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Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton

(2016) 237 FCR 1 · [2016] FCAFC 11

Federal Court of Australia - Full Court · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

This is a decision of the Federal Court of Australia on appeal, given by three judges (Allsop CJ, Griffiths and Wigney JJ) on 15 February 2016. The Minister appealed against a primary judge's decision on judicial review that the Minister's cancellation of Mr Stretton's visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was legally unreasonable and so involved jurisdictional error [28], [35]. Each judge held that the primary judge was wrong to find the decision legally unreasonable [23]–[24], [75]–[76], [103]. All three judges wrote reasons, each agreed with the others, and there was no dissent [1], [87], [90]. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge's orders, dismissed Mr Stretton's judicial review application, dismissed his notice of contention and his application to adduce fresh evidence, and ordered him to pay costs.

Facts

Mr Stretton was born in England on 29 December 1954 and moved to Australia with his father and brother in 1961 [31]. He married in September 1975; his wife is also English, neither of them is an Australian citizen, and they have four children [31]. In 2009, having been found guilty of several relatively minor offences between 1970 and 1974 but not convicted of any criminal offence after 1974, he committed sexual offences in relation to his granddaughter, then 8 or 9 years old, who was under his care [31]. Allsop CJ noted that he was then aged 54 and that the crimes were committed when he was affected by alcohol [14]. On 24 June 2013 the District Court of Queensland convicted him on three counts of indecent treatment of a child under 12 years of lineal descendant [31]. He was imprisoned for two years, to be released after serving six months on entering a two year good behaviour bond, and he was released on 23 December 2013 [31].

On 16 October 2013, while he was in prison, the Minister's Department gave him notice of an intention to consider cancelling his Class BB, Subclass 155 (Five Year) Resident Return visa under s 501(2) [32]. His solicitor's submission of 6 December 2013 included statutory declarations, medical reports and a forensic psychologist's assessment, and a General Practitioner's brief report certifying that, because his youngest daughter was suffering from depression, his return to England would be detrimental to her emotional and psychological health [33]. On 28 October 2014 the then Minister personally determined to cancel the visa and gave a detailed statement of reasons [35].

Having determined that Mr Stretton did not pass the character test, the Minister said he was mindful of the Government's commitment to using s 501 to protect the Australian community from harm from criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens [37]. The Minister considered mitigating factors and the risk of re-offending, Mr Stretton's ties to Australia, which he described as "long and deep", the best interests of the four grandchildren, the substantial hardship to the family, the fragmentation of relationships, the impact on Australian business interests and the impediments Mr Stretton might face in the United Kingdom [38]. The Minister concluded, in his own words, that Mr Stretton "is expected to forfeit the privilege of being able to remain in Australia given the serious nature of his criminal offending" [39]. The Minister gave weight to the countervailing considerations but took the view, again in his own words, that they were "not sufficient to justify not to cancel" the visa, "since even a low risk of re-offending could result in serious harm to a member of the Australian community" [39].

Procedural history

Mr Stretton was taken into immigration detention shortly after the decision, and on 11 March 2015 the primary judge made interlocutory orders that had the effect of restraining the Minister from removing him from the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre other than to attend the hearing [40]. His further amended application, whose grounds the primary judge described as "prolix", alleged jurisdictional error in several ways, including failure to deal with the effect of cancellation on his youngest child, reliance on incorrect information in the departmental issues paper, manifest unreasonableness and the inflexible application of a policy [41]. The primary judge rejected every ground except the one relating to unreasonableness [42].

As Griffiths J recorded, the primary judge did not consider that the Minister had fettered his discretion or adopted an unlawful policy, but read the Minister's reasons as putting to one side the evaluation of the low likelihood of reoffending against the countervailing considerations, and as equating subjective descriptions of an event as serious with its objective seriousness [44]. The primary judge said that, objectively and in a relative sense, the offences were at the lower end of the range of such offending, and that the Minister was not given the benefit of any such assessment by his department in the Issues Paper [49]. He referred to Mr Stretton's residence of nearly half a century, his lack of ties with the United Kingdom other than birth, his continuing family relationships, his blameless adult life until 2009 and the hardship to him and his wife, and said there was no need to deport him to protect the victim or her siblings, who remained estranged from him [20], [49].

