Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW
(2018) 264 CLR 541 · [2018] HCA 30 · (2018) 357 ALR 408 · (2018) 92 ALJR 713
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ), delivered on 8 August 2018, on appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The case concerns the standard an appellate court applies on an appeal by way of rehearing from a primary judge's conclusion that an administrative decision was legally unreasonable, and whether the Refugee Review Tribunal acted unreasonably in deciding a review under s 426A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) when the applicants did not appear [19], [61]. All five judges held that the Full Court should have decided for itself whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable, rather than look for error of the kind required on an appeal from a discretionary judgment [18], [27], [117], [130]. All five judges also held that the Tribunal's decision to proceed without the respondents was not legally unreasonable [10], [71], [124], [141]. The Court allowed the Minister's appeal, set aside the Federal Circuit Court's order, dismissed the respondents' application for judicial review and ordered the Minister to pay the first and second respondents' costs of the appeal [125]–[126].
Facts
The first and second respondents, SZVFW and his wife, applied on 3 December 2013 for Protection (Class XA) visas, giving an address in Roselands, New South Wales, as their residential and postal address [99]. SZVFW did not agree to the Department communicating with him by fax, email or other electronic means, but he gave a mobile number, and both undertook to tell the Department if they intended to change their address for more than 14 days while the application was being considered [99]. The Department wrote to the Roselands address inviting SZVFW to an interview with the Minister's delegate, warning that if he did not attend the application might be decided on the information already provided [100]. After a Mandarin-speaking officer telephoned SZVFW and the interview was rescheduled to 9 April 2014, neither SZVFW nor his wife attended or provided further documents, and on 16 April 2014 the Department wrote to the Roselands address advising that the application had been refused [101]–[102].
On 12 May 2014 they applied to the Tribunal for review, naming the Roselands address for correspondence and giving a mobile number and an email address for SZVFW [103]. They did not respond to the Tribunal's letter of the same date inviting them to provide material or written arguments [104]. By a letter dated 15 August 2014, sent to the Roselands address by ordinary post rather than registered post, the Tribunal invited them to appear on 10 September 2014 and warned that if they did not attend it might make a decision without taking any further action to allow or enable them to appear [105]. Neither of them contacted the Tribunal or attended the hearing, and the Tribunal, exercising the power in s 426A(1) as it then stood, decided the review without taking further action and affirmed the delegate's decision [105]–[106]. The Tribunal's reasons recorded that the respondents had not attended the Department interview, had provided no further documents, had been sent the invitation with its warning at their last address for correspondence, and had made no contact with the Tribunal [66]. In their later application to the Federal Circuit Court, the respondents asserted that they had not been in Sydney at the time and did not receive any letter about the hearing date [64].
Procedural history
In the Federal Circuit Court, the primary judge (Judge Barnes) held that the Tribunal's decision to proceed was legally unreasonable [6]. Her Honour accepted that the Tribunal was not obliged, in every case where an applicant fails to respond to an invitation to appear, to search its records and find other ways of communicating with the applicant [109]. She expressed concern about whether the invitation letter had been dispatched within three working days so as to come within s 441A(4), but held that it was unnecessary to resolve that issue [110]. She relied on the importance of the hearing to the respondents, the relatively short time between the invitation and the hearing, the absence of anything showing that the letter had come to their attention, and the Tribunal's failure to follow them up although it had their email address and telephone number [67], [111]. She also noted that the respondents were not represented by a migration agent or solicitor and that the invitation letter was the first invitation sent to them [112]. She concluded that, even assuming the letter had been dispatched within the prescribed period, the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable, and she made orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus requiring the Tribunal to redetermine the review according to law [113], [23].
The Minister appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court (Griffiths, Kerr and Farrell JJ) on a single ground, that the primary judge erred in concluding that it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to decide the review without further action to enable the respondents to appear [17], [24]. The Full Court said that it was not its task to "step into the shoes of the primary judge", required the Minister to establish an appealable error, and treated the primary judge's conclusion as one turning on her evaluative judgment [114]–[115]. Approaching the matter by analogy with appeals from discretionary judgments, the Full Court deferred to the weight the primary judge had given to the circumstances, found no error and dismissed the appeal [116], [26]. The Minister appealed to the High Court by special leave [21].
Issues
The first issue was the standard of appellate review on an appeal by way of rehearing from a primary judge's conclusion that an administrative decision-maker exceeded its authority by making an unreasonable decision, and in particular whether the appellate court could only interfere if it found error of the kind required on an appeal from a discretionary judgment under House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 [18]-[19], [142]. The second issue was whether the Tribunal's choice to decide the review without taking further action to allow or enable the respondents to appear was legally unreasonable [61], [130]. It was not disputed that the s 426A power had to be exercised reasonably, or that an unreasonable choice would invalidate the Tribunal's decision, so the second issue was solely the reasonableness of the choice [65].
