Muldrock v The Queen
(2011) 244 CLR 120 · [2011] HCA 39 · (2011) 85 ALJR 1154 · (2011) 212 A Crim R 254
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, on appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, about how standard non-parole periods operate in sentencing and how an offender's mental retardation bears on sentence [8]-[9]. In one joint judgment, all seven judges allowed the appeal, held that R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168 was wrongly decided, gave the appellant leave to appeal against his sentence and allowed that appeal, and sent the matter back to the Court of Criminal Appeal for re-sentencing [25], [64].
Facts
The High Court said that the appellant "is mentally retarded", that he was sexually abused as a child and that as an adult he has shown a sexual interest in male children [1]. He was 30 years old at the date of the offence, which occurred on 19 March 2007 [33], [36]. The victim was a nine year old boy who lived with his mother in a granny flat attached to the house where the appellant lived [1], [33].
After the appellant fixed the boy's bike and offered to go for a test ride with him, they cycled to a lake one or two kilometres away, where he touched the boy, conduct charged as aggravated indecent assault that Black DCJ took into account in sentencing for the principal offence [33]. He then pushed the boy to the ground, pinned him down and committed the act charged as the principal offence, sexual intercourse with a child aged under 10 years, for about 10 seconds [1], [34]. In a police interview the appellant denied any wrongdoing and said he thought the boy's mother had set him up [35].
The appellant had committed a similar offence against a neighbouring male child in 2000, when he was living in Cairns, for which the Queensland District Court sentenced him to 12 months' imprisonment to be served by way of an intensive correctional order [10], [36].
Dr Muir, a psychiatrist, concluded in a report prepared for the Queensland proceedings that the appellant was undoubtedly mentally retarded, and said that his retarded development caused his difficulty in managing his impulses and controlling his actions [37], [39]–[40]. Ms Daniels, a clinical psychologist, considered that his maladaptive sexual behaviour appeared to be the manifestation of his own childhood abuse and his mental retardation [39], [41]. Professor Hayes, a psychologist assessing him for the present offence, reported an IQ Composite Standard Score of 62, indicating a mild intellectual disability, language equivalent to that of a child aged five and a half years, and adaptive behaviour in the lowest 0.1% of the population [42]. She considered that he would benefit from a program designed for a sex offender with an intellectual disability and commented on the lack of such programs in custody [44].
The appellant had been assessed as eligible for Selwood Lane, a residential facility whose program is designed to assist intellectually handicapped individuals to moderate their sexually inappropriate behaviour [2]. The Manager of the Long Bay Parole Unit reported that no sex offender treatment options for inmates with intellectual disabilities were available to the appellant, while a principal prison officer swore that a program for such offenders had been written and was being finalised [47].
Procedural history
The appellant pleaded guilty in the District Court of New South Wales before Black DCJ to an offence under s 66A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) carrying a maximum sentence of 25 years' imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of 15 years [1]–[2].
Black DCJ found that the appellant was, in his Honour's words, "significantly intellectually disabled", and treated the disability as making it inappropriate to reflect general deterrence in the sentence [10]. He gave weight to the protection of the community and considered that it would be promoted in the long term by treatment at Selwood Lane [10]. He imposed nine years' imprisonment, reduced from 12 years to reflect the plea of guilty [3], [59]. He specified a non-parole period of 96 days, which expired on the date it was imposed, and directed as a condition of parole that the appellant reside at Selwood Lane [3]. He had no power to impose that condition, because the power is confined to sentences of three years or less, and the High Court said that his sentencing discretion miscarried on that account [4].
The Crown appealed against the inadequacy of the sentence, directing its challenge to the length of the non-parole period [5], [7]. The appellant sought leave to appeal against the severity of the nine year term, submitting that Black DCJ gave disproportionate weight to community protection when orders under the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Sex Offenders Act) may address that concern [6].
The Court of Criminal Appeal (McClellan CJ at CL, Howie and Harrison JJ), in R v Muldrock [2010] NSWCCA 106, refused the appellant leave, upheld the Crown's appeal and re-sentenced him to a non-parole period of six years and eight months and a balance of two years and four months [5], [7]. It criticised Black DCJ's failure to consider the objective seriousness of the offence and the part the standard non-parole period should play [11]. It said that three cases confirmed that the non-parole period was, in its words, "entirely inappropriate", although, the High Court noted, none of them involved a mentally retarded offender [11]. It was not persuaded that special circumstances justified departing from the statutory proportion between the non-parole period and the term [11]. Under s 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (the Sentencing Act), the balance of the term must not exceed one-third of the non-parole period unless the court decides that there are special circumstances [8]. The appellant appealed to the High Court by special leave [8].