The primary judge said the decision was not bizarre and that dishonesty was never part of the case, but that the exercise of the discretion was unreasonable in the sense referred to by the majority in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) [20], [28], [49]. Adopting a turn of phrase used by Mr G Airo-Farulla, which he said commended itself to French CJ, the primary judge said the Minister had "[taken] a sledgehammer to crack a nut", and that the exercise of the discretion was "in excess of what, on any view, was necessary for the purpose it served" [20], [49]. He held that the decision was attended with jurisdictional error and must be quashed, that Mr Stretton must be released from immigration detention forthwith and that the Minister must pay costs, and he said the nature of the error meant remission to the Minister was not warranted [49]. The judgment appealed from is Stretton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCA 559, and the orders were made on 5 June 2015. On the appeal Mr Stretton filed a notice of contention and, on 17 July 2015, an interlocutory application seeking leave to rely on fresh evidence [30], [84].

Issues

The central issue was whether the primary judge correctly applied the principles of judicial review for unreasonableness in the legal sense found in authorities such as Li and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 (Singh) [50]. The notice of contention asked whether the Minister rigidly and inflexibly applied a policy that the visa of any person convicted of a sexual offence involving a child should be cancelled [78]. It also asked whether the Minister denied Mr Stretton procedural fairness by failing to consider the contention and material that cancellation would have a significant deleterious effect on the mental health of his youngest daughter [78]. The fresh evidence consisted of statements made by the former Minister in a talk-back radio interview shortly after the primary judge published his reasons [82]–[84].

Held

Allsop CJ

Allsop CJ agreed with the orders proposed by Griffiths J, agreed with Griffiths J's reasons subject to his own elaboration, and agreed with Wigney J's reasons [1]. He said that jurisdictional error and legal unreasonableness both concern the lawful exercise of power, that trying to define exhaustively when a decision is legally unreasonable is likely to produce complexity and confusion, and that it is unhelpful to draw categorised differences between words such as arbitrary, capricious, illogical, irrational and unjust, as if each had a separate definable meaning [2]. Relying on Li, he said legal reasonableness is an essential element in the lawfulness of decision-making and Parliament is taken to intend that statutory power will be exercised reasonably [4].

He said that, as discussed in Singh, the judgments in Li identified two contexts for the concept: a conclusion after identifying jurisdictional error of a recognised kind, and an outcome-focused conclusion without any specific jurisdictional error being identified [6]. In the outcome-focused context, he said, there is an area of decisional freedom within which minds might differ, framed by the nature and character of the decision, the terms of the statute in their factual and legal context, and the principles and values of the common law [7]. He said the concept does not provide a vehicle for the Court to remake the decision according to its own view as to reasonableness, because Parliament conferred the power on the decision-maker and the Court's function is supervisory as to legality [8]. He said the terms, scope and policy of the statute and fundamental values (a rejection of unfairness, unreasonableness and arbitrariness, equality, and the humanity and dignity of the individual) inform the conclusion, which is necessarily to a degree evaluative [9]. He said a submission that Li at [76] contained two different tests reflected the dangers of overly emphasising the words of judicial decisions, and that the plurality's discussion at [63]–[76] should be read as a whole [10].

In his words, "The task is not definitional, but one of characterisation": the decision is evaluated to decide whether it has the character of being unreasonable, having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of the power, such that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes [11]. He said a decision may be characterised as legally unreasonable because of specific identifiable jurisdictional error, the conclusion or outcome reached, or the reasoning process used [12].

