Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT
(2013) 212 FCR 99 · [2013] FCA 317
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317 is a judgment of the Federal Court of Australia given by Robertson J, sitting alone, on 12 April 2013. The Minister appealed against a Federal Magistrate's finding that a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, which had affirmed the refusal of a protection visa, was affected by jurisdictional error [1], [5]. The Tribunal had disbelieved the visa applicant generally because it found he had been untruthful about studying Persian, and it never referred to a Punjab University transcript in its file that recorded his marks in Persian [9], [13], [15]. Robertson J held that the Federal Magistrate was right to conclude that the Tribunal gave no consideration to the transcript [71]–[72]. He also upheld the Federal Magistrate's conclusion and orders, although he did not agree with all of his reasoning [122]–[123]. The Court dismissed the appeal with costs and rejected the visa applicant's notice of contention that the Tribunal's reasoning was illogical or irrational [159]–[160].
Facts
The visa applicant, a national of Pakistan, arrived in Australia on 17 March 2011 and applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 29 April 2011 [5]. A delegate of the Minister refused the visa on 5 July 2011, and the Tribunal affirmed that decision by a decision dated 21 March 2012 [5]. The applicant feared harm, as a Muslim citizen of Pakistan, from Pakistani militants, including those with close contacts with the Taliban, the LEJ and the LET, and he said much of this militancy centred on the Lal Masjid mosque and Maulana Abdul Aziz [116]. He referred to efforts by the militants to recruit him and to being taken by them to the North West Frontier Province in 2011 [116].
At the Tribunal hearing he said that, from 2006, he had studied education, journalism and Persian privately for a Bachelor of Arts through Punjab University, and that he sat his examinations in Islamabad in 2008 [14]. Asked for a Persian word, he said he did not know any Persian words, explaining that the study was done in Urdu and that the book had only one or two pages in Persian [14].
The Tribunal found that the applicant had fabricated claims of past events and fears of return to Pakistan in order to try to obtain a protection visa [9]. It believed he had been untruthful about his past experiences in Pakistan because it believed he had not been truthful about his study, since he could not recall a Persian word after two years of tertiary study, and it rejected his explanation as implausible [9]. These passages are at the beginning of the Tribunal's findings and reasons, and the delegate had not based his decision on such findings [10]–[11]. The Tribunal also rejected the applicant's claimed close relationship with senior leaders of the Red Mosque and his account of his release by militants, and found he was not a refugee [118].
The Department's file held a copy, certified by a justice of the peace on 29 April 2011, of a Punjab University result card for the Bachelor of Arts Annual Examination 2008, which recorded that the applicant had passed and showed 87 out of 100 in Persian, listed as an optional subject [13]. It was common ground before the Federal Magistrate that this transcript was in the file of documents that reached the Tribunal from the Secretary of the Department [13]. The Tribunal did not refer to the document at the hearing or in its reasons, and said nothing about its authenticity or the truth of its contents [15].
Procedural history
In the Federal Magistrates Court the applicant contended that the Tribunal had failed to take into consideration independent corroborative material, namely the academic transcript [16]. The Federal Magistrate decided that ground alone, finding it unnecessary to address the other grounds [17]. On 12 October 2012 he ordered that a writ of certiorari issue to quash the Tribunal's decision and a writ of mandamus issue requiring the Tribunal to determine the review according to law, and he ordered the Minister to pay costs of $4,500 [6].
The Federal Magistrate concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that the Tribunal overlooked and gave no consideration to the document when it made its adverse findings [18]. He relied on the absence of any reference to the document at the hearing or in the reasons, the folio numbering of the Department's file, and the Tribunal's reasoning, which focused entirely on the applicant's oral evidence [18]. He held that the case fell within the principles in Craig and Yusuf, because evidence the Tribunal was required by law to take into consideration had been ignored [25]. He held that the evidence was material because the Tribunal's disbelief about the Persian course was its principal reason for disbelieving all of the applicant's case [26]. He rejected the Minister's reliance on Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZNPG for the proposition that it could never be a jurisdictional error to ignore a critical piece of corroborative evidence [21]. He reasoned that if it is a jurisdictional error deliberately to refuse to weigh evidence relevant to a material issue of credibility, then unconsciously ignoring corroborative evidence through inadvertence must also be one [24].
The Minister appealed on three grounds: that the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal ignored the transcript; that he should have found that the Tribunal considered it; and, in the alternative, that he erred in finding that ignoring it was a jurisdictional error [7]. The applicant filed a notice of contention that the judgment should be affirmed on the ground that the Tribunal's reasoning was illogical, irrational and not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds [8].
Issues
The first issue was one of fact: whether the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal ignored the academic transcript [2], [7]. The second was one of law: if so, whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error [2], [76]. The third, raised by the notice of contention, was whether the Tribunal's reasoning in concluding that the applicant had fabricated his account was affected by irrationality or illogicality [3].
