everyone would necessarily agree with" [99]. The primary judge's reasons did not directly engage with that justification, and even if he disagreed with it, that gave no proper basis for legal unreasonableness where, as here, it was reasonably open on the objective facts [99].
To the extent his conclusion rested on an absence of proportionality, he did not explain why cancellation was not a proportionate response, and there was no basis for concluding that it was disproportionate "on any view", as French CJ put it in Li, or "obviously", as Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ put it in Li [100]. It was at the very least reasonably open to the Minister to conclude that cancellation was necessary to protect the Australian community [100]. Her view that the balance between that risk and the considerations personal to Mr Eden favoured cancellation was also open [101]. The Court said it should perhaps be observed that the competing considerations were "far from overwhelming": the ties to Australia were of fairly recent origin, Mr Eden had some family links and prospects of accommodation and employment in New Zealand, and the effect on his young child depended to an extent on whether his wife and child would accompany him back [102]. Where the competing considerations were far from compelling, even a relatively small risk to the Australian community was capable of swinging the balance in favour of cancellation [102].
Parliament has entrusted the power to the Minister and provided for no merits review where she exercises it personally, so the Court must be astute not to be seen to engage in impermissible merits review [103]. Consistently with Gageler J's observation in Li at [113], the Court said that in decisions made by the Minister personally one would expect that intervention on this ground "would be fairly rare and would only occur in relatively clear cases", and that this was not such a case [103]. The Court held that the primary judge erred in finding that the decision, or its outcome, was legally unreasonable, and that the decision was within the range of possible lawful outcomes of the power under s 501(2) [104].
Orders. The Court ordered that the appeal be allowed [105]. It set aside the orders of the primary judge and, in their place, dismissed Mr Eden's application for judicial review with costs [105]. It ordered Mr Eden to pay the Minister's costs of the appeal [105].
Why it matters
The case applies principles of legal unreasonableness from Li, Singh and Stretton to a visa cancellation by the Minister under s 501(2) [56], [57]. The Court treated a decision about which reasonable minds could differ, supported by an evident and intelligible justification in the Minister's findings, as within the range of lawful outcomes, even though the primary judge appears not to have agreed with that justification [97], [99], [104]. The Court also treated the question whether delay is a mandatory consideration as a distraction, held that the time elapsed was relevant to the outcome, and still allowed the appeal although the Minister's delay ground had no merit [81], [84], [88], [105].
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