Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd
(2020) 268 CLR 326 · [2020] HCA 17 · (2020) 377 ALR 209 · (2020) 94 ALJR 481
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd [2020] HCA 17 is a High Court of Australia decision on whether s 16 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (the CLA) stops a consumer recovering damages for disappointment and distress under the Australian Consumer Law (the ACL) after a holiday tour did not proceed as promised. [1] Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ wrote joint reasons, and Edelman J agreed with those reasons and the proposed orders and added remarks, so no judge dissented. [1], [62] The Court rejected Mr Moore's argument that s 275 of the ACL does not pick up s 16 of the CLA, but accepted his argument that his claim for disappointment of the expectation of a pleasant and relaxed holiday is not a claim for personal injury and so is not precluded by Pt 2 of the CLA. [3]–[4] It allowed the appeal, reinstated the primary judge's order of damages for disappointment and distress with pre-judgment interest, and remitted to the primary judge the question whether group members may recover such damages. [61]
Facts
In 2012 Mr Moore booked a holiday tour for himself and his wife with Scenic Tours Pty Ltd (Scenic), which involved a European river cruise. [1] Scenic's tour brochure promoted the cruise as "a once in a lifetime cruise along the grand waterways of Europe", with guests treated to "all inclusive luxury". [6] The Moores chose it because they wanted to see different locations in Europe without unpacking more than once, it suited Mr Moore because he found extended sitting difficult following spinal surgery, and the tour was paid for 12 months in advance with what Mr Moore described as his "life savings". [6]
The tour began in Paris on 31 May 2013, and the cruise along the Rhine, Main and Danube Rivers was scheduled to leave Amsterdam on 3 June 2013 on the Scenic Jewel and to end two weeks later in Budapest. [7] Adverse weather caused high water levels on the Rhine and Main Rivers and severely disrupted the cruise, so that instead of cruising for ten days as scheduled Mr Moore spent many hours travelling by bus and cruised for only three days. [7] The cruise began on a different vessel, and the Moores changed ship at least twice before it ended in Budapest. [7]
Mr Moore's case was that Scenic knew or should have known about the likely weather disruptions and chose not to cancel the cruises or to tell passengers in time to give them the chance to cancel. [10] He made no claim that he had suffered any physical injury or recognised psychiatric illness because of his experience. [55]
Procedural history
Mr Moore brought representative proceedings against Scenic in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for himself and about 1,500 other passengers on 13 Scenic cruises scheduled to depart between 19 May 2013 and 12 June 2013. [8] It was alleged that Scenic breached the guarantees in s 60 of the ACL (due care and skill) and s 61(1) and (2) of the ACL (fitness for purpose, and a nature and quality reasonably expected to achieve the result wished for). [9]
The primary judge, Garling J, in Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] NSWSC 733, concluded that Scenic had failed to comply with those guarantees and awarded Mr Moore $10,990 for loss of value under s 267(3) of the ACL and $2,000 for disappointment and distress under s 267(4) of the ACL, plus interest. [24] He held that s 275 of the ACL picks up and applies s 16 of the CLA and, in his words as the High Court quotes them, that he was bound by authority, "however surprising that result may appear in this case to be", to hold that the claim was one for damages relating to the injury of a person under Pt 2 of the CLA. [25] He still rejected Scenic's contention that s 16 applies, because s 16 has no application to loss suffered outside New South Wales and Mr Moore's disappointment and distress was suffered overseas. [26]
The Court of Appeal (Sackville A-JA, with whom Payne JA and Barrett A-JA agreed), in Scenic Tours Pty Ltd v Moore (2018) 361 ALR 456, upheld the conclusion that Scenic breached s 61(1) and (2) and overturned the conclusion on s 60, which the joint judges said is of no present significance. [27] It agreed that s 275 picks up and applies s 16, but disagreed with the view that s 16 has no application to loss sustained outside New South Wales. [28]–[29] The primary judge's award of damages for disappointment and distress was accordingly set aside. [30] According to Edelman J, the Court of Appeal remitted an assessment of Mr Moore's damages referable to his performance interest for determination by the trial judge. [65]
In the Court of Appeal Mr Moore reserved his position on whether his claim was one for personal injury damages for non-economic loss, in light of the state of New South Wales authority, and that court did not consider the issue, which he pursued in the High Court. [31] The High Court heard the appeal on 11 February 2020 and gave judgment on 24 April 2020.