Turning to this decision, he said the essential facts of the offending should not be lost sight of in assessing the harshness of the consequences flowing from what were, ultimately, Mr Stretton's own actions [14]. He accepted that removal would cause hardship, including the breaking of family relationships of many years, and that removing someone who arrived as a child of six and spent much of his life here has a quality of harshness that might, in other statutory contexts, bespeak unjustness, arbitrariness or disproportion of response [15]. He said the purposes of s 501 include protecting the Australian community, that this protection may come at the cost of hardship, and that there was no call to examine what other purposes the provision may have [16]. He said others exercising the power might have been prepared to take the low risk of re-offending to avoid the harshness, but that was not sufficient for the decision to be characterised as legally unreasonable [17]. He said the decision called for an evaluative balancing of unquantifiable (though low) risk, possibly serious harm to unknown persons and known immediate human hardship, that it did not admit of a ready answer by some calculus, and that it was reached by reasoning that related intelligibly to the purposes of the power [17].

On the seriousness of the offences, he said the Minister had the sentencing remarks and said he read them, and there was no basis to conclude that the Minister misapprehended the nature of the offending [19]. He said the difficulty with the primary judge's reasoning was that it was expressed as the judge's own view of what was reasonable and his own evaluation of what was necessary to protect the community, principally if not wholly by reference to the young children in Mr Stretton's immediate family [21]. He said it is not a correct approach on judicial review to ask whether the exercise of discretion was necessary for the purpose, and that, if one is looking at the outcome, the correct question is "whether a decision-maker could reasonably come to the conclusion" [21]. He said the Court may or may not have a degree of familiarity and confidence in assessing how a decision-maker ought to approach the matter, giving Li as an example, and that here the decision was not procedural but a substantive one concerned with an evaluation of the protection of the Australian community by a Minister personally [21]. He described the choice as one between a low risk of significant harm to one or more young vulnerable children, whom he saw no necessary reason to limit to Mr Stretton's immediate family, and great hardship to Mr Stretton and his family, and as a difficult decision about which minds could differ [22]. He concluded that, although some may characterise the decision as hard, it was "defensible as a rational exercise of power, given the nature of the offending and a risk of re-offending, and the protective scope and purpose of the provision" [23].

He added that if the primary judge is instead taken to have assessed whether the decision was capable of being seen as an exercise of power under s 501, the judge's conclusion still could not be accepted [24]. In that event, he said, although no substantive argument was put, a question might arise about the proper approach to the appeal, and the framework would not be review of a judicial discretion under House v The King, since the power was either lawfully exercised or not and there can legally be only one correct answer [25]. Although it was not the focus of argument, he doubted that judicial review is affected or impeded by the Minister's use of phrases such as "the privilege of being able to remain in Australia", which at one level can be seen as an unremarkable synonymous phrase for statutory rights under the Act, and he said that to the extent such language surrounds the decision with an aura of a non-justiciable assessment of community values he would not necessarily accept it [26].

Griffiths J

Griffiths J held that the primary judge misapplied the legal principles relating to this ground of judicial review [29]. He summarised Li as holding, in the plurality's reasons (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), that there is a legal presumption that a statutory discretionary power is to be exercised reasonably, that the standard is not confined to Wednesbury unreasonableness as articulated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, and that the legal standard is the one indicated by the true construction of the relevant statute [53]-[55]. Quoting the plurality in Li, he said there "is an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion", and he said courts must not exceed their supervisory role by reviewing the merits [56]. He noted the plurality's statement in Li that an obviously disproportionate response is one path to a conclusion of unreasonableness, and said the description of proportionality in McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34 at [3] "may indicate" that the concept is an aspect of judicial review of administrative action [57].

He summarised Singh as establishing that legal unreasonableness is fact dependent, that it has two species (one where an underlying jurisdictional error is identified and one that is outcome focused), that where reasons are given they are the focus and it would be rare for a decision to be legally unreasonable where they demonstrate a justification, and that the indicators of unreasonableness are found in the scope, subject and purpose of the particular provision [61]. He said these principles are not exhaustive and should not encourage a formulaic approach, and in his words: "A more sophisticated approach is required, one which focuses central attention on the question whether an administrative decision is one which is within the authority of the decision-maker to make" [62].