Issues
An important issue, on which special leave was granted, was whether R v Way correctly stated the operation of standard non-parole periods, and whether a two-stage approach to sentencing for offences with those periods is required or permitted [21], [28], [59]. The appellant also complained that the Court of Criminal Appeal wrongly rejected Black DCJ's finding about his disability and that judge's emphasis on rehabilitation, and wrongly failed to find special circumstances, in particular by finding that treatment was or may be available in custody, and he maintained that the nine year term was excessive [8]. A further question was whether the availability of orders under the Sex Offenders Act could be taken into account in sentencing [6], [61].
Held
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ
All seven judges joined in a single set of reasons, so there was no separate concurrence and no dissent [1].
Division 1A of Pt 4 of the Sentencing Act governs the sentencing of offenders for the offences listed in its Table [12]. Section 54A(2) provides that the standard non-parole period "represents the non-parole period for an offence in the middle of the range of objective seriousness for offences in the Table to this Division" [12]. Section 54B(2) directed the court to set that period unless it determined that there were reasons for a longer or shorter one, and s 54B(3) confined those reasons to those referred to in s 21A [13]. The Court of Criminal Appeal held in Way that s 21A(1) preserves the entire body of judicially developed sentencing principles, and the High Court said that no question of that interpretation was raised and it may be accepted [18]. The High Court stressed that fixing a non-parole period is "but one part of the larger task of passing an appropriate sentence upon the particular offender", and not "the necessary starting point or the only important end-point" [17]. The purposes of sentencing stated in s 3A of the Sentencing Act are the familiar purposes of punishment under the common law, they are not ranked in order of priority, and nothing in the Act indicates a departure from the principles explained in Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465 [20].
In Way the Court of Criminal Appeal took s 54B(2) to be mandatory, and read it so that an offence falling outside the middle range was a reason for departing from the standard period [22]. It treated objective seriousness as including circumstances personal to the offender that are causally connected to the offence [22]. It also held that the standard period applies only after conviction at trial, and that the judge must ask whether there are reasons for not imposing it [23].
The High Court accepted the respondent's submission that nothing in Div 1A confines the provisions to a category of offending and that s 54B(2) preserves the full scope of the discretion, and said it followed "that Way was wrongly decided" [24]–[25]. It was an error to characterise s 54B(2) as framed in mandatory terms, and a court need not begin by asking whether there are reasons for not imposing the standard period or whether the offence is in the midrange [25]. Section 54B must be read as a whole, and it is a mistake to give "primary, let alone determinative, significance" to the words before "unless" [26]. Read with ss 54B(3) and 21A, s 54B(2) requires an approach consistent with McHugh J's description in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, quoted by the High Court, in which the judge "identifies all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discusses their significance and then makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case" [26].
The court takes the full range of factors into account while mindful of "two legislative guideposts": the maximum sentence and the standard non-parole period [27]. Objective seriousness is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to the offender, and "wholly by reference to the nature of the offending" [27]. Nothing in the amending legislation "requires or permits" a two-stage approach that starts by comparing the offence with a hypothesised midrange offence [28].
A central purpose of Div 1A is to require judges to state fully the reasons for the sentence [29]. Section 54B(4) does not require mathematical values or a classification of objective seriousness, but it does require the judge to identify fully the facts, matters and circumstances bearing on the judgment reached, whether or not the offender was convicted after trial and whatever the range of seriousness [29]. It may be, as the Court of Criminal Appeal observed in Way, that non-parole periods will move upwards for some Div 1A offences, but the High Court said that this is the likely outcome of the court's awareness of the standard period and not because it is a starting point [31].
Here, the 15 year period "says little about the appropriate sentence for this mentally retarded offender and this offence" [32]. The Court of Criminal Appeal erred by treating the standard period as having determinative significance, and that error necessarily affected its decision on the appellant's leave application [32].
