Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ
(2016) 259 CLR 180 · [2016] HCA 29 · (2016) 90 ALJR 901
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29 is a decision of the High Court of Australia given on 27 July 2016 in two matters, the other being Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTZI. It decided two appeals from the Full Court of the Federal Court in proceedings that two former visa applicants had brought in the Federal Circuit Court, claiming they had been denied procedural fairness in the procedures departmental officers used to assess the consequences for them of an incident known as "the Data Breach" [1]. In one joint judgment, all seven Justices held that the Full Court was right that the Federal Circuit Court had jurisdiction and that the applicants were owed procedural fairness, but wrong to conclude that they had been denied it [2]. Each appeal was allowed, the Full Court's orders were set aside, and in their place the appeals to the Full Court were dismissed, except that one order of the Federal Circuit Court in each matter was set aside (in SZSSJ's matter, replaced by a costs order in his favour) [93]–[95].
Facts
On 10 February 2014 the Department of Immigration and Border Protection published statistics on its website in a document whose electronic form included embedded information disclosing the identities of 9,258 protection visa applicants who were then in immigration detention [3]. The document stayed on the website until 24 February 2014 [3]. The Court described the Data Breach as "very serious", noting that the information was protected from unauthorised access and disclosure by criminal prohibitions in Pt 4A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) [4]. The Department retained KPMG to investigate, and an abridged version of its report, later given to affected applicants, recorded that the document had been accessed 123 times from 104 unique internet protocol (IP) addresses [5]. The abridged report did not record those IP addresses or the precise times of access, and recorded that its authors had found no indication that the disclosure was intentional or malicious [6].
In early March 2014 the Secretary of the Department sent each affected applicant a standard form letter telling them of the Data Breach and that the Department would assess any implications for them personally as part of its normal processes [8]. By the end of September 2014 the Department's response appears to have been channelled into International Treaties Obligations Assessments (ITOAs), conducted under standard procedures in its publicly available Procedures Advice Manual [9]. The ITOAs were directed to the effect of the Data Breach on Australia's non-refoulement obligations under the Refugees Convention, the Torture Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [9]. Officers conducting them were instructed to assume that an applicant's personal information may have been accessed by authorities in the country where the applicant feared persecution or other relevant harm [10].
Under the Manual, a finding that a non-refoulement obligation was engaged might lead to the applicant's case being referred to the Minister to decide whether to exercise powers under ss 48B, 195A and 417 of the Act [11]. Those sections confer non-compellable powers to grant a visa (ss 195A and 417) or to lift a statutory bar on applying for a visa (s 48B), which only the Minister personally may exercise, if the Minister thinks it in the public interest, and which the Minister has no duty to consider exercising [12]. Another instruction in the Manual was that a person who is the subject of an ongoing ITOA is not to be considered available for removal from Australia until the ITOA is complete, unless the person requests removal [16].
SZSSJ, a Bangladeshi national, was in immigration detention awaiting removal at the time of the Data Breach, his protection visa application having been refused and his rights to merits and judicial review exhausted, and he remained in detention [17]. An officer told him by letter of 1 October 2014 that an ITOA had begun the previous day and invited him to provide further information within 14 days [19]. On 23 December 2014 another officer sent him country information about Bangladesh proposed to be taken into account [20]. His solicitors had asserted that procedural fairness required at least the full unabridged KPMG report and all information about the IP addresses, and the Australian Government Solicitor refused to accept that assertion on 12 February 2015 [21]-[22].
SZTZI, a Chinese national, had been in immigration detention since September 2013, and the refusal of her protection visa application was affirmed on merits review in January 2014; she too remained in detention [24]. Her ITOA began on 13 January 2015 [25]. On 5 February 2015 the officer told her of the assumption and set out country information from which, the letter suggested, it could be inferred that she would not face a real chance of serious harm in China even if Chinese authorities knew she had applied for a protection visa [26]. Her migration agent argued that the assumption was too narrow because it did not deal with republication and fear of persecution by non-State actors [27]. The officer completed SZTZI's ITOA on 23 March 2015, concluding that non-refoulement obligations were not engaged [28].