Held
Robertson J
On the factual question, the Minister argued that the Tribunal must have considered the transcript, because its reasons said it had regard to the material on the Tribunal and Department files and because, at the hearing, it mentioned that the applicant's witness statement came with a range of documents about his circumstances [28]. Robertson J held that there was an insufficient basis for the Federal Magistrate to conclude that the Tribunal had been unaware of the transcript in the sense that it had become separated from the other material and was never seen by the Tribunal [70]. In his Honour's view the folio numbering provided no basis for any inference about the whereabouts of the document, and it was common ground that the transcript was in the file that reached the Tribunal [70].
However, he held that the Federal Magistrate did not err in concluding that the Tribunal gave no consideration to the transcript when it made its adverse findings [71]. The transcript was so relevant to the nature of the applicant's study that the obvious inference from the Tribunal's silence, in neither putting its falsity to the applicant nor asking him to reconcile his evidence with it, was not outweighed by the Tribunal's general references to the material on the files [72]. His Honour said this was "a matter of ordinary fact-finding rather than depending on some special tenet of administrative law" [72]. Nor was the inference outweighed by the Tribunal's remark about a range of documents or its question whether the applicant had other written documents, and nothing could be made of the size of the file [72]. For the same reason, he was not persuaded by the Minister's submissions that the Tribunal had no legal duty to mention the transcript at the hearing or in its reasons, or that the document did not go to the facts on which the refugee claim rested [73]. The real issue was whether the Tribunal took the transcript into account, not whether it failed to do so through inadvertence or otherwise [74]. He therefore rejected grounds 1 and 2 [75].
On ground 3, Robertson J said that recent High Court authority shows that the legal consequence of such a finding is a case-specific inquiry, not one to be analysed by fixed categories or formulas under which a decision is always or never affected by jurisdictional error [76]–[77]. In his words, categories and formulas "should be seen as servants rather than masters" [77]. He rejected the view that a finding on credit can never found a conclusion of jurisdictional error, particularly where a credit finding on an objectively minor matter of fact is the basis for rejecting the whole of an applicant's evidence and claim [78].
His Honour set out the statutory scheme, including the Tribunal's duty under s 414 to review a decision, the Secretary's duty under s 418 to give the Registrar the documents considered relevant to the review, and the Tribunal's duty under s 430 to set out its findings on material questions of fact [85], [87], [89]. He held that in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, though at times using shorthand expressions, were not saying that ignoring material relevant only to fact-finding of itself constitutes jurisdictional error, and to the extent that the Federal Magistrate proceeded on that basis he disagreed with him [91], [95]. Reading the passage from Craig v South Australia cited in Yusuf, he concluded that "merely to ignore 'relevant material' does not establish jurisdictional error" [97]. He said this is consistent with fact-finding being a matter for the tribunal of fact, while the Court asks whether the tribunal was not performing the task conferred on it by the legislation [97].
But he rejected the Minister's contention that material is relevant only if it can be seen in advance to be part of the claim to be a refugee, because that would put out of account the Tribunal's actual course of decision-making and proceed impermissibly by categories or formulas [98]. Although it is ultimately the claim that the Migration Act requires to be considered, he said "there are many ways, actual or constructive, of failing to consider the claim" [98]. He held that Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, relied on by the applicant, did not assist, as it was brought under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), concerned the interpretation of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), and was not a sound basis for considering questions of jurisdictional error [99].
Reviewing Full Court decisions, he noted that in W412/01A the Full Court held that the Tribunal did not consider relevant and cogent evidence corroborating the claim to have been detained, and that in W360/01A a Full Court applied it, holding that the Tribunal deprived itself of the opportunity to consider corroborative evidence and thereby fell into jurisdictional error [106]–[107]. SZNPG and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZNSP cast no particular light on this appeal because in each the Tribunal did take the corroborative material into account [109]–[110]. He said the present appeal was unlike the example given by McHugh and Gummow JJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002, of a decision-maker proceeding on the footing that no corroboration can undo a conclusion that a party's case comprises lies [105].
In his opinion there is no clear distinction in each case between claims and evidence, and "the fundamental question must be the importance of the material to the exercise of the Tribunal's function and thus the seriousness of any error" [111]. The distinction between claims and evidence, he said, "provides a tool of analysis but is not the discrimen itself" [111]. He warned against reasoning that because a failure to deal with insubstantial or inconsequential evidence will sometimes not establish jurisdictional error, a failure to deal with substantial and consequential evidence will not establish it either [111]. Referring to the Full Court's statement in VAAD that whether the Tribunal must consider a document depends on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the document, he identified as relevant factors for corroborative evidence its cogency and its place in the assessment of the applicant's claims [112]. He did not agree with any contention that these matters may always be dealt with without reference to the Tribunal's reasons [112].