Issues
The issue was whether, as Scenic contended, s 16 in Pt 2 of the CLA applies to preclude Mr Moore recovering damages for disappointment and distress for breach of a contract to provide a pleasant and relaxed holiday, a head of loss recognised in Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344. [1] The focus was his claim under s 267(4) of the ACL, which allows damages for loss or damage suffered because of a failure to comply with a guarantee if that loss or damage was reasonably foreseeable, and his s 267(3) claim for the difference in value was no longer in issue. [12]–[13]
Because the claim was founded on the ACL and brought in federal jurisdiction, the CLA could affect it only if picked up and applied by a law of the Commonwealth, the joint judges citing Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 262 CLR 1. [2] Scenic relied on s 275 of the ACL, under which, where a State or Territory law is the proper law of the contract, that law applies to limit or preclude liability for a failure to comply with a guarantee that applies to a supply of services, and recovery of that liability, in the same way as for a breach of a term of the contract. [2], [15]
Part 2 of the CLA applies to personal injury damages, meaning damages that relate to the death of or injury to a person, and injury includes impairment of a person's physical or mental condition. [17]–[18] Section 16(1) allows no damages for non-economic loss unless its severity is at least 15% of a most extreme case, and s 3 defines non-economic loss as pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, loss of expectation of life or disfigurement. [20], [22] It was uncontroversial that New South Wales law is the proper law of the contract, and common ground that the s 16(1) threshold was not reached. [16], [21]
Mr Moore's submissions raised three questions: whether s 275 picks up State or Territory laws that affect the assessment of compensation, whether his claim is a claim for personal injury within Pt 2, and whether s 16 applies where the loss is suffered outside New South Wales. [3]
Held
Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ
The joint judges rejected Mr Moore's first submission, accepted his second, and found it unnecessary to rule on his third. [4]
On the first, Mr Moore argued that s 275 is directed to laws that limit or preclude liability for breach of contract, not to laws that limit the assessment of damages once liability is established, and that s 16 is a law of the second kind. [32] The joint judges said the distinction "is as difficult to appreciate as it was for Mr Moore's counsel to articulate", and reasoned that s 275 contemplates limits on both liability and recovery, and that recovery is readily understood to include the amount of money assessed as compensation. [33] On its natural reading, they said, s 275 allows a State or Territory law comprehensively to limit or preclude both liability and recovery of compensation by way of damages, if the law has that effect in relation to other contracts governed by the law of that State or Territory. [34] They found that reading confirmed by s 267(3) and (4), which contemplate the quantification of an amount that may be recovered, and described the evident purpose of s 275 as being to pick up and apply State and Territory laws that limit the amount otherwise recoverable under those provisions. [35]
Mr Moore relied on the legislative history of s 275, whose predecessor, s 74(2A) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), was enacted in response to Wallis v Downard-Pickford (North Queensland) Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 388, where a State law limiting a carrier's liability to $20 per package was held invalid as inconsistent with s 74(1) of that Act. [33], [37] He argued that the provisions should be confined to preserving State laws of that particular kind, but the joint judges held that nothing in their text, context or purpose suggests that, and that the history gave no basis for the "artificially constricted understanding of s 275" he contended for. [37] They said the evident purpose was to ensure the application of State and Territory laws that limit the extent of recovery for breach of a contract governed by that law, that it is difficult to see why that purpose would cover laws limiting heads of compensable loss but not laws regulating the quantification of damages, and that the extrinsic materials suggest no reason why s 275 should not pick up State laws like s 16 of the CLA. [38]
On the second submission, Scenic argued that disappointment and distress is an impairment of mental condition and so an injury under Pt 2, relying in particular on Brennan J in Baltic Shipping, and also that it is pain and suffering or, alternatively, loss of amenities of life under s 3. [39] Mr Moore argued that such a reaction is a normal and healthy response rather than an impairment, and the joint judges said, "There is force in this submission". [40]