Procedural history
SZSSJ began a proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court on 7 March 2014 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Minister and the Secretary [18]. That court first dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction, but on appeal the Full Court of the Federal Court held that it had jurisdiction and remitted the claim for determination on the merits [18]. On 28 April 2015 the Federal Circuit Court dismissed SZSSJ's proceeding, not being satisfied that he had then been denied procedural fairness or that he faced a realistic threat of sudden removal while the ITOA process continued [23]. SZTZI also sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the Federal Circuit Court, which dismissed her proceeding on 12 May 2015, holding that it lacked jurisdiction and that she had in any event been neither owed nor denied procedural fairness [29].
The Full Court of the Federal Court (Rares, Perram and Griffiths JJ) heard the two appeals together and decided them unanimously in joint reasons delivered on 2 September 2015, making its orders on 25 September 2015 [30]. It allowed each appeal and declared that the process conducted from 12 March 2014 to 25 September 2015 to assess the implications of the Data Breach for each of SZSSJ and SZTZI had been procedurally unfair [31]. In SZSSJ's appeal it also restrained the Minister and the Secretary from removing him until after the process was determined [31].
The Full Court concluded that s 476(2)(d) of the Act did not exclude the Federal Circuit Court's jurisdiction, that the ITOA process was a statutory process in which procedural fairness was required, and that procedural fairness had not been afforded [32]. It found, and the finding was not challenged in the High Court, that the Minister had personally decided to consider whether to exercise the powers in ss 48B, 195A and 417 for visa applicants affected by the Data Breach [33]. It found the process unfair on two bases: the process had not been adequately explained, and the Department had refused to provide the unabridged KPMG report [35]–[36]. The High Court noted that it was not entirely clear from the Full Court's reasons whether it found the process unfair to SZTZI on the first basis [35]. In the Full Court's words, fairness required the Department to reveal "all that it knows about its own disclosures" [37]. In the Full Court's view, the assumption only made things worse, because it was so vague and generic as effectively to put on the applicants the burden of showing who had accessed their information and why that posed a significant risk [38]. The Minister was granted special leave to appeal on undertakings as to costs [93].
Issues
The Court identified three issues: whether the Federal Circuit Court had jurisdiction; whether procedural fairness was required in the ITOA process; and, if so, whether it was afforded [39]. The jurisdiction issue was confined to whether jurisdiction was excluded by s 476(2)(d), that is, whether an ITOA answers the description of a privative clause decision or purported privative clause decision mentioned in s 474(7) [63]. The Court said that each issue required it first to be clear about how the ITOA process is to be characterised in terms of the Act [40].
Held
French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ
Characterising the ITOA process. The Court said that Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth and Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship show that characterising a departmental process that informs the Minister about non-compellable powers requires close attention both to the structure of the powers and to the facts [41]. In Plaintiff M61/2010E, departmental assessment processes were held to be steps taken under and for the purposes of ss 46A and 195A, conditioned by an implied requirement to afford procedural fairness, because the Minister had decided to consider exercising those powers and the processes prolonged the plaintiffs' detention [44]–[45]. In Plaintiff S10/2011, the unanimous conclusion was that neither the departmental process nor the Minister's decision was conditioned by any requirement to afford procedural fairness [48].
From those cases the Court drew three principles about ss 48B, 195A and 417 [52]. First, each section confers a non-compellable power that the Minister exercises personally by making two distinct decisions, a procedural decision to consider whether to make a substantive decision and a substantive decision to grant a visa or lift the bar; the Minister need make neither, and neither is conditioned by a requirement of procedural fairness [53]. Second, departmental processes take their character from what the Minister personally has or has not done: if the Minister has made a personal procedural decision, a process to assist the Minister has a statutory basis and attracts an implied requirement of procedural fairness where it prolongs immigration detention, but otherwise it has no statutory basis and attracts no such requirement [54]. Third, whether the Minister has personally made a procedural decision in a case or class of cases is a question of fact [55]. On the Full Court's unchallenged finding that the Minister had made that procedural decision for each affected applicant, an ITOA was properly characterised as a process undertaken by a departmental officer under and for the purposes of ss 48B, 195A and 417 [56].