He said the discretion in s 501(2) is substantially unfettered in that there is no express list of factors to take into account, but the power is not without limitation [64]. He said the limits include the two pre-conditions (that the Minister reasonably suspects the visa-holder does not pass the character test, and that the visa-holder does not satisfy the Minister that he or she passes it), the limit stated by Allsop CJ and Katzmann J in NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; (2014) 220 FCR 1 that the Minister may not act arbitrarily, capriciously or legally unreasonably, and a presumption that Parliament intended the discretion to be exercised reasonably in the legal sense [65]-[66], [68].

He said the Act also provides indicators, not intended to be exhaustive or determinative, and that those suggesting the authority is broad include the absence of an explicit list of considerations and the object in s 4 of regulating the presence of non-citizens in the national interest, a concept he described as necessarily broad and as permeating the legislation as a whole [69]–[70]. They also include that the discretion is conferred on a Minister who holds political office and is accountable to Parliament, the power to delegate (s 496) and to give directions (s 499), and that Parliament has not provided merits review where the Minister personally decides, although a delegate's decision is subject to review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under s 500(1)(b) [70]. He said the obligation in s 501G(1)(e) to give written reasons enables a court to ascertain whether there is an evident and intelligible justification, and that it is important that the reasons show a balanced and objective appraisal and weighing of the relevant matters, and show whether the power was exercised for legitimate purposes and not an impermissible purpose such as punishing the visa-holder [70].

He said the value of a statement of reasons should not be diminished by "superficial aphorisms or empty rhetoric", illustrated by the phrase "expectations of the Australian community", which has the potential to mask a subjective value judgment, and by the "privilege" of being a visa-holder, an expression that "is simply misleading as a legal concept" [70]. He said visa-holders hold statutory and non-statutory rights inconsistent with their status being described simply as a privilege, although those statutory rights are subject to the lawful exercise of powers such as those under s 501 [70]. He said the power to refuse or cancel a visa is substantive, in contrast with the procedural power to adjourn in Li and Singh, and that "generally speaking, the intensity of the legal standard is likely to be higher in the case of review of the exercise of a discretion which is of a procedural character" [71].

Applying these principles, he held that the Minister did not exceed his lawful authority: he disagreed with the view that the Minister put the low risk of reoffending to one side, and said the Minister properly evaluated the countervailing considerations with his primary concern being to protect the Australian community, and that the conclusion was reasonably open [72]. He said the word "intolerable" was the primary judge's paraphrase and not the Minister's, and that the Minister was effectively saying that any reoffending could result in serious harm, which he viewed as unacceptable and as outweighing the strong countervailing considerations [73]. He recalled that describing reasoning as unreasonable or irrational may merely be an emphatic way of disagreeing with it, and said a court's disagreement with the decision-maker's evaluation is insufficient of itself to justify intervention [74].

He said the word "necessary" does not appear in s 501(2) or in the Minister's statement of reasons, that the primary judge appears to have introduced an extraneous concept, and that the judge's analysis did not clearly identify the purposes to which the decision was directed [75]. He said that once protecting the Australian public is accepted as at least one purpose of the power, it is difficult to see how the decision exceeded that purpose, and he added that the discretion also serves other purposes, including giving effect in an appropriate case to the personal circumstances of the visa-holder and his or her family and associates [75]. He concluded that the decision was "not unreasonable in the legal sense" [75]. He said the error is perhaps most clearly evident in the primary judge's statement that remission was not warranted, which seems to suggest that only one lawful decision was open and, if that is a correct characterisation, strongly suggests that the judge put himself in the Minister's shoes [76]. He said the legal standard does not go so far as to effectively substitute the Court's view for the Minister's, because Parliament vested the authority to decide in the Minister [76].