They held that disappointment at a breach of a promise to provide recreation, relaxation and peace of mind is not an impairment of the mind, and that frustration and indignation at a breach of a contract to provide a pleasurable and relaxing holiday is, of itself, "a normal, rational reaction of an unimpaired mind". [41] They said the claim is no more a claim relating to personal injury than a claim for the indignation occasioned by false imprisonment or defamation, and referred to the statement of French CJ and Hayne J, with whom Kiefel J agreed, in New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 248 CLR 417 that, while an act of false imprisonment may itself cause psychiatric injury in some cases, an action for false imprisonment, so far as it claims damages for loss of dignity and harm to reputation associated with the deprivation of liberty, is not a claim for an impairment or other form of injury within s 11 of the CLA. [41] Scenic's submission invited the Court to elide the distinction between disappointment and distress for breach of a contract to provide a pleasurable and relaxing experience and disappointment and distress consequential upon personal injury, and they called it "untenable in light of this Court's decision in Baltic Shipping". [42]
They said every member of the Court in Baltic Shipping accepted that disappointment and distress caused by breach of a contract whose object is to provide pleasure or relaxation is a compensable head of loss separate and distinct from injured feelings compensable as pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life associated with personal injury. [43] They read Mason CJ, with whom Toohey and Gaudron JJ relevantly agreed, as identifying damages for distress, vexation and frustration, where the very object of the contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation or freedom from molestation, as a category separate and distinct from damages for pain and suffering where a breach of contract causes physical injury, and as standing independent of physical or psychiatric injury. [44] They held that Scenic's reliance on Brennan J was "misplaced", because he made clear that disappointment and distress is compensable damage where no physical or psychiatric injury or impairment has been suffered. [45] Brennan J, they explained, contrasted the general rule that disappointment of mind that is no more than a mental reaction to a breach is not compensable with the exception where the disappointment is itself the direct consequence of the breach. [45]
They held that disappointment and distress of this kind is not non-economic loss under Pt 2, whose text and structure make clear that such loss is a head of loss associated with personal injury as pain and suffering. [46] They said that at common law pain and suffering was understood to mean actual physical hurt occasioned by the accident or its aftermath, that damages for emotional harm were not recoverable unless a psychiatric injury was suffered, and that assessing loss of amenities of life compares a person's ability to enjoy life before and after the personal injury. [46] The exception for promises of enjoyment, relaxation or freedom from molestation, they said, compensates a plaintiff for what he or she was promised, and the comparison of "the expectations against the reality", quoting Milner v Carnival Plc [2010] 3 All ER 701, does not involve assessing an impairment of the plaintiff's mental condition. [46]
They said the primary judge "was not indulging in hyperbole" when he described as "surprising" the result he regarded himself as bound by authority to reach. [47] Mr Moore's right to recover such damages, they said, "was securely established" by Baltic Shipping, and nothing in the text of the CLA suggests that Pt 2 was enacted to limit liability for claims that do not involve personal injury as defined. [47] They said it is "a strong thing to hold" that Pt 2 abrogated that entitlement, given the absence of any reference to it in the text or extrinsic materials and given that the mischief at which Pt 2 was directed was the perceived excessive strain on insurance schemes indemnifying defendants against common law liability for loss relating to personal injury. [47] Mr Moore's loss and Scenic's liability, they said, "have nothing to do with the mischief at which Pt 2 of the CLA was directed". [47]