Jurisdiction. Section 476(1) gives the Federal Circuit Court the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under s 75(v) of the Constitution, while s 476(2)(d) excludes jurisdiction in relation to a privative clause decision or purported privative clause decision mentioned in s 474(7) [58]. The Court held that the words "in relation to" in s 476(1) are not words of expansion, but words connecting the relief sought to a particular migration decision [60]. Subject to s 476(2)(d), the claims engaged that jurisdiction, because once the Minister had made the procedural decision, an officer's conduct of an ITOA met the definition of "privative clause decision" in s 474(2) through the extended meaning of "decision" in s 474(3)(h), as conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, specifically the holding of an inquiry or investigation [66].
To exclude that jurisdiction, s 474(3)(h) would have to be read into the reference in s 474(7) to a decision of the Minister not to exercise, or not to consider exercising, the Minister's power [67]. The Court held that the structure of s 474 is against that reading, and that even if it could be read in, it could not sensibly cover conduct other than the Minister's [68]. The Court read s 474(7) as limited to a substantive decision by the Minister personally not to exercise a non-compellable power, or a procedural decision by the Minister personally not to consider doing so, not to an officer's preparatory conduct [69]. So s 476(2)(d) excludes jurisdiction where the claim is that the Minister's own decision is affected by jurisdictional error, but not where the claim is that an officer failed to observe an implied limitation in holding an inquiry after the Minister's procedural decision [70]. The Court saw in this a "comprehensible legislative policy": a challenge to an officer's conduct can be heard by the Federal Circuit Court, while a challenge to the Minister's personal decision not to exercise a non-compellable power can only be heard by the High Court under s 75(v) [71]. Three Federal Court decisions relied on by the appellants did not support a contrary construction, the first two concerning an earlier and materially different form of the Act and the third being consistent with the Court's construction [72]. The Federal Circuit Court's jurisdiction was therefore not excluded by s 476(2)(d) [73].
Procedural fairness was required. The Court said it "must now be taken to be settled" that procedural fairness is implied as a condition of a statutory power through a common law principle of statutory interpretation, which, sufficiently stated for present purposes, is that a power apt to affect an individual's interest is presumed to be conditioned on affording that individual procedural fairness, unless the statutory scheme clearly displaces the presumption [75]. An officer's assessment after the Minister's procedural decision is apt to affect the interest in liberty of an applicant whose detention it prolongs [76]. The Court said that what Plaintiff M61/2010E and Plaintiff S10/2011 "critically hold" is that the presumption is displaced for the Minister's personal exercise of power but not for the exercise of power by a departmental officer [77]. Because SZSSJ and SZTZI were in immigration detention at the time of the Data Breach and had stayed there, the inference was that the ITOA process had contributed to the length of their detention, so the process was conditioned by procedural fairness [78]. Procedural fairness was therefore required in SZSSJ's ongoing assessment and in SZTZI's completed assessment [79].
Procedural fairness was afforded. Relying on Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin, as quoted with approval in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the Court said that a court reviewing administrative action for jurisdictional error "has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error" [81]. Procedural fairness requires the decision-maker to adopt a procedure reasonable in the circumstances to give an affected person an opportunity to be heard, and it is breached if the procedure so constrains that opportunity as to amount to a practical injustice, citing Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam as explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [82]. Ordinarily a person must be put on notice of the nature and purpose of the inquiry, the issues to be considered, and the nature and content of information that might be taken into account as a reason for an adverse conclusion, but not of information the decision-maker has chosen not to take into account at all [83].
