Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH
(2015) 256 CLR 326 · [2015] HCA 40
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ) delivered on 4 November 2015, on appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The question was whether the respondent, a Sri Lankan man seeking recognition as a refugee, was denied procedural fairness when the Independent Merits Review (IMR) of his claim, begun by a reviewer who interviewed him, was completed without his knowledge by a second reviewer who did not interview him and recommended against him [2], [5]–[8]. The Court dismissed the Minister's appeal with costs, in two joint judgments, one by Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ and the other by Gageler and Gordon JJ [49]–[50]. Both judgments held that the respondent had been denied procedural fairness and that the Full Court was right to declare that the Second Reviewer's decision was made in breach of procedural fairness [48], [69].
Facts
The respondent, a national of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity, arrived by boat at Christmas Island on 7 November 2010 [1]. Christmas Island was then an excised offshore place and he was an offshore entry person, as those terms were then defined in s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth); having no visa, he was an unlawful non-citizen and was taken into detention under s 189(3) of the Act [1]. Because s 46A of the Act as it then stood prevented him from making a valid application for a Protection (Class XA) visa, on 21 January 2011 he requested a Refugee Status Assessment (RSA) of whether Australia owed him protection obligations under the Refugees Convention [2]. He claimed to fear harm from the Eelam People's Democratic Party and the Sri Lankan authorities because of his Tamil ethnicity, his perceived support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and his having campaigned for a particular politician [3]. A delegate of the Minister assessed his claim adversely on 29 April 2011, and on 20 May 2011 he requested an IMR [4].
On 16 January 2012 an independent merits reviewer (called the First Reviewer) interviewed him and told him that she would "undertake a fresh re-hearing of [his] claims" and make a recommendation to the Minister [5]. For undisclosed reasons the First Reviewer became unavailable, and, unbeknown to the respondent, another individual (the Second Reviewer, who was the second respondent in the High Court) took over the IMR [6]. On 25 July 2012 the Second Reviewer found that the respondent did not meet the criteria in s 36(2) of the Act and recommended that he not be recognised as a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations [7]. The Second Reviewer did not interview the respondent but relied on written materials, including a recording and transcript of the interview with the First Reviewer [7]. He formed an adverse view of the respondent's credibility, rejecting the claimed association with the politician because of inconsistencies in his account of election campaigns, and not accepting that the errors were due to memory lapse, confusion or the effects of detention [8]. The second respondent filed a submitting appearance in the High Court [1].
Procedural history
On 20 September 2012 the respondent applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review, and on 14 October 2013 the primary judge (Judge Raphael) dismissed the application: WZARH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 1608 [9]. He argued there that the Second Reviewer's failure to interview him denied him procedural fairness, pointing out that the Second Reviewer had not seen scars that the respondent said were evidence of torture [10]. The primary judge upheld the Minister's reliance on the proposition, from the Full Federal Court's decision in Chen v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 591, that the rules of natural justice do not mandate an oral hearing in all cases, and held that questions of credibility could properly be resolved against the respondent on the documents and audio evidence [11]-[12]. The primary judge also rejected an argument that the Second Reviewer had failed to take into account the scars on the respondent's arm [13].
On 20 October 2014 the Full Court of the Federal Court allowed the respondent's appeal and declared that the Second Reviewer arrived at his decision in breach of the rules of procedural fairness [9]. The Full Court (Flick and Gleeson JJ in a joint judgment, Nicholas J concurring separately) rejected the scars ground but upheld the ground that the Second Reviewer had not interviewed the respondent: WZARH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 230 FCR 130 [14]-[15]. Flick and Gleeson JJ accepted that there is no universal requirement for an oral hearing, but found that the respondent had a legitimate expectation that the person who interviewed him would make the recommendation, and that he had been denied an opportunity to make oral submissions without warning or an opportunity to object [16]–[17]. They noted that, unlike the position in Abujoudeh and MZXDH, the respondent had not been told of the change in the person making the recommendation [18]. Flick and Gleeson JJ concluded that a claimant whose reviewer becomes unavailable is "at the very least entitled to be heard before his legitimate expectation is defeated", by being given an opportunity to make submissions on how the review should continue [19]. Nicholas J held that, because the respondent was not told of the change, he was unfairly denied an opportunity to make submissions on how the IMR should proceed, and rejected the Minister's argument that an oral hearing would have made no difference, since the respondent's demeanour might have led the Second Reviewer to resolve credibility in his favour [21]. On 17 April 2015 Hayne and Gageler JJ granted the Minister special leave to appeal [22].