On the disability, the High Court said it was not clear that the Court of Criminal Appeal had rejected the finding of intellectual disability, because the relevant passage was ambiguous, but that on either reading that court erred in its approach to the evidence [48]–[49]. The assessment of a mild intellectual disability should not obscure the fact that he is mentally retarded [50]. His paid employment and driver's licence did not detract from the assessment, and Dr Muir's opinion that he understood the wrongfulness of the earlier offence was qualified by the observation that this was only a superficial awareness [51]–[52]. Black DCJ's finding that the disability is significant "was apt" [53].
The High Court quoted Young CJ in R v Mooney that general deterrence "should often be given very little weight in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or abnormality because such an offender is not an appropriate medium for making an example to others" [53]. That principle is well recognised and applies to offenders with a mental illness and those with an intellectual handicap [54]. A mentally retarded offender's lack of capacity to reason about the wrongfulness of the conduct will, in most cases, "substantially lessen the offender's moral culpability for the offence" [54]. The retributive effect and denunciatory aspect of a sentence appropriate to a person of ordinary capacity will often be inappropriate to such an offender and to the needs of the community [54]. The reports of Dr Muir and Ms Daniels gave unchallenged evidence of a causal relation between the appellant's retardation and his offending [55]. His superficial understanding and childish lies were not reasons to assess his criminality as significant, "much less to use him as a medium by which to deter others from offending" [55].
The Court of Criminal Appeal's statement that treatment was available in the prison system approached inconsistency with its earlier finding that the non-parole period would allow for treatment if available, and was not supported by the evidence [56]–[57]. In any event it was an error to structure the sentence on a view that the appellant would benefit from treatment in full-time custody, because "[f]ull-time custody is punitive" and the availability of prison programs is a matter for executive determination [57]. The desirability of suitable treatment "was plainly capable of being a special circumstance" justifying a departure from the statutory proportion [58]. Retribution and denunciation did not require significant emphasis given his limited moral culpability, general deterrence was not required, and it was open to Black DCJ to view personal deterrence as likely to be advanced by tailored treatment in a secure facility [58]. The Court of Criminal Appeal erred in finding no special circumstances within s 44(2) of the Sentencing Act [58].
Although it is not the High Court's function to determine challenges to sentences said to be excessive, it was appropriate to do so here because the special leave question had revealed error in the refusal of leave [59]. A sentence should not be increased beyond what is proportionate to the crime in order to extend the protection of the community, though the line between extending a sentence to protect society and taking its protection into account may not always be easy to draw [60]. The expert evidence gave no foundation for concluding that the appellant's behaviour could not be controlled by treatment and a suitable program [60]. His mental retardation, the absence of earlier full-time custody, the circumstances and nature of the offence, its short duration and the absence of threats or intimidation did not warrant nine years, and the sentence was "manifestly excessive" [60].
That conclusion did not depend on the appellant's submission about the Sex Offenders Act, which empowers the Supreme Court to order continuing detention or extended supervision of a sex offender after the sentence expires [60]–[61]. The appellant submitted that, although s 24A(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act bars treating such orders as mitigating, their availability still lessens the justification for community protection in the sentence [61]. The High Court said that reducing a sentence because of such a regime "may be thought to have little to commend it as a matter of principle", and that the Court of Criminal Appeal was right to reject the submission [61]. A court may not refrain from imposing a sentence that, within the limits of proportionality, serves to protect the community because the offender may later become subject to such an order [61].
The appellant proposed that the High Court itself impose a term under three years, but a place at Selwood Lane was no longer available, and remitter, at which fresh evidence may be led, was the appropriate course [62]. Both the appellant's and the respondent's appeals were to be the subject of the remitter, to preserve the Court of Criminal Appeal's discretion to frame an appropriate sentence [63].
Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed [64]. It set aside pars 2 and 3 of the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal made on 14 May 2010 and in their place ordered that the appellant have leave to appeal against the sentence imposed by Black DCJ on 28 July 2009, and that the appeal be treated as instituted and heard instanter and allowed [64]. It remitted the matter to the Court of Criminal Appeal for the appellant to be re-sentenced consistently with its reasons, and did not itself fix a new sentence [62], [64].
Why it matters
The High Court described the standard non-parole period question as an important one on which special leave was granted [59]. The case holds that Way was wrongly decided, and that the standard non-parole period is a guidepost alongside the maximum sentence and not a starting point reached through a two-stage approach [25], [27]–[28], [31]. It also explains how an offender's mental retardation bears on general deterrence, retribution and denunciation, and how the desirability of treatment can be a special circumstance [53]–[54], [58].
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