The Court held that the circumstances of the Data Breach, extraordinary as they were, did not warrant departing from those ordinary requirements [84]. That the Department was responsible for the breach was "regrettable", but it gave no foundation for apprehending that an officer would not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the assessment, nor for turning the ordinary requirement of notice into a duty, as the Full Court had held, to reveal "all that it knows" about the Data Breach [37], [84]. Neither of the Full Court's two bases could be sustained [85].
On the first basis, whatever the inadequacy of the March 2014 letter, SZSSJ and SZTZI were "put squarely on notice" of the nature and purpose of the assessment and the issues to be considered from the formal notification of their ITOAs, on 1 October 2014 and 13 January 2015 respectively [86]. They were told that an ITOA would be conducted under the Procedures Advice Manual to assess the effect of the Data Breach on Australia's non-refoulement obligations to them [87]. The Manual was available to them and made clear that a finding that a non-refoulement obligation was engaged might lead to referral to the Minister [88]. The fact of the Minister's decision affected the legal characterisation of the ITOA process but had no effect on what was in fact to occur in it, and the ITOA inquired into only one aspect of the public interest, compliance with Australia's non-refoulement obligations [89]. Not being told of the Minister's decision or the correct legal characterisation of the process therefore deprived neither of them of any opportunity to submit evidence or make submissions on the subject matter of their ITOAs [89].
On the second basis, the assumption removed from the factual inquiry any question of precisely who had accessed their personal information, and it was sensible because the true extent of access must in practical terms have been unknowable [90]. Once downloaded, the document could have been forwarded to and interrogated by "anyone, anywhere and at any time", and trying to find who had obtained access to any one applicant's information "might be expected to have been a hopeless endeavour" [90]. Sensibly interpreted, the assumption was that all of their personal information had been accessed by all of the persons or entities from whom they feared harm, which is how it was applied in SZTZI's ITOA and how it could reasonably be expected to be applied in SZSSJ's [91]. Exactly how and why the Data Breach occurred was not relevant to whether Australia's non-refoulement obligations were engaged [92]. Even if the unabridged KPMG report had let them prove that one or more of the IP addresses was linked to those they feared, that proof would take their cases no further than the assumption already made in their favour [92].
Section 197C. The Court said that the Full Court's view that s 197C of the Act did not apply to the removal of an unlawful non-citizen who had begun a proceeding for an injunction before 16 December 2014 was mistaken, because a transitional provision applied the section to removals on or after that date [15]. Since no party suggested that s 197C prevents an officer from giving effect to the instruction that a person subject to an ongoing ITOA is not available for removal, the Court said that no further consideration need be given to that section for the purposes of the appeals [16].
Orders. Each appeal was allowed, and the consequential orders reflected undertakings as to costs that the Minister gave as a condition of the grant of special leave [93]. In the appeal concerning SZSSJ, the Court set aside orders 1 and 2 of the Full Court made on 25 September 2015, and in their place ordered that order 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of 28 April 2015 be set aside and replaced by an order that the first respondent pay the applicant's costs, and that the appeal from the Federal Circuit Court's orders be otherwise dismissed [94]. In the appeal concerning SZTZI, the Court set aside orders 1, 2 and 3 of the Full Court made on 25 September 2015, and in their place ordered that order 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of 12 May 2015 be set aside and that the appeal from that court's orders be otherwise dismissed [95].
Why it matters
The case states three principles, drawn from Plaintiff M61/2010E and Plaintiff S10/2011, for the Minister's non-compellable powers in ss 48B, 195A and 417: they are exercised by two distinct personal decisions of the Minister, departmental processes take their character from what the Minister has done, and whether the Minister has made a procedural decision is a question of fact [52]–[55]. It holds that s 476(2)(d) does not exclude the Federal Circuit Court's jurisdiction over a challenge to an officer's conduct of an inquiry after the Minister has decided to consider exercising such a power, while a challenge to the Minister's personal decision not to exercise the power can only be heard by the High Court under s 75(v) [70]–[71]. It also sets out the notice that procedural fairness ordinarily requires in an inquiry, and holds that a decision-maker's responsibility for a breach like this one does not turn that requirement into a duty to reveal all it knows [83]–[84].
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