Held
Kiefel CJ
Kiefel CJ agreed with Nettle and Gordon JJ that the appeal should be allowed and with the other orders they proposed, and gave her own reasons [1]. Her Honour said the power in s 426A is a discretion, subject to the presumption that the legislature intends it to be exercised reasonably [4]. She said the preconditions to the power were met, because the invitation was given by a method specified in s 441A, s 441C deemed the respondents to have received it, and nothing before the Tribunal suggested otherwise [8]. In her view, the Tribunal's decision not to make further contact with the respondents and adjourn was "perfectly explicable given the history of the respondents' non-responsiveness" [9]. Referring to the joint judgment in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, she said that a decision is legally unreasonable when it lacks an evident and intelligible justification, and that the test for unreasonableness is necessarily stringent [10]-[11]. She distinguished Li, where it was not obvious how the tribunal had reached its decision, because here the basis for the Tribunal's decision was apparent and plainly justified it [14]. She said the primary judge's reasoning came down to saying that the Tribunal should have exercised the power in the respondents' favour because in a practical sense it could have, but the implied requirement to act reasonably does not require a decision to be advantageous to the person affected [15]. That reasoning would imply an obligation in most, if not all, cases of non-response, which the statute does not contain; the Tribunal's ability to contact the respondents was only a factor it could take into account [16]. Kiefel CJ held that the Full Court had to decide for itself whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable rather than defer to the primary judge, and that, for the reasons given by Nettle and Gordon JJ, the principles stated in House v The King do not arise in cases of this kind [18].
Gageler J
Gageler J agreed with the orders proposed by Nettle and Gordon JJ, giving separate reasons [72]. His Honour held that the appellate court must determine not whether the primary judge's conclusion was open but whether it was, in the appellate court's opinion, "the right conclusion" [20]. He explained that an appeal by way of rehearing is a procedure for the correction of error, differing from an appeal in the strict sense in that correctness is judged on the evidence at trial together with any further evidence allowed, and on the law as it stands when the appellate court gives judgment [30]–[31]. He said the natural limitations of an appellate court proceeding on the record have little practical impact on appeals in judicial review cases, which are ordinarily conducted on documentary and affidavit evidence that the appellate court is as well placed to evaluate as the primary judge [34]. He identified two standards of appellate review: the deferential standard stated in House v The King for the exercise of a judicial discretion, and the general correctness standard reaffirmed in Warren v Coombes [36], [43]. In his view, the line between them is drawn not by whether the primary judge's reasoning can be called evaluative, but by whether the legal criterion applied "demands a unique outcome", attracting the correctness standard, or "tolerates a range of outcomes", attracting the House v The King standard [49]. He described that line as "not bright; but it is tolerably clear and workable" [49].
Gageler J said the nature of legal unreasonableness should be taken to be settled by Brennan J's explanation in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin: reasonableness is an implied condition of a statutory power, arising from a common law presumption of statutory interpretation, and a decision made in breach of it lies beyond the authority conferred by the power [53]. Because the question goes to the limits of statutory authority, he said the constitutional system demands that the courts be able to give a unique answer, so the primary judge has no latitude of choice and the appellate court must decide for itself whether the primary judge's conclusion was right or wrong [54]–[56]. He said nothing in Li, or in the Full Court of the Federal Court's decisions in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton, is inconsistent with that explanation, and that Stretton foreshadowed the resolution of the principal question in this appeal [57], [60].
On the facts, he held that the matters relied on by the primary judge did not, individually or in combination, take the Tribunal's choice beyond the bounds of reasonableness [67]. Because Div 4 of Pt 7 is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule on the matters it deals with, he said the Tribunal was entitled to regard an applicant sent an invitation complying with s 425 as having had adequate notice of the opportunity to appear [68]. Where the statutory procedure has been followed and the applicant fails without explanation to appear, he said the Tribunal would ordinarily act reasonably in proceeding to decide the review without any further attempt to make contact [69]. Here, the respondents' failure to respond to the Department's earlier invitation and to give the Tribunal any further documents suggested that a further attempt at contact would be unlikely to elicit a response [70]. He concluded that the primary judge's conclusion was wrong and that the Full Court should have allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge's orders and dismissed the application for judicial review [71], [28].
Nettle and Gordon JJ
Nettle and Gordon JJ held that both the approach and the decision of the Full Court were incorrect, because the only question was whether the Tribunal's exercise of power under s 426A was beyond power because it was legally unreasonable, a question with only one answer, "yes" or "no" [76]. Their Honours said the court assesses the decision by reference to the scope, purpose and objects of the statutory source of the power, Parliament being taken to intend that the power will be exercised reasonably [79]–[80]. They said the ways in which an abuse of statutory power can show itself are not closed, and that legal unreasonableness is not limited to irrational decisions but may be outcome focused, as where there is no evident and intelligible justification for the decision [81]–[82]. They said legal unreasonableness is "invariably fact dependent", that reasons given will be a focal point, and that it would be a "rare case" to find a discretionary decision unreasonable where the reasons demonstrated a justification for it [84]. A primary judge's conclusion of unreasonableness does not depend on any exercise of discretion; it may involve an evaluative process, but that label does not allow an appeal court to hold that the decision was valid and yet conclude that the opposite view was open to the primary judge [85]. In their view, the analogy with House v The King drawn in Li meant only that a court should not interfere with an administrator's discretion just because it would have exercised it differently, and the administrator's discretion is not transferred to the primary judge [86]–[87]. They said s 426A does not require the Tribunal to postpone or refrain from deciding a review every time an applicant fails to appear [96]. They said the exercise of the s 426A discretion is affected by the subject matter of the review, its course, the Tribunal's approach, the applicant's situation and conduct and the other surrounding circumstances, within an area of genuinely free discretion inside the bounds of legal reasonableness [97].