Issues
The Minister argued that Flick and Gleeson JJ had treated legitimate expectation as the basis for an entitlement to a particular procedure, including an interview, relying on Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 [23]. The Minister also argued that the Full Court found a denial of procedural fairness without first establishing why the denial of a second interview was procedurally unfair [24]. The respondent argued that legitimate expectation was not the sole basis of Flick and Gleeson JJ's conclusion, and that all members of the Full Court were right that he had been denied the opportunity of an interview with the person who actually made the recommendation, without being heard on the question [25]–[26]. Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ framed the questions as whether it was unfair for the Second Reviewer to proceed on only some of the information available to the First Reviewer, and whether it was unfair to deny the respondent an opportunity to be heard on whether the IMR should proceed in that way [38].
Held
Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ
Their Honours accepted the respondent's submissions [27]. They noted that the use of legitimate expectation as the criterion of an entitlement to procedural fairness had been described in earlier decisions of the High Court as "apt to mislead", "unsatisfactory" and "superfluous and confusing", and that Hayne J in Lam had concluded that "reference to expectations, legitimate or not, is unhelpful" [28]. They referred to Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 246 CLR 636, where Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ said that the phrase, used in public law, should be disregarded [29]. Their Honours held that a person's legitimate expectation "does not provide a basis for determining whether procedural fairness should be accorded to that person or for determining the content of such procedural fairness" [30]. In the absence of a clear, contrary legislative intention, administrative decision-makers must accord procedural fairness to those affected by their decisions, and "[r]ecourse to the notion of legitimate expectation is both unnecessary and unhelpful" [30]. The real question, they said, is what is required to ensure that the decision is made fairly in the circumstances, having regard to the legal framework within which it is made [30].
Flick and Gleeson JJ's conclusion that the fundamental change to the process, made without alerting the respondent, was a failure to observe procedural fairness was a sufficient basis for their decision, which might have been more readily apparent had they not used the concept of legitimate expectation [31]. The Minister's criticism could not be made of Nicholas J, whose analysis turned on the alteration of the process without the respondent being informed, and his consequent loss of the possible advantage of having his demeanour at interview considered [32].
It was common ground that the IMR had to accord the respondent procedural fairness even though it proceeded under administrative guidelines [33]. There is no general rule that procedural fairness requires an oral hearing in every case; whether one is required depends on the practical requirements of procedural fairness in the circumstances of the case [33]. Lam did not support the Minister: it held that a failure to adhere to a foreshadowed line of inquiry may, but will not necessarily, amount to a denial of procedural fairness [34]–[35]. Lam was readily distinguishable because there, as Gleeson CJ said in that case, the applicant "lost no opportunity to advance his case", and for that reason no practical injustice was found [36]. Here the respondent had been given an interview, with the advantage that the person making the recommendation could use all the information he gave, including impressions from his demeanour, in deciding whether his account was genuine [37]. Their Honours accepted that the respondent was not entitled to insist on a particular form of decision-making process, but said that was not to the point [38].
On the first question, the First Reviewer's interview gave "at the very least, some practical indication of what procedural fairness required in the circumstances of this case" [40]. An interview allows direct questioning, clarification of confusion on both sides and observation of the applicant's demeanour, and impressions from demeanour may be an important part of the information before a decision-maker [40]. That opportunity may be especially important to a fair assessment of a refugee claim where English is not the applicant's mother tongue and he or she must communicate through an interpreter [41]. Their Honours agreed with Nicholas J's statement that oral hearings are most often thought desirable where a witness's credibility is in question [41]. The Full Court was right that it could not be said that the respondent lost no opportunity to advance his case, and, adopting what was said in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the relevant question is about the decision-maker's processes, not its actual decision [42]. An interview by the Second Reviewer might have made a difference, because the case was likely to turn not only on inconsistencies in the respondent's account but also on impressions of how he responded to questions in the recorded interview [43]. The benefit of seeing a witness should not be exaggerated but cannot be dismissed as illusory: the respondent could not have been worse off, and may have been better off if the Second Reviewer had formed the impression that he was genuinely doing his best to give truthful evidence [44].
On the second question, because the respondent was not told of the change, he was denied an opportunity to be heard on how the changed process might be completed so that he would not be disadvantaged, and, as Nicholas J said, he lost the chance to apply for an oral hearing, which the Minister would have been hard pressed to resist [45]. Their Honours found it difficult to identify any reasonable basis on which the Second Reviewer could fairly have refused the respondent an opportunity to be heard on how the review should proceed once the First Reviewer withdrew [46]. "Elementary considerations of fairness", they said, required that he be informed that the process the First Reviewer had explained would not be completed, so that he could be heard on how it should now proceed [46]. Quoting Gleeson CJ in Lam, they noted that a failure to adhere to a statement of intention about procedure can result in unfairness justifying judicial intervention, and held that the Full Court was right to conclude that this was such a case [47]–[48]. They concluded that the appeal should be dismissed with costs [49].