In Flight Centre Ltd v Louw (2010) 78 NSWLR 656, the decision to which the primary judge referred in particular, Barr A-J held that inconvenience, distress and disappointment over an overseas holiday disrupted by construction noise and inaccessibility of parts of a resort, with no physical injury claimed, was pain and suffering and an impairment of mental condition amounting to personal injury. [48] The joint judges noted that this view was applied in Tralee Technology Holdings Pty Ltd v Yun Chen [2015] NSWSC 1259, said that Flight Centre was the first case to hold a claim of this kind caught by Pt 2, and held that in this regard it "was incorrectly decided". [48]
Barr A-J had cited Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young (2010) 78 NSWLR 641, New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168 and New South Wales v Corby (2010) 76 NSWLR 439, which the joint judges emphasised were cases where the disappointment and distress was claimed as loss consisting of, or consequential upon, physical injury. [49] They held that neither Ibbett nor Corby concerned a contract to provide a pleasurable and relaxing holiday, and that those decisions do not stand as authority that a claim for disappointment and distress not consequent upon physical or psychiatric injury, but flowing directly from a breach of such a contract, is within Pt 2. [50] They explained that Ipp JA's statement in Ibbett that anxiety and distress would be an impairment was made in a context of anxiety and distress arising from an apprehension of physical violence, and that Basten JA's statement in Corby was directed to an argument that aggravated damages fell outside personal injury damages. [51]–[52]
They said the plaintiff's disappointment and distress in Insight Vacations was directly occasioned by physical injury sustained on a European tour, and that the present case "is readily distinguishable" because Mr Moore's disappointment and distress was not occasioned by any physical injury. [53], [55] They said Spigelman CJ's agreement in Insight Vacations "may have been something of a departure" from his earlier view in Ibbett that reactions such as disappointment and distress do not involve an impairment of a person's mental condition, at least where the reaction is not an aspect of physical injury. [56] They said his passage in Ibbett accords with the view of French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ in Williamson and "reflects a correct appreciation" of Baltic Shipping, namely that a claim of Mr Moore's kind stands separately and apart from a claim for disappointment and distress associated with physical injury. [57]
They also held that the Court of Appeal erred in suggesting that, when Insight Vacations came before the High Court on appeal in (2011) 243 CLR 149, the High Court accepted that this issue had been correctly decided below, because it did not address those conclusions and had no occasion to do so. [58] Because s 16 does not affect Scenic's liability on this claim wherever the loss was suffered, they found it unnecessary to consider Mr Moore's argument, made in light of s 12(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), that s 16 has no application to loss suffered outside New South Wales. [60]
Edelman J
Edelman J agreed with the reasons and proposed orders in the joint judgment, and added remarks on why Pt 2 of the CLA is concerned exclusively with claims for damages for personal injury and why those damages do not extend to "expectation loss", including distress or disappointment, that is not consequential upon physical injury. [62] He said the expressions "expectation damages" and "expectation loss", which both parties relied upon, are problematic because they can conceal a fundamental difference between compensation directly for the performance interest and compensation for consequential losses, which s 267(3) and s 267(4) of the ACL provide for separately. [63]
In his view the performance interest component is not concerned with loss in any real or factual sense and aims to give the promisee the difference between the value of what was promised and the value of what was received, and in contracts for a service involving pleasure or enjoyment it can provide some compensation for the value of the lost enjoyment benefit. [64]–[65] Consequential losses, he said, can include some non-economic losses, and are contained in s 267(4), and he noted the assumption of all the parties that damages under s 267(4) for non-economic loss are governed by the same principles as common law damages for breach of contract. [66]–[67]