On the notice of contention, he said the primary judge was correct to reject both grounds [79]. On the first ground, he held that the statement of reasons was inconsistent with an inflexibly applied policy, because it recorded the Minister taking into account a wide range of matters personal to Mr Stretton, including his difficult childhood, his remorse, his ties to Australia and the effect of removal on him and his family [80]. He said it was understandable why some people might construe the interview statements as suggesting a rigid policy, but on balance he held that they did not establish that such a policy existed and was applied to Mr Stretton, because the former Minister was not cross-examined, the interview took place about eight months after the decision, and the statements were made at a level of generality without specific reference to Mr Stretton [83]. He described the statements as equivocal and said he would not allow the fresh evidence because, even if adduced, it would not affect the outcome [84].

On the second ground, he agreed with the primary judge that the effect on the youngest daughter was not a mandatory relevant consideration and that the Minister was not obliged to refer to it specifically in his reasons [85]–[86]. He added that in any event no inference should be drawn that the Minister did not take her circumstances into account, as the reasons refer to considering all the submissions and material in the Departmental brief, which included her statutory declaration and the medical evidence of her depression [86]. He said he had read the draft reasons of the Chief Justice and Wigney J and respectfully agreed with them [87].

Wigney J

Wigney J agreed with the orders proposed by Griffiths J and with Griffiths J's reasons together with the Chief Justice's additional analysis, and added brief observations [90]. He said the Court's role in reviewing for legal unreasonableness is strictly supervisory, and that where reasonable minds might differ, or the outcome falls within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes, the exercise of power is not legally unreasonable simply because the Court disagrees, even emphatically [92]. He said that if there is an evident, transparent and intelligible justification, or the decision is within the area of decisional freedom, it would be an error to overturn it simply because the Court would have decided differently, and that it was difficult to escape the conclusion that this occurred here [92].

He identified four key findings as appearing to underpin the primary judge's conclusion: that the Minister put to one side the low likelihood of reoffending, that he did not himself assess the objective seriousness of the offence, that he failed to confront and balance the countervailing factors, and that the decision was in excess of what was necessary for the purpose of the power [93]–[97]. On the first, he read the Minister's reasons as expressly having regard to the low risk, and as reasoning that the risk to the Australian community was nonetheless significant given the serious harm that would result if Mr Stretton did reoffend [99]. On the second, he said the Minister did form his own view of the objective seriousness of the offence, and that even if it may be correct that the offence was at the lower end of the range, it did not follow that it was not objectively very serious [100]. On the third, he said there was no basis for the primary judge's finding that the Minister did not "confront and balance" the countervailing factors, and that there was an evident and intelligible justification for the decision [101]. On the fourth, he said reasonable minds might differ and it was at the very least open to the Minister to form the view that the risk to the Australian public outweighed the hardship to Mr Stretton and his family [102]. He concluded that the primary judge "effectively remade the decision, which the Parliament vested in the Minister, according to his Honour's own view of reasonableness", that this was a misapplication of the concept of legal unreasonableness, and that the appeal must be allowed [103].

Orders. The Court ordered that the appeal be allowed [77], [88]. It ordered that the orders of the Federal Court of Australia of 5 June 2015 be set aside and that, in lieu, Mr Stretton's further amended application dated 25 May 2015 be dismissed and he pay the Minister's costs of proceeding QUD640/2014. It ordered that the notice of contention be dismissed [88]. It ordered that the interlocutory application filed on 17 July 2015 seeking leave to adduce fresh evidence be dismissed [84]. It ordered Mr Stretton to pay the Minister's costs of the proceeding as agreed or assessed [89].

Why it matters

Griffiths J said the appeal raises important issues concerning the nature and scope of the judicial review ground of legal unreasonableness [28]. Each set of reasons stresses that the review is supervisory or is not a means of substituting the Court's view for the decision-maker's [8], [76], [92]. Allsop CJ and Griffiths J each referred to the decision or power here being substantive and not procedural [21], [71]. Allsop CJ and Griffiths J dealt in different terms with the purposes of the power: Allsop CJ saw no call to examine purposes beyond protecting the community [16], [26], while Griffiths J said the discretion also serves other purposes [75]. They also dealt in different terms with the word "privilege": Allsop CJ said that at one level it can be seen as an unremarkable synonymous phrase for statutory rights [26], while Griffiths J said it is "simply misleading as a legal concept" [70].

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