As to paragraph 28 of SZNPG, he held that this appeal was not a case of mere misunderstanding of evidence but of failure to take corroborative material into account, and he agreed with the Federal Magistrate that SZNPG is not authority that ignoring a critical piece of corroborative evidence could never be a jurisdictional error [114]. He observed that what North and Lander JJ said in paragraph 38 of SZNSP is expressed more widely than necessary for this appeal if read as applying to all corroborative material or evidence [114]–[115].
The key features of the case were that the Tribunal did not consider the transcript and that the matter to which it went founded the Tribunal's rejection of the applicant's claims on the basis that he had been untruthful [119]. The Tribunal had not taken a nuanced approach to credit but had disbelieved the applicant generally; in a nuanced case, he said, a credit finding may more readily be seen as going only to a matter of fact and thus as "quintessentially the province of the Tribunal" [119]. Because the Tribunal had not dealt with the transcript, the Court was not traversing findings of fact about it, and possibilities such as that the transcript was false, that the applicant was a bad student or had a bad memory, or that studying Persian meant culture and history rather than language, were unexplored and were for the Tribunal to resolve [120]. Adopting the language of Buchanan J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZCOQ, relied on by the Minister, he said these considerations bear upon the material elements which must be satisfied or rejected when dealing with an applicant's claims [121].
Robertson J concluded that, although he did not agree with the Federal Magistrate's reasoning, his Honour's conclusion and orders were correct [122]. In particular, the proposition that it is always a jurisdictional error to ignore relevant material was too widely expressed, as was the Federal Magistrate's reasoning that it is always a jurisdictional error unconsciously to ignore corroborative evidence [122]. He rejected ground 3 and dismissed the appeal [123]–[124].
Robertson J considered the notice of contention for completeness [125]. The applicant argued that the Tribunal reasoned that, if he or his father had a close association with the Lal Masjid (the Red Mosque) and Moulana Abdul Aziz, he would have known that Jamia Hafsa was a girls' seminary and that Jamia Faridia was the madrassa for men, when he had claimed only that his father had such an association [127]–[128]. He submitted that the Tribunal's inferences about his knowledge of the two madrassas were not supported by the evidence and that its reasoning was illogical [129]–[131]. The Minister argued that illogicality must touch the decision itself rather than anterior findings of fact, relying on Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [136].
Robertson J chose to consider the Tribunal's findings and reasoning before going to the authorities [140]. He held that it was open to the Tribunal to infer from the oral evidence that the applicant appeared unaware that Jamia Hafsa is, or is consistently referred to as, a seminary for girls, and that it was for the Tribunal to evaluate his answer [143]. If the contention's phrase "was not supported by the evidence" meant that there was no evidence, the first element could not succeed, and if it meant something less, it impermissibly invited the Court, on an appeal in judicial review proceedings, to choose between contestable facts [143]. The second element, about the Tribunal's statement that the applicant made no reference to Jamia Faridia, failed for the same reasons once the sentence was read in context, the Tribunal's point being that the applicant appeared unfamiliar with Jamia Faridia and could not independently identify it as associated with the Red Mosque [145]. On illogicality, he held that the contention involved a less than beneficial reading of the Tribunal's reasons and put to one side any relevant communication between father and son, contrary to the balance of the material [146]. He agreed that the Tribunal's words at paragraph 48 of its reasons, about the applicant or any member of his family having a close relationship with senior leaders of the Red Mosque, were "too loosely expressed in their reference to the applicant", but he did not accept that the Tribunal reasoned as a matter of bare logic from the father's relationship to the applicant's knowledge [146].
On the law, he held that the ground refers to extreme illogicality or irrationality, measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions, and within the framework of whether there has been jurisdictional error [148]. He did not accept the Minister's submission that illogicality or irrationality are to be considered only in relation to the end result, reading the reasons of Crennan and Bell JJ, and of Heydon J, in SZMDS as not limiting the inquiry in that way [150]–[151]. Nor, in his view, did the reasons in SZLSP, SZOCT or SZOOR limit the inquiry to the ultimate decision [154]–[156]. He said it may be that the Minister's point was no more than a pleading point, and if so it was not one of substance given the terms of ground 2 of the notice of contention [157]. He noted that irrationality in one finding may be immaterial given other findings, but found it unnecessary to explore that given his earlier conclusions [158]. The notice of contention therefore failed [159].
Orders. The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant Minister pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or taxed [160]. The notice of contention failed, and Robertson J noted that it did not substantially extend the length of the hearing [159]–[160].
Why it matters
Robertson J accepted that ignoring material relevant only to fact-finding does not of itself establish jurisdictional error [97]–[98]. But he upheld the conclusion that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error where it failed to consider highly relevant corroborative evidence on a matter that founded its rejection of the applicant's claims as untruthful [72], [119], [122]–[123]. He treated the question as a case-specific inquiry, in which the distinction between claims and evidence is a tool of analysis rather than the test, and the relevant factors include the cogency of the corroborative evidence and its place in the assessment of the claims [77], [111]–[112]. On illogicality, he treated the ground as referring to extreme illogicality or irrationality and did not accept that the inquiry is confined to the end result [148], [151].
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