Drawing on Mason CJ's list in Baltic Shipping, he said damages for what might broadly be described as mental harm consequent upon a breach of contract are available at common law where the harm is pain and suffering consequent upon physical injury, vexation and discomfort consequent upon physical inconvenience, or distress or disappointment in contracts for the provision of pleasure or relaxation. [68]–[69] He said it "may be" that the common principle is that in each category a promisor will usually be taken to have assumed the risk of liability for such distress, but added that each category has had a separate history of development. [69] He said the contractual category of pain and suffering was concurrent with the far more common claim in tort, and that in the law of torts pain and suffering encompasses the immediate felt effect of an injury and, quoting McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages, the "distress which is not felt as being directly connected with any bodily condition". [70]–[71]
He identified two related constraints on s 16, the first being that Pt 2 applies to personal injury damages, a definition in terms that borrow heavily from the law of torts. [72] He added that Pt 3 of the CLA generally follows the traditional approach of the law of torts by prohibiting recovery for mental harm that is not the consequence of physical harm unless it consists of a recognised psychiatric illness, and treats recognised psychiatric harm in the same way as physical injury, with an added control mechanism in s 30. [72] The second constraint is that s 16 applies only to non-economic loss, and, putting aside the conventional award for an objective loss of expectation of life, the other three categories in s 3 comprise "a classic statement of heads of general damages consequent upon physical injury in the law of torts". [73]
He concluded that the scheme in Pt 2 is "concerned only with claims for personal injury", and that s 11A(2) is "an anti-avoidance provision" designed to ensure that a claimant cannot avoid the restrictions in Pt 2 by bringing a claim for damages consequential upon physical injury in contract or under statute, a point he supported from the Ipp Report. [74] He said the scheme "may be comprehensive" in its coverage of damages consequential upon physical injury, including damages for mental harm where the physical injury ruined or prevented the plaintiff's holiday, but that where a claim is not for damages consequential upon physical injury Pt 2 applies to neither the performance interest nor consequential losses. [75]
Orders. By orders the parties had agreed should take effect if the appeal succeeded, the High Court allowed the appeal. [61] It set aside order 5 made by the Court of Appeal on 24 October 2018, reinstated the primary judge's order of damages for disappointment and distress under s 267(4) of the ACL and for pre-judgment interest, and ordered Scenic to pay Mr Moore post-judgment interest under s 101 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). [61] It set aside order 8 made on 24 October 2018 and remitted to the primary judge the question whether group members may recover damages for disappointment and distress. [61]
It varied order 14 made by the Court of Appeal on 7 December 2018, with reference to the Agreed Common Questions and Answers filed on 7 November 2018, by replacing the words in the last paragraph of A15, "however, there is no entitlement under that provision to any damages for distress or disappointment", with "which damages may include disappointment and distress suffered by reason of the defendant's failure to comply with the guarantees", and by substituting "No" in A17. [61] It set aside order 13 made on 24 October 2018 and remitted the question of the costs of that appeal to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration. [61] Scenic was ordered to pay Mr Moore's costs of the appeal and of the application for special leave to appeal. [61]
Why it matters
The case decides that s 275 of the ACL picks up State and Territory laws that regulate the quantification of damages, not only laws that limit liability, so that, where the law of a State or Territory is the proper law of the contract, a law like s 16 of the CLA is capable of applying to a claim for failure to comply with a guarantee that applies to a supply of services. [4], [15], [35], [38] It also decides that damages for disappointment and distress flowing directly from a breach of a promise of pleasure and relaxation, and not consequent upon physical or psychiatric injury, fall outside Pt 2 of the CLA, so that s 16 does not affect them. [46], [50], [60]
The joint judges said such a claim stands separately and apart from a claim for disappointment and distress associated with physical injury, and they distinguished Insight Vacations on the basis that the disappointment there resulted from physical injury. [53], [55], [57] Flight Centre was held to be incorrectly decided on this point. [48]
The joint judges did not decide whether s 16 has the geographical limit for which Mr Moore contended. [4], [60] Whether group members may recover these damages was remitted to the primary judge. [61]
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