On the facts, the unchallenged finding that the invitation letter was sent to the last address for correspondence established that s 441A(4) was satisfied, so that s 441C(4) deemed the respondents to have received it and the Tribunal could act under s 426A [118]–[119]. They held that the primary judge paid no regard to that statutory presumption, which there was no attempt to rebut, and that the Tribunal did not deny the respondents the "meaningful opportunity" to appear (the primary judge's phrase) that s 425 required [120]. The primary judge also paid no regard to the respondents' failure to attend the delegate's interview despite a written invitation and telephone contact, so their failure to attend the Tribunal hearing was not unexpected or remarkable [121]. They said the hearing before the delegate was equally, if not more, important than the Tribunal hearing, and the respondents' conduct before the Tribunal was consistent with their conduct before the delegate [122]. They concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not legally unreasonable and proposed the orders that the Court made [124]–[126].
Edelman J
Edelman J distinguished questions that have only one right answer, such as the construction of legislation, contracts, wills or trusts, from categories where review or appeal is limited to decisions outside a permissible range, namely judicial review for reasonableness and appeals from "discretionary" decisions such as sentences and general damages for personal injury [127]–[128]. His Honour said the reasonableness constraint is generally based on a statutory implication, breach of which means the decision was made beyond power, and that his reasons concerned only unreasonableness as an independent ground of judicial review [131]. He said it is not helpful to divide unreasonableness into predetermined species: there is only one test, whose content is assessed in light of the terms, scope, purpose and object of the statute [134]–[135].
He held that the matters relied on by the primary judge did not, even in combination, establish legal unreasonableness, and that two matters of statutory context, the objective in s 420(1) and the provision in s 422B(1) that Div 4 is an exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule, required a "highly demanding approach" [140]. He noted, as Nettle and Gordon JJ observed, that s 441C(4) deemed the respondents to have received the invitation [140]. He held that the Tribunal's decision, for the reasons it gave, was not legally unreasonable, and added three further reasons: the respondents had not provided any change of address despite their undertaking, the Department's refusal letter had been sent to their nominated address, and they had not attended the Department interview, so it would have been reasonable to infer that a rescheduled hearing "might have been futile" [141].
On the second issue, Edelman J said that labels such as "discretionary decision" and "deference" can lead to confusion, as they did in this case, and that the danger of treating a decision on an evaluative and uncertain legal issue as subject to judicial restraint was exemplified by the Full Court's approach [143], [147]. Where the source of the power and the grounds of review are statutory, he said any requirement for judicial restraint should be implied from, or based on, the terms of the statute, the breadth of the decision-making power being a significant but not conclusive indication [151]–[153]. He agreed with the section of Gageler J's reasons headed "The need for appealable error" [153]. He held that judicial review for legal unreasonableness under s 476 of the Migration Act, which gave the Federal Circuit Court the same original jurisdiction as the High Court has under s 75(v) of the Constitution, raises a question to which there can be only one right answer, so an appeal from it is concerned with correctness [154]. He said that although there may be uncertainty in some, perhaps many, such cases, the constitutional tradition has never been to exercise judicial restraint on this category of question, and that, if a departure were constitutionally permissible, it would need clear words or a strong foundation for an inference, which the Migration Act did not provide [155]. He agreed that the appeal should be allowed with the orders proposed by Nettle and Gordon JJ [156].
Orders. The High Court allowed the appeal [125]. It set aside paragraph 1 of the Full Court's order of 2 March 2017 and in its place ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed and that the Federal Circuit Court's order of 19 August 2016 be set aside and the application be dismissed [125]. The Minister was ordered to pay the first and second respondents' costs of the appeal [126].
Why it matters
The case holds that an appellate court hearing an appeal by way of rehearing from a primary judge's conclusion on legal unreasonableness must decide for itself whether the administrative decision was legally unreasonable, rather than apply the House v The King standard for discretionary judgments [18], [56], [76], [154]. Gageler J described that standard of appellate review as the question of public importance in the appeal [19]. Gageler J's reasons also state a general test for when the House v The King standard applies: where the legal criterion tolerates a range of outcomes rather than demanding a unique outcome [49]. Gageler J, Nettle and Gordon JJ and Edelman J each treated legal unreasonableness as going to the limits of statutory power, so that a decision in breach of the implied requirement of reasonableness is beyond power [53], [80], [131]. Gageler J said that where the Tribunal has followed the statutory procedure for inviting an applicant and the applicant fails without explanation to appear, the Tribunal would ordinarily act reasonably in proceeding to decide under s 426A(1) [69].
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