Gageler and Gordon JJ
Gageler and Gordon JJ agreed with Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ that the appeal should be dismissed [50]. They began from Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth, which held that because the RSA and IMR processes prolonged the detention of an offshore entry person, the Minister's statutory powers that those processes informed were conditioned on procedural fairness, so the processes themselves had to be procedurally fair [51]. Procedural fairness required that the person be given a reasonable opportunity to present an affirmative case that Australia owed him or her protection obligations, and to answer material suggesting otherwise [52]. The standard is the opportunity which "a reasonable assessor or reviewer ought fairly to give in the totality of the circumstances" [53]. Quoting Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala, their Honours said that the concern of procedural fairness is with procedures rather than outcomes [54]–[55]. A failure to give that opportunity is therefore, "without more", a denial of procedural fairness, and the breach is material, justifying declaratory relief, if it deprives the person of the possibility of a successful outcome [55]–[56]. They said this approach is consistent with Gleeson CJ's observation in Lam that the concern of procedural fairness is to avoid practical injustice [57].
Contrary to the Minister's submission, and as the Full Court of the Federal Court had repeatedly recognised, Lam is not authority that a person alleging a denial of procedural fairness must always show what would have happened had procedural fairness been observed; what must be shown depends on the precise defect alleged [58]. Where an administrator's conduct misled a person into not taking up an opportunity to be heard under an otherwise fair procedure, showing that the person would have taken some step is part of establishing the denial [59]. Where, however, the procedure itself failed to afford a fair opportunity to be heard, that failure alone establishes a denial of procedural fairness, and relief is justified unless it is shown that the failure did not deprive the person of the possibility of a successful outcome [60]. In such a case the practical injustice lies in the denial of an opportunity which in fairness ought to have been given [60]. Their Honours said that legitimate expectation can introduce confusion, because focusing on the opportunity expected distracts from the true inquiry into the opportunity a reasonable administrator ought fairly to have given, and they quoted Gleeson CJ in Lam that the ultimate question is whether there has been unfairness, not whether an expectation has been disappointed [61].
Here the procedure itself failed: the IMR began as one in which the First Reviewer alone would interview and assess, and ended with assessment by the Second Reviewer, a change made after the interview and the advisors' submissions and without notice to the respondent [62]. Had the procedure from the outset been an interview by the First Reviewer and an assessment by another administrator, it would be difficult to conclude that the respondent lacked a reasonable opportunity to be heard, since there is no universal rule requiring an oral hearing for a protection claimant, much less one before the person making the ultimate assessment [63]. The problem was that the change altered the nature of the opportunity, from a chance personally to convince an identified individual, including by answering that person's questions, into a chance to present a case to an unknown assessor through a record of oral evidence and written submissions [64]. The significance of the change was to be gauged by the nature of the assessment, which raised issues of credit and required consideration of the respondent's subjective state of mind as a person fearing persecution, not by the reasoning the Second Reviewer came to adopt [65]. The Second Reviewer ought reasonably to have considered that the evidence and submissions could have differed in coverage, detail and emphasis had the respondent and his advisors known that the First Reviewer would not make the assessment [66]. Fairness required the Second Reviewer to give the respondent notice of the changed procedure, an opportunity to supplement the written submissions, and an opportunity to request that the record of interview be supplemented by further oral evidence [67]. Whether any such request ought to have been granted, and the form of any further hearing, would have turned on matters including the strength of the justification and logistical considerations, and their Honours declined to explore those questions because doing so would be "a hypothetical inquiry" [68]. By failing to give notice of the changed procedure, the Second Reviewer failed to afford the respondent a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and as there was no basis for concluding that the recommendation would inevitably have been the same, the Full Court was correct to make its declaration [69].
Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs [49]. The result left in place the Full Court's declaration that the Second Reviewer's decision was made in breach of procedural fairness [9], [69].
Why it matters
The case is significant for Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ's statement that a person's legitimate expectation provides no basis for deciding whether procedural fairness is owed or what it requires, and that recourse to the notion is unnecessary and unhelpful [30]. Gageler and Gordon JJ likewise treated the concept as a source of confusion that distracts from the opportunity a reasonable administrator ought fairly to give [61]. Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ stated that there is no general rule requiring an oral hearing, while holding that on these facts replacing the reviewer who had interviewed the respondent, without telling him, denied him procedural fairness [33], [45]–[48]. Gageler and Gordon JJ explained that Lam does not require a person always to show what would have happened, and that where the procedure itself is unfair, relief is justified unless the failure did not deprive the person of the possibility of a successful outcome [58], [60].
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